(HC) Jonkiel Errate v. Warden, California City Immigration Processing Center

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
REINIER JONKIEL ERRATE (A-
Number: 244-285-383),
Petitioner,
v.
WARDEN, CALIFORNIA CITY
DETENTION FACILITY,
Respondent.
Case No. 1:26-cv-4918-TLN-JDP
FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Petitioner Reinier Jonkiel Errate was paroled into the United States in 2023 and was re-
detained by ICE in 2026. Petitioner, now proceeding with counsel, has filed an amended petition
for writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, arguing that his re-detention without a bond
hearing violates the Fifth Amendment. Respondent counters that petitioner is subject to
mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c). For the following reasons, I recommend that the
amended petition be granted and that petitioner be provided a bond hearing.
Background
In November 2023, petitioner presented himself at a port of entry to the United States, was
detained by immigration officials, and then was paroled into the United States. ECF No. 6-1 at 2.
On June 9, 2026, petitioner was convicted of breaching a retail fuel dispenser, tampering with a
component of a retail fuel dispenser, and retail fuel theft in violation of Florida Statute

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§ 812.0151. ECF No. 6-3 at 1. On the following day, petitioner was re-detained by ICE upon his
release from a local jail. ECF No. 10 ¶ 19; ECF No. 6 at 2. Petitioner has not been provided a
bond hearing.
Procedural History
On June 26, 2026, petitioner, initially proceeding pro se, filed a petition for writ of habeas
corpus.1 ECF No. 1. On August 21, 2026, I ordered the appointment of counsel for petitioner.
ECF No. 8. On September 8, 2026, petitioner, proceeding through counsel, filed an amended
petition. ECF No. 10. Respondent has filed an answer, ECF No. 13, and petitioner has filed a
reply, ECF No. 14.
Legal Standard
A federal court may grant habeas relief when a petitioner shows that his custody violates
federal law. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241(a), (c)(3), 2254(a); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 374-75
(2000). “[T]he essence of habeas corpus is an attack by a person in custody upon the legality of
that custody, and . . . the traditional function of the writ is to secure release from illegal custody.”
Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 484 (1973). A writ of habeas corpus may be granted to a
petitioner who demonstrates that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or federal law.
28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). Historically, “the writ of habeas corpus has served as a means of
reviewing the legality of Executive detention, and it is in that context that its protections have
been strongest.” I.N.S. v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 301 (2001). A district court’s habeas jurisdiction
includes challenges to immigration detention. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 687 (2001).
Analysis
Petitioner claims that his re-detention without a bond hearing violates the Fifth
Amendment. ECF No. 10 ¶¶ 39-46. Respondent counters that petitioner’s detention is
mandatory under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) such that it does not violate the Fifth Amendment. ECF No.
6 at 2-7.
1 The court referred the matter to me on June 29, 2026. ECF No. 3.

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Under section 1226(c), the attorney general “shall take into custody” any noncitizen who:
(i) “is inadmissible under paragraph (6)(A), (6)(C), or (7) of section 1182(a) of [Title 8]”; and
(ii) “is charged with, is arrested for, is convicted of, admits having committed, or admits
committing acts which constitute the essential elements of any burglary, theft, larceny,
shoplifting, or assault of a law enforcement officer offense, or any crime that results in death or
serious bodily injury to another person.” 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1)(E)(ii).
While respondent argues that petitioner “fits these criteria,” petitioner asserts that neither
criterion is satisfied. See ECF No. 6 at 4; ECF No. 10 ¶¶ 22-38. I find that respondent has failed
to show that petitioner is inadmissible within the meaning of section 1226(C)(1)(E)(i).
Consequently, I do not consider whether his convictions fall within the meaning of section
1226(c)(1)(E)(ii)).
When a noncitizen arrives at the border without documentation for lawful admission, they
are deemed “applicants for admission” and subject to mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C.
§ 1225(b). Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281, 287 (2018). However, “applicants for
admission may be temporarily released on parole ‘for urgent humanitarian reasons or significant
public benefit.’” Id. at 288 (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A)). “Immigration authorities at ports
of entry have historically exercised the authority to parole aliens into the United States for various
limited purposes, including for prosecution.” Vazquez Romero v. Garland, 999 F.3d 656, 660
(9th Cir. 2021). “The government’s historical parole authority has been codified in § 1182(d)(5),
which gives the Attorney General the discretion to parole into the United States ‘any alien
applying for admission to the United States.’” Id. (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A)).
Here, petitioner presented himself at a port of entry, was detained by immigration
officials, and then was paroled into the United States. ECF No. 6-1 at 2. Throughout this action,
petitioner has alleged that he was issued a Form I-94 when he was paroled into the United States.
See ECF No. 7 at 3; ECF No. 11 ¶ 36; ECF No. 14 at 3. Respondent has not contested that
allegation. As the Court of Appeals held, this form “is typically given to § 1182(d)(5)(A)
parolees.” Ortega-Cervantes v. Gonzales, 501 F.3d 1111, 1115 (9th Cir. 2007). Respondent has
not argued that petitioner was paroled under a different statute. Under these circumstances, I find

