(HC) Singh v. Albarran et al

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
AMANDEEP SINGH,
Petitioner,
v.
SERGIO ALBARRAN, et al.,
Respondents.
Case No. 1:25-cv-01788-CDB (HC)
ORDER GRANTING PETITIONER’S MOTION
FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER
AND REQUIRING RESPONDENTS TO
RELEASE PETITIONER FROM CUSTODY
IMMEDIATELY
(Doc. 2)
Pending before the Court1 is Petitioner Amandeep Singh’s motion for temporary restraining
order (“TRO”), filed on December 9, 2025. (Doc. 2). On December 16, 2025, Respondents Sergio
Albarran, in his official capacity as Field Officer Director of Immigration and Customs
Enforcement (“ICE”), San Francisco; Todd M. Lyons, in his official capacity as Acting Director of
ICE; Kristi Noem, in her official capacity as Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security
(“DHS”); and Pamela Bondi, in her official capacity as Attorney General of the United States
(collectively, “Respondents”) filed their reply, and on December 18, 2025, Petitioner replied.
(Docs. 8, 10). Because neither party requests a hearing (Doc. 8 at 9; Doc. 10 at 6), the Court deems
the motion submitted for decision without oral argument. (Doc. 4).
1 Both parties have consented to the jurisdiction of a U.S. magistrate judge for all proceedings in
this action, in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(1). (Doc. 9).
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I. Relevant Procedural and Factual Background
Petitioner Amandeep Singh, a federal detainee proceeding by counsel, initiated this action
by filing a petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241, while in custody of ICE
at the Mesa Verde Processing Center, located in Kern County, California, which is where he is
currently detained. (Doc. 1). After Petitioner filed the instant motion for temporary restraining
order2 (Doc. 2), on December 9, 2025, the Court set a briefing schedule on the motion. (Doc. 4).
Petitioner, a citizen of India, entered the United States of America on February 8, 2022.3
(Doc. 2 at 3; Doc. 1-4). Petitioner fled India after “being persecuted by the Indian Central
Government for supporting an opposition party that demands an Independent State, [Khalistan].”
Id. at 4; (Doc. 1 at 7). According to the Form I-220A (“Order of Release on Recognizance”)
attached to his petition, Petitioner was arrested by the U.S. Border Patrol (“USBP”) on or about
February 8, 2022. (Doc. 1-4). On February 10, 2022, he signed the Order of Release on
Recognizance and agreed to comply with numerous conditions set forth therein, including that he
enroll and participate in the “Alternatives to Detention (ATD)” program as designated by the U.S.
Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”). Id. The Order of Release on Recognizance provides,
in part, that “[f]ailure to comply with the conditions of this order may result in revocation of your
release and your arrest and detention by the Department of Homeland Security.” Id. Respondents
acknowledge that USBP encountered Petitioner at Yuma, Arizona, and determined he had
unlawfully entered the country from Mexico, and that Petitioner was enrolled in the Intensive
Supervision Appearance Program (“ISAP”). (Doc. 8 at 2).
According to the Form I-862 “Notice to Appear” attached to his petition, on or about March
16, 2022, Respondents initiated removal proceedings against Petitioner, pursuant to 8 U.S.C. §
1229a, asserting that Petitioner was inadmissible to the United States of America under 8 U.S.C. §
2 For purposes of this order, the Court will construe Plaintiff’s motion for temporary restraining
order as a motion for preliminary injunction.
3 The factual background is drawn from Petitioner’s petition for writ of habeas corpus and other
evidence in the record. (Docs. 1, 2, 8).
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1182(a)(6)(A)(i). (Doc. 1-3). In the Notice to Appear, Respondents directed Petitioner to appear
for a hearing before an immigration court on July 20, 2022. Id.
Although not alleged in the petition, in his motion for TRO, Petitioner asserts that he
married his wife, a citizen of the United States of America, on October 3, 2025. Petitioner lived in
Bakersfield, California, prior to his arrest and his mother and sister are citizens of the United States
of America. Petitioner was providing for his spouse before he was detained and funding her
education. (Doc. 2 at 3-4).
Petitioner alleges that he was re-arrested by immigration authorities on November 1, 2025,
and has remained detained since that date. (Doc. 1 ¶¶ 5, 23). Respondents likewise represent
Petitioner was re-arrested on November 1, 2025. (Doc. 8 at 2); cf. (Doc. 2-1 at 21) (Petitioner’s
assertion in moving for TRO that he has been detained since September 30, 2025).
II. Governing Authority4
“A preliminary injunction is an extraordinary remedy never awarded as of right.” Winter v.
Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 24 (2008) (citing Munaf v. Geren, 553 U.S. 674, 689–90
(2008)). “A plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction must establish that he is likely to succeed on
the merits, that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, that the
balance of equities tips in his favor, and that an injunction is in the public interest.” Glossip v.
Gross, 576 U.S. 863, 876 (2015) (quoting Winter, 555 U.S. at 20); Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo,
456 U.S. 305, 311–12 (1982)). “Under Winter, plaintiffs must establish that irreparable harm is
likely, not just possible, in order to obtain a preliminary injunction.” Alliance for the Wild Rockies
v. Cottrell, 632 F.3d 1127, 1131 (9th Cir. 2011). Likelihood of success on the merits is a threshold
inquiry and is the most important factor.” Simon v. City & Cnty. of San Francisco, 135 F.4th 784,
797 (9th Cir. 2025) (quoting Env’t Prot. Info. Ctr. v. Carlson, 968 F.3d 985, 989 (9th Cir. 2020)).
“[I]f a plaintiff can only show that there are serious questions going to the merits—a lesser showing
than likelihood of success on the merits—then a preliminary injunction may still issue if the balance
of hardships tips sharply in the plaintiff's favor, and the other two Winter factors are satisfied.”
4 The Court has jurisdiction over Petitioner’s claim that he is improperly detained, pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 2241. See (Doc. 1). In opposing issuance of a preliminary injunction, Respondents do not
challenge the Court’s jurisdiction over this claim. See generally (Doc. 8).
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Friends of the Wild Swan v. Weber, 767 F.3d 936, 942 (9th Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks
and citations omitted).
Preliminary injunctions are intended “merely to preserve the relative positions of the parties
until a trial on the merits can be held, and to balance the equities at the litigation moves forward.”
Lackey v Stinnie, 604 U.S. 192, 200 (2025) (citations and quotations omitted). “The status quo
refers to ‘the last uncontested status which preceded the pending controversy.’” E.A.P.C. v.
Wofford, No. 1:25-cv-01546-JLT-CDB, 2025 WL 3289185, at *8 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 25, 2025)
(quoting Tanner Motor Livery, Ltd. v. Avis, Inc., 316 F.2d 804, 809 (9th Cir. 1963)).
III. Discussion
A. Exhaustion
“Section 2241 … ‘does not specifically require petitioners to exhaust direct appeals before
filing petitions for habeas corpus.’” Laing v. Ashcroft, 370 F.3d 994, 997 (9th Cir. 2004) (citing
Castro-Cortez v. INS, 239 F.3d 1037, 1047 (9th Cir. 2001)). The Ninth Circuit, however, requires
“as a prudential matter, that habeas petitioners exhaust available judicial and administrative
remedies before seeking relief under § 2241.” Castro-Cortez, 239 F.3d at 1047 (citing United
States v. Pirro, 104 F.3d 297, 299 (9th Cir. 1997)). “Under the doctrine of exhaustion, ‘no one is
entitled to judicial relief for a supposed or threatened injury until the prescribed ... remedy has been
exhausted.’” Laing, 370 F.3d at 997-98 (citing McKart v. United States, 395 U.S. 185, 193 (1969)).
“Exhaustion can be either statutorily or judicially required. If exhaustion is required by statute, it
may be mandatory and jurisdictional, but courts have discretion to waive a prudential requirement.”
Id. at 998 (citing El Rescate Legal Servs., Inc. v. Executive Office of Immigration Review, 959 F.2d
742, 746 (9th Cir. 1991); Stratman v. Watt, 656 F.2d 1321, 1325-26 (9th Cir. 1981)). “Although
courts have discretion to waive the exhaustion requirement when it is prudentially required, this
discretion is not unfettered…. Lower courts … [must] first determin[e whether] the exhaustion
requirement has been satisfied or properly waived.” Id. (internal citations omitted); see Murillo v.
Mathews, 588 F.2d 759, 762 n.8 (9th Cir. 1978) (“Although the application of the rule requiring
exhaustion is not jurisdictional, but calls for the sound exercise of judicial discretion, it is not lightly
to be disregarded.”).
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Petitioner contends that exhaustion should be waived because it would be futile for him to
seek release by administrative means and agency delay would result in irreparable injury. (Doc. 2
at 22). Petitioner asserts that a request for a bond hearing would be futile as DHS policy instructs
ICE employees to consider anyone arrested within the United States and charged with being
inadmissible to be an “application for admission,” detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b), and subject
to indefinite mandatory detention with no statutory right to a bond hearing. (Doc. 2-1 at 22-23;
citing Matter of Yajure Hurtado, 29 I&N Dec. 216 (B.I.A. 2025)).
Respondents assert that exhaustion is warranted. In support, Respondents argue that this
Court would “benefit from the [Board of Immigration Appeals’] expertise,” as it is a subject-matter
expert in immigration bond decisions and “well-positioned to assess the interplay” between §§ 1225
and 1226. Respondents represent that waiving exhaustion would encourage other detainees to
bypass the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) and individuals would have little incentive to
seek relief before the BIA, as well as increase the burden on the federal courts. (Doc. 8 at 5-6;
citations omitted). Respondents argue that accepting the Petitioner’s proffered argument for
irreparable harm, namely additional detention and separation, would result in “every single
individual who alleges unlawful detention” meeting the irreparable harm standard. Id. at 6-7.
