(HC) Singh v. Andrews et al

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
SARTAJ S.,
Petitioner,
v.
TONYA ANDREWS, Golden State Annex
Detention Facility Administrator; SERGIO
ALBARRAN, Acting Field Office Director
of the San Francisco Immigration and
Customs Enforcement Office; TODD
LYONS, Acting Director of United States
Immigration and Customs Enforcement;
KRISTI NOEM, Secretary of the United
States Department of Homeland Security;
PAMELA BONDI, Attorney General of the
United States,
Respondents.
No. 1:25-cv-01669-KES-EPG (HC)
ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR
PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION
Doc. 2
This habeas action concerns the re-detention of petitioner Sartaj S., a noncitizen who was
detained and released in 2022 then recently re-detained.1 This matter is before the Court on
petitioner’s motion for temporary restraining order. Doc. 2. For the reasons explained below,
petitioner’s motion for temporary restraining order, which the Court converts to a motion for
preliminary injunction, is granted.
1 As recommended by the Committee on Court Administration and Case Management of the
Judicial Conference of the United States, the Court omits petitioner’s full name, using only his
first name and last initial, to protect sensitive personal information. See Memorandum re: Privacy
Concern Regarding Social Security and Immigration Opinions, Committee on Court
Administration and Case Management, Judicial Conference of the United States (May 1, 2018),
https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/18-cv-l-suggestion_cacm_0.pdf.

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I. Background2
Petitioner is a 33-year-old asylum-seeker from India who entered the United States on
April 16, 2022. Doc. 1 at ¶ 35. Immigration authorities detained petitioner for three days. Id.
¶ 36. On April 19, 2022, immigration officials paroled petitioner from custody pursuant to 8
U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A). See Doc. 1-7, Ex. A. Immigration officials may parole a noncitizen
pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A) “for ‘urgent humanitarian reasons’ or ‘significant public
benefit,’ provided the [noncitizen] present[s] neither a security risk nor risk of absconding.” 8
C.F.R. § 212.5(b) (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A)). Such release therefore reflects a
determination that the noncitizen is not a danger to the community or a flight risk. See Saravia v.
Sessions, 280 F. Supp. 3d 1168, 1176 (N.D. Cal. 2017), aff’d sub nom. Saravia for A.H. v.
Sessions, 905 F.3d 1137 (9th Cir. 2018).
As a condition of his release, petitioner was required to enroll in the Intensive Supervision
Appearance Program (“ISAP”), and he was provided a form outlining the conditions of that
program. See Doc. 1-5, Ex. F. That form instructed petitioner to report to the San Francisco
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) Office on May 3, 2022. Id. He was also
required to complete virtual check-ins via a mobile phone application. Id. Petitioner was later
served a notice to appear, placing him in removal proceedings pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1229a. See
Doc. 1-7, Ex. A.
Following his release, petitioner lived in California with his wife and daughter. Doc. 1-6,
Sartaj S. Decl. at 2. His wife gave birth to their second daughter in 2023. Doc. 1-4, Ex. D.
Petitioner was granted work authorization and worked as a truck driver to provide for his family.
Doc. 1 at ¶ 2. He became an active member of and volunteered at a Sikh temple. Doc. 1-3,
Ex. C. Petitioner sought relief in his removal proceedings by filing a petition for asylum. Doc. 1
at ¶ 38. Respondents do not dispute petitioner’s assertion that he maintained a clean criminal
record while in the United States and complied with all requirements of his release. Doc. 1 at
2 The facts set out in this section come from petitioner’s verified petition and other evidence in
the record. A court “may treat the allegations of a verified . . . petition [for writ of habeas corpus]
as an affidavit.” L. v. Lamarque, 351 F.3d 919, 924 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing McElyea v. Babbitt,
833 F.2d 196, 197–98 (9th Cir. 1987)).