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that petitioner was paroled under section 1182(d)(5)(A).
The Court of Appeals has held that “written notice is essential to effectuate a termination”
of a parole under section 1182(d)(5)(A). United States v. Lagarda-Aguilar, 617 F.2d 527, 528
(9th Cir. 1980). In Lagarda-Aguilar, the government escorted a noncitizen to the Mexican border
for removal even though the noncitizen was paroled under section 1182(d)(5)(A). Id. at 527. The
Court of Appeals found that the noncitizen “was never furnished written notice of termination of
the parole” and there was no “indication in the record that he was ever advised, either orally or in
writing, that the parole was to terminate automatically on a given date. Indeed, there is no record
of any formal termination of the parole status.” Id. The government argued on appeal that any
“violation of the regulation requiring written notice made no difference in this case because the
alien had actual notice of a termination by [government] agents when they took him to the
border.” Id. at 528. The Court of Appeals rejected that argument, holding that “[t]ermination of
parole should not be, and is not under applicable regulations, left to the whim of [government]
agents in that manner. The requirement of written notice is the only safeguard, for both the alien
and the United States government, that parole status is administered in an orderly manner.” Id.
Here, there is no evidence that petitioner’s parole under section 1182(d)(5)(A) has been
terminated. In the first amended petition, petitioner alleges that the government “has not asserted
that any parole granted to him was terminated.” ECF No. 10 ¶ 36. Respondent does not contest
this allegation. See ECF No. 13. In his traverse, petitioner again argues that there is no evidence
that his parole has been terminated. ECF No. 14 at 9. Because “written notice is essential to
effectuate a termination” of a parole under section 1182(d)(5)(A), I find that petitioner’s parole
has not been terminated. See Lagarda-Aguilar, 617 F.2d at 528.
To substantiate mandatory detention under section 1226(c), respondent asserts that
petitioner is inadmissible under 8 U.S.C. §§ 1182(a)(6)(A) and (a)(7)(A)(i)(I). ECF No. 6-1 at 2.
However, neither provision applies to him because he is on parole. First, section 1182(a)(6)(A)
provides that “[a]n alien present in the United States without being admitted or paroled, or who
arrives in the United States at any time or place other than as designated by the Attorney General,
is inadmissible.” 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i). Because petitioner is paroled under section

