Hamzeh v. Pharmavite LLC et al

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United States District Court
Northern District of California
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
SAN FRANCISCO DIVISION
GUITY HAMZEH,
Plaintiff,
v.
PHARMAVITE LLC, et al.,
Defendants.
Case No. 24-cv-00472-HSG 	(PHK)
ORDER RE: DISCOVERY DISPUTE
Re: Dkt. 138
This case has been referred to the undersigned for all discovery purposes. 	See Dkt. 105.
Now before the Court is a joint discovery letter brief regarding a dispute between the Plaintiff Guity
Hamzeh (“Plaintiff”) and Defendant Pharmavite LLC (“Pharmavite” or “Defendant”). [Dkt. 138].
The Court finds this dispute suitable for resolution without oral argument. See Civil L.R. 7-1(b).
LEGAL STANDARD
The Court has broad discretion and authority to manage discovery. U.S. Fidelity & Guar.
Co. v. Lee Inv. LLC, 641 F.3d 1126, 1136 n.10 (9th Cir. 2011) (“District courts have wide latitude
in controlling discovery, and their rulings will not be overturned in the absence of a clear abuse of
discretion.”); Laub v. U.S. Dep’t of Int., 342 F.3d 1080, 1093 (9th Cir. 2003). The Court’s discretion
extends to crafting discovery orders that may expand, limit, or differ from the relief requested. See
Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 598 (1998) (holding trial courts have “broad discretion to
tailor discovery narrowly and to dictate the sequence of discovery”). For example, the Court may
limit the scope of any discovery method if it determines that “the discovery sought is unreasonably
cumulative or duplicative, or can be obtained from some other source that is more convenient, less
burdensome, or less expensive.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2)(C)(i).
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The relevant legal standards for discovery are well-known. Rule 26(b)(1) delineates the
scope of discovery in federal civil actions and provides that “[p]arties may obtain discovery
regarding any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party's claim or defense and proportional
to the needs of the case.” Information need not be admissible to be discoverable. Id. Relevancy for
purposes of discovery is broadly defined to encompass “any matter that bears on, or that reasonably
could lead to other matter that could bear on, any issue that is or may be in the case.” In re Williams-
Sonoma, Inc., 947 F.3d 535, 539 (9th Cir. 2020) (quoting Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437
U.S. 340, 350-51 (1978)); see also In re Facebook, Inc. Consumer Privacy User Profile Litig., No.
18-MD-2843 VC (JSC), 2021 WL 10282215, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 29, 2021) (“Courts generally
recognize that relevancy for purposes of discovery is broader than relevancy for purposes of trial.”)
(alteration omitted).
While the scope of relevance is broad, discovery is not unlimited. ATS Prods., Inc. v.
Champion Fiberglass, Inc., 309 F.R.D. 527, 531 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (“Relevancy, for the purposes of
discovery, is defined broadly, although it is not without ultimate and necessary boundaries.”).
Information, even if relevant, must be “proportional to the needs of the case” to fall within the scope
of permissible discovery. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). The 2015 amendments to Rule 26(b)(1)
emphasize the need to impose reasonable limits on discovery through increased reliance on the
commonsense concept of proportionality: “The objective is to guard against redundant or
disproportionate discovery by giving the court authority to reduce the amount of discovery that may
be directed to matters that are otherwise proper subjects of inquiry. The [proportionality
requirement] is intended to encourage judges to be more aggressive in identifying and discouraging
discovery overuse.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26 advisory committee’s note to 2015 amendment. In evaluating
the proportionality of a discovery request, the Court considers “the importance of the issues at stake
in the action, the amount in controversy, the parties' relative access to the information, the parties'
resources, the importance of the discovery in resolving the issues, and whether the burden or expense
of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1).
The party seeking discovery bears the burden of establishing that its request satisfies the
relevancy requirements under Rule 26(b)(1). La. Pac. Corp. v. Money Mkt. 1 Inst. Inv. Dealer, 285
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F.R.D. 481, 485 (N.D. Cal. 2012). The resisting party, in turn, has the burden to show that the
discovery should not be allowed. Id. The resisting party must specifically explain the reasons why
the request at issue is objectionable and may not rely on boilerplate, conclusory, or speculative
arguments. Id.; see also Blankenship v. Hearst Corp., 519 F.2d 418, 429 (9th Cir. 1975) (“Under
the liberal discovery principles of the Federal Rules defendants were required to carry a heavy
burden of showing why discovery was denied.”).
