Sanai v. Kruger et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CYRUS MARK SANAI,
Plaintiff,
v.
LEONDRA KRUGER, et al.,
Defendants.
Case No. 25-cv-02607-AMO (AGT)
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
ON DEFAULT JUDGMENT
Re: Dkt. No. 26
Plaintiff Cyrus Mark Sanai, proceeding pro se, sued the Justices of the Supreme
Court of California: Chief Justice Patricia Guerrero, Justice Carol A. Corrigan, Justice Good-
win H. Lui, Justice Leondra R. Kruger, Justice Joshua P. Groban, Justice Martin J. Jenkins,
and Justice Kelli Evans (collectively, Defendants). Dkt. 1. Defendants have not appeared in
the case. Sanai’s motion for default judgment, dkt. 26, is now pending before the Court after
a referral to the undersigned for a report and recommendation by presiding Judge Martínez-
Olguín. Dkt. 30. For the reasons that follow, the undersigned recommends that Judge Mar-
tínez-Olguín deny the motion.
I. Background
On March 17, 2025, Sanai, an attorney ineligible to practice in California,1 sued
1 The Ninth Circuit has found that “state bar records reflecting disciplinary proceedings” are
appropriate subjects for judicial notice. White v. Martel, 601 F.3d 882, 885 (9th Cir. 2010).
Sanai’s records indicate that he is ineligible to practice law. Attorney Search, State Bar of
California, https://apps.calbar.ca.gov/attorney/LicenseeSearch/QuickSearch (type “Cyrus
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Defendants. See dkt. 1. Sanai sues all Defendants (but not Justice Jenkins) in their individual
and official capacities.2 See id. ¶¶ 3–8. He alleges widespread corruption within the Califor-
nia judiciary, orchestrated by attorney Thomas Girardi and his firm Girardi Keese, e.g., id.
¶¶ 10–15, and further alleges that his own State Bar disciplinary proceedings were influ-
enced by Girardi’s network. E.g., id. ¶¶ 51–81. Sanai claims that the State Bar Court’s pro-
cedures are unconstitutional. E.g., id. ¶¶ 111–14. He seeks declaratory relief, id. ¶ 127 &
¶ 134, and injunctive relief. Id. ¶ 130.3
Defendants have not appeared in this action. On June 10, 2025, Sanai moved for
default, dkt. 20, which the Clerk of Court granted. Dkt. 23. Sanai then moved for default
judgment on September 4, 2025. Dkt. 26. On September 5, 2025, Judge Martínez-Olguín
referred that motion to the undersigned. Dkt. 30.4
II. Legal Standard
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55(b) permits entry of default judgment after the
Clerk of Court’s entry of default. Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(b). Whether to enter a default judgment
lies within the district court’s discretion. See NewGen, LLC v. Safe Cig, LLC, 840 F.3d 606,
616 (9th Cir. 2016). Before entering default judgment, a district court must first confirm that
Sanai,” then click “search”) (last visited January 13, 2026).
2 Sanai does not explain in the body of his complaint under what capacity Justice Jenkins is
sued. See dkt. 1 ¶ 5. The cover page to his complaint, however, explains that Justice Jenkins
is sued in his individual and official capacities. See dkt. 1.
3 Sanai seeks an injunction barring discipline against him until the State Bar has paid Sanai
damages. Dkt. 1 ¶ 127. But in his motion, Sanai clarifies that he is not seeking damages.
Dkt. 26 at 30.
4 Since then, Sanai has filed a motion for leave to file an overlength motion for default judg-
ment. Dkt. 28. Judge Martínez-Olguín previously denied such a motion, explicitly finding
the standard page limits sufficient for Sanai’s default judgment motion. Dkt. 25. In light of
this ruling, the undersigned did not review the supplemental briefs filed at dkts. 32 and 33.
Sanai additionally filed an “Ex Parte Motion to Vacate Submission of Dispositive Motion
for Injunctive Relief to Magistrate Judge and Objection Thereto.” Dkt. 31. This motion was
not referred to the undersigned and the undersigned expresses no opinion as to its merits.
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it has jurisdiction, both personal and subject matter. See In re Tuli, 172 F.3d 707, 712 (9th
Cir. 1999).
If jurisdiction exists, a court considers the following factors (the Eitel factors) to
determine whether default judgment is appropriate: “(1) the possibility of prejudice to the
plaintiff if judgment isn’t entered, (2) the merits of the plaintiff’s claims, (3) the sufficiency
of the complaint, (4) the sum of money at stake, (5) the possibility of a dispute concerning
material facts, (6) whether the default was due to excusable neglect, and (7) the strong policy
in favor of obtaining a decision on the merits.” NewGen, 840 F.3d at 616 (citing Eitel v.
