Bertuccio v. California State Contractors License Board et al

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For The Northern District Of California
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DECISION IN PART ON DEBTOR’S ACTION FOR
DAMAGES FOR VIOLATION OF THE AUTOMATIC STAY
UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
In re 	] 	Case No. 04-56255
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Frank Bertuccio, 	] 	Chapter 13
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Debtor. 	]
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Frank Bertuccio, 	] 	Adversary No. 04-5524
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Plaintiff, 	]
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vs. 	]
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California State Contractors 	]
License Board, et al. 	]
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Defendants. 	]
___________________________________]
DECISION IN PART ON DEBTOR’S ACTION FOR DAMAGES FOR
VIOLATION OF THE AUTOMATIC STAY
On November 11, 2004, Debtor Frank Bertuccio (“Debtor”) filed a
Complaint for Preliminary Injunction and Declaratory Relief
(“Complaint”) against Defendants California State Contractors
License Board (“CSLB”), the California State Employment Development
Department (“EDD”), Stephen P. Sands as the Registrar of the CSLB
(“Sands”) and Sally McKeag as the Chief Deputy Director of the EDD
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Signed December 31, 2008
Arthur S. Weissbrodt
U.S. Bankruptcy Judge
________________________________________
Entered on Docket
December 31, 2008
GLORIA L. FRANKLIN, CLERK
U.S BANKRUPTCY COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
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1 	Unless otherwise provided, all references to code sections
shall mean the Bankruptcy Code, codified in Title 11 of the United
States Code, 11 U.S.C. § 101, et seq., including all amendments
thereto, as applicable at the time this Adversary Proceeding was
filed on November 1, 2004.
2 	Trial Exhibit U. 	The exhibits admitted at trial were
submitted by the parties on a joint basis. 	The parties stipulated
DECISION IN PART ON DEBTOR’S ACTION FOR
DAMAGES FOR VIOLATION OF THE AUTOMATIC STAY 2
(“McKeag”)(collectively, “Defendants”). 	The Complaint alleges that
the Defendants willfully violated the automatic stay by failing to
timely reinstate the Debtor’s contractor’s license upon notice of
his bankruptcy filing. 	The Debtor seeks actual and exemplary
damages against the Defendants pursuant to Bankruptcy Code
§ 362(h). 1
Debtor is represented by Cathleen Cooper Moran, Esq. of the
Moran Law Group. 	Defendants Sands and the CSLB (hereinafter,
collectively, the “CSLB” unless otherwise specified) are
represented by Maretta D. Ward, Esq., Deputy Attorney General for
the State of California. 	Defendants McKeag and the EDD
(hereinafter, collectively the “EDD” unless otherwise specified)
are represented by Marguerite C. Stricklin, Esq., Deputy Attorney
General for the State of California.
This Memorandum Decision constitutes the Court’s findings of
fact and conclusions of law, pursuant to Rule 7052 fo the Federal
Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure (“Bankruptcy Rules”).
I.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On or about October 14, 1994, the Debtor applied with the CSLB
for a flooring and floor covering contractor’s license. 2 	On
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on the record to the admission of Trial Exhibits A-V.
3 	Trial Exhibits A, N and O.
4 	On May 2, 2000, the Debtor changed the name of his
business, in the records of the CSLB, to “Statewide Professional
Services/European Hardwood Floors.” 	Statewide Professional
Services, Inc. was later incorporated by the Debtor on
September 6, 2001 (“Statewide”). 	Trial Exhibit B. 	Statewide’s
corporate status was suspended on July 21, 2004. 	Id.
On November 7, 2005 –- roughly one month after the Debtor
filed his Chapter 13 petition and a few days after the filing of
this Adversary Proceeding –- Statewide filed its own Chapter 7
petition. 	The Debtor signed Statewide’s petition as its President
and authorized agent. 	Statewide’s schedules indicate that the
Debtor’s “new corporation” “European Floor Coverings” purchased
most of Statewide’s assets. 	Statewide’s Schedule E lists a
$37,514.00 debt owing to the EDD. 	No proof of claim was filed by
the EDD in Statewide’s case. 	Statewide’s Schedule E showed total
unsecured priority debts of $131,983.00. 	Statewide had no secured
debts and only $72,156.36 in general unsecured debts. 	Statewide’s
Statement of Financial Affairs indicates that the EDD seized
approximately $68,000 from Statewide’s accounts between 2002 and
2005. 	A Final Decree was entered in Statewide’s bankruptcy case on
February 21, 2006.
In the Debtor’s instant bankruptcy case, the EDD filed a claim
in total amount of $12,385,34 for the tax period from April 1, 2001
through September 30, 2001, asserting a priority as to $11,797.22
of that amount. 	Trial Exhibit J. 	The tax period covered by this
claim was prior to the incorporation of Statewide by the Debtor on
September 6, 2001, and, therefore, presumably while the Debtor was
operating his business as a “sole owner.”
5 	EDD’s Closing Post Trial Brief, Attachment 1. 	This
attachment is the May 1, 2008 Decision by the CSLB (the “CSLB
Decision”). 	The CSLB Decision references and attaches the
April 14, 2008 Proposed Decision by Administrative Law Judge
Melissa G. Crowell (the “Proposed Decision”). 	A complete copy of
the CSLB Decision, with the attached Proposed Decision, is attached
DECISION IN PART ON DEBTOR’S ACTION FOR
DAMAGES FOR VIOLATION OF THE AUTOMATIC STAY 3
March 30, 1995, the CSLB issued a contractor’s license to the
Debtor, as a sole owner business, under the business name of
European Hardwood Floors Design & Interiors. 3 	Between May 2, 2000 4
and April 23, 2003, the Debtor changed the name of his business in
the records of the CSLB three times. 5
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as Attachment 1 to EDD’s Closing Post Trial Brief. 	A complete copy
of the CSLB Decision, with the attached Proposed Decision, is also
included as Exhibit B to the Chamber’s Copy of the Request for
Judicial Notice Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Section 201, filed by the
CSLB on June 25, 2008 (the “Request for Judicial Notice”).
However, the electronically-filed version of the Request for
Judicial Notice posted on the Court’s docket does not include the
Proposed Decision. 	Assuming that the copy served on the parties
included the Proposed Decision, counsel for the CSLB should correct
the version posted on the Court’s website to also attach the
Proposed Decision. 	For the sake of clarity in the meantime, when
referencing the CSLB Decision, the Court will cite to Attachment 1
of EDD’s Closing Post Trial Brief since the electronically-filed
version of this document includes the Proposed Decision.
6 	EDD’s Closing Post Trial Brief, Attachment 1.
7 	Staci Pugh of the CSLB testified at trial that this
application was “returned because we needed additional information
regarding corporate titles and because the EDD liability needed to
be complied with.” 	Trial Transcript, Vol. II, 37:9-11. 	However,
the Proposed Decision issued by Administrative Law Judge Melissa G.
Crowell indicates that on April 23, 2003, the CSLB granted this
application for a corporate license. 	EDD’s Closing Post Trial
Brief, Attachment 1.
8 	Trial Exhibit E.
DECISION IN PART ON DEBTOR’S ACTION FOR
DAMAGES FOR VIOLATION OF THE AUTOMATIC STAY 4
On April 10, 2003, the Debtor signed an application with the
CSLB to change the business’ status to a corporation with the name
of European Hardwood Floors Design and Interiors. 6 	It is unclear,
from the evidence currently before this Court, whether this
April 2003 application was ever granted. 7 	The California Secretary
of State has no record of any corporation named European Hardwood
Floors Design and Interiors.
On June 25, 2003, the EDD advised the CSLB that the Debtor was
in violation of state law for failing to pay taxes in the amount of
$34,517.46. 8 	This tax liability is based on an uncontested audit
by the EDD, for the period beginning January 1, 1999 through
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9 	Trial Transcript, Vol. I., 45:12-24 and Trial Exhibits C
and D.
10 	Trial Exhibit E.
11 	Trial Exhibit F.
12 	Trial Transcript, Vol. I., 12:13-22. 	The Debtor testified
at trial that 20-30% of his business was attributable to the sale
of flooring material without associated installation. 	Trial
Transcript, Vol. I., 20:3-6. 	The Debtor further testified at trial
that, just prior to the suspension of his contractor’s license in
the Summer of 2003, the installation portion of his business
realized about $50,000/month in gross sales. 	Trial Transcript,
Vol. I, 21:3-5. 	Of this gross amount, the cost to the Debtor for
the labor and materials was approximately $10,000. 	Trial
Transcript, Vol. I, 21:10-12, 23:5-8. Prior to the suspension of
his contractor’s license, the Debtor grossed roughly $10,000-
$15,000/month from material sales. 	Trial Transcript, Vol. I.,
25:10-12.
DECISION IN PART ON DEBTOR’S ACTION FOR
DAMAGES FOR VIOLATION OF THE AUTOMATIC STAY 5
September 30, 2001. 9 	On June 26, 2003, the CSLB sent a letter to
the Debtor advising him of his default with the EDD and the
potential suspension of his license if the default was not
corrected. 10 	On August 26, 2003, the CSLB suspended the Debtor’s
contractor’s license for failing to resolve the outstanding 2001
tax liability owing to the EDD, in accordance with California
Business and Professions Code § 7145.5. 11
While his contractor’s license was suspended, the Debtor
continued to operate his business. 	At trial, the Debtor insisted
that he only continued that portion of his business related to the
sale of flooring materials, for which the Debtor contends a
contractor’s license was not needed. 12 	The evidence shows, however,
that in early October 2004, while the Debtor’s contractor’s license
was suspended, he entered into contracts for the installation of
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13 	Trial Exhibits P, Q and R.