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¶¶ 6, 37–38; see Doc. 8.
On October 29, 2025, petitioner requested approval from ICE to travel to a family
wedding. Doc. 1 at ¶ 39. ICE approved the request and instructed petitioner to upload a check-in
photograph on November 3, 2025, when he returned. Id. Petitioner reports that, when he
returned, he completed the check-in several minutes late.3 Id. ¶ 40. On November 8, 2025, ICE
agents arrested petitioner at his home. Id. ¶ 41. He was transported to Golden State Annex,
where he remains detained. Id.
On November 28, 2025, petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus, Doc. 1, and a
motion for temporary restraining order, Doc. 2, arguing that his detention violated the Due
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Respondents filed an opposition on December 8, 2025.
Doc. 8. Petitioner filed a reply on December 11, 2025. Doc. 9.
II. Conversion to a Motion for Preliminary Injunction
The Court directed the parties to state their position on whether the motion for temporary
restraining order should be converted to a motion for preliminary injunction and whether they
requested a hearing on the motion. Doc. 5. Respondents did not request oral argument, but they
oppose the conversion of the motion to one for a preliminary injunction, requesting that the Court
hold the case in abeyance pending the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Rodriguez Vazquez v. Bostock,
No. 25-6842, which they indicate is set for oral argument in February 2026. Doc. 8 at 1–2.
While it may be appropriate to defer further briefing on the petition itself, the Court declines to
further hold in abeyance a decision on the preliminary injunction given the nature of the relief
sought and petitioner’s showing. Additionally, the Court notes that the issue raised in the district
court in Rodriguez Vazquez appears to concern whether 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A) could be
applied to noncitizens living in the country for many years. See Rodriguez Vazquez v. Bostock,
779 F.Supp.3d 1239 (W.D. Wash. 2025). But here petitioner raises a constitutional claim based
on the liberty interest that developed during his over three and a half years on release, and
petitioner argues that the government may not re-detain him without a showing at a pre-
3 Respondents do not allege that this was a violation of the terms of petitioner’s release. See
Doc. 8.

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deprivation hearing that he is either a flight risk or a danger to the community. See Doc. 1 at
¶¶ 48–57; Doc. 2 at 13–20. Given that the standard for issuing a temporary restraining order and
preliminary injunction is the same, see Stuhlbarg Int’l Sales Co. v. John D. Bush & Co., 240 F.3d
832, 839 n.7 (9th Cir. 2001), and respondents had notice and opportunity to respond in
opposition, see Doc. 8, petitioner’s motion is converted to a motion for preliminary injunction.
III. Legal Standard
“A preliminary injunction is an extraordinary remedy never awarded as of right.” Winter
v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 24 (2008) (citing Munaf v. Geren, 553 U.S. 674, 689–
90 (2008)). “A plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction must establish that he is likely to
succeed on the merits, that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary
relief, that the balance of equities tips in his favor, and that an injunction is in the public interest.”
Id. at 20 (citing Munaf, 553 U.S. at 689–90; Amoco Prod. Co. v. Vill. of Gambell, AK, 480 U.S.
531, 542 (1987); Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 311–12 (1982)). “Likelihood of
success on the merits is a threshold inquiry and is the most important factor.” Simon v. City &
Cnty. of San Francisco, 135 F.4th 784, 797 (9th Cir. 2025) (quoting Env’t Prot. Info. Ctr. v.
Carlson, 968 F.3d 985, 989 (9th Cir. 2020)). “[I]f a plaintiff can only show that there are serious
questions going to the merits—a lesser showing than likelihood of success on the merits—then a
preliminary injunction may still issue if the balance of hardships tips sharply in the plaintiff’s
favor, and the other two Winter factors are satisfied.” Friends of the Wild Swan v. Weber, 767
F.3d 936, 942 (9th Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
IV. Discussion
a. Likelihood of Success on the Merits
Petitioner argues that the Due Process Clause bars the government from re-detaining him
without first providing a hearing where it must prove he is a flight risk or danger. Doc. 2 at 13–
20. Petitioner’s due process claim is analyzed “in two steps: the first asks whether there exists a
protected liberty interest under the Due Process Clause, and the second examines the procedures
necessary to ensure any deprivation of that protected liberty interest accords with the
Constitution.” Garcia v. Andrews, No. 2:25-cv-01884-TLN-SCR, 2025 WL 1927596, at *2 (E.D.

