Wilson v. Horizon Actuarial Services, LLC et al

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United States District Court
Northern District of California
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CARLOS DARIO WILSON,
Plaintiff,
v.
HORIZON ACTUARIAL SERVICES,
LLC, et al.,
Defendants.
Case No. 25-cv-08909-EMC
ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S
MOTION FOR EMERGENCY
INJUNCTION
Docket No. 9
Plaintiff Carlos Dario Wilson, proceeding pro se, has filed suit against Defendants Horizon
Actuarial Services, LLC (“Horizon”); Unite Here, Local 2 (“Union”); Mike Casey; and Anand
Singh.1 In his complaint, Mr. Wilson alleges that he was formerly an employee of the Union; that
the Union contracted with Horizon to provide certain services to Union employees; that Horizon
suffered a data breach; and that Mr. Wilson was injured a result.2 According to Mr. Wilson, the
data breach “made possible violent stalking[,] cyber stalking, witness intimidation, obstruction,
harassment, rape, torture and the human trafficking by third party actors believed to be the agents
and associates of former Unite Here[] Local 2 . . . leader, Mike Casey.”3 Compl., ECF Page 3. He
1 Mr. Casey, as alleged, is the former president of the Union. Mr. Singh appears to be the current
president.
2 As alleged by Mr. Wilson, a class action was brought against Horizon because of the data breach.
See Sherwood, et al. v. Horizon Actuarial Services, LLC, No. 1:22-cv-01495-ELR (N.D. Ga.).
That lawsuit settled, but Mr. Wilson opted out of the class action settlement.
3 Attached as Exhibit C to the complaint is a letter written by Mr. Wilson. In the letter, Mr.
Wilson seems to claim that the alleged wrongdoers are, in fact, family members and others
associated with them. See Compl., Ex. C (ECF Page 3-4). Mr. Wilson brought a separate lawsuit
making similar charges; that case has been dismissed. See Wilson v. Tahbazof, No. C-23-5624
TLT (N.D. Cal.).
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United States District Court
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also indicates that the goal of the “bad actors” was “to steal his identity and defraud [him] and his
family of his retirement investment accounts and his family’s estates.” Compl., ECF Page 5; see
also Compl., ECF Pages 9-10 (referring to his own financial accounts held with “San Francisco
Federal Credit Union, Merrill Lynch, Fidelity Investments, US Bank, Wells Fargo[,] Bank of
America, ING, Cash App, PayPal and others” as well as his “grandparent’s and parent’s estates”).
Currently pending before the Court is Mr. Wilson’s motion for an emergency injunction
and claim to victim’s rights. In the motion, Mr. Wilson asks the Court to prevent further
harassment and intimidation, to halt the dissipation of funds belonging to him or family members,
to declare that he has certain rights as a victim, and to order the return of his ADA service animals.
Having considered the papers filed, the Court hereby DENIES Mr. Wilson’s motion for relief.
I. 	DISCUSSION
Mr. Wilson is proceeding pro se. The Court liberally construes his motion as one seeking
a temporary restraining order (“TRO”).
As an initial matter, the Court denies Mr. Wilson relief because there is no indication that
he gave notice of his motion to any Defendant. Nor has Mr. Wilson provided an explanation as to
why an ex parte TRO should issue. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(b)(1) (providing that “[t]he court may
issue a temporary restraining order without written or oral notice to the adverse party or its
attorney only if: (A) specific facts in an affidavit or a verified complaint clearly show that
immediate and irreparable injury, loss, or damage will result to the movant before the adverse
party can be heard in opposition; and (B) the movant’s attorney certifies in writing any efforts
made to give notice and the reasons why it should not be required”); see also Reno Air Racing
Ass’n v. McCord, 452 F.3d 1126, 1131 (9th Cir. 2006) (noting that “courts have recognized very
few circumstances justifying the issuance of an ex parte TRO”).
Furthermore, even if there were no procedural impediment to Mr. Wilson’s motion, the
Court would still deny Mr. Wilson relief because it is not clear that the Court has subject matter
jurisdiction over the case. Mr. Wilson seems to allege in his complaint only state law causes of
action. See Compl., ECF Page 4 (incorporating the state law claims pled in Sherwood, the data
breach case brought against Horizon). If he is bringing only state law causes of action, there is no
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diversity jurisdiction because complete diversity between the parties is lacking. See 28 U.S.C. §
1332(a)(1) (providing that, for diversity jurisdiction, the amount in controversy must exceed
$75,000 and the controversy is between “citizens of different States”). Both Mr. Wilson and
Horizon appear to be citizens of California. See Johnson v. Columbia Props. Anchorage, LP, 437
F.3d 894, 899 (9th Cir. 2006) (“hold[ing] that, like a partnership, an LLC is a citizen of every state
of which its owners/members are citizens”); Compl., ECF Page 3 (alleging that some of the
members of Horizon – an LLC – are citizens of California).
Finally, even if a federal cause of action were pled in the complaint4 – which would give
rise to federal question jurisdiction, see 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (providing that “[t]he district courts shall
have original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the
United States”) – Mr. Wilson’s contention that Defendants were involved in some kind of
conspiracy to intimidate him, engage in human trafficking, or otherwise violate his rights is
entirely speculative. He does not offer any evidence, let alone any nonconclusory allegations, to
support this assertion. Accordingly, Mr. Wilson has failed to show a likelihood of success on the
merits, or even serious questions going to the merits, and a TRO is not proper. See Winter v.
NRDC, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 22 (2008) (noting that, for preliminary injunctive relief, a plaintiff “must
establish that [plaintiff] is likely to succeed on the merits, that [plaintiff] is likely to suffer
irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, that the balance of equities tips in
[plaintiff’s] favor, and that an injunction is in the public interest”); Alliance for the Wild Rockies v.
Cottrell, 632 F.3d 1127, 1131-32 (9th Cir. 2011) (noting that the Ninth Circuit has adopted a
sliding scale approach under which “a preliminary injunction could issue where the likelihood of
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4 Mr. Wilson makes a passing reference to RICO and the Trafficking Victims Protection
Reauthorization Act in the complaint. See Compl., ECF Page 4 (alleging “violations of O.C.G.A.
§ 13-6-11, culminating in RICO and TVPRA violations, both severe and ongoing”).
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success is such that ‘serious questions going to the merits were raised and the balance of hardships
tips sharply in [plaintiff’s] favor”).
II. 	CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Mr. Wilson’s motion for a TRO is denied.
This order disposes of Docket No. 9.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: November 19, 2025
______________________________________
P. CASEY PITTS
United States District Judge
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