14 	Trial Transcript, Vol. I, 27:7-28:5.
15 	Declaration of Frank Bertuccio in Support of Motion for
Preliminary Injunction, filed by the Debtor on November 9, 2004.
16 	Trial Exhibit M.
17 	Trial Exhibit T.
18 	Trial Exhibit G.
19 	Trial Exhibit G.
DECISION IN PART ON DEBTOR’S ACTION FOR
DAMAGES FOR VIOLATION OF THE AUTOMATIC STAY 6
hardwood flooring with at least two parties. 13 	The Debtor testified
that he entered into the contracts in question believing that his
contractor’s license would be reinstated –- in light of his Chapter
13 bankruptcy filing –- in sufficient time to perform the
installations called for in the contracts. 14
The contracts in question were initially brought into evidence
by the Debtor as evidence of the alleged damages he sustained as a
result of the Defendants’ failure to timely reinstate his
contractor’s license. 15 	As further evidence of the damage he
incurred from not having his contractor’s licence, at trial the
Debtor submitted copies of his business’ phone log of calls from
potential customers between October 8, 2004 and October 30, 2004. 16
On October 7, 2004, the Debtor filed a Chapter 13 bankruptcy
petition. 	On October 8, 2004, the Debtor’s counsel provided actual
notice to the CSLB of the Debtor’s bankruptcy filing via facsimile
and asked that the Debtor’s license be reinstated. 17 	On
October 14, 2008, the CSLB relayed this information to the EDD. 18
The EDD declined the request by the CSLB for permission to lift the
suspension of the Debtor’s contractor’s license. 19 	On
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20 	Trial Exhibit G.
21 	Trial Brief in Opposition to Debtor’s Amended Motion for
Damages and Attorney’s Fees, filed by the EDD on January 28, 2008,
2:21-23. 	See also, Deposition of Morris Hampton of the EDD,
admitted into evidence at trial by stipulation of the parties, at
26:17-27:25:
[Morris Hampton answering]
A. 	It was another request for reinstatement of the
license.
[Attorney Cathleen Cooper Moran questioning]
Q. 	What did you do?
A. 	I believe I contacted your office and tried to
ascertain some information on the nature of how the
plan was going to be funded because there wasn’t a
plan at that time. 	And I didn’t know what was
different in what I was seeing than what had been
present in the past.
Q. 	What relevance did you believe that had, that
information you were seeking had to the decision to
reinstate the license or not to reinstate the
license?
A. 	To our knowledge, the debtor was in a situation
where he was earning wages and could fund it other
than with the Contractors License.
. . .
DECISION IN PART ON DEBTOR’S ACTION FOR
DAMAGES FOR VIOLATION OF THE AUTOMATIC STAY 7
October 18, 2004, the Debtor’s counsel called the EDD directly and
again requested a release of the Debtor’s license. 	In response,
the EDD’s representative asked if the Debtor’s Chapter 13 plan
required the use of his contractor’s license. 20 	The EDD has argued
that “[s]ince the debtor had continuously received earnings during
the period his contractor’s license was suspended, it was not clear
to EDD that the debtor needed the license to fund the plan.” 21 	On
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Q. 	My question is: What information did you think you
needed to have in order to recommend reinstatement
of the license?
A. 	Why did he need the license?
Q. 	You thought that was the central issue to whether
the license ought to be reinstated or not?
A. 	Based on the fact that he was earning wages to fund
a plan, yes.
Q. 	So was it your thought then that if he was earning
wages he didn’t need a license?
A. 	He was consistently earning wages at the same place.
Q. 	And therefore what?
A. 	What was different in needing the license that he
hadn’t had for almost a year and a half.
22 	Deposition of Morris Hampton at 32:5-7.
23 	Trial Transcript, Vol. II, 25:12-17; Trial Exhibit G.
24 	Trial Transcript, Vol. II, at 27:1-3.
25 	Id. at 27:5-8.
26 	Id. at 27:12-13.
DECISION IN PART ON DEBTOR’S ACTION FOR
DAMAGES FOR VIOLATION OF THE AUTOMATIC STAY 8
October 22, 2004, the EDD received a copy of the Debtor’s Chapter
13 plan from the Debtor’s counsel, as requested. 22
On November 1, 2004, the Debtor’s attorney called to advise the
CSLB that she would be filing a motion seeking an injunction and
would fax those documents to the CSLB. 23 	The CSLB received this fax
and forwarded it to the EDD. 24 	After this fax was sent to the EDD,
the CSLB received an email from the EDD’s representative
authorizing the release of the license. 25 	The CSLB released the
Debtor’s contractor’s license that same day. 26
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27 	On November 1, 2004, the CSLB was instructed by the EDD
that the suspension of the Debtor’s license could be lifted. 	Trial
Exhibit I. 	The CSLB lifted the license suspension on
November 1, 2004. 	On November 2, 2004, the CSLB sent a letter to
the Debtor indicating his license had been reinstated effective
November 1, 2004. 	Trial Exhibit K. 	Also on November 2, 2004,
Staci Pugh of the CSLB called the Debtor’s counsel to advise her of
the reinstatement and left a message. 	Trial Transcript, Vol. II,
52:14-53:1.
28 	Trial Exhibits D and S.
29 	Trial Exhibit V.
DECISION IN PART ON DEBTOR’S ACTION FOR
DAMAGES FOR VIOLATION OF THE AUTOMATIC STAY 9
On November 1, 2004, the Debtor commenced this Adversary
Proceeding by filing the Complaint. 	On November 3, 2004, a hearing
was held on the Debtor’s motion for a temporary restraining order
and preliminary injunction against the Defendants. 	Not aware that
the Debtor’s contractor’s license had been reinstated just two days
before, on November 1, 2004 27 , the Court issued a Preliminary
Injunction through December 9, 2004, requiring the immediate
reinstatement of the Debtor’s contractor’s license. 	At the
January 27, 2004 continued hearing of this matter, the Debtor’s
request for a preliminary injunction was denied as moot.
On December 16, 2004, the Debtor filed a motion for damages for
violation of the automatic stay (the “Motion for Damages”).
Roughly nine months after the filing of his Chapter 13
bankruptcy, on July 8, 2005, the Debtor formed a California
corporation named European Floor Coverings, Inc. 28 	About seven
months later, on February 14, 2006, the Debtor filed an application
with the CSLB for a corporate license under the name European Floor
Coverings, Inc. 29 	The Debtor testified at trial that this second
application was not granted because his contractor’s license was
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30 	Trial Transcript, Vol. I., 57:18-24.
31 	Trial Transcript, Vol. II, 39:14-40:1. 	The Debtor
testified at trial that the CSLB requested a copy of his “rap
sheet” as part of his application for a corporate license. 	Trial
Transcript, Vol. II, 99:3-4. 	The Debtor testified that this rap
sheet was provided to the CSLB three times, but because it was not
provided by the Debtor in the correct format and in a timely
matter, the application was void and he would have to reapply.
Trial Transcript, Vol. II., 95:23-96:1, 103:5-10.
32 	Trial Exhibit M and Trial Transcript, Vol. I., 57:7-13.
33 	Defendant Contractors’ State License Board Post-Trial
Brief, filed June 25, 2008, at 2:2-5 states: “During cross-
examination on a mundane matter, Plaintiff Bertuccio made an
untruthful statement. 	When that statement was investigated
further, it was discovered that Plaintiff Bertuccio had
fraudulently obtained the contracting license on which he was
attempting to sue CSLB.”
See also Defendant Contractors State License Board and
Registrar Stephen P. Sands Post Trial Brief (“CSLB’s Post Trial
Brief”), filed May 30, 2008, at 6:13-14. 	The CSLB has argued in
its Post Trial Brief that the Debtor “has committed multiple acts
of bankruptcy fraud against this Court from filing and pursuing
DECISION IN PART ON DEBTOR’S ACTION FOR
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suspended. 30 	However, evidence presented by the CSLB at trial shows
this application was denied for other reasons, which would become
very significant after the trial. 	In considering this application,
the CSLB asked for additional information regarding the Debtor’s
criminal history. 	The Debtor failed to respond to this request for
information and the “application went void for failure to comply.” 31
Evidence presented at trial shows that the Debtor was using the
business name “European Floor Coverings” as early as October 2004. 32
Trial on this matter was held on February 13 and 15, 2008. 	The
CSLB has alleged that, in the course of the trial, it learned for
the first time that the Debtor had lied on his original application
for a contractor’s license, as well as on his subsequent
applications for corporate contractor’s licenses. 33 	Specifically,
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this matter to knowing that he had essentially stolen the license
at issue, to each of the documents he filed in relation to his
claim.” 	CSLB’s Post Trial Brief at 12:3-5. 	The CSLB has also
asked that the Debtor’s attorney, Cathleen Moran, be sanctioned for
“prosecuting an action on an illegal contract and participating in
bankruptcy fraud.” 	CSLB’s Post Trial Brief at 17:11. 	CSLB also
“preserves all of its rights to pursue state and federal criminal
charges against Plaintiff that were discovered during this case
even though not listed on Defendant’s Answer.” 	CSLB’s Post Trial
Brief at 13, n. 8.