With regard to proportionality, “[t]he parties and the court have a collective responsibility
to consider the proportionality of all discovery and consider it in resolving discovery disputes.” Fed.
R. Civ. P. 26 advisory committee’s note to 2015 amendment. “A party claiming undue burden or
expense ordinarily has far better information—perhaps the only information—with respect to that
part of the determination. A party claiming that a request is important to resolve the issues should
be able to explain the ways in which the underlying information bears on the issues as that party
understands them. The court’s responsibility, using all the information provided by the parties, is to
consider these and all the other factors in reaching a case-specific determination of the appropriate
scope of discovery.” Id.
As part of its inherent discretion and authority, the Court has broad discretion in determining
relevancy for discovery purposes. Surfvivor Media, Inc. v. Survivor Prods., 406 F.3d 625, 635 (9th
Cir. 2005) (citing Hallett v. Morgan, 296 F.3d 732, 751 (9th Cir. 2002)). Similarly, a district court’s
determination as to proportionality of discovery is within the district court’s discretion. See Jones
v. Riot Hospitality Grp. LLC, 95 F.4th 730, 737-38 (9th Cir. 2024) (finding district court did not
abuse discretion on proportionality ruling). Ultimately, “the timing, sequencing and proportionality
of discovery is left to the discretion of the Court.” Toro v. Centene Corp., No. 19-cv-05163 LHK
(NC), 2020 WL 6108643, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 14, 2020).
DISCUSSION
The Parties reached agreement that the Relevant Time Period for ESI would be from January
1, 2017 to the present. 	Plaintiff argues that Defendant is refusing to produce ESI from “non-
custodial sources” from that Relevant Time Period and has only produced ESI from custodial
sources from that Relevant Time Period. [Dkt. 138 at 2].
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Defendant argues that this misrepresents Defendant’s position and the dispute. Defendant
argues that the instant dispute is much narrower. 	Defendant is not and has not withheld “non-
custodial” ESI from the Relevant Time Period and has, in fact, produced such ESI (using agreed
upon search terms) from both custodial and non-custodial sources. Id. at 4. Defendant argues that
the real dispute is whether Sales Data and Exemplars (which Defendant defines in the letter brief)
are being produced outside of the ESI protocol process and that such data are only relevant within
the statute of limitations period because such data only relates to damages (because information on
sales which predates the statute of limitations is not relevant to damages). Id. 	Defendant argues
that it should properly only be required to produce Sales Data and Exemplars dating from the start
of the statute of limitations period (January 25, 2020) to the present. Id. at 4-5.
Plaintiff argues that the statute of limitations is not a proper limitation on the scope of
discovery, citing Allen v. Similasan Corp., 2014 WL 2212120, at *2 (S.D. Cal. May 27, 2014). [Dkt.
138 at 3]. Plaintiff also argues that Judge Van Keulen held in a co-pending case similar to the instant
case Clark et al. v. Nordic Naturals, Inc., No. 5:24-CV-04058-EKL, (N.D. Cal. 2024) that the
relevant time period for both custodial and non-custodial ESI should be the same as sought here
(January 1, 2017) and that this ruling should be followed here. [Dkt. 138 at 2].
In response, Defendant argues that the issue of Sales Data and Exemplars was not before
Judge Van Keulen, and cites Ogden v. Bumble Bee Foods, LLC, 292 F.R.D. 620 (N.D. Cal. 2013)
to support the position that the information sought here (such as sales numbers and sales volumes)
outside the statute of limitations period is not relevant. [Dkt. 138 at 4].
Based on Defendant’s representations, it appears that Defendant is not refusing on a blanket
basis to produce non-custodial data from January 1, 2017 and has agreed to produce such data
following the ESI protocol and agreed search terms. 	It is unclear whether that production is
complete or not. Accordingly, Defendant is ORDERED to file a Status Report with the Court by
September 11, 2026 which reports on the status of completion of the production of ESI from non-
custodial sources from January 1, 2017 to the present, and to include in that Status Report
confirmation of what the non-custodial sources are.