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1182(d)(5)(A), he is not “present in the United States without being admitted or paroled” for
purposes of section 1182(a)(6)(A). Second, section 1182(a)(7)(A)(i)(I) provides that “any
immigrant at the time of application for admission who is not in possession of a valid unexpired
immigrant visa, reentry permit, border crossing identification card, or other valid entry document
required by this chapter” is inadmissible. However, as noted, petitioner was provided a Form I-
94 and paroled into the United States. ECF No. 11 ¶ 36. Respondent does not explain why,
under these circumstances, petitioner is inadmissible within the meaning of section
1182(a)(7)(A)(i)(I).2
Accordingly, respondent has failed to show that petitioner is inadmissible within the
meaning of section 1226(c)(1)(E)(i). Consequently, petitioner’s detention is not governed by
section 1226(c).3 Instead, I find that petitioner’s detention is governed by section 1226(a).
Petitioner, as noted, claims that his re-detention without a bond hearing violates the Fifth
Amendment. ECF No. 10 ¶¶ 39-46. Respondent only responds to petitioner’s due process claim
through the lens of section 1226(c). See ECF No. 6 at 4-7.
Courts analyze procedural due process claims in two steps: first, we consider whether
there exists a protected liberty interest under the Due Process Clause, and, second, we evaluate
what procedures are necessary to ensure that any deprivation of that protected liberty interest
accords with the Constitution. See Kentucky Dep’t of Corr. v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 460
(1989). I consider each in turn.
To determine whether a specific conditional release rises to the level of a protected liberty
interest, courts have compared “specific conditional release in the case before them with the
liberty interest in parole as characterized by Morrissey [v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1971)].”
2 Indeed, respondent has not offered any analysis regarding inadmissibility. Instead,
respondent simply states that “Petitioner is charged with inadmissibility under 8 U.S.C. § 1182,
which satisfies the requirement of subsection (i)” of section 1226(c)(1)(E). ECF No. 6 at 4. To
support that assertion, respondent cited petitioner’s notice to appear, which provides that
petitioner is amenable to removal on the grounds of the two sections analyzed above. See ECF
No. 6-1 at 2. However, petitioner’s notice to appear does not provide any analysis as to why
petitioner is inadmissible under either section. See id.
3 As a result, respondent’s argument that petitioner should request a Matter of Joseph
hearing is misplaced. See ECF No. 13 at 1-2.

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Gonzalez-Fuentes v. Molina, 607 F.3d 864, 887 (1st Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted). In Morrissey, the Supreme Court explained that parole from a criminal
conviction “enables [the parolee] to do a wide range of things open to persons” who have never
been in custody or convicted of any crime, including to live at home, work, and “be with family
and friends and to form the other enduring attachments of normal life.” 408 U.S. at 482. The
court observed that while “the [government] properly subjects [the parolee] to many restrictions
not applicable to other citizens,” such as monitoring and seeking authorization to work and travel,
the petitioner’s “condition is very different from that of confinement in a prison.” Id. “The
parolee has relied on at least an implicit promise that parole will be revoked only if he fails to live
up to the parole conditions.” Id. The revocation of parole undoubtedly “inflicts a grievous loss
on the parolee.” Id. (quotations omitted). Therefore, in Morrissey, the Supreme Court found that
a parolee in a criminal case possessed a protected interest in “continued liberty.” Id. at 481-84.
Recently, confronted with questions similar to those raised by petitioner, courts in this
Circuit have found that noncitizens released from ICE custody acquire a liberty interest in their
continued release. See, e.g., Labrador-Prato v. Noem, No. 1:25-cv-1598-DC-SCR, 2025 WL
3458802, at *5 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 2, 2025); Pinchi v. Noem, 792 F. Supp. 3d 1025, 1032 (N.D. Cal.
2025). “Even where the revocation of a person’s freedom is authorized by statute, that person
may retain a protected liberty interest under the Due Process Clause.” Rico-Tapia v. Smith, No.
1:25-cv-00379-SASPKJM, 2025 WL 2950089, at *8 (D. Haw. Oct. 10, 2025) (citing Gagnon v.
Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 782 (1973) and Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481-82 (1972));
Shoimov v. Chestnut, No. 1:25-cv-1603-CSK, 2026 WL 35624, at *5 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 6, 2026). I
agree with the bulk of other courts to have considered the issues presented here and find that
petitioner has a protected liberty interest in his continued release.
Immigration officials paroled petitioner in 2023. ECF No. 6-1 at 2. Since then, petitioner
has lived in the United States, subject to ICE supervision but outside of custody, for over two
years. Petitioner thereby formed “enduring attachments of normal life.” See Morrissey, 408 U.S.
at 482. I conclude that petitioner’s initial release and time out of custody have created a
constitutionally protected liberty interest in continued release. See Guillermo M. R. v. Kaiser, No.