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Cal. July 14, 2025) (citing Kentucky Dep’t of Corrections v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 460
(1989)).4
1. Petitioner Possesses a Protected Liberty Interest.
A protected liberty interest may arise from a conditional release from physical restraint.
Young v. Harper, 520 U.S. 143, 147–49 (1997). Even when a statute allows the government to
arrest and detain an individual, a protected liberty interest under the Due Process Clause may
entitle the individual to procedural protections not found in the statute. See id. (Due Process
requires hearing before revocation of preparole); Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 782 (1973)
(same, in probation context); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 482 (1972) (same, in parole
context). To determine whether a specific conditional release rises to the level of a protected
liberty interest, “[c]ourts have resolved the issue by comparing the specific conditional release in
the case before them with the liberty interest in parole as characterized by Morrissey.” Gonzalez-
Fuentes v. Molina, 607 F.3d 864, 887 (1st Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted).5
Petitioner’s humanitarian parole similarly allowed him to live and work in his community
and to provide for his family while he sought relief in his removal proceedings. These actions
were made possible by petitioner’s freedom, which is “the most elemental of liberty interests[.]”
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 529 (2004). And the evidence shows that petitioner complied
with the terms of his release on parole.
4 Respondents’ only argument in response is that petitioner is subject to mandatory detention
under the terms of 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A). See Doc. 8. But, as noted above, petitioner raises a
constitutional challenge to his re-detention without a pre-deprivation hearing.
5 In Morrissey, the Supreme Court explained that parole “enables [the parolee] to do a wide range
of things open to persons” who have never been in custody or convicted of any crime, including
to live at home, work, and “be with family and friends and to form the other enduring attachments
of normal life.” Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 482. “Though the [government] properly subjects [the
parolee] to many restrictions not applicable to other citizens,” such as monitoring and seeking
authorization to work and travel, his “condition is very different from that of confinement in a
prison.” Id. “The parolee has relied on at least an implicit promise that parole will be revoked
only if he fails to live up to the parole conditions.” Id. The revocation of parole undoubtedly
“inflicts a grievous loss on the parolee.” Id. (quotations omitted). Therefore, a parolee possesses
a protected interest in his “continued liberty.” Id. at 481–84.

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Respondents argue that they nonetheless had discretion to re-detain petitioner under
§ 1225(b). Doc. 8 at 2. In Ramirez Tesara v. Wamsley, the District Court for the Western District
of Washington rejected a similar argument: the court found that the government’s “argument does
not explain why [immigration authorities] found Petitioner to be eligible for parole [when it
release him a year earlier], but not the following year even after he had established deep ties to
the community . . . and timely filed an asylum application.” Id. at *3. And while immigration
officials may have had discretion over the initial decision to detain or release petitioner, their
decision to release an individual from custody creates “an implicit promise” upon which an
individual may rely: that his liberty “will be revoked only if [he] fails to live up to the . . .
conditions [of release].” Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 482. As other courts have found in similar
circumstances, “even when ICE has the initial discretion to detain or release a noncitizen pending
removal proceedings, after that individual is released from custody she has a protected liberty
interest in remaining out of custody.” Pinchi v. Noem, 792 F. Supp. 3d 1025, 1032 (N.D. Cal.
2025). “[T]he government’s discretion to incarcerate non-citizens is always constrained by the
requirements of due process.” Hernandez v. Sessions, 872 F.3d 976, 981 (9th Cir. 2017).
The Court finds that petitioner has a protected liberty interest in his release. See
Guillermo M. R. v. Kaiser, No. 25-CV-05436-RFL, 2025 WL 1983677, at *4 (N.D. Cal. July 17,
2025) (recognizing that “the liberty interest that arises upon release [from immigration detention]
is inherent in the Due Process Clause”); Ortega v. Kaiser, No. 25-cv-05259-JST, 2025 WL
1771438, at *3 (N.D. Cal. June 26, 2025) (collecting cases finding that noncitizens who have
been released have a strong liberty interest). The Court must therefore determine what process is
due before the government may terminate his liberty.
2. Mathews Factors
Due process “is a flexible concept that varies with the particular situation.” Zinermon v.
Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 127 (1990). The procedural protections required in a given situation may be
evaluated using the Mathews v. Eldridge factors:
First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action;
second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through