With regard to Sales Data (as defined by Defendant), Defendant has been producing such
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information in spreadsheet form compiling sales information from internal databases or sources.
This production is therefore somewhat different from the standard ESI production protocol which
relies on identifying sources and then running agreed-upon search terms. 	As such, Defendant’s
argument that the Sales Data are outside the agreed-upon ESI protocol has some merit. In any event,
Plaintiff has not addressed or shown why such information, which predates the statute of limitations
period, is within the scope of relevance for discovery. 	See Ogden, 292 F.R.D. at 628 (“. . .
information such as sales numbers, advertising expenditures, profits, costs, or other information not
tied to the marketing decisions is not relevant beyond the limitations period.”). Nor has Plaintiff
demonstrated why Sales Data preceding the statute of limitations period is important in resolving
issues in dispute, and thus has not shown why, even if somehow relevant, that pre-limitations period
Sales Data is proportional to the needs of the case. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). Accordingly, the
Court DENIES WITHOUT PREJUDICE Plaintiff’s motion to compel Sales Data which predates
the statute of limitations period.
While there is no support in the record now, it is conceivable that, as discovery progresses,
Plaintiff may develop a reasonable basis to show why such Sales Data from the pre-statute of
limitations period (January 1, 2017 to January 25, 2020) is within the scope of relevance for
discovery purposes and is proportional to the needs of the case. The Ogden opinion indicates, for
example, that sales numbers which are tied to the marketing decisions beyond the limitations period
could be within the scope of relevance. 	If later in this case Plaintiff reasonably believes in good
faith, based on new facts or developments in this case, that such pre-limitations period Sales Data
is both relevant and proportional, the Court ORDERS the Parties to meet and confer to attempt to
reach agreement on a protocol for production of such Sales Data.
The next issue is whether Defendant should be required to produce “Exemplars” from the
pre-statute of limitation period. Defendant defines Exemplars as “every iteration of every label on
which Plaintiff and the putative class members could have relied in purchasing the Products during
the SOL period.” [Dkt 138 at 5]. Defendant does not explain how or why these sample labels are
exempt from the general agreement to produce non-custodial materials from January 1, 2017 to the
present. There is no information in the record that these labels are somehow not electronically
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stored. Unlike the argument as to Sales Data, Defendant’s argument that Exemplars are somehow
outside the scope of the ESI protocol here is not well-supported.
Defendant cites no case law to support exempting sample labels from an agreed upon ESI
protocol 	(which 	by 	definition 	should 	reflect 	the 	Parties’ 	agreements 	on 	relevance 	and
proportionality). Defendant makes no argument and provides no evidence that producing sample
labels for products from January 1, 2017 to the start of the statute of limitation period (January 25,
2020) would be unduly burdensome or not proportional. Indeed, because the Parties apparently
agreed that Defendant need only produce samples of labels for products (regardless of time period),
and not every single duplicative label, the burden is mitigated further.
Accordingly, the Court OVERRULES Defendant’s objections to producing Exemplars
from January 1, 2017 to the present. Because Defendant represents that Defendant has already
completed production of the Exemplars from January 25, 2020 to the present, the only time period
missing for Exemplars is January 1, 2017 to January 25, 2020. Accordingly, the Court ORDERS
Defendant to produce Exemplars from January 1, 2017 to January 25, 2020.
In the Status Report due September 11, 2026, Defendant SHALL also report on the status
of producing the additional Exemplars which were not already previously produced from the time
period from January 1, 2017 to the start of the statute of limitations period.
CONCLUSION
For all the reasons discussed herein, the Court DENIES WITHOUT PREJUDICE
Plaintiff’s motion to compel Defendant to produce Sales Data which predates the statute of
limitations period. And for the reasons discussed herein, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s motion to
compel Defendant to produce Exemplars from January 1, 2017 to January 25, 2020.
This RESOLVES Dkt. 138.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: September 1, 2026
PETER H. KANG
United States Magistrate Judge
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