The Court finds that the prudential exhaustion requirement should be waived as it would be
futile to seek release by administrative means. Specifically, Respondents contend that Petitioner is
subject to indefinite mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b) (see Doc. 8), and under that
framework, Petitioner has no statutory right to a bond hearing during his course of detention and
therefore lacks recourse through statutory or administrative means. See Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583
U.S. 281, 282 (2018) (“§§ 1225(b) … do[e]s not give detained aliens the right to periodic bond
hearings during the course of their detention.”); Rodriguez Diaz v. Garland, 53 F. 4th 1189, 1201
(9th Cir. 2022). Further, the BIA has recently held that all noncitizens present within the country
without admission are seeking admission pursuant to § 1225, rendering any administrative relief
futile. See J.A.C.P. v. Wofford, No. 1:25-CV-01354-KES-SKO (HC), 2025 WL 3013328, at *7
(E.D. Cal. Oct. 27, 2025) (“In addition, pursuit of administrative remedies would almost certainly
be futile given the BIA’s recent holding that all noncitizens present in the United States without
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admission are ‘seeking admission’ for purposes of 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A) and must be
detained.”) (citing Hurtado, 29 I&N Dec. 216).
Thus, the Court will waive the prudential exhaustion requirement for Petitioner’s claim for
habeas corpus relief. See Chavez v. Noem, No. 3:25-CV-02325-CAB-SBC, 2025 WL 2730228, at
*3 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 24, 2025) (waiving prudential exhaustion requirement because the BIA “already
applied its expertise in deciding and designating” Hurtado as precedential, pursuant to which
detainees are subject to mandatory detention without bond under § 1225(b)(2)); e.g., Rodriguez v.
Bostock, 779 F. Supp. 3d 1239, 1253 (W.D. Wash. 2025) (“The Ninth Circuit has recognized ‘the
irreparable harms imposed on anyone subject to immigration detention.’”) (citing Hernandez v.
Sessions, 872 F.3d 976, 995 (9th Cir. 2017)); Beltran v. Noem, No. 25cv2650-LL-DEB, 2025 WL
3078837, at *4 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 4, 2025); Kuzmenko v. Phillips, No. 25-cv-00663-DJC-AC, 2025
WL 779743, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 10, 2025)).
B. Likelihood of Success on the Merits
1. Statutory Construction
a. Parties’ Contentions
Petitioner asserts that the plain text of §§ 1225 and 1226 demonstrate that Petitioner is not
subject to mandatory detention. Petitioner argues that § 1226(a) applies to Petitioner because, by
the statute’s text, it attaches where a person is detained “pending a decision on whether the alien is
to be removed from the United States.” Petitioner asserts that § 1226 explicitly establishes that this
authority includes noncitizens who are inadmissible pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a). (Doc. 2-1 at
5; citing 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)).
Petitioner argues that the Laken Riley Act (“LRA”) added language to § 1226 setting forth
categories of individuals subject to the mandatory detention provisions at § 1226(c), namely
individuals who have entered the country without inspection, those who are inadmissible because
they are present in the country without admission, those who lack valid documentation to enter,
and those who have been arrested, charged with, or convicted of certain crimes. Petitioner asserts
that, by including such categories in § 1226(c) under the LRA amendments, Congress clarified that
§ 1226(a) covers persons like Petitioner because the specific exceptions of the LRA logically leave
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those who are inadmissible noncitizens, and who are not implicated under said categories, subject
to § 1226(a)’s default rule. (Doc 2-1 at 6-7; citing, inter alia, Rodriguez, 779 F. Supp. 3d at 1259).
Petitioner further argues that the text of § 1226 demonstrates that subsection (a) covers
those who are present and residing within the country and who are not at the border seeking
admission, and the text of § 1225 reinforces this interpretation. Id. (citing Jennings, 583 U.S. at
297).
Respondents assert that Petitioner falls under the specific detention authority of § 1225,
instead of the general authority found at § 1226(a), because the narrower provision of § 1225
regarding “applicant for admission” covers Petitioner. Respondents argue that the phrase “seeking
admission” in § 1225(b)(2)(A) must be read in the context of the definition of “applicant for
admission” in § 1225(a)(1), namely those individuals both present in the country without admission
and those who arrive in the United States. (Doc. 8 at 7-8).
b. Analysis
Based on the facts before the Court, and undisputed by Respondents (see Doc. 8), Petitioner
was already in the United States at the time of his arrest. Petitioner attaches to his petition an Order
of Release on Recognizance, dated February 8, 2022, and signed by an immigration officer on
February 10, 2022, releasing Petitioner under a set of conditions. These conditions required that
Petitioner not change his place of residence prior to securing permission from the immigration
officer, not violate any laws, assist the DHS in obtaining necessary travel documents, and stated
Petitioner was not authorized for employment. Petitioner was warned that failure to comply with
the conditions may result in a revocation of release and arrest. See (Doc. 1-4). Petitioner represents
that he lived in the community “without incident” (Doc. 2-21 at 20) and Respondents neither
challenge this representation nor assert that Petitioner violated any such conditions; nor can the
Court locate any such facts in the record. See (Docs. 1, 2, 8, 10).
Relevant Text of § 1225
Section 1225 governs the detention of noncitizens seeking admission into the United States.
See Jennings, 583 U.S. at 289. In contrast, § 1226 sets forth a “default rule” for noncitizens already
present within the United States. Id. at 288.
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Relevant here, § 1225(b)(1) applies to aliens “arriving in the United States” or aliens who
have “not been admitted or paroled into the United States” and have not “affirmatively shown, to
the satisfaction of an immigration officer, that the alien has been physically present in the United
States continuously for the 2-year period immediately prior to the date of the determination of
inadmissibility.” 8 U.S.C.A. § 1225(b)1)(A)(i), (iii)(II). The plain language of the statute
demonstrates that it is inapplicable to Petitioner. Petitioner is not “arriving” in the United States of
America, but rather arrived in February 2022 and has remained here for a period of over three
years.
Section 1225(b)(2)(A) provides that “in the case of an alien who is an applicant for
admission, if the examining immigration officer determines that an alien seeking admission is not
clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted, the alien shall be detained for a proceeding
under section 1229a of this title.” 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A). For § 1225(b)(2)(A) to apply, an
examining immigration officer must determine that the individual is (1) an “applicant for
admission,” (2) “seeking admission,” and (3) “not clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be
admitted.” See Lepe v. Andrews, No. 1:25-CV-01163-KES-SKO (HC), -- F. Supp. 3d --, 2025 WL
2716910, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 23, 2025) (citing Martinez v. Hyde, 792 F. Supp. 3d 211, 214 (D.
Mass. 2025)).
Respondents have not shown that an examining immigration officer made said
determinations. They claim that an “applicant for admission” is defined as an “alien present in the
United States who has not been admitted or who arrives in the United States,” that “[a]pplicants for
admission are both those individuals present without admission and those who arrive in the United
States,” and that § 1225(b) applies “because Petitioner is present in the United States without being
admitted.” (Doc. 8 at 7-8). Respondents therefore assert that, in essence, an “applicant for
admission” is any individual living in this country who is a noncitizen and did not lawfully enter,
regardless of how long they have lived within the country or whether they took affirmative steps to
seek admission.
The Court agrees with the reasoning of the courts in Lepe and Martinez in finding that
Respondents’ interpretation of the statutory scheme is without merit. “Seeking” means “asking
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for” or “trying to acquire or gain.” The use of “seeking” as a present participle “necessarily implies
some sort of present-tense action.” Lepe, 2025 WL 2716910, at *5 (citing Martinez, 792 F. Supp.
3d at 218). The relevant statutory definition of “admission” and “admitted” is “the lawful entry of
the alien into the United States after inspection and authorization by an immigration officer.” 8
U.S.C.A. § 1101(a)(13)(A). “Entry” means “a crossing into the territorial limits of the United
States.” Lepe, 2025 WL 2716910, at *5 (citing Hing Sum v. Holder, 602 F.3d 1092, 1100–01 (9th
Cir. 2010)). Thus, the phrase “‘seeking admission means that one must be actively ‘seeking’
‘lawful entry.’” Lepe, 2025 WL 2716910, at *5.
Here, Petitioner is not “seeking” “lawful entry” because Petitioner already entered the
United States over three years ago. Petitioner crossed into the territorial limits of the country in
February 2022 and was ordered released on recognizance. See (Doc. 1-4 at 1). In addition,
Respondents treat the terms “‘applicant for admission’ and ‘alien seeking admission’ as
synonymous,” and such an interpretation “violates the principle that Congress is presumed to have
acted intentionally in choosing different words in a statute, such that different words and phrases
should be accorded different meanings.” Lopez Benitez v. Francis, 795 F. Supp. 3d 475, 488
(S.D.N.Y. 2025); see Martinez, 792 F. Supp. 3d at 218. Furthermore, Respondent’s argument
would “render the phrase ‘seeking admission’ … mere surplusage.” Lopez, 795 F. Supp. 3d at 487
(citing, inter alia, United States, ex rel. Polansky v. Exec. Health Res., Inc., 599 U.S. 419 (2023)
(“… the Government’s alternative construction creates surplusage … violating the interpretive
principle that ‘every clause and word of a statute’ should have meaning.”)); see League of
California Cities v. Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n, 118 F.4th 995, 1019 (9th Cir. 2024) (“The rule
against surplusage generally prohibits us from interpreting [a statute] in a way that ‘mak[es] a part
of it unnecessary.’”) (citation omitted; alterations in original).
Thus, Respondents set forth an interpretation of § 1225 that ignores the plain meaning of
the language within the statute.
Overall Statutory Scheme
“It is a fundamental canon of statutory construction that the words of a statute must be read
in their context and with a view to their place in the overall statutory scheme.” Davis v. Michigan
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Dep’t of Treasury, 489 U.S. 803, 809 (1989). § 1225 is titled “Inspection by immigration officers;
expedited removal of inadmissible arriving aliens; referral for hearing.” The term “inspection” is
regularly used in statutory language to refer to a process that occurs at ports of entry. Lepe, 2025
WL 2716910, at *6 (citing Posos-Sanchez v. Garland, 3 F.4th 1176, 1183 (9th Cir. 2021)).