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the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or
substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the government’s
interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and
administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural
requirement would entail.
Id. (quoting Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976)); see Hernandez v. Sessions, 872
F.3d 976, 993 (9th Cir. 2017) (applying Mathews factors in immigration detention context).
Turning to the first factor, petitioner has a significant private interest in remaining free
from detention. “Freedom from imprisonment—from government custody, detention, or other
forms of physical restraint—lies at the heart of the liberty that [the Due Process] Clause protects.”
Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 690 (2001). Petitioner had been out of custody for over three-
and-a-half years. During that time, he established ties in the community, his wife gave birth to
their second daughter, and petitioner worked and provided for his family. His detention denies
him that freedom.
Second, “the risk of an erroneous deprivation [of liberty] is high” when, as here, “[the
petitioner] has not received any bond or custody redetermination hearing.” A.E. v. Andrews, No.
1:25-cv-00107-KES-SKO, 2025 WL 1424382, at *5 (E.D. Cal. May 16, 2025). Civil
immigration detention, which is “nonpunitive in purpose and effect[,]” is justified when a
noncitizen presents a risk of flight or danger to the community. See Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690;
Padilla, 704 F. Supp. 3d at 1172. Petitioner has no criminal history and respondents do not
dispute that he complied with all terms of his release. See Doc. 8. As there have been no
procedural safeguards to determine if petitioner’s re-detention is justified, “the probable value of
additional procedural safeguards, i.e., a bond hearing, is high.” A.E., 2025 WL 1424382, at *5.
Third, although the government has a strong interest in enforcing the immigration laws,
the government’s interest in detaining petitioner without a hearing is “low.” Ortega v. Bonnar,
415 F. Supp. 3d 963, 970 (N.D. Cal. 2019); Doe v. Becerra, 787 F. Supp. 3d 1083, 1093–95
(E.D. Cal. 2025). In immigration court, custody hearings are routine and impose a “minimal”
cost. Doe, 2025 WL 691664, at *6. “If the government wishes to re-arrest [petitioner] at any
point, it has the power to take steps toward doing so; but its interest in doing so without a hearing
is low.” Ortega, 415 F. Supp. 3d at 970.

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On balance, the Mathews factors show that petitioner is entitled to a bond hearing, which
should have been provided before petitioner was detained. “‘[T]he root requirement’ of the Due
Process Clause” is “‘that an individual be given an opportunity for a hearing before he is deprived
of any significant protected interest.’” Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 542
(1985) (quoting Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 379 (1971)); see Zinermon, 494 U.S. at 127
(“Applying [the Mathews] test, the Court usually has held that the Constitution requires some
kind of a hearing before the State deprives a person of liberty . . . .”). The Supreme Court has
held that Due Process requires a pre-deprivation hearing before those released on parole from a
criminal conviction can have their bond finally revoked. See Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 480–86. The
same is true for those subject to revocation of probation. Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. at 782.
Given the absence of “evidence of urgent concerns,” the Court concludes that “a pre-
deprivation hearing [was] required to satisfy due process.” Guillermo M. R., 2025 WL 1983677,
at *9. Numerous district courts have reached a similar conclusion. See, e.g., id.; Garcia, 2025
WL 1927596, at *5; Pinchi, 2025 WL 1853763, at *3–4; Ortega, 415 F. Supp. 3d at 970; Doe,
787 F. Supp. 3d at 1093–95; Diaz v. Kaiser, No. 3:25-cv-05071, 2025 WL 1676854, at *2 (N.D.
Cal. June 14, 2025); Romero v. Kaiser, No. 22-cv-02508-TSH, 2022 WL 1443250, at *4 (N.D.
Cal. May 6, 2022); Vargas v. Jennings, No. 20-cv-5785-PJH, 2020 WL 5074312, at *4 (N.D. Cal.
Aug. 23, 2020). Petitioner is therefore likely to succeed on his habeas claim that his re-detention
without a pre-deprivation hearing violates his due process rights.
b. Irreparable Harm
Turning to the second Winter factor, “[i]t is well established that the deprivation of
constitutional rights ‘unquestionably constitutes irreparable injury.’” Hernandez, 872 F.3d at 994
(quoting Melendres v. Arpaio, 695 F.3d 990, 1002 (9th Cir. 2012)). “When an alleged
deprivation of a constitutional right is involved, most courts hold that no further showing of
irreparable injury is necessary.” Warsoldier v. Woodford, 418 F.3d 989, 1001–02 (9th Cir. 2005)
(quoting Wright, Miller, & Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure, § 2948.1 (2d ed. 2004)). Given
the Court’s conclusion that petitioner is likely to succeed on the merits of his claim that his
detention without a bond hearing violates the Due Process Clause, petitioner faces irreparable

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harm absent a preliminary injunction.
c. Balance of Equities and Public Interest
When the government is the nonmoving party, “the last two Winter factors merge.” Baird
v. Bonta, 81 F.4th 1036, 1040 (9th Cir. 2023) (internal citations omitted). Although the
government has a strong interest in enforcing the immigration laws, the issue in this case is not
whether the government can re-detain petitioner at all, but whether it can re-detain petitioner
without a bond hearing pending his removal proceedings. Faced with a choice “between
[minimally costly procedures] and preventable human suffering,” the Court concludes “that the
balance of hardships tips decidedly in [petitioner’s] favor.” Hernandez, 872 F.3d at 996 (quoting
Lopez v. Heckler, 713 F.2d 1432, 1437 (9th Cir. 1983)).
The public interest also weighs in petitioner’s favor. “The public has a strong interest in
upholding procedural protections against unlawful detention, and the Ninth Circuit has
recognized that the costs to the public of immigration detention are staggering.” Diaz, 2025 WL
1676854, at *3 (citing Jorge M.F. v. Wilkinson, No. 21-CV-01434-JST, 2021 WL 783561, at *3)
(N.D. Cal. Mar. 1, 2021); see also Index Newspapers LLC v. U.S. Marshals Serv., 977 F.3d 817,
838 (9th Cir. 2020) (“It is always in the public interest to prevent the violation of a party’s
constitutional rights.”) (citing Padilla, 953 F.3d at 1147–48).
d. Remedy
In conclusion, the Court finds that the requirements for issuing a preliminary injunction
are met. Petitioner’s immediate release is required to return him to the status quo ante—“the last
uncontested status which preceded the pending controversy.” Pinchi, 2025 WL 1853763, at *3;
Kuzmenko v. Phillips, No. 2:25-cv-00663-DJC-AC, 2025 WL 779743, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 10,
2025); see also Valdez v. Joyce, 25 Civ. 4627, 2025 WL 1707737, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. June 18, 2025)
(ordering immediate release of unlawfully detained noncitizen); Ercelik v. Hyde, No. 1:25-CV-
11007-AK, 2025 WL 1361543, at *15–16 (D. Mass. May 8, 2025) (same); Günaydın v. Trump,
No. 25-CV-01151, 2025 WL 1459154, at *10–11 (D. Minn. May 21, 2025) (same).
///
///

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V. Conclusion and Order
Accordingly:
1. Petitioner’s motion for a preliminary injunction, Doc. 2, is GRANTED.
2. Respondents are ORDERED to release petitioner immediately.
3. Respondents are ENJOINED AND RESTRAINED from re-detaining petitioner unless
they demonstrate, by clear and convincing evidence at a pre-deprivation bond hearing
before a neutral decisionmaker, that petitioner is a flight risk or danger to the
community such that his physical custody is legally justified.
4. The bond requirement of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(c) is waived. Courts
regularly waive security in cases like this one. See Diaz v. Brewer, 656 F.3d 1008,
1015 (9th Cir. 2011); Garcia, 2025 WL 1676855, at *3; Pinchi, 2025 WL 1853763, at
*4.
5. This matter is referred to the assigned magistrate judge for further proceedings
including the preparation of findings and recommendations on the petition or other
appropriate action.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: December 31, 2025
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE