Muhammad v. Oliveros et al

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United States District Court
Northern District of California
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
KWESI MUHAMMAD,
Plaintiff,
v.
MARISOL HERNANDEZ, et al.,
Defendants.
Case No. 22-cv-01604-AMO (PR)
ORDER DENYING DEFENDANTS’
MOTION FOR COSTS AND DENYING
REMAINING PENDING MOTIONS AS
MOOT
Re: Dkt. Nos. 43, 46
This is a closed federal civil rights action filed by Plaintiff Kwesi Muhammad, who
represented himself. On August 19, 2025, the Court granted Defendants’ summary judgment
motion and entered judgment in favor of Defendants. Dkts. 41, 42. Now pending before the
Court is Defendants’ motion for costs, seeking $1,512.00 for Defendants’ cost of litigation,
including costs to depose Muhammad and various filing fees.1 Dkt. 43-1 at 7-8. Muhammad has
filed an objection to the motion for costs, arguing that this action was neither frivolous nor brought
in bad faith, and imposing such costs would “chill future civil rights litigation.” Dkt. 44 at 1-2.
Muhammad also states that he is unable to pay the costs. Id. at 2.
Rule 54(d)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides in pertinent part that
“[u]nless a federal statute, these rules, or a court order provides otherwise, costs — other than
attorney’s fees — should be allowed to the prevailing party.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(d)(1). While the
rule creates a presumption in favor of awarding costs to a prevailing party, it also vests district
courts with the discretion to refuse to award costs. Ass’n of Mexican-Am. Educators v. State of
Cal., 231 F.3d 572, 591 (9th Cir. 2000). A district court “must state reasons for the denial of costs
1 Defendants have also filed a motion for extension of time to file a reply to Muhammad’s
opposition to their motion for costs. Dkt. 43. Muhammad subsequently filed a motion for leave to
file a surreply to Defendants’ reply. Dkt. 46. Both motions are DENIED as moot because the
Court did not consider the reply and surreply when deciding the motion for costs. Dkts. 43, 46.
Case 3:22-cv-01604-AMO Document 49 Filed 02/20/26 Page 1 of 3

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United States District Court
Northern District of California
so that the appellate court will be able to determine whether or not the trial court abused its
discretion.” Subscription Television, Inc. v. S. Cal. Theatre Owners Ass’n, 576 F.2d 230, 234 (9th
Cir. 1978).
A prevailing party is entitled to recover costs even in the case of indigent prisoner litigants.
Monroe v. U.S. Marshals, 101 F.3d 706, 1996 WL 665147, at *2 (9th Cir. 1996). However, in a
civil rights action, consideration of a plaintiff’s limited resources is an appropriate reason for
denial of costs. Ass’n of Mexican-Am. Educators, 231 F.3d at 593. The court should also consider
the financial resources of the plaintiff and the chilling effect on future similar actions. Stanley v.
Univ. of S. Cal., 178 F.3d 1069, 1079 (9th Cir. 1999); see also Nat’l Org. for Women v. Bank of
Cal., 680 F.2d 1291, 1294 (9th Cir. 1982).
In Draper v. Rosario, the Ninth Circuit held that the district court abused its discretion
when it awarded $3,018.35 against the plaintiff alleging Eighth Amendment violations in a state
prison. See 836 F.3d 1072, 1089 (9th Cir. 2016). The Ninth Circuit found that individual Eighth
Amendment cases are important for safeguarding the rights and safety of prisoners, indicating that
it is a case of substantial public importance. Id. at 1088. The Ninth Circuit also found that the
case was close because the plaintiff’s evidence was sufficient to survive summary judgment,
leaving it to the jury to assess competing accounts of the alleged events. Id. The Ninth Circuit
further reasoned that such a large cost award could chill similar lawsuits challenging Eighth
Amendment violations in jails and prisons. Id. “Many would-be litigants in Eighth Amendment
excessive force cases . . . have virtually no resources. Even those with meritorious cases may
choose not to risk an unsuccessful lawsuit that could add to the fees and costs associated with
conviction and imprisonment.” Id. Finally, the Ninth Circuit noted that district courts have
routinely declined to award costs against prisoners representing themselves proceeding under
similar circumstances, citing potential chilling effects. Id. at 1088-89 (citing Baltimore v.
Haggins, No. 1:10-CV-00931-LJO, 2014 WL 804463, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 27, 2014) (denying
$1,462.61 in costs and noting that potential chilling effect of being taxed with costs upon defeat
cannot be ignored in indigent inmates’ section 1983 cases)).
Here, the Court takes judicial notice of Muhammad’s limited resources. The Court
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United States District Court
Northern District of California
concludes that Muhammad’s limited resources, combined with the possibility that the imposition
of the award would have a chilling effect on civil rights litigants, render an award of costs against
Muhammad inequitable. The Court therefore declines to award costs to Defendants and against
Muhammad.
Accordingly, Defendants’ motion for costs is DENIED. Dkt. 43. Defendants’ motion for
an extension of time to file a reply and Muhammad’s motion for leave to file a surreply to
Defendants’ reply are DENIED as moot because the Court did not consider the reply and surreply
when deciding the motion for costs. Dkts. 43, 46.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated:
ARACELI MARTÍNEZ-OLGUÍN
United States District Judge
February 20, 2026
Case 3:22-cv-01604-AMO Document 49 Filed 02/20/26 Page 3 of 3