McCool, 782 F.2d 1470, 1471–72 (9th Cir. 1986)).
Upon entry of default, the well-pleaded, factual allegations of the operative
complaint are taken as true, except for those relating to damages. TeleVideo Sys., Inc. v.
Heidenthal, 826 F.2d 915, 917–18 (9th Cir. 1987) (cleaned up).
III. Discussion
The undersigned recommends denying the motion for default judgment: the Court
lacks subject matter jurisdiction and, even if subject matter jurisdiction existed, the Court
should abstain under Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
A. Judicial Immunity Bars Claims.
State judges are absolutely immune from a suit for acts performed in their judicial
capacity. See Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985). Judges sued in their personal
capacity for decisions made in their judicial capacity are generally afforded absolute judicial
immunity. See Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 225–26 (1988); see also In re Castillo, 297
F.3d 940, 947 (9th Cir. 2002) (explaining that courts have “long recognized judicial
immunity, a sweeping form of immunity for acts performed by judges that relate to the
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judicial process.”). The doctrine of judicial immunity thus provides “an immunity from suit,
not just from ultimate assessment of damages.” Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11 (1991) (per
curiam).
There are some narrow exceptions to absolute immunity. Judicial immunity does not
apply to (1) “actions not taken in the judge’s judicial capacity” or (2) “actions, though
judicial in nature, taken in the complete absence of all jurisdiction.” Id. at 11–12. Whether a
judge acts in a judicial capacity turns on “the nature of the act itself, i.e., whether it is a
function normally performed by a judge, and to the expectations of the parties, i.e., whether
they dealt with the judge in his judicial capacity.” Id. at 12 (cleaned up).
Sanai’s claims against Defendants relate to actions taken in connection with his
disciplinary proceedings. For example, Sanai claims that Defendants denied him the due
process right to an impartial tribunal, dkt. 1 ¶ 122, by denying his requests for the production
of certain documents. Id. ¶¶ 119–22. He also seeks an injunction against enforcement of the
California Supreme Court’s suspension order and declaratory judgment stating that certain
California Supreme Court holdings are unconstitutional. Id. ¶ 127 & ¶ 130. Rulings on
motions and reviewing discipline recommendations from the State Bar are quintessentially
judicial acts. Defendants are entitled to absolute immunity for such acts. See Duvall v. Cnty.
of Kitsap, 260 F.3d 1124, 1133 (9th Cir. 2001), as amended on denial of reh’g (Oct. 11,
2001) (“Ruling on a motion is a normal judicial function . . . .”); Hirsh v. Justs. of Supreme
Ct. of State of Cal., 67 F.3d 708, 715 (9th Cir. 1995) (“The justices of the California Supreme
Court have absolute immunity for their role in reviewing the recommendations of the Bar
Court.”).5
5 Sanai also requests a finding that certain State Bar Court Rules of Procedure are
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Sanai spends much of his complaint and motion detailing the alleged corruption
within the California judiciary. First, much of Sanai’s argument focuses on the “State Bar’s
failure to investigate [Thomas] Girardi, an issue of no relevance to [Sanai’s] application to
enjoin the State Bar from disciplining [Sanai].” Sanai v. Cardona, No. 22-CV-01818-JST,
2023 WL 3101512, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 22, 2023), aff’d sub nom. Roshan v. Lawrence, No.
21-15771, 2024 WL 339100 (9th Cir. Jan. 30, 2024).
Second, the majority of Sanai’s allegations focus on the conduct of actors not
currently before the Court, not actions by these Defendants. And to the extent Sanai does
allege action by these Defendants, characterizing generally judicial acts as being corrupt fails
to negate the application of absolute immunity. For example, even “a conspiracy between
judge and prosecutor to predetermine the outcome of a judicial proceeding, while clearly
improper, nevertheless does not pierce the immunity extended to judges . . . . As long as the
judge’s ultimate acts are judicial actions taken within the court’s subject matter jurisdiction,
immunity applies.” Ashelman v. Pope, 793 F.2d 1072, 1078 (9th Cir. 1986). Defendants are
entitled to absolute judicial immunity against any claims for money damages.
B. Eleventh Amendment Bars Claims.
The Eleventh Amendment prohibits federal courts from hearing suits brought against
a nonconsenting state. Munoz v. Super. Ct. of Los Angeles Cnty., 91 F.4th 977, 980 (9th Cir.
2024). “This prohibition applies when the ‘state or the ‘arm of a state’ is a defendant.’” Id.
So, a suit against individual state judges or justices in their judicial capacity is additionally
unconstitutional. Dkt. 1 ¶ 127. Defendants have legislative immunity for the promulgation
of such rules. See Supreme Ct. of Virginia v. Consumers Union of U. S., Inc., 446 U.S. 719,
721 & 734 (1980) (finding that the “Supreme Court of Virginia . . . and its chief justice are
officially immune from suit in an action brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 challenging the
Virginia Court’s disciplinary rules” under legislative immunity).
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barred by the Eleventh Amendment. See id. at 980–81 (citing Whole Woman’s Health v.
Jackson, 595 U.S. 30, 39 (2021)).
Many of Sanai’s allegations relate to actions taken in connection with his State Bar
disciplinary proceedings, and he seeks relief in connection with those proceedings. These
allegations undoubtably relate to judicial acts, as found above. Sanai’s claims against
Defendants on this basis for retrospective relief are therefore barred by the Eleventh
Amendment and the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to hear them. See Munoz, 91
F.4th at 981 (“Eleventh Amendment immunity is a threshold jurisdictional issue, and we
have no power to resolve claims brought against state courts or state court judges acting in
a judicial capacity.”).6
C. The Court Should Abstain Under Younger.
Sanai also seeks an injunction against enforcement of disciplinary actions against
him and declaratory relief. See, e.g., dkt. 1 ¶ 127 & ¶ 130. The Court takes judicial notice of
Sanai’s State Bar disciplinary records, see White, 601 F.3d at 885, which indicate that
proceedings against Sanai are ongoing in case number SBC-23-N-31004. On October 15,
2025, the State Bar Court’s recommendation was filed with the Supreme Court, which has
yet to rule.
“Younger and its progeny generally direct federal courts to abstain from granting
injunctive or declaratory relief that would interfere with pending state judicial proceedings.
Absent extraordinary circumstances, abstention in favor of state judicial proceedings is
6 To the extent that Sanai seeks to challenge the constitutionality of the State Bar’s rules by
suing these Defendants, that path is not available. “[A]s Ex parte Young explained, this tra-
ditional exception does not normally permit federal courts to issue injunctions against state-
court judges or clerks. . . . ‘[A]n injunction against a state court’ or its ‘machinery’ ‘would
be a violation of the whole scheme of our Government.’” Whole Woman’s Health v. Jackson,
595 U.S. 30, 39 (2021) (citing Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 159–60 (1908)).
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required if the state proceedings (1) are ongoing, (2) implicate important state interests, and
(3) provide the plaintiff an adequate opportunity to litigate federal claims.” Hirsh, 67 F.3d
at 712 (cleaned up) (citing Middlesex Cty. Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar Ass’n, 457
U.S. 423 (1982)). The Ninth Circuit has already held that ongoing California State Bar
disciplinary proceedings satisfy the three Middlesex prongs for purposes of Younger
abstention. See, e.g., Canatella v. California, 404 F.3d 1106, 1110–12 (9th Cir. 2005)
(“California’s attorney discipline proceedings are judicial in character for purposes of
Younger abstention,” “implicate important state interests,” and “provide [a defendant] with
an adequate opportunity to litigate his federal constitutional claims”).
Additionally, “[t]he requested relief must seek to enjoin or have the practical effect
of enjoining — ongoing state proceedings.” ReadyLink Healthcare, Inc. v. State Comp. Ins.
Fund, 754 F.3d 754, 758 (9th Cir. 2014). Here, Sanai expressly asks the Court to enjoin
disciplinary proceedings, dkt. 1 ¶ 130, which as noted above are ongoing.
If each of these conditions is met, as here, Younger abstention is appropriate unless
“there is a showing of bad faith, harassment, or some other extraordinary circumstance that
would make abstention inappropriate.” Arevalo v. Hennessy, 882 F.3d 763, 765–66 (9th Cir.
2018) (cleaned up). Sanai has not attempted to demonstrate that extraordinary circumstances
apply. See dkt. 26 (motion) at 29. Indeed, judges in this District adjudicating similar cases
filed by Sanai denied relief, citing Younger. See, e.g., Sanai v. Kruger, No. 23-CV-01057-
AMO, 2023 WL 5496477 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 24, 2023); Sanai v. Cardona, 2023 WL 3101512.
The Ninth Circuit then affirmed in an unpublished decision. See Roshan v. Lawrence, No.
21-15771, 2024 WL 339100 (9th Cir. Jan. 30, 2024). The recommendation is thus clear:
abstain.
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IV. Conclusion
For the reasons stated above, the undersigned recommends denial of Sanai’s motion
for default judgment.
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636 and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72, a party may
serve and file any objections within fourteen days of being served with a copy. Failure to
file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal Judge Martínez-
Olguín’s order.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: January 13, 2026
______________________________
Alex G. Tse
United States Magistrate Judge
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