Additionally, § 1225(a)(2) concerns “stowaways,” namely a noncitizen who “obtains transportation
without the consent of the owner … of any vessel … through concealment aboard,” and is therefore
discovered at a port of entry. See id.; 8 U.S.C.A. § 1101(a)(49).
Further, to credit Respondents’ interpretation that 1225(b)(2)(A) applies to any individual
who has entered the country unlawfully, without regard to the length of time they have resided
within the country, would render the applicability of 1226(a) unclear at best, if not entirely
superfluous. See Lopez, 795 F. Supp. 3d at 490 (“If … anyone who entered the country unlawfully
… is subject to mandatory detention … then it is not clear under what circumstances § 1226(a)’s
authorization of detention on a discretionary basis would ever apply … there is nothing in the
history or application of § 1226 to even remotely suggest that it was intended to have such a narrow
reach.”). An interpretation of a statutory provision that “would render another provision
superfluous” violates a core judicial principle. Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 607–08 (2010)
(“This principle, of course, applies to interpreting any two provisions in the [U.S. Code], even when
Congress enacted the provisions at different times.”).
The Supreme Court has explained that “our immigration laws have long made a distinction
between those aliens who have come to our shores seeking admission ... and those who are within
the United States after an entry, irrespective of its legality. In the latter instance the Court has
recognized additional rights and privileges not extended to those in the former category who are
merely ‘on the threshold of initial entry.’” Leng May Ma v. Barber, 357 U.S. 185, 187 (1958)
(citations omitted). The distinction historically drawn between §§ 1225 and 1226, “making sense
of their text and the overall statutory scheme, is that section 1225 governs detention of non-citizens
‘seeking admission into the country,’ whereas section 1226 governs detention of non-citizens
‘already in the country.’” Martinez, 792 F. Supp. 3d at 221 (citing Jennings, 583 U.S. at 288-89).
///
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Laken Riley Act Amendments
Where “Congress has created specific exceptions” to a specific statute or rule, it does not
prove that the rule does not generally apply. To the contrary, “it proves the opposite,” namely that
the statute or rule generally applies absent those exceptions, otherwise “the statutory exceptions
would be unnecessary.” Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 559 U.S. 393,
400 (2010).
In 2025, Congress passed the Laken Riley Act, adding § 1226(c)(1)(E), which mandates
detention for any noncitizen who is both inadmissible under § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i) and “charged with,
arrested for, convicted of, [or] admits” to committing certain crimes. 8 U.S.C.A. § 1226(c)(1)(E).
However, if the inadmissibility of a noncitizen was, by itself, sufficient to mandate detention under
section 1225(b)(2)(A), the Laken Riley Act amendment would have no effect. See Martinez, 792
F. Supp. 3d at 221. “This tension between sections 1225 and 1226 motivates the conclusion that
they apply to different classes of aliens. Indeed, as the Attorney General has previously decided,
‘section [1225] (under which detention is mandatory) and section [1226] (under which detention is
permissive) can be reconciled only if they apply to different classes of aliens.’” Id. (alterations in
original; citing Matter of M-S-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 509, 516 (Att’y Gen. 2019)). “If § 1225(b)(2)
already mandated detention of any alien who has not been admitted, regardless of how long they
have been here, then adding § 1226(c)(1)(E) to the statutory scheme was pointless.” Maldonado v.
Olson, 795 F. Supp. 3d 1134, 1152 (D. Minn. 2025).
The amendments implemented by Congress in the Laken Riley Act further support the
findings, as set forth by the Supreme Court in Jennings, that § 1225(b) applies to “aliens seeking
admission into the country,” and § 1226 applies to “aliens already in the country.” Jennings, 583
U.S. at 288-89 (emphasis added).
For the foregoing reasons, the Court finds that Petitioner’s detention is governed by §
1226(a)’s discretionary framework, rather than § 1225(b)’s mandatory detention procedure. See
Otero v. Robbins, et al., No. 1:25-CV-1790 CSK, 2025 WL 3704453, at *5 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 22,
2025) (collecting cases, adopting the reasoning of the Lepe court, and finding that “[t]his Court
agrees with and joins the majority of courts nationwide, including the Eastern District of California,
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in rejecting respondents’ interpretation of Sections 1225 and 1226”); Morales-Flores v. Lyons, No.
1:25-cv-01640-TLN-EFB, 2025 WL 3552841, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 11, 2025) (collecting cases
and noting “Courts nationwide, including this one, have overwhelmingly rejected respondents’
arguments and found DHS’s new policy unlawful”); J.Y.L.C. v. Bostock, No. 3:25-CV-02083-AB,
2025 WL 3169865, at *2 (D. Or. Nov. 12, 2025) (citing cases and noting that this conclusion is
“consistent with the holdings of dozens of district courts across the country”); Barco Mercado v.
Francis, No. 25-CV-6582 (LAK), 2025 WL 3295903, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 26, 2025) (noting that
this statutory interpretation “has been challenged in at least 362 cases in federal district courts,”
with the challengers having prevailed “either on a preliminary or final basis, in 350 of those cases
decided by over 160 different judges sitting in about fifty different courts”).
2. Procedural Due Process
a. Governing Authority
“The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment mandates that ‘[n]o person shall ... be
deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.’” United States v. Quintero, 995
F.3d 1044, 1051 (9th Cir. 2021) (citing U.S. Const. amend. V). “The Due Process Clause ‘protects
individuals against two types of government action’: violations of substantive due process and
procedural due process.” Id. (citing United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 746 (1987)).
“Procedural due process imposes constraints on governmental decisions which deprive
individuals of ‘liberty’ or ‘property’ interests within the meaning of the Due Process Clause of the
Fifth … Amendment.” Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976). “[F]reedom from
imprisonment—from government custody, detention, or other forms of physical restraint—lies at
the heart of the liberty that Clause protects.” Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 690 (2001).
“Procedural due process requires that, even where a deprivation of liberty survives substantive due
process scrutiny, the action ‘be implemented in a fair manner.’” Quintero, 995 F.3d at 1051-52
(citing Salerno, 481 U.S. at 746). “The ‘right to be heard before being condemned to suffer
grievous loss of any kind, even though it may not involve the stigma and hardships of a criminal
conviction, is a principle basic to our society.’” Mathews, 424 U.S. at 902 (citation omitted). “The
fundamental requirement of due process is the opportunity to be heard ‘at a meaningful time and in
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a meaningful manner.’” Id. (citing Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965)). “[D]ue process
is flexible and calls for such procedural protections as the particular situation demands.” Morrissey
v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972).
“[T]he Due Process Clause applies to all ‘persons’ within the United States, including
aliens, whether their presence here is lawful, unlawful, temporary, or permanent.” Zadvydas, 533
U.S. at 693 (citations omitted); see Hernandez, 872 F.3d at 990 (“[I]t is well-established that the
Due Process Clause stands as a significant constraint on the manner in which the political branches
may exercise their plenary authority.”). “In the context of immigration detention, it is well-settled
that ‘due process requires adequate procedural protections to ensure that the government’s asserted
justification for physical confinement outweighs the individual's constitutionally protected interest
in avoiding physical restraint.’” Hernandez, 872 F.3d at 990 (quoting Singh v. Holder, 638 F.3d
1196, 1203 (9th Cir. 2011)).
b. Liberty Interest and Mathews Factor Test
Here, Petitioner shows that, under procedural due process, he has an underlying, continuing
liberty interest from detention. Specifically, Petitioner was conditionally released on an order of
recognizance. (Doc. 1-4 at 1). The decision to release Petitioner appears to be a tacit acceptance
that Petitioner was not a flight risk nor a danger to the community. Petitioner remained released
from immigration detention for a significant amount of time—over three and a half years—and
“without incident.” (Doc. 2-1 at 20). Respondents do not set forth that Petitioner failed to comply
with the conditions of his release. See (Doc. 8).
The undersigned agrees with other courts and other judges of this Court that noncitizens
released from immigration custody on general orders of supervision (like Petitioner here) have a
liberty interest in their freedom that implicates protections under principles of procedural due
process. See Guillermo M.R. v. Kaiser, 791 F. Supp. 3d 1021, 1031 (N.D. Cal. 2025) (“The fact
that Petitioner is subject to discretionary conditions of release likewise does not mean he lacks a
protectable liberty interest and can be re-detained without process.”); see id. (“[E]ven if
immigration detainees must wait months before a periodic re-review of their detention, those
already released on immigration bond possess an interest in their continued liberty, which grows
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over time, and a due process right to a hearing before being re-detained.”); Nak Kim Chhoeun v.
Marin, 442 F. Supp. 3d 1233, 1245 (C.D. Cal. 2020); accord Doe v. Becerra, 787 F. Supp. 3d 1083,
1099 (E.D. Cal. 2025) (considering in connection with a petitioner’s procedural due process claim
that “[t]he lengthy duration of his conditional release as well as the meaningful connections
Petitioner seems to have made with his community during that time create a powerful interest for
Petitioner in his continued liberty”); Ramazan M. v. Tonya Andrews, No. 1:25-cv-01356-KES-SKO
(HC), 2025 WL 3145562, at *5-6 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 10, 2025) (“Even when a statute allows the
government to arrest and detain an individual, a protected liberty interest under the Due Process
Clause may entitle the individual to procedural protections not found in the statute”).
Because Petitioner has shown he has a protected liberty interest, the Court must determine
what process is due before the government may terminate that liberty interest. Here, Petitioner
asserts that the three-factor test articulated in Mathews applies in consideration of Petitioner’s
claims implicating procedural due process. (Doc. 2-1 at 18). Respondents neither challenge nor
address the applicability of Mathews. See (Doc. 8). The Court agrees with Petitioner that the
Mathews test applies.
Mathews “requires consideration of three distinct factors: [(1)] the private interest that will
be affected by the official action; [(2)] the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through
the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural
safeguards; and [(3)] the Government’s interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and
administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.”
Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335; see Hernandez, 872 F.3d at 993-94 (applying Mathews test in
immigration detention context); id. at 993 (“The appropriateness of the requirement that ICE and
IJs consider financial circumstances and alternative conditions of release is confirmed by the
balance of factors under Mathews[.]”).
As to the first factor, Petitioner has shown he has a significant private interest in remaining
on release from detention. He has been out of immigration custody for over three and a half years,
and during that time, has lived in Bakersfield, California, where he has supported his spouse.
Nothing in the record provides that Petitioner was arrested or convicted of any crime, or has failed
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to comply with all obligations of his release. (Doc. 2-1 at 19). Petitioner’s continued liberty interest
in remaining on release is undermined by his detention. Doe, 787 F. Supp. 3d at 1093-94 (“Freedom
from imprisonment is at the core of the Due Process Clause … The lengthy duration of his
conditional release [for over five years] as well as the meaningful connections [he] seems to have
made with his community during that time create a powerful interest for [him] in his continued
liberty.”).
As to the second factor, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of Petitioner’s liberty interest
is considerable here where he has not received any bond or custody redetermination. Id. at 1094;
A.E. v. Andrews, No. 1:25-cv-00107-KES-SKO, 2025 WL 1424382, at *5 (E.D. Cal. May 16, 2025)
(“‘the risk of an erroneous deprivation of [petitioner’s liberty] interest is high’ where ‘[h]e has not
received any bond or custody redetermination hearing.’”) (citation omitted). Because there were
no procedural safeguards to determine if Petitioner’s detention was justified, and Respondents have
not articulated any change in circumstances while Petitioner was on release sufficient to justify
Petitioner’s detention, the probable value of the additional procedural safeguard of a bond hearing
to determine whether Petitioner is a flight risk or a danger to the community is high such that this
factor weighs in favor of granting a bond hearing. See Doe, 787 F. Supp. at 1094 (“[G]iven that
Petitioner was previously found to not be a danger or risk of flight and the unresolved questions
about the timing and reliability of the new information, the risk of erroneous deprivation remains
high.”); A.E., 2025 WL 1424382 at *5; Ramazan, 2025 WL 3145562, at *6. Therefore, this factor
weighs in favor of granting a bond hearing and/or release.
Third, the government’s interest in detaining Petitioner without a bond hearing is low. Doe,
787 F. Supp. 3d at 1094 (citation omitted); see Ortega v. Bonnar, 415 F. Supp. 3d 963, 970 (N.D.
Cal. 2019)) (“[T]he government's interest in re-arresting Ortega without a hearing before an IJ is
low. The allegedly material change of circumstances—the Order of Removal—occurred over a
year and a half ago, and during all that time, Ortega has strictly complied with all the requirements
of his release. If the government wishes to re-arrest Ortega at any point, it has the power to take
steps toward doing so; but its interest in doing so without a hearing is low. Accordingly, the
Mathews factors favor Ortega.”); accord Diaz v. Kaiser, No. 3:25-cv-05071, 2025 WL 1676854, at
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*3 (N.D. Cal. June 14, 2025) (“And, like other Courts in this district, the Court concludes that the
government’s interest in re-detaining Petitioner-[] without a hearing is ‘low,’ particularly in light
of the fact that Petitioner[] has long complied with his reporting requirements.”). “The effort and
cost to provide Petitioner with [a bond hearing] is minimal[.]” Doe, 787 F. Supp. 3d at 1094.
Therefore, any additional burden from requiring the government to seek a bond hearing before it
may re-detain Petitioner does not outweigh his liberty interest and the risk of erroneous deprivation.
Accordingly, this factor weighs in favor of granting a bond hearing and/or release.
In sum, the Court finds that, under Mathews, Petitioner demonstrates a likelihood of success
on the merits of his claims asserting violations of his procedural due process rights.
C. Irreparable Harm
The Court now turns to the second Winter factor. “It is well established that the deprivation
of constitutional rights ‘unquestionably constitutes irreparable injury.” Hernandez, 872 F.3d at 994
(quoting Melendres v. Arpaio, 695 F.3d 990, 1002 (9th Cir. 2012)). “When an alleged deprivation
of a constitutional right is involved, most courts hold that no further showing of irreparable injury
is necessary.” Warsoldier v. Woodford, 418 F.3d 989, 1001-02 (9th Cir. 2005) (quoting Wright,
Miller, & Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure, § 2948.1 (2d ed. 2004)).
Petitioner contends that absent a preliminary injunction, he will continue to suffer
irreparable injury each day he remains in detention in violation of his Fifth Amendment rights.
(Doc. 2-1 at 17-18). The Court agrees. As noted above, Petitioner shows that he is likely to succeed
on the merits of his claim that his detention violates procedural due process. Therefore, Petitioner
faces irreparable harm absent a preliminary injunction. This Winter factor weighs in favor of
preliminary injunctive relief.
D. Balance of Equities and Public Interest
“When … the nonmovant is the government, the last two Winter factors ‘merge.’” Baird v.
Bonta, 81 F.4th 1036, 1040 (9th Cir. 2023) (citing Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 435 (2009);
Roman v. Wolf, 977 F.3d 935, 940-41 (9th Cir. 2020) (per curiam)).
Here, Respondents do not address the balance of the equities and public interest factors.
See (Doc. 8). Thus, Respondents fail to show that any harm they face here is more than minimal,
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and do not identify any material burden they would experience from issuance of the requested
injunction. Therefore, the Court has “‘little difficulty concluding that the balance of hardships tips
decidedly in [Petitioner’s] favor.’” See Hernandez, 872 F.3d at 996 (quoting Lopez v. Heckler, 713
F.2d 1432, 1437 (9th Cir. 1983)).
Additionally, the Court finds that the public interest also weighs in Petitioner’s favor. “It
is always in the public interest to prevent the violation of a party’s constitutional rights.” Index
Newspapers LLC v. U.S. Marshals Serv., 977 F.3d 817, 838 (9th Cir. 2020) (citation omitted);
Preminger v. Principi, 422 F.3d 815, 826 (9th Cir. 2005) (“[P]ublic interest concerns are implicated
when a constitutional right has been violated, because all citizens have a stake in upholding the
Constitution.”) (citations omitted). “The public has a strong interest in upholding procedural
protections against unlawful detention, and the Ninth Circuit has recognized that the costs to the
public of immigration detention are staggering.” Diaz v. Kaiser, No. 3:25-cv-05071, 2025 WL
1676854, at *3 (N.D. Cal. June 14, 2025) (citing Jorge M.F. v. Wilkinson, No. 21-CV-01434-JST,
2021 WL 783561, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 1, 2021)).
Therefore, these Winter factors weigh in favor of granting preliminary injunctive relief.
E. Maldonado Bautista Action
Petitioner refers to Maldonado Bautista v. Santacruz, Case No. 5:25-cv-01873-SSS-BFM,
and represents that, in that action, the Central District of California certified a nationwide class and
held that individuals like Petitioner, who entered the United States without inspection and were
apprehended after their entry, are detained under § 1226(a) and eligible for a bond hearing. (Doc.
2-1 at 12).
Insofar as Petitioner seeks relief from the Court regarding the government’s specific
compliance with the ruling in Maldonado Bautista, Petitioner must request such relief in the Central
District of California. See Brave & Free Santa Cruz v. Aragon, No. 2:24-CV-02312-DAD-JDP,
2025 WL 2324172, at *5 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 12, 2025) (collecting cases and noting “that the
undersigned, a district judge in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of California, lacks
the authority to ‘enforce’ an injunction issued in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of
California”) (citing, inter alia, Klett v. Pim, 965 F.2d 587, 590 (8th Cir. 1992)).
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F. Remedy
Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that Petitioner has met the requirements to issue a
preliminary injunction. Respondents do not assert that Petitioner is a flight risk or a danger to the
community. As § 1225(b)(2)(A) does not apply to Petitioner, Petitioner has therefore shown a
likelihood of success regarding his claim that the government may not detain him pursuant to §
1225(b)(2)(A). As Respondents do not provide any other basis to detain Petitioner and do not assert
any risk of flight or danger to the community, the appropriate remedy is Petitioner’s immediate
release. In the event the government seeks to re-detain Petitioner, the government must provide
notice to Petitioner a minimum of seven days in advance and must hold a bond hearing before a
neutral arbiter pursuant to § 1226(a) and applicable regulations, at which Petitioner’s eligibility for
bond must be considered.
Because Respondents have not provided any evidence of costs that it will incur due to
Petitioner’s release (see Doc. 8), the Court finds that no security bond is required. See Guillermo
M.R., 791 F. Supp. 3d at 1038; see also Lepe, 2025 WL 2716910, at *10 (noting that courts
“regularly waive security in cases like this”).
IV. Conclusion and Order
Accordingly, it is HEREBY ORDERED that:
1. Petitioner’s motion for a temporary restraining order (Doc. 2), construed as a motion
for preliminary injunction, is GRANTED;
2. Respondents are ORDERED to release Petitioner immediately;
3. Respondents are enjoined and restrained from re-detaining Petitioner unless the
government provides notice to Petitioner a minimum of seven (7) days in advance and
holds a bond hearing before a neutral arbiter pursuant to section 1226(a) and applicable
regulations, at which Petitioner’s eligibility for bond must be considered, and where
the government must demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that Petitioner is a
flight risk or danger to the community, such that physical custody is legally justified;
and
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4. No later than January 6, 2026, the parties SHALL file a joint status report as to
Petitioner’s status and address therein whether a briefing schedule need be set to
address the petition on the merits.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: December 24, 2025 ___________________ _
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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