Coretronic Corporation et al v. Maxell, Ltd

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United States District Court
Northern District of California
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CORETRONIC CORPORATION, et al.,
Plaintiffs,
v.
MAXELL, LTD,
Defendant.
Case No. 26-cv-00697-EKL
ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO
DISMISS IN PART
Re: Dkt. No. 19
This case arises from a dispute over a patent for projectors. Plaintiffs Coretronic
Corporation (“Coretronic”) and its wholly-owned subsidiary Optoma Technology, Inc.
(“Optoma”) seek declaratory judgments of non-infringement, invalidity, and unenforceability as to
the asserted patent. Plaintiffs also contend that Defendant Maxell, Ltd. committed antitrust
violations and engaged in unfair business practices by asserting the patent against them.
Defendant moves to dismiss. Mot. to Dismiss, ECF No. 19 (“Mot.”); Reply, ECF No. 33. The
Court carefully reviewed the parties’ briefs and relevant authority and heard argument on October
7, 2026. For the following reasons, the motion is GRANTED in part with leave to amend and
DENIED in part.
I. BACKGROUND
Coretronic, Optoma, and Maxell design and sell projectors. See First Am. Compl. ¶¶ 2-4,
31, ECF No. 12 (“Compl.”); Mot. at 2-3. This action is part of a multi-year skirmish between the
parties, Compl. ¶ 46, and focuses on U.S. Patent No. 8,075,142 (’142 Patent), a patent for an
“image display apparatus for projecting an image on a screen.”1 ’142 Patent col. 1 ll. 16-17.
1 On July 9, 2024, Defendant sued Plaintiffs for patent infringement in the Eastern District of
Texas. That litigation does not involve the ’142 Patent. See Compl. ¶ 93, Maxell, Ltd. v.
Coretronic Corp., No. 5:24-cv-00088-RWS-JBB (E.D. Tex. July 9, 2024); see also Mot. at 4.
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The parties first interacted in April 2023, when Defendant sent a letter to Plaintiffs
contending that Plaintiffs’ projectors were infringing “numerous” patents, including the ’142
Patent. Mot. at 3-4. The Parties corresponded repeatedly until February 2024, during which time
Plaintiffs allege that they “presented concrete evidence that the claims of many of [Defendant’s]
patents were not infringed . . . and/or were invalid over the prior art.” Compl. ¶ 7; see also Mot. at
3-4.
In December 2025, Defendant informed non-party Amazon.com, Inc. (“Amazon”) through
Amazon’s Patent Evaluation Express (“APEX”) program that some of Plaintiffs’ products sold on
Amazon.com infringed the ’142 Patent. Mot at 1. On January 14, 2026, Defendant provided
Optoma with the list of products and the corresponding claim chart that it submitted as part of the
APEX proceeding. Id. at 4. On January 22, 2026, Plaintiffs brought this action alleging that
Defendant’s actions amount to “bad faith” patent assertion. Plaintiffs assert six claims:
(1) Declaratory judgment of non-infringement; (2) Declaratory judgment of invalidity; (3) Patent
misuse; (4) Walker Process fraud under the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2; (5) Tortious interference
with prospective economic advantage under California common law; and (6) Unfair business
practices and bad faith patent assertion under Washington law. Defendant now moves to dismiss
all claims pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).
II. LEGAL STANDARD
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a court must dismiss a complaint if it fails
to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. To avoid dismissal, the plaintiff must allege
“enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,
550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim is facially plausible when the pleaded facts allow the court “to
draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft
v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). For purposes of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the court generally
“accept[s] factual allegations in the complaint as true and construe[s] the pleadings in the light
most favorable to the nonmoving party.” Manzarek v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 519 F.3d
1025, 1031 (9th Cir. 2008). However, the court need not “assume the truth of legal conclusions
merely because they are cast in the form of factual allegations.” Fayer v. Vaughn, 649 F.3d 1061,
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1064 (9th Cir. 2011) (per curiam) (quoting W. Mining Council v. Watt, 643 F.2d 618, 624 (9th Cir.
1981)).
III. DISCUSSION
Defendant contends that dismissal is warranted because Plaintiffs fail to plead facts that
plausibly demonstrate: (1) Plaintiffs’ entitlement to a declaratory judgment of non-infringement,
invalidity, or unenforceability as to the ’142 Patent; or (2) Defendant’s violation of federal or state
laws governing anticompetitive behavior and unfair business practices. The Court addresses these
arguments in turn.
A. Plaintiffs’ Declaratory Judgment Claims
1. Declaratory Judgment of Non-Infringement
A plaintiff seeking a declaratory judgment of non-infringement must, as in other contexts,
plead enough detail to “give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds
upon which it rests.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at
555); see also Zoho Corp. Pvt. Ltd. v. Orion Labs Tech, LLC, No. 25-cv-08727-VKD, 2026 WL
816229, at *7 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 24, 2026) (collecting cases).
Here, Plaintiffs plausibly state a claim for non-infringement of the ’142 Patent. Plaintiffs
contend that their projectors “do not project ‘a portion of an image selectively fitted to’ the screen
. . . as required by the claims of the ’142 Patent.” Compl. ¶ 44 (citing ’142 Patent col. 15 ll. 37-
38). Plaintiffs’ pleading is straightforward, and Defendant is aware of the specific reason – the
lack of selective image-fitting – why Plaintiffs believe that their accused products do not infringe
the ’142 Patent. See Zoho Corp. Pvt. Ltd., 2026 WL 816229, at *7 (denying motion to dismiss a
declaratory judgment of non-infringement claim because the complaint went “beyond ‘general
denials’ of infringement and identifie[d] at least one reason why” the “accused products do not
infringe”).
Defendant nonetheless contends that Plaintiffs’ pleading is insufficient because it is
conclusory and merely “quotes snippets of claim 1 of the ’142 Patent.” Mot. at 6. This argument
is unavailing. Patent infringement “requires all claim limitations to be present” in the accused
products. Ajinomoto Co. v. ITC, 597 F.3d 1267, 1274 (Fed. Cir. 2010). Therefore, Plaintiffs
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sufficiently alleged non-infringement by identifying one specific claim limitation – the
requirement that “a portion” of an image be “selectively fitted to” a screen – that is not practiced
by the accused projectors. See ’142 Patent col. 15 ll. 37-38. This allegation alerts Defendant to
the entire basis of Plaintiffs’ non-infringement argument. See Ironworks Pats. LLC v. Samsung
Elecs. Co., No. 17-cv-01958-HSG, 2018 WL 1400440, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 20, 2018) (“Though
somewhat minimalist, Defendants’ non-infringement counterclaims provided Plaintiff with
enough detail to put them on notice of Defendants’ non-infringement contentions. That is
sufficient for Defendants’ counterclaims to survive beyond the pleading stage.”).
