(HC) B.D.S. v. Warden of the Mesa Verde Detention Facility et al

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
MARCOS B.D.S.,
Petitioner,
v.
WARDEN OF THE MESA VERDE
DETENTION FACILITY, et al.,
Respondents.
No. 1:25-cv-02032-TLN-CSK
ORDER
This matter is before the Court on Petitioner Marcos B.D.S.’s (“Petitioner”) Petition for
Writ of Habeas Corpus. (ECF No. 1.) On December 30, 2025, the Court ordered Respondents
Warden of the Mesa Verde Detention Facility and Current or Acting Field Office Director, San
Francisco Field Office, United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement; Director, United
States Immigration and Customs Enforcement; Secretary, United States Department of Homeland
Security; and United States Attorney General (collectively “Respondents”) to submit a response
to Petitioner’s request for immediate injunctive relief. (ECF No. 5.) On January 5, 2026,
Respondents filed a response. (ECF No. 6.) On December 22, 2025, Petitioner filed a traverse.
(ECF No. 9.) For the reasons set forth below, Petitioner’s petition is GRANTED.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Petitioner is a native and citizen of Brazil. (ECF No. 6-1 at 4.) Petitioner entered the
United States on or about June 8, 2024. (Id.) Petitioner left his home country after experiencing
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persecution for being a member of the LGBTQ+ community, including his father being killed due
to Petitioner’s sexual identity. (ECF No. 9 at 2.)
After arriving to the United States, an asylum officer determined Petitioner had raised a
credible fear of persecution or torture if returned to Brazil. (ECF No. 6-1 at 4.) Petitioner was
then placed in standard removal proceedings under 8 U.S.C. § 1229a, issued a Notice to Appear,
and paroled into the United States beginning July 17, 2024. (Id. at 2–4.)
Petitioner was detained on or about September 22, 2025. (Id. at 8.) He was detained
without an individualized assessment or bond hearing. (ECF No. 9 at 2.) Petitioner has remained
in detention for over three months at the Mesa Verde Detention Facility in Bakersfield. (Id.)
On December 29, 2025, Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus challenging
his detention as violating his due process rights. (ECF No. 1.) The Court issued an order
directing Respondents to file a response to Petitioner’s request for injunctive relief. (ECF No. 5.)
II. STANDARD OF LAW
The Constitution guarantees the availability of the writ of habeas corpus “to every
individual detained within the United States.” Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 525 (2004)
(citing U.S. Const., Art I, § 9, cl. 2). “The essence of habeas corpus is an attack by a person in
custody upon the legality of that custody, and . . . the traditional function of the writ is to secure
release from illegal custody.” Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 484 (1973). A writ of habeas
corpus may be granted to a petitioner who demonstrates that he is in custody in violation of the
Constitution or federal law. 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). Historically, “the writ of habeas corpus has
served as a means of reviewing the legality of Executive detention, and it is in that context that its
protections have been strongest.” I.N.S. v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 301 (2001). Accordingly, a
district court’s habeas jurisdiction includes challenges to immigration detention. See Zadvydas v.
Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 687 (2001).
III. ANALYSIS
In his habeas petition, Petitioner’s singular claim for relief asserts that his continued
detention without a hearing violates his due process rights. (ECF No. 1 at 16–17.) Though the
parties raise a variety of arguments in their subsequent filings, the Court limits its analysis to
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those related to Petitioner’s due process claim.1
The Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause prohibits government deprivation of an
individual’s life, liberty, or property without due process of law. Hernandez v. Session, 872 F.3d
976, 990 (9th Cir. 2017). The Due Process Clause applies to all “persons” within the borders of
the United States, regardless of immigration status. Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 693 (“[T]he Due
Process Clause applies to all ‘persons’ within the United States, including noncitizens, whether
their presence here is lawful, unlawful, temporary, or permanent.”). These due process rights
extend to immigration proceedings, including deportation proceedings. Id. at 693–94; see
Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 523 (2003).
Courts examine procedural due process claims in two steps: the first asks whether there
exists a protected liberty interest under the Due Process Clause, and the second examines the
procedures necessary to ensure any deprivation of that protected liberty interest accords with the
Constitution. See Kentucky Dep’t of Corrections v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 460 (1989);
Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972) (“Once it is determined that due process applies,
the question remains what process is due.”).
a) Liberty Interest
“Freedom from imprisonment—from government custody, detention, or other forms of
physical restrain—lies at the heart of the liberty that [the Due Process] Clause protects.”
Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690. “Even individuals who face significant constraints on their liberty or
over whose liberty the government wields significant discretion retain a protected interest in their
liberty.” Pinchi v. Noem, 792 F. Supp. 3d 1025, 1032 (N.D. Cal. July 24, 2025). To determine
whether an individual’s specific conditional release rises to the level of a protected liberty
1 Respondents’ opposition claims Petitioner is an “applicant for admission” subject to
mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1), Petitioner’s substantive due process claim fails
because his detention is not indefinite, and Petitioner’s procedural due process claim fails because
he is not entitled to a bond hearing. (ECF No. 6 at 3–8.) In addition to discussing his due process
claim, Petitioner’s traverse also argues he is not an “applicant for admission” or subject to
mandatory detention and instead falls under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), Respondents’ revocation of
parole without notice was arbitrary and capricious in violation of the Administrative Procedure
Act, Petitioner is likely to suffer irreparable harm, and the balance of equities and the public
interest favor his release. (ECF No. 9 at 3–14.)
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interest, courts have “compar[ed] the specific conditional release in the case before them with the
liberty interest in parole as characterized by Morrissey.” R.D.T.M. v. Wofford, No. 1:25-CV-
01141-KES-SKO, 2025 WL 2617255, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 9, 2025).
Here, the Court finds Petitioner developed “enduring attachments of normal life” during
his conditional release as described in Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 482. Prior to re-detention,
Petitioner lived in the United States for approximately one year and two months. (ECF No. 9 at
9.) During that time, he was gainfully employed as a painter, met and began a relationship with
his boyfriend, and pursued his application for asylum relief. (Id.) He complied with the terms of
his parole and did not engage in any criminal activity. (Id.) For these reasons, the Court finds
Petitioner’s prior release from immigration custody creates a substantial liberty interest protected
by the Fifth Amendment. See Salcedo Aceros v. Kaiser, No. 25-CV-06924-EMC, 2025 WL
2637503, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 12, 2025) (“Accordingly, a noncitizen release from custody
pending immigration proceedings has a protected liberty interest in remaining out of custody.”).
Respondents’ argument that Petitioner is subject to mandatory detention under
§ 1225(b)(1) does not change this Court’s analysis. Section 1225(b)(1) provides a process for
detention and expedited removal of certain “aliens arriving in the United States and certain other
aliens who have not been admitted or paroled.” 8 U.S.C. 1225(b)(1) (emphasis added). The
statute’s scope is defined as follows:
An alien described in this clause is an alien who is not described in
subparagraph (F), who has not been admitted or paroled into the
United States, and who has not affirmatively shown, to the
satisfaction of an immigration officer, that the alien has been
physically present in the United States continuously for the 2-year
period immediately prior to the date of the determination of
inadmissibility under this subparagraph.
8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(iii)(II) (emphasis added). Here, Petitioner was paroled into the United
States on July 17, 2024, and remained on parole until his challenged re-detention. (ECF No. 6-1
at 2.) Respondents’ argument that § 1225(b)(1) expedited removal procedures apply to Petitioner
thus fails and does not alter the Court’s analysis of Petitioner’s liberty interest.2
2 Having found Petitioner is not subject to 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1), the Court agrees with
Petitioner that he is instead subject to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) and entitled to the process that statute
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b) Procedural Due Process
Having found a protected liberty interest, the Court examines what process is necessary to
ensure any deprivation of that protected liberty interest accords with the Constitution. The Court
considers three factors: (1) “the private interest that will be affected by the official action;” (2)
“the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the
probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards;” and (3) “the
Government’s interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens
that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.” Mathews v. Eldridge, 424
U.S. 319, 335 (1976). Due process rights in the immigration context “must account for the
government’s countervailing interests in immigration enforcement.” Rodriguez Diaz v. Garland,
53 F.4th 1189, 1206 (9th Cir. 2022).
As to the first Mathews factor – Petitioner’s private interest – as discussed above,
Petitioner has been out of custody since July of 2025. (ECF No. 6-1 at 2.) In that time, Petitioner
secured gainful employment, met and entered a relationship with his boyfriend, and made a life in
Pinole, California. (ECF No. 9 at 9.) The time Petitioner has spent in the United States, as well
as his established relationships, create a powerful interest for Petitioner in his continued liberty.
See Doe v. Becerra, 787 F. Supp. 3d 1083, 1094 (E.D. Cal. 2025).
As to the second Mathews factor – the risk of erroneous deprivation – the Court finds the
risk here be considerable. The risk of an erroneous deprivation of Petitioner’s liberty interest is
high where he has received virtually no procedural safeguards such as a bond or custody
redetermination hearing. A.E. v. Andrews, No. 1:25-CV-00107-KES-SKO, 2025 WL 1424382, at
*5 (E.D. Cal. May 16, 2025). This is particularly so where, as here, Petitioner has no criminal
history and has complied with all conditions of his parole. (ECF No. 9 at 11); See R.D.T.M. v.
Wofford, No. 1:25-CV-01141-KES-SKO, 2025 WL 2686866, at *6 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 18, 2025)
(“Civil immigration detention, which is ‘nonpunitive in purpose and effect,’ is justified when a
noncitizen presents a risk of flight or danger to the community.”).
demands. (ECF No. 9 at 3.) However, because Petitioner’s habeas petition only claims a
constitutional violation, the Court need not discuss a potential statutory violation.
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As to the third Mathews factor, the government’s interest in detaining Petitioner without a
hearing before a neutral decisionmaker is negligible. R.D.T.M., 2025 WL 2686866 at *6.
Custody hearings in immigration court are “routine and impose a ‘minimal’ cost,” and the
government’s interest is further diminished here where Petitioner was already found appropriate
for release on parole, has complied with the conditions of that parole, has no criminal history.
(ECF No. 9 at 11.) “The government has no legitimate interest in detaining individuals who have
been determined not to be a danger to the community and whose appearance at future
immigration proceedings can be reasonably ensured by [ ] bond or alternative conditions.”).
Hernandez, 872 F.3d at 994.
The Court therefore finds Petitioner’s re-detention without a hearing violate due process.
The Court GRANTS Petitioner’s petition. (ECF No. 1).
IV. CONCLUSION
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:
1. Petitioner’s petition for writ of habeas corpus (ECF No. 1) is GRANTED;
2. Respondents must IMMEDIATELY RELEASE Petitioner Marcos B.D.S. from
custody. Respondents are ENJOINED AND RESTRAINED from re-detaining Petitioner unless
they demonstrate, by clear and convincing evidence at a pre-deprivation bond hearing before a
neutral decisionmaker, that Petitioner is a flight risk or danger to the community such that his
physical custody is legally justified.
3. The Clerk of Court shall enter judgment in favor of Petitioner and close this case.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Date: January 12, 2026
___________________________________
TROY L. NUNLEY
CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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