34 	CSLB’s Post Trial Brief at 4:17-18. 	At trial, Staci Pugh
testified that, in her 26½ years of experience of working for the
CSLB, she had never known the CSLB to issue a license to an
applicant with Plaintiff’s criminal history. 	Trial Transcript,
Vol. II, 43:12-17. 	Ms. Pugh is currently a Programmer II with the
CSLB. 	Id. at 9:16. 	Between 1995 and 2006, Ms. Pugh worked in the
Judgment Unit of the CSLB, where she was responsible for first
suspending the Debtor’s license and then lifting that suspension at
the direction of the EDD. 	Id. at 13:8-27:13.
35 	EDD’s Closing Post Trial Brief, filed May 30, 2008,
Attachment 1.
36 	Id.
DECISION IN PART ON DEBTOR’S ACTION FOR
DAMAGES FOR VIOLATION OF THE AUTOMATIC STAY 11
the Debtor failed to disclose several prior criminal convictions.
Trial Transcript, Vol. II, p.60:14-63:4. 	The CSLB insisted that
the Debtor “had multiple convictions for serious crimes and acts
for which CSLB will routinely not issue a license.” 34
On April 11, 2008, a hearing was held before the CSLB regarding
the revocation of the Debtor’s contractor’s license. 35 	On April 16,
2008, Administrative Law Judge Melissa G. Crowell issued a proposed
decision to revoke the Debtor’s contractor’s license in light of
his repeated failure to disclose his criminal record, as well as
his entry into contracts for the installation of flooring while his
license was suspended. 36 	On May 1, 2008, the CSLB issued a decision
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37 	Request for Judicial Notice Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Section
201, filed by CSLB on 6/25/08, Exhibit B.
38 	Id.
39 	Bankruptcy Code § 362 was substantially amended by the
Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005
(the “BAPCPA”). 	Upon the enactment of the BAPCPA, what had been
362(h) became 362(k)(1). 	In addition, the BAPCPA added 362(k)(2),
which now limits recovery to the actual damages sustained if the
violating entity’s actions were in good faith. 	However, this
Adversary Proceeding was filed prior to the enactment of the
BAPCPA, therefore, as also noted at footnote 1, the code sections
referenced herein shall refer to the Bankruptcy Code as it was in
effect at the time of the filing of this Adversary Proceeding.
DECISION IN PART ON DEBTOR’S ACTION FOR
DAMAGES FOR VIOLATION OF THE AUTOMATIC STAY 12
adopting the proposed decision of Judge Crowell. 37 	On June 2, 2008,
the decision of the CSLB became final and the Debtor’s contractor’s
license was again revoked, this time with a one year bar for
reapplying for a reissuance or reinstatement. 38
II.
ANALYSIS
In both his Complaint and his Motion for Damages, the Debtor
has alleged that the Defendants willfully violated the automatic
stay by failing to timely reinstate his contractor’s license upon
notice of his bankruptcy filing. 	The Debtor seeks actual and
exemplary damages against the Defendants pursuant to Bankruptcy
Code § 362(h). 39 	Section 362(h) creates a statutory remedy for
individual debtors who are injured by a violation of the automatic
stay. 	It provides:
(h) An individual injured by any willful violation of a
stay provided by this section shall recover actual damages,
including costs and attorneys' fees, and, in appropriate
circumstances, may recover punitive damages.
11 U.S.C. § 362(h). 	A party seeking damages for violation of the
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40 	The official notice of the bankruptcy filing was not mailed
by the Court until October 28, 2004. 	However, it is common for key
creditors to receive actual notice of the filing prior to the
issuance of the notice from the Court. 	“Such ‘informal’ notice
. . . can constitute notice sufficient for a finding of
willfulness.” 	March, Ahart & Tchaikovksy, CAL. PRAC. GUIDE:
BANKRUPTCY (The Rutter Group 2007) at ¶ 8:880, citing In re Abrams,
127 B.R. 239, 240-244 (9 th Cir. BAP 1991)(creditor who repossessed
debtor’s vehicle postpetition, without knowledge of the bankruptcy
filing, willfully violated stay by refusing to return vehicle after
being notified of debtor’s bankruptcy by fax from debtor’s
attorney); In re Knaus, 889 F.2d 773, 775 (8 th Cir. 1989)(creditor’s
failure to return property lawfully taken prepetition after
bankruptcy notification and demand from debtor constituted willful
violation of stay).
DECISION IN PART ON DEBTOR’S ACTION FOR
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automatic stay must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that
(1) a bankruptcy petition was filed; (2) the debtor is an
individual; (3) the creditor received notice of the petition;
(4) the creditor’s actions were in willful violation of the stay;
and (5) the debtor suffered damages. 	In re Henry, 328 B.R. 664,
667 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2005)(citations omitted).
The parties agree as to the underlying facts in this case and,
therefore, the first three elements of this cause of action are
easily met. 	The Debtor filed a Chapter 13 petition on
October 7, 2004. 	On October 8, 2004, the Debtor’s counsel provided
actual notice of the filing to the CSLB via facsimile and asked
that the Debtor’s license be reinstated. 40 	On October 14, 2004, the
CSLB relayed this information to the EDD. 	A subsequent request for
reinstatement was made by the Debtor’s counsel to the EDD and
further exchanges occurred. 	The Debtor’s license was not
reinstated until November 1, 2004, when the EDD finally authorized
the CSLB to do so. 	Therefore, a total of twenty-four days elapsed
between the date upon which the CSLB was given actual notice and
the reinstatement of the Debtor’s license. 	The CSLB had notice of
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the Debtor’s bankruptcy for six days before relaying that
information to the EDD to request permission to reinstate the
license. 	Then, an additional eighteen days elapsed between the
time the EDD received notice and the reinstatement of the Debtor’s
license. 	It also appears from the evidence presented that the
license was reinstated on November 1, 2004 in response to the
Debtor’s Complaint, which was faxed to the Defendants and filed
that same day. 41
The disagreements between the parties relate to the final two
elements of this cause action –- the Defendants’ alleged willful
violation of the stay and the alleged damages suffered by the
Debtor. 	The Court must, therefore, decide two separate issues to
resolve this matter. 	First, did the Defendants willfully violate
the automatic stay by failing to reinstate promptly the Debtor’s
contractor’s license postpetition? 	Second, if so, what are the
Debtor’s actual damages for such violation?
A. 	Willful Violation
On the issue of whether a violation of the automatic stay is
“willful,” the Ninth Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate Panel has held:
An award of actual damages under § 362(h) requires a
showing by the debtor that she sustained an injury from a
“willful” violation of the stay. 	A “willful violation”
does not require specific intent to violate the automatic
stay. 	A violation of the automatic stay is “willful” if
1) the creditor knew of the stay and 2) the creditor’s
actions, which violated the automatic stay, were
intentional.
In re Roman, 283 B.R. 1, 7-8 (9 th Cir. BAP 2002) (internal citations
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omitted). 	Accord, In Re Pace, 67 F.3d 187, 191 (9 th Cir. 1995); In
Re Bloom, 875 F.2d 224, 227 (9 th Cir. 1989); In re Abrams, 127 B.R.
239, 243 (9 th Cir. BAP 1991).
Once a creditor knows that the automatic stay exists, the
creditor bears the risk of all intentional acts that
violate the automatic stay regardless of whether the
creditor means to violate the automatic stay.
In re Campion, 294 B.R. 313, 318 (9 th Cir. BAP 2003).
The parties agree that the prepetition suspension of the
Debtor’s contractor’s license was not a violation of any stay.
There is also no dispute that, after being notified of the Debtor’s
bankruptcy filing, the CSLB and the EDD failed to reinstate the
license for twenty-four days. 	The issue is whether the delay in
the reinstatement of the license constitutes a willful violation of
the automatic stay.
The applicable provision of Bankruptcy Code § 362(a)(1)
provides as follows:
Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, a
petition filed under section 301, 302, or 303 of this
title, or an application filed under section 5(a)(3) of the
Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970, operates as a
stay, applicable to all entities, of--
(1) the commencement or continuation, including the
issuance or employment of process, of a judicial,
administrative, or other action or proceeding against the
debtor that was or could have been commenced before the
commencement of the case under this title, or to recover a
claim against the debtor that arose before the commencement
of the case under this title;
11 U.S.C § 362(a)(1).
The Debtor notes that 362(a)(1) specifically prohibits the
continuation of an administrative proceeding pending against the
Debtor that was commenced prepetition. 	The Debtor contends that
the suspension of his contractor’s license constitutes such an
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administrative proceeding. 	In response to the Debtor’s arguments
that the Defendants willfully violated the automatic stay, the
Defendants raise several defenses. 	First, the Defendants argue
that no violation occurred since they took no affirmative act after
the commencement of the Debtor’s bankruptcy case to collect the
debt owed by the Debtor to the EDD. 	Second, the Defendants argue
that their actions related to the reinstatement of the Debtor’s
contractor’s license are protected under the “police powers”
exception of § 362(b)(4). 	Third, the EDD argues that the stay was
not violated because, under California State law, the Debtor was
not entitled to reinstatement of his license until he satisfied his
tax obligations. 	Fourth, the CSLB argues that it was acting
pursuant to state statute and at the direction of the EDD.
Finally, related to the Defendants’ arguments regarding their
statutory authority under California State law, the Defendants
argue that it was within their discretion to determine whether a
debtor “needs” his contractor’s license reinstated to effectuate
the debtor’s bankruptcy plan. 	If the Defendants decided that the
Debtor did not “need” his contractor’s license to fund his
bankruptcy case, then, at least in Defendants’ view, they were not
required to reinstate the license and their refusal to reinstate
the license would not constitute a violation of the automatic stay.
The Court will address each of the defenses raised separately.
1. 	Affirmative Act to Collect Debt
The EDD argues that its initial decision not to allow the
reinstatement of the license was not the functional equivalent of
an affirmative act to collect a prepetition claim, which would
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constitute a stay violation. 	The Defendants note that the
suspension of the Debtor’s license occurred several months
prepetition. 	Even though the basis of this suspension was the
Debtor’s non-payment of a debt owed to the EDD, the Defendants
argue that their initial refusal to reinstate the Debtor’s license
upon his bankruptcy filing was not an affirmative act to collect
the prepetition debt. 	Rather, the Defendants argue they were
simply reviewing the Debtor’s case to determine if the suspension
of his license should be removed.
The Debtor counters that the Defendants had an affirmative duty
to lift the suspension of the license upon receiving notice of the
Debtor’s bankruptcy filing. 	Eskanos & Adler, P.C. v. Leetien, 309
F.3d 1210, 1215 (9 th Cir. 2002). 	An unjustifiable delay in
correcting the creditor’s behavior in violation of the automatic
stay may warrant the award of sanctions against the creditor.
Leetien, 309 F.3d at 1215. 	The Debtor alleges that the Defendants
violated their affirmative duty by failing to reinstate the
Debtor’s license for twenty-four days after receiving notice of the
bankruptcy filing and the Debtor’s request for reinstatement.
An affirmative duty to undo actions taken before the imposition
of the automatic stay has been recognized by many cases, albeit in
slightly different factual contexts than the case at hand. 	See In
re Del Mission, Ltd. (EDD v. Taxel), 98 F.3d 1147 (9 th Cir.
1996)(State’s continued retention of taxes violated the automatic
stay), In re Roberts (FTB v. Roberts), 175 B.R. 339, 343 (9 th Cir.
BAP 1994)(“[A] garnishing creditor has an affirmative duty to stop
garnishment proceedings when notified of the automatic stay.”), In
re Abrams, 127 B.R. 239 (9 th Cir. BAP 1991)(creditor that
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repossessed a car postpetition without notice of the bankruptcy
violated the stay by refusing to turn the car over when notified of
the bankruptcy filing). 	See also In re Henry, 328 B.R. 664 (Bankr.
E.D.N.Y. 2005)(law firm violated the stay when the firm failed to
release a lien placed prepetition on the debtor’s bank account), In
re Jessamey, 330 B.R. 80 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2005)(judgment on the
pleadings denied since City could violate the automatic stay by
failing to release a hold on the debtor’s car registration which
had been lawfully blocked prepetition for the debtor’s failure to
pay a tax).
The exact question at issue in this case -– which is not
specifically addressed by any of the cases noted above -- is
whether the State of California has an affirmative duty to
reinstate a contractor’s license (which was suspended solely for
failure to pay a tax) upon the contractor’s bankruptcy filing.
Cases have found that a State agency cannot condition the
reinstatement of a license postpetition upon the payment in full of
back taxes. 42 	However, the parties have not cited, and the Court
has not found, a case directly addressing the issue of whether the
State has an affirmative duty to reinstate a contractor’s license
under these circumstances.
While not directly on point, Grimes v. Hoschler, 12 Cal.3d 305,
525 P.2d 65, 115 Cal.Rptr. 625 (Cal. 1974) does provide some
insight. 	In Grimes, the California Supreme Court held that a
earlier version of Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 7113.5 -- which allowed
the suspension of a contractor’s license if the contractor’s “debts
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incurred as a contractor were discharged for less than their full
amount in a bankruptcy proceeding” and further forbade “the
reissuance of a revoked license until the amounts of the discharged
debts are paid in full” -- was invalid under the supremacy clause
of the United States Constitution in that it conflicted with the
provisions of the Bankruptcy Act. 	Just as the Grimes court held
that the discharge of debts in a bankruptcy proceeding cannot be a
basis for refusing to reinstate a contractor’s license, by logical
extension, the Defendants cannot simply refuse to reinstate the
Debtor’s license upon his bankruptcy filing. 	The sole basis for
the initial suspension of the Debtor’s license was his non-payment
of a debt owed to the EDD. 	The practical effect of the Defendants
non-action is the same as if they were refusing to reinstate the
license solely because of the potential discharge of the debt to
the EDD in the Debtor’s bankruptcy. 	In this regard, the facts
presented are analogous to those in the Del Mission, Roberts,
Abrams, Henry and Jessamey cases noted above, in which an
affirmative duty to undo prepetition actions was found. 	For these
reasons, under the circumstances presented, the Court finds that
the Defendants did have an affirmative duty to reinstate the
Debtor’s contractor’s license upon notice of his bankruptcy filing.
However, the Court’s finding of an affirmative duty by the
Defendants to reinstate the Debtor’s license does not end the
inquiry as to whether the Defendants willfully violated the
automatic stay. 	The other defenses raised by the Defendants must
first be analyzed.
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2. 	Police Powers under § 362(b)(4)
The next defense raised by the Defendants is the State’s
exercise of its “police powers.” 	The “police powers” exception to
the automatic stay is recognized in Bankruptcy Code § 362(b)(4)
which provides:
The filing of a petition under section 301, 302, or 303 of
this title, or of an application under section 5(a)(3) of
the Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970, does not
operate as a stay—
. . .
(4) under paragraph (1), (2), (3), or (6) of subsection (a)
of this section, of the commencement or continuation of an
action or proceeding by a governmental unit or any
organization exercising authority under the Convention on
the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling
and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction,
opened for signature on January 13, 1993, to enforce such
governmental unit’s or organization’s police and regulatory
power, including the enforcement of a judgment other than a
money judgment, obtained in an action or proceeding by the
governmental unit to enforce such governmental unit’s or
organization’s police or regulatory power;
11 U.S.C. § 363(b)(4). 	By its own language, the “police and
regulatory powers” exception of 362(b)(4) does not include actions
by the governmental unit to enforce a money judgment. 	“This
exception is intended to allow governmental units to sue a debtor
‘to prevent or stop violation of fraud, environmental protection,
consumer protection, safety, or similar police or regulatory laws,
or attempting to fix damages for violation of such a law....’” 	In
re Dunbar, 235 B.R. 465, 471 (9 th Cir. BAP 1999), aff’d, 245 F.3d
1058 (9 th Cir. 2001), quoting, House and Senate Reports (Reform Act
of 1978) (H.Rep. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 343 (1977); S.Rep.
No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 52 (1978)). 	The police power
exception must be narrowly construed and is only meant to apply to
actions that further public health and safety. 	In re PMI-DMV Real
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Estate Holdings, LLP, 240 B.R. 24, 31 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 1999).
The application of the police powers exception is not
automatic. 	Dunbar, 235 B.R. at 471. 	Two tests have developed to
determine whether a state agency’s administrative action falls with
the police powers exception –- the “pecuniary purpose” test and the
“public policy” test. 	The Ninth Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate Panel
has described these two tests as follows:
Under the "pecuniary purpose" test, the court must
determine whether the government action relates "primarily
to the protection of the government's pecuniary interest in
the debtors' property or to matters of public safety and
welfare." In re Universal Life Church. Inc., 128 F.3d 1294,
1297 (9th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 524 U.S. 952, 118 S.Ct.
2367, 141 L.Ed.2d 736 (1998) (citing N.L.R.B. v.
Continental Hagen Corp., 932 F.2d 828, 833 (9th Cir.
1991)). "Indeed, most government actions which fall under
[§ 362(b)(4)] have some pecuniary component, particularly
those associated with fraud detection. This does not
abrogate their police power function. Only if the action is
pursued ‘solely to advance a pecuniary interest of the
governmental unit' will the automatic stay bar it."
Universal Life Church, 128 F.3d at 1299 (9th Cir. 1997)
(quoting Thomassen, 15 B.R. at 909).
The "public policy" test distinguishes between those
proceedings that effectuate public policy and those that
adjudicate private rights. Universal Life, 128 F.3d at
1297; In re Charter First Mortg., Inc., 42 B.R. 380, 383
(Bankr. D. Or. 1984). Under the latter test, the court
considers whether the administrative agency is exercising
legislative, executive, or judicial functions. In re Poule,
91 B.R. 83, 86 (9th Cir. BAP 1988). "Where the agency's
action affects only the parties immediately involved in the
proceedings, it is exercising a judicial function and the
debtor is entitled to the same protection from the
automatic stay as if the proceeding were being conducted in
a judicial form." Id.
Dunbar, 235 B.R. at 471.
The Debtor argues that the suspension of his contractor’s
license was triggered solely by his failure to pay prepetition
employment taxes, and that the license would have been reinstated
as soon as the Debtor paid those taxes. 	That being the case, per
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the Debtor, there is no issue of public health or safety furthered
by the suspension. 	The Debtor argues that the collection of the
taxes owed to the EDD is not an exercise of the State of
California’s police power and, thus, is subject to the automatic
stay.
The Defendants insist that the CSLB is a government agency
charged with the authority to qualify, license and discipline
contractors in the State of California. 43 	After an individual is
licensed with the State, that individual is required to comply with
the laws of the State or risk discipline against his license.
These disciplinary actions may include suspension, probation or
outright revocation of the license. 	The Defendants argue that the
suspension of the Debtor’s license was not solely to advance the
pecuniary interest of the EDD. 	Rather, per the Defendants, the
CSLB suspended the license under Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 7145.5 as
a means of regulating the business activities of contractors under
the CSLB’s licensure.
The Defendants note that, under the “pecuniary interest” test,
only actions that are solely to advance a pecuniary interest of the
governmental unit are outside the police powers exception to the
automatic stay. 	Universal Life Church, 128 F.3d at 1298-99. 	The
statute under which the Debtor’s license was suspended does not
provide for the actual collection of taxes, it simply allows the
suspension of license of contractors who fail to comply with
California State law. 	Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 7145.5(a)(1)
specifically provides as follows:
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44 	Not until this matter went to trial did the CSLB become
aware of other “bad acts” by the Debtor, for which the CSLB
ultimately sought and obtained revocation of the Debtor’s
contractor’s license. 	At the time that the alleged violation of
the automatic stay occurred, the sole basis upon which the
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The registrar may refuse to issue, reinstate, reactivate,
or renew a license or may suspend a license for the failure
of a licensee to resolve all outstanding final liabilities,
which include taxes, additions to tax, penalties, interest,
and any fees that may be assessed by the board, the
Department of Industrial Relations, the Employment
Development Department, or the Franchise Tax Board.
(1) Until the debts covered by this section are satisfied,
the qualifying person and any other personnel of record
named on a license that has been suspended under this
section shall be prohibited from serving in any capacity
that is subject to licensure under this chapter, but shall
be permitted to act in the capacity of a nonsupervising
bona fide employee.
Since the statute does not call for the actual collection of the
delinquent taxes –- but rather disciplinary actions against the
contractor –- the Defendants argue that the “pecuniary interest”
test is satisfied.
This argument by the Defendants may seem to have merit at first
glance, but it simply does not hold up upon closer examination.
The pecuniary purpose test distinguishes “between governmental
actions which are aimed at obtaining a pecuniary advantage for the
unit in question or its citizens, and those actions which represent
a direct application of the unit’s police or regulatory powers.”
In re Thomassen, 15, B.R. 907, 909 (9 th Cir. BAP 1981). 	In the
Debtor’s case, the continued suspension of his contractor’s license
was unquestionably for the purpose of “obtaining a pecuniary
advantage.” 	There can be no doubt that if the Debtor had paid the
taxes owing to the EDD, his license would have been reinstated
promptly by the CSLB. 44 	As soon as the EDD authorized the CSLB to
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suspension of the Debtor’s license was being maintained was the tax
debt owed to the EDD.
45 	See Trial Brief in Opposition to Debtor’s Amended Motion
for Damages and Attorney’s Fees, filed by the EDD on January 28,
2008, at 2:23-26. 	See also Deposition of Morris Hampton at 31:11-
21, 33:2-18
46 	Compare In re Poule, 91 B.R. 83 (9 th Cir. BAP 1988)(“It is
undisputed that the debtor . . . had committed serious violations
of the Contractor’s State License Law and ample grounds existed for
revoking his license.” 	The CSLB found that the debtor had
abandoned a project without just excuse and had taken payment for
materials not used on the project, compelling the customer to
secure the services of other contractors to complete the job.) 	No
such malfeasance on the part of the Debtor is alleged here.
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remove the suspension, the CSLB did so immediately without further
inquiry. 	Further, the Notice of Suspension mailed by the CSLB to
the Debtor on August 26, 2003 unequivocally states: “This
suspension will be lifted when you submit proof from the EMPLOYMENT
DEVELOPMENT DEPARTMENT that the liability has been satisfied.”
Trial Exhibit F (emphasis added). 	Thus, the Debtor needed to do
nothing more than pay the debt owing to the EDD. 	The EDD readily
admits that one of its purposes in requiring review of the Debtor’s
plan before it would allow the suspension to be released was so
that the EDD could ensure its claims would be paid under the plan. 45
There was no issue of public safety or welfare behind the continued
suspension of the Debtor’s license. 46 	It was simply a matter of
owing back taxes. 	It is clear, therefore, that the continued
suspension of the Debtor’s license was done solely to advance the
pecuniary interests of the EDD. 	For that reason, the Defendants
actions fail the “pecuniary interest” test for the police powers
exception.
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The EDD also argues that the Defendants should prevail under
the “public policy test” for determining whether the police powers
exception applies. 	In re Herr, 28 B.R. 465, 468 (Bankr. D. Me.
1983). 	This approach distinguishes between proceedings that
effectuate a public policy and those that adjudicate private
rights. 	The EDD says that neither it nor the CSLB was attempting
to adjudicate private rights in this case, therefore, this test is
satisfied.
While it may be true that the Defendants were not pursuing
private rights such as restitution for victims of violations of
California State laws, that does not necessarily mean that the
Defendants’ actions meet the “public policy” test. 	The Ninth
Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate Panel has provided some additional
guidance with the respect to the “public policy” test:
[W]here a state agency is attempting to punish a debtor for
fraudulent conduct by assessing civil penalties, or where
it is attempting to prevent future occurrences of fraud
through injunctive relief, the action comes within the
scope of section 362(b)(4).
Poule, 91 B.R. at 87. 	The purpose of the State of California’s
Contractor’s Licensing Law is “to guard the public against the
consequences of incompetent workmanship, imposition, and
deception.” 	Poule, 91 B.R. at 87, citing Asjourian v. Araj, 38
Cal.3d 276, 282, 211 Cal. Rptr. 703, 696 P.2d 95 (1985). 	Its
purpose is not to ensure the payment of taxes owing to the EDD,
which is how it was used against the Debtor in this case. 	In this
case, there was no such incompetent, fraudulent or deceptive
conduct underlying the suspension of the Debtor’s license or the
EDD’s refusal to authorize the release of this suspension.
Therefore, the actions of the Defendants also fail the “public
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47 	In re Realty Trust Corp., 1994 WL 202439 (9 th Cir. 1994); In
re Sacramento Mini Storage, 1997 WL 206077 (9 th Cir. 1997); In re
Kingsley, 2000 WL 33679445 (Bankr. D.N.H. 2000).
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policy” test for the police powers exception.
3. 	Debtor’s Entitlement to Reinstatement Under State Statute
The next argument raised by the Defendants, which is somewhat
related to their “no affirmative act” defense, is that they were
not required, under California State law, to reinstate the Debtor’s
license. 	In support of this argument, the EDD cites two Bankruptcy
Court decisions, one from the Eastern District of California and
one from the Eastern District of Arkansas -- In re Feature Homes,
Inc., 116 B.R. 731 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 1990) and In re Kimsey, 263
B.R. 244 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 2001). 	Both of these cases are easily
distinguishable from the facts at hand and provide little support
for the Defendants’ argument.
The EDD cites Feature Homes for the proposition that a State’s
refusal to reinstate the debtor’s corporate status, which had been
suspended for failure to pay franchise taxes, did not constitute a
violation of the stay. 	While this may have been the result in
Feature Homes, this particular proposition was, at best, dicta in a
footnote of that decision. 	Every subsequent case that has
discussed Feature Homes has cited it for the proposition that a
corporation, whose powers are suspended, may nonetheless file
bankruptcy to wind up its affairs. 47
In Feature Homes, a corporate debtor entered into a stock sale
agreement prepetition in which the debtor agreed to sell 100% of
its interest in a non-debtor company (the “Stock Sale Agreement”).
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Roughly one month after the Stock Sale Agreement was entered into,
but before it was finalized, the debtor’s corporate status was
suspended for failure to pay taxes and/or file tax returns. 	Three
days later, the debtor filed its voluntary Chapter 11 petition.
The Bankruptcy Court approved the debtor’s assumption of the Stock
Sale Agreement. 	The debtor then moved to compel the State to issue
a certificate of revival of the debtor’s corporate status. 	The
Bankruptcy Court denied the debtor’s motion on the basis that “the
issuance of a certificate of revivor is completely unrelated and
irrelevant to successful closing of the Stock Sale Agreement.” 	Id.
at 733.
Feature Homes is not controlling on this Court and is factually
distinguishable on many levels. 	The debtor in Feature Homes had
already agreed to the sale of its principal asset, before its
bankruptcy filing. 	It was obvious, therefore, that the debtor
would not continue its business operations, and, therefore, did
not, in the Court’s determination, need its corporate status
revived. 	Further, the debtor in Feature Homes was a corporation,
not an individual. 	Finally, Feature Homes did not arise in the
context of an action for damages under § 362(h); instead Feature
Homes found that the debtor’s motion to compel reinstatement of the
debtor’s corporate status under §§ 362(h) and 525(a) was
unnecessary and premature at that point in the case. 	The Stock
Sale Agreement did not require the debtor’s corporate status to be
current in Feature Homes, and the Bankruptcy Court could and did
approve the sale regardless of the debtor’s corporate status.
While the Feature Homes court decided not to grant the
“extraordinary relief requested at this time”, it left open the
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possibility that the court might compel such a revivor in the
future “in the event that [the debtor] chooses to reactivate its
contracting business.” 	Id. at 733.
Those are far from the facts presented in our current case.
Unlike the corporate debtor in Feature Homes, the Debtor
specifically advised the Defendants of his desire to reinstate his
contractor’s license so that he could continue his business
operations postpetition. 	The Debtor here was certainly not selling
his assets and terminating his business operations, but rather was
seeking to reinstate his license and to increase those business
operations as part of his reorganization. 	For these reasons, the
dicta in Feature Homes is not applicable here.
The other case cited by the EDD is In re Kimsey, 263 B.R. 244
(Bankr. E.D. Ark. 2001). 	The EDD cites Kimsey for the proposition
that a City’s refusal to reinstate a Chapter 13 debtor’s driver’s
license, which had been suspended prepetition as a result of the
debtor’s traffic violations as well as for the failure to pay
resultant fines, did not violate the automatic stay. 	In Kimsey,
the debtor filed an adversary complaint to compel the reinstatement
of his driver’s license. 	The debtor’s confirmed plan provided for
the payment of all traffic fines, but the City of North Little Rock
did not reinstate the debtor’s license. 	The debtor argued that the
City was in violation of § 362(a)(6) because the City refused to
reinstate his driver’s license. 	The Kimsey court rejected this
argument and found:
The evidence before the Court is that, prior to the filing
of the chapter 13 case, the debtor’s license was validly
suspended for his failure to comply with the laws of the
State of Arkansas and there is no requirement in the
Bankruptcy Code, including section 362, that a governmental
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unit reinstate the privilege to operate a motor vehicle
simply because the individual later files a bankruptcy
case. 	Thus, the City is not in violation of the automatic
stay for refusing to lift the suspension of this driving
privileges.
Id. at 246.
While this language from Kimsey appears to present a more
compelling analogy for the Defendants, Kimsey too is not truly
applicable to the facts at hand because the payment of the fines
owed by the debtor in Kimsey would not have resulted in the
reinstatement of the debtor’s license. 	As Judge Montali noted in
the recent case of In re Thomas, 2007 WL 1079980 at *3 (Bankr. N.D.
Cal. 2007), in Kimsey:
[T]he debtor pleaded guilty to “driving without a driver's
license, unsafe driving, failing to have proof of liability
insurance (and, in a subsequent year, failing to have
liability insurance), leaving the scene of an accident,
driving on a suspended license, and failing to yield the
right of way.” Id. at 246. The debtor in Kimsey alleged
that the refusal to reinstate his license was for financial
reasons, but the court found “no evidence” that the
government “has in fact taken any action to collect the
debt.” Id. Instead it found that “the City is not refusing
to reinstate the debtor's license because of his bankruptcy
filing, but, rather, seeks to enforce the traffic [safety]
laws which permit termination of the driving privilege
based upon violations of the law.” Id. at 247.
Beyond owing fines to the City, the suspension of the debtor’s
license in Kimsey was because of the debtor’s serious traffic and
safety violations and, therefore, was an issue of public safety and
punishment. 	Kimsey could not avoid the punishment of having his
license suspended simply by paying the fines or by filing
bankruptcy.
Those are not the facts surrounding the suspension of the
Debtor’s contractor’s license. 	While Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code
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48 	Taxel v. California Employment Dev. Dep't ( In re Del
Mission Ltd.), 116 B.R. 734 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1990), aff'd, 130
B.R. 362, aff'd, 998 F.2d 756 (9th Cir.1993); In re Nu-Process
Brake Engineers, Inc., 119 B.R. 700, 702-03 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. 1990),
citing In re William Tell II, Inc., 38 B.R. 327 (N.D. Ill. 1983)
and In re Nashville White Trucks, Inc., 22 B.R. 578 (Bankr. M.D.
Tenn. 1982).
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§ 7145.5(a)(1) allows for the punishment of a contractor for the
failure to pay all outstanding debts to the State of California, it
also contemplates that this punishment only lasts “until the debts
covered by this section are satisfied.” 	Several courts have found
that a requirement of payment in full of all back taxes as a
condition to reinstatement of a license by a state agency is
violative of 11 U.S.C. § 362. 48 	The EDD’s refusal to grant the
CSLB’s request to allow reinstatement of the license was an
“affirmative act to collect a prepetition claim.” 	There was no
overriding issue of public safety relating to the suspension of the
Debtor’s contractor’s license, as there was in the suspension of
the debtor’s driver’s license in Kimsey. 	Therefore, the EDD’s
reliance on Kimsey is also misplaced.
4. 	CSLB Acting Under Direction of the EDD
The CSLB argues that it did not violate the automatic stay
since it was simply complying with Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 7145.5.
The CSLB insists that it could not legally remove the prepetition
revocation of the Debtor’s license until it was authorized by the
EDD to do so. 	While this may be true, it does not address the fact
that the CSLB delayed six days after receiving actual notice of the
Debtor’s bankruptcy filing before it even contacted the EDD seeking
permission to reinstate the Debtor’s license per his request.
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5. 	Discretion to Determine Whether the Debtor “Needs” his
Contractor’s License
Finally, as made clear at trial, the Defendants raise one final
defense on the issue of whether they violated the automatic stay in
refusing to reinstate the Debtor’s license for twenty-four days.
The Defendants argue that since the Debtor had continued to operate
his business without his contractor’s license for more than a year
prior to filing, the Debtor did not “need” his license to effectuate
his bankruptcy. 	The Court rejects the general proposition asserted
by the Defendants that they may simply refuse to act as long as they
determine, in their sole discretion, that the reinstatement of the
Debtor’s license is not necessary for his bankruptcy case. 	This is
not their decision to make and not even a proper inquiry on their
part. 	Further, it is preposterous for the Defendants –-
particularly as agents of the State of California -- to argue in one
breath that the Debtor violated California State licensing law by
continuing to operate without a license for over a year, and then
suggest that they did not have to reinstate the Debtor’s license
because he could simply continue to operate illegally without one.
The Defendants cite no authority in support of their argument
that the Defendants could delay reinstating a debtor’s license while
they consider whether that debtor “needs” his license reinstated
upon his bankruptcy filing. 	The only case that this Court has found
which even remotely raises the issue of a debtor’s “need” for
authorization by a State agency is Feature Homes. 	In Feature Homes,
the Bankruptcy Court found that the debtor had already sold all of
its assets and the State’s refusal to revive the debtor’s corporate
status had “little or no tangible impact upon this particular”
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49 	The Court has serious doubts that this lack of “need” –-
even if proven –- would constitute an exception to Bankruptcy Code
§ 362(h). 	However, the Defendants could have made those arguments
to the Court prior to reinstating the license.
50 	Deposition of Morris Hampton at 32:5-7.
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debtor since the debtor had “apparently not engaged in any
contracting work for over three years, and [had] made no offer of
proof that it in fact intends to pursue this occupation through a
subsequent plan of reorganization.” 	Id. at 733. 	The Feature Homes
decision then goes on to note:
Of course, it may be that the Debtor will require a
certificate of revivor in the event that it chooses to
reactivate its contracting business under a confirmed plan
of reorganization. 	In the event the State refuses to
voluntarily issue such a certificate following confirmation
of the plan by this court, the issue will no doubt be ripe
for reconsideration.
Id. at 733, n. 5.
The EDD does not contend that it relied on this language from
Feature Homes in thinking it had the right to review the Debtor’s
Chapter 13 plan before deciding whether or not to allow the CSLB to
reinstate the Debtor’s license. 	However, even if that contention
had been made, any such reliance would have been misplaced. 	This
language from Feature Homes was buried in a footnote and is clearly
dicta. 	Further, even in this language from Feature Homes, it is the
Court –- not the State agency –- deciding whether the debtor’s
corporate status was necessary for its bankruptcy case.
If the Defendants had any serious doubt about this issue, the
Defendants could have easily sought expeditious guidance from the
Court on the issue of the Debtor’s “need” for his contractor’s
license, before reinstating the Debtor’s license. 49 	Instead, the
EDD asked for a copy of the Debtor’s Chapter 13 plan. 50 	When the
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51 	Id. at 30:12-33:13.
52 	Id. at 33:16-36:22
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EDD received the plan, the EDD still refused to release the
suspension of the Debtor’s license because it was concerned how the
EDD’s claim would be treated under the plan. 51 	Although the
Defendants now say their concern was that the Debtor did not “need”
his contractor’s license for his bankruptcy case, the actions of the
EDD clearly show its true motivation was the collection of the debt
owed by the Debtor to the EDD. 	Only upon receiving a copy of the
Debtor’s motion for a temporary restraining order did the EDD then
decide to release the hold on the Debtor’s license. 52 	The EDD still
insists that it was not required to do so, but that it simply chose
to do so.
The Court finds that it would frustrate the very purposes of a
bankruptcy filing if State agencies were given the time and
discretion to determine, at their leisure, whether a bankruptcy
debtor “needs” a license reinstated to effectuate his or her
bankruptcy case.
B. 	Damages
Upon a finding of willful violation of the automatic stay, an
award of actual damages, including costs and attorneys’ fees, must
follow and is mandatory. 	In re Taylor, 884 F.2d 478, 483 (9 th Cir.
1989); In re Ramirez, 183 B.R. 583, 589 (9 th Cir. BAP 1995); In re
Stainton, 139 B.R. 232, 235 (9 th Cir. BAP 1992). 	In appropriate
circumstances, § 362(h) also allows the recovery of punitive
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53 	Humetrix v. Gemplus, 268 F.3d 910, 919 (9 th Cir. 2001)
(internal citations omitted).
54 	Trial Exhibits P, Q and R.
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damages. 	In this case, the Debtor seeks both actual and punitive
damages.
1. 	Actual Damages
“An award of actual damages under § 362(h) is intended to
compensate a debtor for damages sustained as a result of a willful
violation of the automatic stay.” 	Henry, 328 B.R. at 668. 	Accord
Roman, 283 B.R. at 9. 	The Ninth Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate Panel
stated in Roman:
Section 362(h) provides little guidance regarding the
applicable standards for awarding actual damages.
Nonetheless, most courts apply a reasonableness analysis.
Section 362(h) “requires that the injured party be awarded
the entire amount of actual damages reasonably incurred as
a result of a violation of the automatic stay.” 	[In re]
Stainton, 139 B.R. [232,] 235 [9th Cir. BAP 1992] (emphasis
added).
Roman, 283 B.R. at 11.
The Debtor has claimed that he lost certain profits as a result
of the delay by the Defendants in reinstating his contractor’s
license. 	The Ninth Circuit has recognized that lost profits are
“‘necessarily an estimate’ . . . and that their ‘amount cannot be
shown with mathematical precision.’” 53 	In support of his alleged
lost profits, the Debtor initially relied upon two contracts he had
entered into shortly before filing (the “Leal and Tovar
Contracts”). 54 	Had his license been timely restored, the Debtor
alleged he would have realized a profit of $14,238 from those two
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55 	Trial Exhibit R at ¶ 9.
56 	Trial Exhibit P shows that the deposit from Christopher
Leal was returned on October 4, 2004. 	Trial Exhibit Q shows the
deposit from Oscar Tovar was refunded at 1:50 P.M. on
October 7, 2004. 	The Debtor’s Chapter 13 petition was filed
shortly after 3:00 P.M. that same day.
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contracts. 55 	However, evidence presented a trial shows that these
contracts were cancelled and the deposits refunded prior to the
filing of the Debtor’s bankruptcy petition. 56 	Therefore, the loss
of the Leal and Tovar Contracts cannot constitute actual damages
sustained by the Debtor. 	At best, as argued by counsel for the
Debtor at trial, the Leal and Tovar Contracts may be some evidence
of the Debtor’s ability to obtain installation jobs at about the
time of his bankruptcy filing.
At trial, the Debtor testified that prior to the suspension of
his license, in the Summer of 2003, he realized about $40,000 per
month in net profit from the installation portion of his business.
The Debtor provided absolutely no documentary evidence or business
records (e.g., books and records showing sales, profits, etc.) in
support of his testimony. 	While this testimony may be some evidence
of a potential lost profit by the Debtor, it also fails to account
for the fact that the Debtor alleges he had not installed flooring
for over a year prior to his bankruptcy filing. 	Clearly a business
that had not operated -– or at least should not have been operating
–- for over a year will require some start-up time before it will
again realize the same profits as it did at the height of its prior
operations. 	At trial, the Debtor also submitted phone logs from
potential customers between October 8, 2004 and October 30, 2004.
While this provides some evidence of potential business, it is
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57 	Plaintiff’s Post Trial Brief at 6:1-3.
58 	Trial Brief In Opposition to Debtor’s Amended Motion for
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at 8:9-12.
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speculative at best.
Finally, in his Post Trial Brief, the Debtor suggests that the
Court discharge the $12,385 claim of the EDD to “compensate the
debtor in part for the injury caused by the state’s violation of the
automatic stay.” 57 	This is not a measure of compensatory damages
and will not be awarded by the Court.
The Defendants raise several arguments against the alleged
damages sustained by the Debtor.
First, the Defendants submit that the Debtor has not produced
any evidence of actual damages for which he may recover. 	While the
Court agrees that the Debtor cannot rely upon the specific values of
the Leal and Tovar Contracts as evidence of actual damages sustained
by the Debtor, those contacts do provide some limited evidence of
the Debtor’s ability to obtain installation jobs near the time of
his bankruptcy filing. 	In addition, the Debtor –- through the
course of the trial –- has submitted other evidence, albeit weak, in
support of his damage claim.
Second, the Defendants argue that “the debtor’s damages would
appear to be minimal since he admits that he continued to operate
his business illegally as a suspended corporation, and without a
contractor’s license for the 13½ months prior to filing the
bankruptcy petition.” 58 	This is really a multi-faceted argument by
the Defendants. 	First, the argument is that if the Debtor actually
continued his installation business notwithstanding the suspension
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of his license, then his business was not hurt by the fact he did
not have a valid contractor’s license. 	Second, if he was entering
into installation contracts, they were illegal contracts pursuant to
California state law –- since he did not have a valid contractor’s
license at the time –- and he cannot recover damages resulting from
those contracts. 	Finally, since the Debtor was operating his
business under the Statewide corporate name between 2001 and 2005,
and the corporate status of Statewide was suspended on
July 21, 2004, the Debtor was prohibited from legally operating his
business as a corporation, even with his contractor’s license
reinstated.
Each part of this second defense fails. 	First, it is
disingenuous of the Defendants to suggest that the Debtor’s business
operations were not hurt by the continued suspension of his license.
Even assuming arguendo that the Debtor did operate the installation
portion of his business without a valid contractor’s license, he
likely may not have gone full force with his advertising and other
means of normal business development. 	Second, even if the Debtor is
precluded by California state law from recovering from customers
under contracts entered into without a valid contractor’s license,
the Debtor is not precluded, by this State law provision, from
recovering damages against the CSLB and/or the EDD for violating the
automatic stay. 	Finally, while Statewide’s corporate status may
have been suspended prior to the Debtor’s bankruptcy filing –-
thereby, preventing Statewide from lawfully conducting business –-
the Debtor was operating, per the records of the CSLB, as a sole
proprietor, not a corporation, under the business name “European
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59 	Trial Exhibits A, E, F, I, K
60 	Trial Exhibits P and Q. 	However, “Statewide Professional
Services” –- without any “Inc.” or other indication of possible
corporate status –- is noted at the very bottom of the Tovar
Contract in very small type. 	Trial Exhibit Q.
61 	Kendall-Jackson Winery v. Superior Court, 76 Cal.App.4 th
970, 979 (Cal.App. 5 Dist. 1999), ESP Fidelity Corp. V. Department
of Housing and Urban Development, 512 F.2d 887 (9 th Cir. 1975).
62 	Adler v. Fed. Republic of Nigeria, 219 F.3d 869, 877 (9 th
Cir. 2000).
63 	Plaintiff’s Post Trial Brief, filed on May 30, 2008, at
3:13.
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Hardwood Floors Design & Interiors” from April 23, 2003. 59 	The Leal
and Tovar Contracts also specify the business name of European
Hardwood Floor Design & Interiors. 60 	Therefore, at least per the
records of the CSLB, the Debtor could have legally operated as a
contractor if the CSLB had removed the suspension placed on his
license.
Finally, the Defendants argue that, as a court of equity, this
Court should not allow the Debtor to recover damages when he has
acted with “unclean hands.” 61 	The CSLB notes that the party seeking
to recover damages from a court of equity must have “acted fairly
and without fraud or deceit as to the controversy in issue.” 62 	The
Defendants argue that the Debtor lied on his initial contractor’s
application and subsequent filings with the CSLB, and would not have
been issued a license and/or would have had his license revoked
earlier if he had not made such material misrepresentations. 	The
Debtor, in turn, argues that the Court has “no need or jurisdiction
to consider whether debtor should have been licensed.” 63 	The Court
agrees that the Debtor’s past “bad acts” do not negate the fact that
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28 64 	No evidence was presented on the reasons why the Leal and
Tovar Contracts were canceled prepetition.
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the Defendants willfully violated the automatic stay. 	On the other
hand, the Court cannot be blind to the fact that the Debtor may very
well not have been entitled to the license upon which he now sues.
Under the evidence presented, however, the Court need not and does
not reach this problematic issue of the equities presented by this
case –- at least not at this point.
The Court need not decide this final defense raised by the
Defendants because, after weighing all the evidence and arguments
presented, the Court finds that the Debtor has failed to
sufficiently establish any damages arising from the operation of his
installation business. 	The Debtor has submitted three forms of
evidence is support of his damages claim: (1) the Leal and Tovar
Contracts, (2) his own testimony asserting he had averaged a net
profit of roughly $40,000 per month for the installation component
of his business before his license was suspended over a year prior
to his filing, and (3) phone logs of potential customer calls from
October 8, 2004 through October 30, 2004. 	The Court finds each of
these items of evidence unpersuasive.
The Leal and Tovar Contracts are, at best, examples of the type
of contract the Debtor may have been able to obtain had his license
been reinstated. 	However, the Leal and Tovar Contracts were both
entered into and cancelled just prior to the Debtor’s bankruptcy. 64
Customers solicited by the Debtor postpetition, may very well have
been much less receptive to a contractor operating while in
bankruptcy –- even with a reinstated contractor’s license. 	Just as
the Leal and Tovar customers may have searched the public records
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and determined that the Debtor was not a licensed contractor,
customers can also search this Court’s records to determine if a
contractor is a bankruptcy debtor. 	In any event, the Court finds
that the Leal and Tovar Contracts are not persuasive evidence of any
actual damages that the Debtor sustained from the Defendants’
violation of the automatic stay for the twenty-four days involved
here.
The Debtor’s testimony about his past profits is also of little
help. 	At trial, the Defendants submitted substantial evidence
impeaching the Debtor’s credibility. 	The Debtor could have
submitted accounting records to support his testimony, but chose not
do so. 	No documentary evidence, of any kind, was provided by the
Debtor on the issue of his past income and expenses. 	The Court has
no way of knowing what the Debtor’s actual revenues were, either at
the peak of his business or in the months immediately preceding his
bankruptcy filing, when his license was suspended. 	Even if the
$40,000 per month net profit testified by the Debtor is accurate, it
is of limited relevance since it apparently represents the Debtor’s
revenues at the peak of his operations. 	At the time of his
bankruptcy filing, the Debtor alleges he had not been in the
installation business for over a year.
The telephone log of potential customers is not only tenuous
and speculative evidence of damages, the testimony at trial
demonstrates that it is not even necessarily indicative of potential
installation projects –- the purpose for which the Debtor introduced
the telephone log at trial. 	Many of the calls noted clearly relate
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65 	Trial Transcript, Vol. I, at 33:7-34:22.
66 	Trial Transcript, Vol. I, at 63:23-65:1.
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to potential material sales. 65 	The Debtor also noted that some of
the calls that appear to relate to installation inquiries might
actually relate to warranties for past installations. 66 	Therefore,
the Court finds that the telephone log is not sufficiently
persuasive evidence with respect to the losses the Debtor may have
sustained from being unable to service installation requests
postpetition.
Finally, all of the evidence presented by the Debtor must also
be considered in light of the fact that the delay caused by the
Defendants in the reinstatement of the Debtor’s license lasted only
twenty-four days. 	While this is not insignificant, it does limit
the time period for which the Debtor may claim operational damages.
Weighing all the evidence presented by the Debtor, the Court
finds that the Debtor has failed to meet his burden of proof.
Notwithstanding the violation of the automatic stay by the
Defendants, the Debtor has failed to prove he sustained any actual
damages to his business operations.
2. 	Attorneys’ Fees and Costs
However, the above analysis does not necessarily mean that the
Debtor cannot recover for his attorneys’ fees and costs. 	A debtor’s
actual damages under 362(h) also explicitly includes costs and
attorneys’ fees. 	The Debtor argues that even if the actual damages
incurred by the debtor are only his or her attorneys’ fees for
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28 67 	In re Taylor, 884 F.2d 478, 483 (9 th Cir. 1989), In re
Walsh, 219 B.R. 873 (9 th Cir. BAP 1998).
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enforcing the terms of the automatic stay, an award of such
attorneys’ fees to the debtor is mandatory. 67
In Roman, the Ninth Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate Panel endorsed
the use of the principles used in Bankruptcy Code § 330 as a guide
for awarding attorneys’ fees under Bankruptcy Code § 362(h). 	The
Roman Panel also noted that there is a consensus in the case law
that, under § 362(h), the Bankruptcy Court must also examine whether
the debtor could have mitigated the attorney fee damages.
“Generally, in determining the appropriate amount of attorneys’ fees
to award as a sanction, the court looks to two factors: ‘(1) what
expenses or costs resulted from the violation and (2) what portion
of those costs was reasonable, as opposed to the costs that could
have been mitigated.’” Roman, 283 B.R. at 12 (citations omitted).
The Debtor argues that the first factor in determining
reasonableness of the debtor’s attorneys’ fees is to ascertain
whether the creditor of the debtor created the injury. 	Roman, 283
B.R. at 24. 	On this issue, the Debtor notes that the creditor has
the burden both to establish administrative safeguards to prevent
stay violations and to restore the status quo by undoing them. 	Id.
The Debtor also notes:
The State continues to this moment in denying that it had
any obligation to honor the automatic stay. 	EDD Post Trial
Brief, page 4, lines 2-24. 	The record shows that the
license was not reinstated until service of the complaint
and motion for a TRO were served on the State. 	No more
need be said about the need to bring this action and to
take it to trial in the face of governmental intransigence.
Plaintiff’s Post Trial Reply Brief at 4:27-5:3.
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There is one additional provision relating to the award of
attorneys’ fees which has not been addressed by the parties -– the
Court’s ability to award attorneys’ fees and costs against a State
agency. 	This issue is addressed by Bankruptcy Code § 106(a)(3),
which provides:
(a) 	Notwithstanding an assertion of sovereign immunity,
sovereign immunity is abrogated as to a governmental unit
to the extent set forth in this section with respect to the
following:
(3) The court may issue against a governmental unit an
order, process, or judgment under such sections or the
Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure, including an
order or judgment awarding a money recovery, but not
including an award of punitive damages. Such order or
judgment for costs or fees under this title or the
Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure against any
governmental unit shall be consistent with the
provisions and limitations of section 2412(d)(2)(A) of
title 28.
The problem with the Debtor’s arguments in favor of an award of
attorneys’ fees and costs in this case is that no evidence has been
submitted by the Debtor on this issue. 	Without such evidence, it is
impossible for the Defendants or the Court to determine “(1) what
expenses or costs resulted from the violation and (2) what portion
of those costs was reasonable, as opposed to the costs that could
have been mitigated.’” 	Roman, 283 B.R. at 12 (citations omitted).
For this reason, to the extent that the Debtor still wishes the
Court to consider an award of his attorneys’ fees and costs, the
Debtor’s counsel is hereby directed to file with the Court, and
serve on the Defendants a declaration containing a detailed
accounting of her fees and costs.
A further potential complication for the Court’s consideration
of whether attorneys’ fees and costs should be awarded is the issue
of whether the equities would preclude an award of attorneys’ fees
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in this case. 	The Court did not need to reach the question of the
equities or “unclean hands” with respect to the Debtor’s claim for
actual damages arising from his business operations. 	However, such
an inquiry, may or may not be relevant with respect to the potential
award of the Debtor’s attorneys’ fees and costs. 	If the equities
were to preclude the Debtor from recovering damages, does that
necessarily preclude an award of attorneys’ fees under 362(h)? 	Even
if the Debtor ultimately failed to prove any actual damages to his
business operations, the Debtor still wanted his contractor’s
license reinstated. 	Therefore, the adversary proceeding was
nonetheless necessary under the circumstances. 	There is no evidence
that Debtor’s counsel knew or should have known about the alleged
“bad acts” which ultimately led to the revocation of the Debtor’s
contractor’s license. 	Therefore, is it even appropriate for the
Court to consider the “bad acts” and the underlying license issues
in determining the reasonableness of the attorneys’ fees and costs
incurred, and whether those fees and costs could have been
mitigated? 	On the other hand, the Debtor acknowledged under cross-
examination at trial that he chose not to answer truthfully on the
question regarding his criminal history on his application for a
contractor’s license. 	Trial Transcript, Vol. II, at 59:7-64:12.
Must the Court consider such factors since an award of attorneys’
fees and costs is still an award to the Debtor, even if indirectly?
The parties must be given a full opportunity to address these
issues, and any other they may wish to raise after reviewing the
Debtor’s attorneys’ fees and costs. 	For this reason, the Court
cannot rule on the issue of attorneys’ fees and costs at this time.
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3. 	Punitive Damages
The Debtor also seeks punitive damages against the Defendants.
Such damages against governmental units are expressly prohibited
under 11 U.S.C. § 106(a)(3), quoted above. 	For this reason, the
Debtor’s request for punitive damages is denied. 	Further, even if
such punitive damages were available, they are not appropriate under
the facts of this case.
III.
CONCLUSION
For the above stated reasons, the Court finds that the
Defendants, collectively, violated the automatic stay by failing to
reinstate timely the Debtor’s contractor’s license upon receiving
actual notice of his bankruptcy filing and request for
reinstatement. 	However, the Debtor has failed to prove any actual
damages arising from the operation of his business, and, therefore,
shall not be awarded any damages on that basis. 	The Court also
denies the Debtor’s request for punitive damages.
The Court cannot, at this time, determine whether the Debtor
should be awarded any attorneys’ fees or costs as actual damages.
The Court suggests that the parties may want to discuss settlement
of this remaining issue at this juncture. 	If no settlement can be
reached and the Debtor still wishes to pursue an award of attorneys’
fees and costs, the Debtor’s counsel must file and serve a
declaration with support documentation that sets forth all of her
fees and costs in detail, within sixty days of the entry of this
Partial Decision. 	The Debtor should concurrently file and serve a
Memorandum of Points and Authorities addressing the issues noted
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above by the Court, and setting forth such further arguments as the
Debtor would like the Court to consider. 	The Defendants shall have
seventeen days from the date of service of the Debtor’s papers to
file their responses. 	The deadline for the Debtor’s reply shall be
ten days after the deadline for the Defendants’ responses. 	No
further pleadings should be submitted. 	The Court will take the sole
issue of attorneys’ fees and costs under submission upon the filing
of the Debtor’s reply. 	The Court will schedule oral argument only
if the Court determines that such argument would likely be of
assistance to the Court.
If the Debtor chooses not to further pursue an award of
attorneys’ fees and costs, after sixty days from the entry of this
Partial Decision, the Court will issue an order consistent with this
Partial Decision but also denying the Debtor’s request for
attorneys’ fees.
***END OF DECISION***
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Court Service List
Frank Bertuccio
1080 Terra Bella #C
Mountain View, CA 94040
Cathleen Cooper Moran, Esq.
Moran Law Group, Inc.
1674 N Shoreline Blvd. #140
Mountain View, CA 94041-1375
Maretta D. Ward, Esq.
Deputy Attorney General
California Department of Justice
455 Golden Gate #11000
San Francisco, CA 94102
Marguerite C. Stricklin, Esq.
Deputy Attorney General
Office of the Attorney General
P.O. Box 70550
Oakland, CA 94612-0550
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