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25-cv-5436-RFL, 2025 WL 1983677, at *4 (N.D. Cal. July 17, 2025) (recognizing that “the
liberty interest that arises upon release [from immigration detention] is inherent in the Due
Process Clause”); Ortega v. Kaiser, No. 25-cv-5259-JST, 2025 WL 1771438, at *3 (N.D. Cal.
June 26, 2025) (collecting cases finding released noncitizens to have strong liberty interests).
Once a court has found that a noncitizen has a liberty interest in continued release, the
court must next determine what procedural protections the government must afford the noncitizen
before depriving him of that liberty interest. This requires balancing the factors laid out in
Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976). See Hernandez v. Sessions, 872 F.3d 976, 993
(9th Cir. 2017) (applying Mathews factors in immigration detention context).
The Mathews test requires courts to consider:
First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action;
second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through
the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or
substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government’s
interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and
administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural
requirement would entail.
Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335.
First, petitioner has a significant private interest in his continued release. “Freedom from
imprisonment—from government custody, detention, or other forms of physical restraint—lies at
the heart of the liberty that [the Due Process] Clause protects.” Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690.
Petitioner has a private interest in continued release that developed over the more than two years
between his release and his re-detention. See Noori v. LaRose, No. 25-cv-1824-GPC-MSB, 2025
WL 2800149, at *10 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 1, 2025) (“Petitioner has a private interest in remaining free,
which developed over the year he resided in the United States.”).
Turning to the second Mathews factor, the risk of erroneous deprivation without a bond
hearing is high. Prior to releasing petitioner, immigration officers necessarily determined that he
presented neither a danger to the community nor a risk of flight. See Pinchi, 792 F. Supp. 3d at
1034 (explaining that a petitioner’s “release from ICE custody after her initial apprehension
reflected a determination by the government that she was neither a flight risk nor a danger to the
community”). Absent a pre-deprivation bond hearing in front of a neutral arbiter, the risk of

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erroneous deprivation is high given the possibility that petitioner’s re-detention will not be
pursuant to a valid state interest. See Omer G. G. v. Kaiser, No. 1:25-cv-01471-KES-SAB, 2025
WL 3254999, at *7 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 22, 2025) (“Civil immigration detention, which is
‘nonpunitive in purpose and effect[,]’ is justified when a noncitizen presents a risk of flight or
danger to the community.”) (quoting Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690).
“Where, as here, ‘[the petitioner] has not received any bond or custody . . . hearing,’ ‘the
risk of an erroneous deprivation [of liberty] is high’ because neither the government nor [the
petitioner] has had an opportunity to determine whether there is any valid basis for her detention.”
Pinchi, 792 F. Supp. 3d at 1035 (quoting Singh v. Andrews, No. 1:25-cv-00801, 2025 WL
1918679, at *7 (E.D. Cal. July 11, 2025)). Respondent offers no evidence or argument indicating
that any procedural safeguards have been employed following petitioner’s re-detention; more
generally, they give the court no reason to believe that any efforts have been made to prevent
erroneous deprivation of petitioner’s liberty. See id. Accordingly, “the probable value of
additional procedural safeguards, i.e., a bond hearing, is high.” See A.E. v. Andrews, No. 1:25-cv-
0107-KES-SKO, 2025 WL 1424382, at *5 (E.D. Cal. May 16, 2025), report and recommendation
adopted, 2025 WL 1808676 (E.D. Cal. July 1, 2025).
“Third, the Government’s interest in detaining Petitioner without . . . a hearing is ‘low.’”
Salazar v. Casey, No. 25-cv-2784-JLS, 2025 WL 3063629, at *5 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 3, 2025)
(citation omitted). “In immigration court, custody hearings are routine and impose a ‘minimal’
cost.” Carballo v. Andrews, No. 1:25-cv-0978-KES-EPG, 2025 WL 2381464, at *8 (E.D. Cal.
Aug. 15, 2025) (quoting Doe v. Becerra, 787 F. Supp. 3d 1083, 1094 (E.D. Cal. 2025)).
Respondent has not provided any information about the additional burden that would fall on them
as a result of being required to provide a bond hearing. See ECF Nos. 6 & 13.
Accordingly, a consideration of the Mathews factors demonstrates that petitioner’s re-
detention without a bond hearing violates his due process rights. Given this finding, I must
determine the appropriate remedy. Petitioner requests a bond hearing. ECF No. 1 at 15.
Respondent argues that “only appropriate relief is a bond hearing, not release from detention.”
ECF No. 6 at 7.