Accordingly, Defendant’s motion is DENIED with respect to Plaintiffs’ claim for
declaratory judgment of non-infringement.
2. Declaratory Judgment of Invalidity
Plaintiffs contend that the ’142 Patent is invalid on three independent grounds:
anticipation, obviousness, and indefiniteness. Compl. ¶¶ 50-51; 35 U.S.C. §§ 102, 103, 112(f).
Defendant argues that Plaintiffs have failed to sufficiently plead each basis.
a. Anticipation (35 U.S.C. § 102)
A plaintiff seeking a declaratory judgment can plausibly state a claim for invalidity by
pleading a specific theory of invalidity and identifying the corresponding prior art. See Dror v.
Kenu, Inc., No. 19-cv-03043-LB, 2019 WL 5684520, at *11 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 1, 2019). Claimed
subject matter is “‘anticipated’ when it is not new; that is, when it was previously known.
Invalidation on this ground requires that every element and limitation of the claim was previously
described in a single prior art reference, either expressly or inherently, so as to place a person of
ordinary skill in possession of the invention.” Sanofi-Synthelabo v. Apotex, Inc., 550 F.3d 1075,
1082 (Fed. Cir. 2008). “The way in which the elements are arranged or combined in the claim
must itself be disclosed, either expressly or inherently, in an anticipatory reference.” Therasense,
Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 593 F.3d 1325, 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
Here, Plaintiffs plausibly allege that the ’142 Patent is invalid on anticipation grounds
because “one or more products that practice each and every limitation of at least the asserted
claims of the ’142 Patent was on the market, sold to and used by consumers, and publicly
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disclosed in the United States prior to the effective filing date of the ’142 Patent.” Compl. ¶¶ 48,
50. Plaintiffs identify these products as “the Optoma-branded HD72 model and HD73 model
projectors,” and Defendant’s own product, “the Hitachi-branded CP-A100 model series of
projectors.” Id. ¶ 48. Thus, Plaintiffs alerted Defendant to the theory of invalidity (anticipation
under 35 U.S.C. § 102) and the prior art (the three projector models) on which that theory relies.
See Dror, 2019 WL 5684520, at *11 (finding that defendant was “on notice as to one of the main
bases for [plaintiff’s] invalidity claims” because plaintiff alleged obviousness under 35 U.S.C.
§ 103 and identified five pieces of prior art); see also Fitness Anywhere LLC v. Woss Enters. LLC,
No. 14-cv-01725-BLF, 2014 WL 4802432, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Sep. 26, 2014) (similar).
Defendant contends that Plaintiffs’ pleading is insufficient because it “does not map any
feature of the prior art to any claim of the ’142 Patent.” Mot. at 8. Defendant also adds that
“merely naming products is not the same as alleging invalidity with the specificity Twombly and
Iqbal require.” Reply at 4. But Plaintiffs did more than just name products in the abstract – they
named the specific products that allegedly anticipated the ’142 Patent under 35 U.S.C. § 102.
That detail nudges their invalidity claim “across the line from conceivable to plausible.”
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 547; cf. J & K IP Assets, LLC v. Armaspec, Inc., No. 3:17-cv-07308-WHO,
2018 WL 3428757, at *2-3 (N.D. Cal. July 16, 2018) (dismissing a declaratory judgment claim for
invalidity under 35 U.S.C. § 102 because the complaint “fail[ed] to include any allegations
identifying prior art”).
Accordingly, Defendant’s motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’ invalidity claim on anticipation
grounds under 35 U.S.C. § 102 is DENIED.
b. Obviousness (35 U.S.C. § 103)
A patent claim is invalid for obviousness “if the differences between the claimed invention
and the prior art are such that the claimed invention as a whole would have been obvious before
the effective filing date of the claimed invention to a person having ordinary skill in the art to
which the claimed invention pertains.” 35 U.S.C. § 103. The existence of disparate pieces of
prior art is not enough – the person of ordinary skill in the art must have some “motivation to
combine prior art references to arrive at the claimed invention.” Natera, Inc. v. NeoGenomics
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Labs., Inc., 106 F.4th 1369, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2024). The party challenging the patent’s validity
“must show a reason why a skilled artisan would have made the combination.” Id.; see also KSR
Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 417-18 (2007).
Here, because Plaintiffs plausibly allege invalidity based on anticipation as summarized
above, they also plausibly allege invalidity based on obviousness. See supra Section III.A.2.a.
“[A] disclosure that anticipates under § 102 also renders the claim invalid under § 103, for
‘anticipation is the epitome of obviousness.’” Connell v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 722 F.2d 1542,
1548 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (citation modified). Accordingly, Defendant’s motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’
invalidity claim on obviousness grounds under 35 U.S.C. § 103 is DENIED.
c. Indefiniteness (35 U.S.C. § 112(f))
By contrast, Plaintiffs’ claim for invalidity on indefiniteness grounds pursuant to 35 U.S.C.
§ 112(f) is insufficient. Section 112(f) governs so-called “means-plus-function” claims. It permits
a patent applicant to express claims using general language – a “means or step for performing a
specified function” – so long as the patent specification discloses the “structure” or “material” in
the invention that actually performs the claimed function. 35 U.S.C. § 112(f). A patent claim that
fails to do so is invalid for indefiniteness. See Tobii Tech. AB v. Eye Tribe APS, No. C 13-05877-
SBA, 2016 WL 269890, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 22, 2016) (“[A] means-plus-function clause is
indefinite if no corresponding structure appears in the specification.” (citing Noah Sys., Inc. v.
Intuit Inc., 675 F.3d 1302, 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2012)).
Here, Plaintiffs allege that “at least the asserted claims of the ’142 Patent include one or
more elements governed by 35 U.S.C. § 112(f) but the specification of the ’142 Patent fails to
disclose a corresponding structure.” Compl. ¶ 51. However, the complaint does not identify the
specific limitation(s) in the ’142 Patent on which this indefiniteness challenge is based. Without
that information, Plaintiffs’ pleading is little more than a recitation of 35 U.S.C. § 112(f) itself.
See J & K IP Assets, LLC, 2018 WL 3428757, at *2-3 (dismissing declaratory judgment
counterclaims that included only conclusory allegations).
Plaintiffs contend that “showing how claim limitations are . . . invalid under 35 U.S.C.
§ 112(f) is simply not required” at the pleading stage because Patent Local Rule 3-5 sets forth the
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framework for a plaintiff to disclose invalidity contentions in declaratory judgment cases.
Opp. at 11, ECF No. 39. But Patent Local Rules 3-5’s procedure for disclosing more detailed
information later does not excuse Plaintiffs from meeting the threshold requirement to plausibly
state a claim now. See Bot M8 LLC v. Sony Corp. of Am., 4 F.4th 1342, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2021)
(affirming dismissal of patent infringement claim because reciting elements and offering
conclusions “without supporting factual allegations” was “insufficient to satisfy the
Iqbal/Twombly standard”); see also Big Baboon, Inc. v. SAP Am., Inc., No. 17-cv-02082-HSG,
2018 WL 4096396, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 28, 2018) (“[T]he pleading standard articulated in
Twombly and Iqbal appl[ies] in the patent context.”). In any event, it makes little sense to relieve
Plaintiffs from plausibly alleging the basis of their indefiniteness challenge because indefiniteness
is based on the language of the patent itself. See Nautilus, Inc. v. Biosig Instruments, Inc., 572
U.S. 898, 901 (2014) (“[A] patent is invalid for indefiniteness if its claims, read in light of the
specification . . . fail to inform . . . about the scope of the invention.” (emphasis added)).
Therefore, Plaintiffs have the information they need to add the requisite detail to their complaint.
Accordingly, Defendant’s motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’ invalidity claim on indefiniteness
grounds under 35 U.S.C. § 112(f) is GRANTED.
3. Patent Misuse
Plaintiffs also fail to plausibly state a claim for a declaratory judgment of patent misuse.
A plaintiff seeking a declaratory judgment of patent misuse based on a defendant’s allegedly
improper assertion of a patent “must provide some factual basis for the allegation that [the
defendant] knew the patent was invalid or unenforceable” at the time of enforcement. Advanced
Cardiovascular Sys., Inc. v. Scimed Sys., Inc., No. C-96-0950 DLJ, 1996 WL 467277, at *4 (N.D.
Cal. July 24, 1996). A plaintiff must also “state how [a defendant] has attempted to overbroadly
and impermissibly construe its patent such as to cause an anticompetitive effect.” Id.
Here, Plaintiffs allege that Defendant is “impermissibly broaden[ing] the physical or
temporal scope of the patent grant with anticompetitive effect” because Defendant “sought to
prevent the sale” of Plaintiffs’ projectors despite “knowing that the claims of the ’142 Patent were
not and are not infringed by the Optoma-branded projectors.” Compl. ¶¶ 55, 57 (internal
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quotation marks omitted). In support of this theory, Plaintiffs allege that Defendant “sought to
prevent the sale” of Plaintiffs’ projectors by reporting them as “infringing” to Amazon in early
January 2026. Id. ¶¶ 10-11. Plaintiffs also allege that they sent multiple letters and emails to
Defendant that demonstrated the invalidity of the ’142 Patent and “undermined [Defendant’s]
allegations of infringement.” See id. ¶¶ 6-8, 19-22.
As an initial matter, Congress has exempted certain practices from liability for patent
misuse. See 35 U.S.C. § 271(d). A patent owner cannot be “deemed guilty of misuse or illegal
extension of the patent right” solely because he “sought to enforce his patent rights against
infringement,” as Defendant appears to have done by initiating Amazon’s internal patent
evaluation proceeding. Id. § 271(d)(3); see also Compl. ¶ 10. Plaintiffs’ theory of misuse thus
hinges on their contention that Defendant notified Amazon despite knowing that the ’142 Patent
was invalid and not infringed. But Plaintiffs’ belief in those contentions does not necessarily
make them true, and the mere fact that Defendant declined to concede non-infringement or
invalidity upon learning of Plaintiffs’ position does not amount to “knowledge” of invalidity. See
Parallax Grp. Int’l, LLC v. Greatmats.com Corp., No. SACV 16-00927-CJC(DFMX), 2017 WL
3453297, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 11, 2017) (“That [defendant] disagrees with [plaintiff’s]
interpretation of its patents . . . is insufficient for purposes of pleading patent misuse.”); see also
Hon Hai Precision Indus. Co. v. Wi-LAN, Inc., No. 12 Civ. 7900 SAS, 2013 WL 2322675, at *10
(S.D.N.Y. May 28, 2013) (“If allegations that a patentee sent a notice of infringement related to a
non-infringing product stated a claim for patent misuse, then every successful defense of
noninfringement would necessarily result in a finding that a patent was unenforceable due to
patent misuse.”). Moreover, because an issued patent is “cloaked in a presumption of validity,”
actions to enforce a patent are “presumed to be brought in good faith.” Atari Games Corp. v.
Nintendo of Am., Inc., 897 F.2d 1572, 1577 (Fed. Cir. 1990). In light of these principles, the Court
cannot plausibly infer from Plaintiffs’ threadbare allegations that Defendant is misusing the ’142
Patent. See Parallax Grp. Int’l, LLC, 2017 WL 3453297, at *3 (dismissing a declaratory
judgment claim of patent misuse for “conclusory” assertion, based only on the plaintiff’s belief,
that the defendant knew the plaintiff’s products were non-infringing).
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Accordingly, Defendant’s motion to dismiss is GRANTED with respect to Plaintiffs’ claim
for declaratory judgment of patent misuse.2
B. Plaintiffs’ Antitrust and Unfair Business Practices Claims
Plaintiffs next seek relief under federal and state laws regulating anticompetitive conduct:
Section 2 of the Sherman Act, California common law, and two Washington statutes governing
unfair competition and bad faith patent assertion. The Court will address each of these claims
individually, but turns first to a brief discussion of Noerr-Pennington immunity.
1. Noerr-Pennington Immunity
The Noerr-Pennington doctrine immunizes “those who petition any department of the
government for redress.” Sosa v. DIRECTV, Inc., 437 F.3d 923, 929 (9th Cir. 2006). Litigation
activity – including activity “incidental” to litigation – is generally immune from antitrust liability.
See Prof’l Real Est. Inv., Inc. v. Columbia Pictures, Inc., 508 U.S. 49, 60 (1993) (“PRE”); see also
Sosa, 437 F.3d at 925-26, 942 (affirming dismissal of claim because sending “tens of thousands of
demand letters” was protected Noerr-Pennington conduct). Many courts have construed Noerr-
Pennington immunity broadly, applying it to a variety of state law claims, including those that
Plaintiffs bring here. See, e.g., Kottle v. Nw. Kidney Ctrs., 146 F.3d 1056, 1059 (9th Cir. 1998)
(“[T]he Noerr-Pennington doctrine sweeps broadly and is implicated by both state and federal
antitrust claims[.]”); Monolithic Power Sys., Inc. v. O2 Micro Int’l Ltd., Nos. C 04-2000 CW, C
06-2929 CW, 2007 WL 801886, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 14, 2007) (“While the Noerr-Pennington
doctrine was formulated in the context of antitrust cases, it has been extended to cases involving
other types of civil liability, including state law claims of unfair competition.”).
2 Defendant also argues that this claim is improperly styled as one for “Patent Misuse” instead of
“Declaratory Judgment of Patent Misuse,” and patent misuse is “not a standalone cause of action.”
Mot. at 2, 9. Plaintiffs can address the clerical error when amending the complaint. With respect
to Defendant’s broader argument, it is true that patent misuse is typically raised as an affirmative
defense in patent infringement cases. See Windsurfing Int’l Inc. v. AMF, Inc., 782 F.2d 995, 1001
(Fed. Cir. 1986). However, this does not preclude a declaratory judgment plaintiff from raising
patent misuse if a case or controversy exists with respect to patent infringement. The only relief
available for a successful patent misuse claim is a declaration rendering the patent unenforceable.
See B. Braun Med., Inc. v. Abbott Labs., 124 F.3d 1419, 1428 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
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However, a party cannot claim the protection of Noerr-Pennington immunity if it
(1) engages in “sham litigation” or (2) commits Walker Process fraud by fraudulently obtaining a
patent and using it to “exclude a competitor from the market through infringement suits.” See
PRE, 508 U.S. at 60 (discussing sham litigation); see also Kaiser Found. Health Plan, Inc. v.
Abbott Lab’ys, Inc., 552 F.3d 1033, 1045 (9th Cir. 2009) (citing Walker Process Equip., Inc. v.
Food Mach. & Chem. Corp., 382 U.S. 172, 177 (1965)). As applied to the patent context, a
patentee who enforces or attempts to enforce her patent rights is protected by Noerr-Pennington
immunity unless the alleged infringer can show that the patentee’s conduct falls within the sham
litigation or Walker Process exception. See Glass Equip. Dev., Inc. v. Besten, Inc., 174 F.3d 1337,
1343 (Fed. Cir. 1999). The party seeking relief based on conduct otherwise protected by Noerr-
Pennington immunity bears the burden of establishing that an exception applies. See Gamble v.
Kaiser Found. Health Plan, Inc., 348 F. Supp. 3d 1003, 1028 (N.D. Cal. 2018) (“The Ninth
Circuit has required a plaintiff seeking to establish the sham exception to Noerr-Pennington to
plead around the defense with specificity.” (citing Boone v. Redevelopment Agency of City of San
Jose, 841 F.2d 886, 894 (9th Cir. 1988)).
Here, Plaintiffs base their Sherman Act and state law claims on the same set of allegations
underpinning their declaratory judgment claims. The crux of Plaintiffs’ argument is that
Defendant’s decision to report Plaintiffs’ projectors as “infringing” to Amazon amounts to a
baseless and improper “pre-suit assertion of patent infringement.” Compl. ¶ 76; see also id. ¶¶ 64,
70. Because Plaintiffs’ claims are based on Defendant’s patent assertions, the Court must presume
that the ’142 Patent is valid and that Defendant’s efforts to enforce it were in good faith. See Atari
Games Corp., 897 F.2d at 1577. Accordingly, Defendant’s conduct presumptively falls within the
scope of Noerr-Pennington immunity. See Sosa, 437 F.3d at 925, 935, 942 (holding that
communications between private parties fall under Noerr-Pennington protection if they are made
“incidental” to litigation); see also Glass Equip. Dev., Inc., 174 F.3d at 1343 (noting that “a patent
owner who brings a lawsuit to enforce [his] statutory right . . . is exempt from the antitrust laws”
unless one of two established exceptions to Noerr-Pennington immunity apply). In view of
Plaintiffs’ burden to plead facts that plausibly allege an applicable exception to Noerr-Pennington
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immunity, the Court now addresses each of Plaintiffs’ claims in turn. See Gamble, 348
F. Supp. 3d at 1028.
2. Walker Process Fraud and Sherman Act Violation
Plaintiffs first contend that Defendant’s conduct falls within the Walker Process exception
to Noerr-Pennington immunity and is thus actionable under Section 2 of the Sherman Act. To
state a Walker Process claim, a plaintiff must first establish that the defendant “obtained the patent
by knowing and willful fraud on the [U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (‘PTO’)] and maintained
and enforced the patent with knowledge of the fraudulent procurement.” TransWeb, LLC v. 3M
Innovative Props. Co., 812 F.3d 1295, 1306 (Fed. Cir. 2016). A plaintiff must then plead facts
“necessary to establish a Sherman Act” claim. Id.
Plaintiffs’ claim falls short on several grounds. The Court addresses each below.
a. Failure to allege fraud
First, Plaintiffs fail to plausibly allege that Defendant obtained the ’142 Patent by
“knowing and willful fraud” on the PTO. To make such a showing, a plaintiff must at minimum
establish that “(1) an individual associated with the filing and prosecution of a patent application
made an affirmative misrepresentation of a material fact, failed to disclose material information, or
submitted false material information; and (2) the individual did so with a specific intent to deceive
the PTO.” Exergen Corp. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 575 F.3d 1312, 1327 n.3 (Fed. Cir. 2009)
(discussing the pleading standard for inequitable conduct); see also Dippin’ Dots, Inc. v. Mosey,
476 F.3d 1337, 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (noting that a claimant seeking to demonstrate Walker
Process fraud “must make higher threshold showings of both materiality and intent than are
required to show inequitable conduct”). Here, Plaintiffs plead only that Defendant failed to
disclose the “offer for sale” of the “Hitachi-branded CP-A100 model series of projectors” during
the prosecution of the ’142 Patent. Compl. ¶ 61. Plaintiffs do not plausibly allege materiality –
that the ’142 Patent would not have issued “but for” the purported misrepresentation – nor do they
identify who allegedly defrauded the PTO and their specific intent to deceive. See Kaiser Found.
Health Plan Inc. v. Merck & Co. Inc., No. 21-cv-05497-HSG, 2025 WL 844415, at *12 (N.D. Cal.
Mar. 18, 2025) (dismissing Walker Process claim for “failure to name any specific individual
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responsible for intentionally withholding material information from the PTO”); see also Nalco Co.
v. Turner Designs, Inc., No. 13-cv-02727 NC, 2014 WL 645365, at *7 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 19, 2014)
(dismissing Walker Process claim because plaintiff failed to establish “that the patent would not
have issued but for the misrepresentation or omission” (citation omitted)).
b. Failure to allege monopolization or attempted monopolization
Second, Plaintiffs fail to plausibly allege the remaining elements of a Sherman Act claim.
Section 2 of the Sherman Act makes it unlawful to monopolize, or to attempt to monopolize,
interstate or foreign commerce. 15 U.S.C. § 2. As an initial matter, it is unclear if Plaintiffs are
asserting a claim for monopolization or attempted monopolization. However, Plaintiffs’ claim
fails under either theory because Plaintiffs have not sufficiently identified a relevant market. See
Dreamstime.com, LLC v. Google LLC, 54 F.4th 1130, 1137-38 (9th Cir. 2022) (holding that a
plaintiff must allege a relevant market to plausibly state a claim for monopolization); see also
Spectrum Sports, Inc. v. McQuillan, 506 U.S. 447, 459 (1993) (“[D]emonstrating the dangerous
probability of monopolization in an attempt case also requires inquiry into the relevant product
and geographic market and the defendant’s economic power in that market.”).
“The relevant market is the field in which meaningful competition is said to exist.” Image
Tech. Servs., Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 125 F.3d 1195, 1202 (9th Cir. 1997). A relevant market
includes two components: a product market and a geographic market. Hicks v. PGA Tour, Inc.,
897 F.3d 1109, 1120 (9th Cir. 2018). The relevant product market must include “the product at
issue as well as all economic substitutes for the product.” Newcal Indus. v. Ikon Office Sol., 513
F.3d 1038, 1045 (9th Cir. 2008). Although a plaintiff “need not plead a relevant market with
specificity, . . . a complaint may be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6) if the complaint’s ‘relevant
market’ definition is facially unsustainable.” Hicks, 897 F.3d at 1120 (quoting Newcal, 513 F.3d
at 1045).
Here, Plaintiffs do not plausibly allege either component of a relevant market. In fact,
Plaintiffs do not allege any geographic market at all – an omission that alone warrants dismissal.
See Hicks, 897 F.3d at 1120; see also Killian Pest Control, Inc. v. HomeTeam Pest Defense, Inc.,
No. 14-cv-05239-VC, 2015 WL 3766754, at *2 (N.D. Cal. June 16, 2015). As to a product
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market, Plaintiffs allege only that it is “the market for projectors.” Compl. ¶ 65. Plaintiffs do not
plead any facts that speak to the bounds or the contents of this proposed market, including whether
all economic substitutes are included. See Newcal, 513 F.3d at 1045. Thus, Plaintiffs’ vague and
conclusory assertion of the relevant market is facially unsustainable. See Hicks, 897 F.3d at 1123.
Plaintiffs also fail to plausibly allege that Defendant has monopoly power or a dangerous
probability of achieving it. Monopoly power is “the ability to raise price profitably by restricting
output.” Ohio v. Am. Express Co., 585 U.S. 529, 549 (2018) (quoting Phillip E. Areeda & Herbert
Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law: An Analysis of Antitrust Principles & Their Application ¶ 501).
Monopoly power may be demonstrated through direct or indirect evidence. FTC v. Ind. Fed’n of
Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 460-61 (1986). Direct evidence of monopoly power requires allegations
of “restricted output and supracompetitive prices.” Forsyth v. Humana, Inc., 114 F.3d 1467, 1475
(9th Cir. 1997), overruled on other grounds by Lacey v. Maricopa Cnty., 693 F.3d 896 (9th Cir.
2012). Indirect evidence of monopoly power requires allegations that: (1) the defendant has a
high share of the relevant market; (2) “new competitors face high market barriers to entry”; and
(3) “current competitors lack the ability to expand their output to challenge [the] monopolist’s
high prices.” Image Tech. Servs., 125 F.3d at 1207-08; see also Rebel Oil Co. v. Atl. Richfield
Co., 51 F.3d 1421, 1438 (9th Cir. 1995) (applying these requirements to a claim for attempted
monopolization).
Here, Plaintiffs offer only that “[Defendant’s] patent rights give [it] significant power” in
the “market for projectors.” Id. ¶ 65. But bare assertions that a defendant derives power from a
patent are insufficient to plausibly allege monopoly power or a dangerous probability of achieving
it. See Ill. Tool Works Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28, 44 (2006) (“[A] patent does not
necessarily confer market power upon the patentee.”); see also Rebel Oil, 51 F.3d at 1441-42. The
complaint does not include facts that speak to restricted output or supracompetitive prices in the
projector market, nor does it address entry or expansion barriers for competitors. Moreover, the
Court cannot plausibly infer that Defendant has a “high share of the relevant market” as defined by
Plaintiff, because it is unclear whether Defendant has patent rights over a significant share of the
projectors or projector-related components available for sale.
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In sum, Plaintiffs fail to plausibly allege that Defendant’s conduct (1) falls within the
Walker Process exception to Noerr-Pennington immunity or (2) amounts to a violation of
Section 2 of the Sherman Act. Accordingly, Defendant’s motion to dismiss is GRANTED with
respect to the Walker Process claim.
3. State Law Claims
Plaintiffs next seek relief under California and Washington law. More specifically,
Plaintiffs allege that Defendant’s conduct amounts to (1) tortious interference with prospective
advantage under California common law and (2) statutory violations of Washington’s Consumer
Protection Act (“CPA”) and Patent Troll Prevention Act (“PTPA”). See Compl., Prayer for
Relief; see also Wash. Rev. Code. §§ 19.86, 19.350. As noted above, many courts have applied
Noerr-Pennington immunity in the context of state law claims, including those at issue in this
case. See Theme Promotions, Inc. v. News Am. Mktg. FSI, 546 F.3d 991, 1007 (9th Cir. 2008)
(holding that the Noerr-Pennington doctrine applies to the plaintiff’s California tortious
interference with prospective economic advantage claim); Umouyo v. Bank of Am., NA, No. 2:22-
cv-00704-JHC, 2023 WL 1433804, at *6 n.5 (W.D. Wash. Feb. 1, 2023) (collecting cases) (“Other
judges in this district have applied Noerr-Pennington immunity to a [Washington CPA] claim.”).
The Ninth Circuit requires the party seeking relief based on conduct otherwise protected by Noerr-
Pennington immunity to plead, “with specificity,” that an exception applies. Gamble, 348 F.
Supp. 3d at 1028 (citing Boone, 841 F.2d at 894). Accordingly, the Court first evaluates
Plaintiffs’ complaint with respect to the Noerr-Pennington exceptions before addressing the
substantive elements of each of Plaintiffs’ state laws claims.
a. Exceptions to Noerr-Pennington immunity
Plaintiffs have not plausibly alleged that Defendant’s conduct falls outside of Noerr-
Pennington protection. Plaintiffs first err by failing to identify the exception they are invoking in
the context of their state law claims. See Opp. at 17 (contending that Defendant’s actions fall
outside Noerr-Pennington protection because they “are part of a general anticompetitive
scheme”); see also Or. Nat. Res. Council v. Mohla, 944 F.2d 531, 533 (9th Cir. 1991)
(“Conclusory allegations are not sufficient to strip a defendant’s activities of Noerr-Pennington
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protection.”). To the extent that Plaintiffs intended to import their allegations of Walker Process
fraud to the state law context, their pleading falls short for the reasons already discussed. See
supra Section III.B.2.
Even if the Court assumes that Plaintiffs intended to invoke the sham litigation exception,
Plaintiffs’ complaint remains insufficient. The Ninth Circuit applies a “a strict two-step analysis
to assess whether a single action constitutes sham petitioning.” USS-POSCO Indus. v. Contra
Costa Cnty. Bldg. & Const. Trades Council, AFL-CIO, 31 F.3d 800, 810-11 (9th Cir. 1994)
(“POSCO”). Plaintiffs must first establish that an action is “objectively baseless in the sense that
no reasonable litigant could realistically expect success on the merits.” Id. at 810 (quoting PRE,
508 U.S. at 60). Plaintiffs must then establish that the objectively baseless lawsuit “conceal[s] an
attempt to interfere directly with the business relationships of a competitor.” Id. “Only if the suit
is found to be objectively baseless does the court proceed to examine the litigant’s subjective
intent.” Id.
Based on Plaintiffs’ pleading, the Court cannot plausibly infer that Defendant’s efforts to
assert the ’142 Patent rise to the level of objective baselessness. Plaintiffs’ contention that
Defendant knew the ’142 Patent was invalid, unenforceable, and not infringed is insufficient
because the ’142 Patent is presumptively valid and Defendant’s assertions are presumptively in
good faith. See Tyco Healthcare Grp. LP v. Mut. Pharm. Co., 762 F.3d 1338, 1345 (Fed. Cir.
2014) (“Given the presumption of patent validity and the burden on the patent challenger to prove
invalidity by clear and convincing evidence, it will be a rare case in which a patentee’s assertion of
its patent in the face of a claim of invalidity will be so unreasonable as to support a claim that the
patentee has engaged in sham litigation.”); see also Realtek Semiconductor Corp. v. MediaTek,
Inc., 769 F. Supp. 3d 1067, 1090 (N.D. Cal. 2025) (noting that “[t]he presumption of patent
validity does not allow a court to take as true bare allegations that this issued patent is invalid” in
the context of determining objective baselessness).
Plaintiffs also contend that Defendant was not properly assigned the rights to the ’142
Patent, and thus does not own it, to support a finding of objective baselessness. Compl. ¶¶ 70, 78.
However, the validity of the assignment has been litigated in the Eastern District of Texas
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litigation, where the Magistrate Judge recently issued a report and recommendation finding that
the ’142 Patent assignment was not invalid.3 See Mot. Ex. 1 (Report and Recommendation at 21-
26, Maxell, Ltd. v. Coretronic Corp., No. 5:24-cv-00088-RWS-JBB (E.D. Tex. June 24, 2026),
ECF No. 223); Compl. ¶¶ 23-29 (establishing that the same patent assignment addressed in the
R&R also included the ’142 Patent). Although Plaintiffs may disagree with that ruling, the fact
that Defendant survived the patent ownership challenge indicates that its claim to ownership of the
’142 Patent is not “objectively baseless.” Cf. PRE, 508 U.S. 49, 60 n.5 (1993) (noting that even
when a defendant has “lost the underlying litigation, a court must resist the understandable
temptation to engage in post hoc reasoning by concluding that an ultimately unsuccessful action
must have been unreasonable or without foundation” (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted)). Because Plaintiffs have not plausibly alleged that Defendant’s efforts were objectively
baseless, the Court need not reach the adequacy of Plaintiffs’ pleading with respect to Defendant’s
subjective intent. See POSCO, 31 F.3d at 810.
Because Defendant’s alleged conduct falls within the scope of Noerr-Pennington
immunity, Plaintiffs’ failure to plausibly allege a Noerr-Pennington exception precludes their state
law claims. See supra Section III.B.1.; see also Sosa, 437 F.3d at 942 (affirming dismissal of
claim because underlying conduct was protected under Noerr-Pennington immunity). However,
because Plaintiffs will have the opportunity to amend their complaint and remediate the
deficiencies just described, the Court also addresses the substantive elements of Plaintiffs’ state
law claims.
b. California Tortious Interference Claim
Plaintiffs next allege that Defendant, under California law, has tortiously interfered with
Plaintiffs’ prospective economic advantage by “engag[ing] in wrongful conduct,” including
asserting the ’142 Patent against [Plaintiffs’] projectors” despite “knowing” that the ’142 Patent
3 Judicial notice of the related proceedings is appropriate under these circumstances because the
court’s holding is an adjudicative fact that bears on whether Defendant’s assertion of the ’142
Patent is objectively baseless. See Fed. R. Evid. 201; see also Reyn’s Pasta Bella, LLC v. Visa
USA, Inc., 442 F.3d 741, 746, n.6 (9th Cir. 2006); UCP Int’l Co. v. Balsam Brands Inc., 420
F. Supp. 3d 966, 981 (N.D. Cal. 2019).
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was “invalid and unenforceable.” Compl. ¶ 70. To state a claim for tortious interference with
prospective economic advantage under California law, a plaintiff must allege “(1) an economic
relationship between the plaintiff and some third party, with the probability of future economic
benefit to the plaintiff; (2) the defendant’s knowledge of the relationship; (3) intentional acts on
the part of the defendant designed to disrupt the relationship; (4) actual disruption of the
relationship; and (5) economic harm to the plaintiff proximately caused by the acts of the
defendant.” Kor. Supply Co. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 29 Cal. 4th 1134, 1153 (2003) (quoting
Westside Ctr. Assocs. v. Safeway Stores 23, Inc., 42 Cal. App. 4th 507, 521-22 (1996)). Plaintiffs
must identify, at least in some manner, the third party with which its prospective economic
relationship has been damaged. See R Power Biofuels, LLC v. Chemex LLC, No. 16-cv-00716-
LHK, 2016 WL 6663002, at *16 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 11, 2016); see also Westside Ctr. Assocs.,
42 Cal. App. 4th at 527 (noting that the requirement “does not mean the party must [be] identified
by name; it [i]s enough that the defendant was aware its actions would frustrate the legitimate
expectations of a specific, albeit unnamed” party” (citation modified)). A plaintiff must also
allege disruption of that relationship. See 7EDU Impact Acad. Inc. v. You, 760 F. Supp. 3d 981,
1001 (N.D. Cal. 2024) (finding allegations of “generalized disruption” insufficient); see also
Name.Space, Inc. v. Internet Corp. for Assigned Names & Nos., 795 F.3d 1124, 1134 (9th Cir.
2015) (affirming dismissal of tortious interference claim because complaint did “not allege any
specific resultant disruption to contractual or economic relationships”).
Here, Plaintiffs plead only that Defendant acted with the intent to “disrupt the economic
relationship” between Plaintiffs and their “current and potential customers.” Compl. ¶ 71. This
vague assertion is insufficient to state a tortious interference claim because it “fail[s] to adequately
suggest that those relationships contain a probability of future economic benefits.” Ring Central,
Inc. v. Nextiva, Inc., No. 19-cv-02626-NC, 2020 WL 4039322, at *5 (N.D. Cal. July 17, 2020);
see also Westside Ctr. Assocs., 42 Cal. App. 4th at 527 (“Without an existing relationship with an
identifiable buyer, [a party’s] expectation of a future sale was ‘at most a hope for an economic
relationship and a desire for future benefit.’” (quoting Blank v. Kirwan, 39 Cal. 3d 311, 331
(1985))).
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Plaintiffs also fail to plead facts speaking to specific incidences of economic disruption.
Indeed, Plaintiffs offer only that “[t]he economic relationship between [Plaintiffs] and its current
and potential customers has been and is being disrupted by [Defendant’s] conduct.” Compl. ¶ 72.
Such a conclusory statement cannot form the basis of a plausible tortious interference claim.4 See
Infectolab Americas LLC v. ArminLabs GmbH, No. 20-cv-03318-VKD, 2021 WL 292182, at *5-6
(N.D. Cal. Jan. 28, 2021) (dismissing tortious interference claim in part because the plaintiff’s
allegations of harm were “entirely conclusory”).
In sum, Plaintiffs’ pleading with respect to its California tortious interference claim is
insufficient because Plaintiffs (1) did not plausibly allege an exception to Noerr-Pennington
immunity and (2) failed to identify a specific economic relationship and describe how it has been
harmed. Defendant’s motion to dismiss is GRANTED.
c. Washington Statutory Claim
Plaintiffs allege that Defendant violated Washington’s Consumer Protection Act (“CPA”),
again by asserting the ’142 Patent in “bad faith.” See Compl. ¶¶ 78-81; Wash. Rev. Code. § 19.86.
Plaintiffs seek to establish bad faith by alleging that Defendant violated Washington’s Patent Troll
Prevention Act (“PTPA”), which is a per se “unfair or deceptive act” for the purposes of the CPA.
See Compl. ¶¶ 80-81; see also Microsoft Corp. v. MediaPointe, Inc., 626 F. Supp. 3d 1129, 1137
(C.D. Cal. 2022) (noting that “a PTPA violation is a cognizable unfair method of competition for
which Washington’s [CPA] provides a private right of action” (discussing Wash. Rev. Code
§ 19.350.030)); see also Valve Corp. v. Rothschild, No. 23-cv-1016, 2024 WL 4335682, at *8
(W.D. Wash. Sep. 26, 2024) (“A violation of [the PTPA] is an ‘unfair or deceptive act in trade or
commerce and an unfair method of competition for purposes of applying [the CPA].’” (quoting
Wash. Rev. Code § 19.350.030)).
4 In their opposition brief, Plaintiffs contend that they identified SpaceBound as a current
customer. Opp. at 20 n.5 (citing Compl. ¶¶ 10, 11, 35). The relationship between Plaintiffs and
SpaceBound is not clear on the face of the complaint. In any event, Plaintiffs fail to allege that
their relationship with SpaceBound was actually disrupted by Defendant’s conduct.
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i. Lack of significant contacts with Washington
As a threshold matter, Defendant contends that this claim should be dismissed because
Plaintiffs offer “no basis” for invoking Washington law. Mot. at 23. An out-of-state plaintiff
seeking relief under the CPA must establish that a defendant’s conduct has “a significant contact
with Washington.” See Cameron v. Country Mut. Ins. Co., No. 1:24-cv-03075-MKD, 2024 WL
4557671, at *8 (E.D. Wash. Oct. 23, 2024) (citing Thornell v. Seattle Serv. Bureau, Inc., 184
Wash. 2d 793, 804 (2015)). In their opposition brief, Plaintiffs point to their allegation that
Defendant “made a pre-suit assertion of patent infringement in the State of Washington by sending
the Reports to [Amazon]” and that the “only reasonable inference” is that Amazon operates in
Washington. Opp. at 21 (citing Compl. ¶ 76). Plaintiffs also urge the Court to take judicial notice
of the information posted on Amazon’s website that “indicates that it is operated out of
Washington.” Id. at 21 n.6.
Beginning with Plaintiffs’ request for judicial notice, the Court concludes that judicial
notice of Amazon’s website is inappropriate. In ruling on Rule 12(b)(6) motions, courts generally
do not consider material outside the pleadings. United States v. Corinthian Colls., 655 F.3d 984,
998 (9th Cir. 2011) (citation omitted). However, courts may consider facts in public records that
are “not subject to reasonable dispute” because they “can be accurately and readily determined
from sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.” Fed. R. Evid. 201(b). Plaintiffs’
request is not up to par because “[t]he simple act of posting something publicly on the Internet is
insufficient assurance of an exhibit’s accuracy.” Thornton v. Mindvalley, Inc., No. 24-cv-00593,
2025 WL 877714, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 14, 2025) (quoting Cappello v. Walmart Inc., No. 18-cv-
06678-RS, 2019 WL 11687705, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 5, 2019)); see also Harmoni Int’l Spice, Inc.
v. Bai, 2016 WL 6542731, at *23 (C.D. Cal. May 14, 2016) (“Although courts routinely take
judicial notice of government documents and public records available from government websites, .
. . courts do not routinely take judicial notice of document printouts from private, third-party
websites.” (citations omitted)). Accordingly, the Court denies Plaintiffs’ request for judicial
notice.
Turning now to Plaintiffs’ alleged ties to Washington, the Court is not persuaded that
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Defendant’s initiation of an APEX proceeding is sufficient. Plaintiffs do not allege that Defendant
is a Washington corporation or was otherwise based in Washington when it initiated the
proceeding, nor do they plead any facts indicating that Plaintiffs have been harmed in Washington.
See Cameron, 2024 WL 4557671, at *8 (dismissing claim because non-Washington residents
“who lack any significant contact or aggregation of contacts with Washington” would not have “a
constitutionally permissible CPA claim”). Moreover, it is not clear that Washington law permits a
non-resident plaintiff to pursue a CPA claim against a non-resident defendant. See Thornell v.
Seattle Serv. Bureau, Inc., 184 Wash. 2d 793, 804 (2015) (“Under the CPA, an out-of-state
plaintiff may bring a claim against a Washington corporate defendant for allegedly deceptive
acts.” (emphasis added)); but see id. at 803 (“The CPA does allow claims for an out-of-state
plaintiff against all persons who engage in unfair or deceptive acts that directly or indirectly affect
the people of Washington.”).
The Court is skeptical that Plaintiffs can allege facts to cure these pleading deficiencies.
However, because this is the first time that the Court has evaluated the sufficiency of Plaintiffs’
allegations, the Court also addresses the substantive elements of Plaintiffs’ claims.
ii. Patent Troll Prevention Act (“PTPA”)
Under the PTPA, “a person may not make assertions of patent infringement in bad faith.”
Wash. Rev. Code § 19.350.020(1). To establish a PTPA violation, a plaintiff must describe the
specific actions, taken by a defendant, that amount to bad faith. Cf. Microsoft Corp., 626 F. Supp.
3d at 1137-38 (dismissing a PTPA claim because the plaintiff did not adequately demonstrate that
the defendant “engaged in a form of prohibited activity”). The PTPA provides a non-exhaustive
list of factors that “a court may consider” in determining bad faith. Wash. Rev. Code
§ 19.350.020(2).
Here, Plaintiffs allege that two of these factors weigh in favor of bad faith: Defendant
“threaten[ed] legal action that cannot legally be taken” and “previously filed or threatened to file
one or more lawsuits based on the same or substantially equivalent assertion of patent
infringement.” See Compl. ¶ 80 (citing Wash. Rev. Code §§ 19.350.020(2)(d); 19.350.020(2)(f)).
Both allegations are insufficient. Plaintiffs’ argument that Defendant threatened “action that
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cannot legally be taken” is, once again, based on Plaintiffs’ belief that the ’142 Patent is invalid,
unenforceable, and not infringed by Plaintiffs’ projectors. See id. But believing that a legal
conclusion is true does not make it so, and Defendant is entitled to enforce its patent. See
Concrete Unlimited Inc. v. Cementcraft, Inc., 776 F.2d 1537, 1539 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (“[A] patent
owner has the right to . . . enforce its patent, and that includes threatening alleged infringers with
suit.” (citing 35 U.S.C. § 281)). Likewise, Plaintiffs’ invocation of a separate matter currently
pending between the parties in the Eastern District of Texas is unpersuasive. Under Section
19.350.020(2)(f), previous litigation is only relevant to bad faith if it is “based on the same or
substantially equivalent assertion of patent infringement.” Plaintiffs do not contend that the
’142 Patent is being asserted in the Texas litigation; indeed, it appears that it is not. See
Compl. ¶ 93, Maxell, Ltd., No. 5:24-cv-00088-RWS-JBB (E.D. Tex. July 9, 2024). Section
19.350.020(2)(f) also only applies if a court found the previous assertion to be “without merit” or
“false, misleading, or deceptive.” Plaintiffs provide no evidence that such a finding exists.
Accordingly, Defendant’s motion to dismiss is GRANTED with respect to Plaintiffs’
PTPA claim.
iii. Consumer Protection Act (“CPA”)
To plausibly allege a violation of the CPA, a plaintiff must establish “(1) an unfair or
deceptive act or practice; (2) occurring within trade or business; (3) affecting the public interest;
(4) injuring the plaintiff’s business or property; and (5) a causal relationship between [defendant’s]
deceptive act and the resulting injury.” Haley v. Allstate Ins. Co., No. C09-1494 RSM, 2010 WL
4052935, at *7 (W.D. Wash. Oct. 13, 2010) (citing Hangman Ridge Training Stables, Inc. v.
Safeco Title Ins. Co., 105 Wash. 2d 778, 780 (1986)). A plaintiff can adequately plead the first
element by alleging that a defendant’s conduct is a per se “unfair or deceptive act or practice.”
Hangman Ridge Training Stables, Inc., 105 Wash. 2d at 785-86. A per se unfair trade practice
exists when “a statute which has been declared by the [Washington] Legislature to constitute an
unfair or deceptive act in trade or commerce has been violated.” Id. Alternatively, a plaintiff may
plead facts to establish that an act is unfair or deceptive. An unfair act is one that “(1) causes or is
likely to cause substantial injury, which (2) consumers cannot avoid, and (3) is not ‘outweighed by
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countervailing benefits.’” Krefting v. Kaye-Smith Enters. Inc., No. 2:23-cv-220, 2023 WL
4846850, at *8 (W.D. Wash. July 28, 2023) (quoting Merriman v. Am. Guar. & Liab. Ins. Co.,
98 Wash. App. 594, 628 (2017)). A deceptive act is one that “has the capacity to deceive
substantial portions of the public.” Klem v. Wash. Mut. Bank, 176 Wash. 2d 771, 787 (2013).
Here, Plaintiffs contend that Defendant’s conduct is a per se unfair trade practice because
it violates the PTPA. Compl. ¶ 81. For the reasons already described, the Court concludes that
Plaintiffs did not plausibly allege that Defendant’s conduct violated the PTPA’s prohibition on bad
faith patent assertion. See supra III.B.3.c.ii. And because Plaintiffs’ complaint lacks any
assertions that would allow the Court to plausibly infer that Defendant’s conduct unavoidably
injures consumers or deceives the public, Plaintiffs’ CPA claim is insufficient. See Wick v. Twilio
Inc., No. C16-00914RSL, 2017 WL 2964855, at *6 (W.D. Wash. July 12, 2017) (dismissing a
CPA claim because plaintiff failed to raise a plausible inference that defendant’s conduct message
was “somehow unfair or deceptive”).
In sum, Plaintiffs’ complaint is insufficient with respect to the Washington law claim
because Plaintiffs failed to plausibly allege: (1) an exception to Noerr-Pennington immunity;
(2) that Defendant’s conduct is actionable under Washington law, and (3) that Defendant’s
conduct amounted to an “unfair or deceptive” act. Defendant’s motion to dismiss is GRANTED.
C. Leave to Amend
The Court grants leave to amend because this is the Court’s first ruling on the legal
sufficiency of Plaintiffs’ claims. See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127 (9th Cir. 2000)
(en banc) (holding that the “court should grant leave to amend . . . unless it determines that the
pleading could not possibly be cured by the allegation of other facts” (quoting Doe v. United
States, 58 F.3d 494, 497 (9th Cir. 1995))). Although the Court grants leave to amend, it may
dismiss Plaintiffs’ claims with prejudice if the amended complaint fails to plausibly state a claim.
See Zucco Partners, LLC v. Digimarc Corp., 552 F.3d 981, 1007 (9th Cir. 2009) (holding that
failure to correct pleading deficiencies after dismissal is a “strong indication” that further
amendment would be futile (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)); see also Salameh v.
Tarsadia Hotel, 726 F.3d 1124, 1133 (9th Cir. 2013) (“A district court’s discretion to deny leave
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to amend is ‘particularly broad’ where the plaintiff has previously amended.” (citation omitted)).
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the motion to dismiss is DENIED as to the first claim for relief
(declaratory judgment of non-infringement). As to the second claim for relief (declaratory
judgment of invalidity), the motion is GRANTED with leave to amend as to Plaintiffs’
indefiniteness (35 U.S.C. § 112(f)) theory, but is otherwise DENIED. Finally, the motion is
GRANTED with leave to amend as to the third, fourth, fifth, and sixth claims for relief (patent
misuse, Walker Process fraud, tortious interference, and violations of Washington law).
Within 21 days of this Order, Plaintiffs may file a second amended complaint to address
the pleading deficiencies identified above.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: October 9, 2026
Eumi K. Lee
United States District Judge
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