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The Supreme Court has recognized that “[h]abeas is at its core a remedy for unlawful
executive detention,” and the “typical remedy for such detention is, of course, release.” Munaf v.
Geren, 553 U.S. 674, 693 (2008). The Court has also observed, however, that “release need not
be the exclusive remedy and is not the appropriate one in every case in which the writ is granted.”
Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 779 (2008). “Indeed, common-law habeas corpus was, above
all, an adaptable remedy. Its precise application and scope changed depending upon the
circumstances.” Id.; see also Carafas v. LaVallee, 391 U.S. 234, 239 (1968) (The federal habeas
statute “does not limit the relief that may be granted to discharge of the applicant from physical
custody”).
Before re-detaining petitioner, due process would ordinarily require a pre-deprivation
hearing. See Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 127 (1990) (“[T]he [Supreme] Court usually has
held that the Constitution requires some kind of a hearing before the State deprives a person of
liberty or property.”). However, “there may be situations that urgently require arrest, in which a
prompt post-deprivation hearing is appropriate.” Guillermo M.R. v. Kaiser, 791 F. Supp. 3d
1021, 1036 (N.D. Cal. 2025). For example, in Martinez Hernandez v. Andrews, the court held
that, where the petitioner had allegedly violated his parole, a post-deprivation hearing was
appropriate because it was “at least arguable that providing [the petitioner] with notice and a pre-
deprivation hearing would have been impracticable and/or would have motivated his flight.” No.
1:25-cv-1035-JLT-HBK, 2025 WL 2495767, at *12 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 28, 2025).
Here, as noted, petitioner was convicted of breaching a retail fuel dispenser, tampering
with a component of a retail fuel dispenser, and retail fuel theft in violation of Florida Statute
§ 812.0151. ECF No. 6-3 at 1. On the following day, petitioner was re-detained by ICE upon his
release from a local jail. ECF No. 10 ¶ 19; ECF No. 6 at 2. Under these circumstances, I find
that it is “at least arguable that providing [petitioner] with notice and a pre-deprivation hearing
would have been impracticable and/or would have motivated his flight.” See Martinez
Hernandez v. Andrews, 2025 WL 2495767, at *12. Accordingly, the present record does not
establish that petitioner was constitutionally entitled to a pre-deprivation hearing.

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Due process still required, however, that petitioner be afforded a “prompt post-deprivation
hearing.” See Guillermo M.R., 791 F. Supp. 3d at 1036. Petitioner, as noted, has not been
afforded such a hearing. Accordingly, I find that the appropriate remedy is a bond hearing. See
Archundia v. Wofford, No. 1:26-cv-1452-DJC-CSK, 2026 WL 607977, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 4,
2026) (finding a bond hearing to be the proper remedy where petitioner was previously arrested
for “allegedly engaging in prostitution”) (citing J.S.H.M. v. Wofford, No. 1:25-cv-1309-JLT-
SKO, 2025 WL 2938808, at *15-16 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 16, 2025)).
Lastly, the parties dispute who should carry the burden at the bond hearing. See ECF No.
1 at 15; ECF No. 6 at 7-8. Because petitioner’s re-detention implicates due process concerns, the
government must show by clear and convincing evidence that petitioner is a danger to the
community or a flight risk. See Martinez v. Clark 124 F.4th 775, 780 (9th Cir. 2024); Lopez v.
Garland, 631 F. Supp. 3d 870, 882 n.9 (collecting cases).
Conclusion
Accordingly, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that:
1. The amended petition for writ of habeas corpus, ECF No. 10, be GRANTED.
2. Within seven days of the court’s order, petitioner (A-Number: 244-285-383) shall be
provided a bond hearing before a neutral adjudicator. Within 24 hours of the filing of the
court’s order, respondent shall personally serve petitioner with the court’s order and file
proof of such service on the docket. At this hearing, the government shall bear the burden
of establishing, by clear and convincing evidence, that petitioner poses a danger to the
community or a risk of flight, and petitioner shall be allowed to have counsel present.
3. The Clerk of Court be ordered to enter judgment accordingly and close this case.
These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge
assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within three days of
service of these findings and recommendations, any party may file written objections with the
court and serve a copy on all parties. Any such document should be captioned “Objections to
Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations,” and any response shall be served and filed
within three days of service of the objections. The parties are advised that failure to file

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objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District Court’s order. See
Turner v. Duncan, 158 F.3d 449, 455 (9th Cir. 1998); Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir.
1991).
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: October 9, 2026
JEREMY D. PETERSON
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE