(PC) Jones v. C.D.C.R. et al

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
EUGENE JONES,
Plaintiff,
v.
CDCR, et al.,
Defendants.
Case No. 1:24-cv-01298-KES-BAM (PC)
FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
REGARDING DISMISSAL OF CERTAIN
CLAIMS AND DEFENDANTS
(ECF No. 35 )
FOURTEEN (14) DAY DEADLINE
Plaintiff Eugene Jones (“Plaintiff”) is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma
pauperis in this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff’s second amended
complaint is currently before the Court for screening. (ECF No. 35.)
I. Screening Requirement and Standard
The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a
governmental entity and/or against an officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915A(a). Plaintiff’s complaint, or any portion thereof, is subject to dismissal if it is frivolous
or malicious, if it fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or if it seeks monetary
relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A(b).
A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the
pleader is entitled to relief . . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are not
required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere

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conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell
Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). While a plaintiff’s allegations are taken as
true, courts “are not required to indulge unwarranted inferences.” Doe I v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.,
572 F.3d 677, 681 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
To survive screening, Plaintiff’s claims must be facially plausible, which requires
sufficient factual detail to allow the Court to reasonably infer that each named defendant is liable
for the misconduct alleged. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quotation marks omitted); Moss v. U.S. Secret
Serv., 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009). The sheer possibility that a defendant acted unlawfully
is not sufficient, and mere consistency with liability falls short of satisfying the plausibility
standard. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quotation marks omitted); Moss, 572 F.3d at 969.
II. Plaintiff’s Allegations
Plaintiff is currently housed at California State Prison, in Los Angeles, California.
Plaintiff alleges the events in the complaint occurred while he was housed at Wasco State Prison.
Plaintiff names as defendants:1 (1) Correctional office Borrego, (2) Correctional officer Hurd.
In claim 1, Plaintiff alleges use of excessive force in violation of the Eighth Amendment.
On 5/21/24, while housed on C-yard in Wasco State Prison, Plaintiff was attacked and badly
beaten by several S.T.G. (security threat group) inmate gang members. Plaintiff was not legally
ever meant to be housed on C yard in an “open dorm setting.” Plaintiff’s CDCR security level is
a 3 of 4 requiring Plaintiff to be housed inside a locked cell. By placing Plaintiff inside an open
dorm setting (C yard), Plaintiff was harmed which should not have happened. Plaintiff was
injured. Also in this same incident of 5/21/24, correctional officer Borrego attempted to apply
handcuffs on Plaintiff for transportation to the hospital for injuries suffered while on C-yard. He
1 The caption of the second amended complaint continues to name C.D.C.R. as a defendant,
although the allegations do not assert any conduct against C.D.C.R. Fed. R. Civ. P. 10.
Regardless, Plaintiff could not state a cognizable claim against C.D.C.R. As Plaintiff was
previous informed, “[t]he Eleventh Amendment bars suits for money damages in federal court
against a state, its agencies, and state officials acting in their official capacities.” Aholelei v.
Dep’t of Public Safety, 488 F.3d 1144, 1147 (9th Cir. 2007); see also Brown v. Cal. Dep’t. of
Corrs., 554 F.3d 747, 752 (9th Cir. 2009) (finding California Department of Corrections and
California Board of Prison Terms entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity). The Court does
not address C.D.C.R any further.

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broke and snapped Plaintiff’s third finder on his right hand causing irreparable ligament damage.
Plaintiff now has a permanent deformity to his right hand with very limited functioning and a
permanent disability.
In claim 2, Plaintiff alleges a failure to protect in violation of the Eighth Amendment.
Plaintiff alleges that Officer Hurd showed and did gross negligence to Plaintiff while housed in
C-yard H-3 Dorm. Plaintiff informed him several times that Plaintiff’s well-being and safety was
in jeopardy while housed on C-yard. Then days later, Plaintiff was attacked by 15 S.T.G. inmates
also being stabbed in the face and head and body. Plaintiff alleges he asked Officer Hurd to call
someone (supervisor or sergeant) to remove Plaintiff from C-yard because Plaintiff was a level 4
inmate and Plaintiff’ didn’t feel safe being housed in an open dorm setting which was a yard
classified as a level 1 or 2 facility. After Plaintiff was jumped by S.T.G. gang, officer Borrego
placed cuffs on Plaintiff twisting Plaintiff’s arm with unnecessary force behind Plaintiff’s back
breaking Plaintiff finger and snapping the ligament to the third finger. Plaintiff was not resisting.
Plaintiff constantly filed 602s about the treatment he was receiving from inmates and correctional
staff.
As remedies, Plaintiff asks that the correctional officer be fired. He also seeks damages.
III. Request to be Appointed Counsel
Plaintiff does not have a constitutional right to appointed counsel in this action, Rand v.
Rowland, 113 F.3d 1520, 1525 (9th Cir. 1997), rev’d in part on other grounds, 154 F.3d 952, 954
n.1 (9th Cir. 1998), and the court cannot require an attorney to represent plaintiff pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1). Mallard v. U.S. Dist. Court for the S. Dist. of Iowa, 490 U.S. 296, 298
(1989). However, in certain exceptional circumstances the court may request the voluntary
assistance of counsel pursuant to section 1915(e)(1). Rand, 113 F.3d at 1525.
Without a reasonable method of securing and compensating counsel, the Court will seek
volunteer counsel only in the most serious and exceptional cases. In determining whether
“exceptional circumstances exist, a district court must evaluate both the likelihood of success on
the merits [and] the ability of the [plaintiff] to articulate his claims pro se in light of the
complexity of the legal issues involved.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

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The Court has considered Plaintiff’s request, but does not find the required exceptional
circumstances. Even if it is assumed that Plaintiff has made serious allegations which, if proved,
would entitle him to relief, his case is not exceptional. This Court is faced with similar cases filed
almost daily by prisoners suffering from severe medical or mental health conditions. These
plaintiffs also must litigate their cases without the assistance of counsel.
Furthermore, at this stage in the proceedings, the Court cannot make a determination that
Plaintiff is likely to succeed on the merits. While Plaintiff’s second amended complaint, as
screened below, states a cognizable claim, the Court cannot conclude that Plaintiff’s claims are
likely to succeed on the merits. Finally, based on a review of the record in this case, the Court
does not find that Plaintiff cannot adequately articulate his claims.
IV. Discussion
Eight Amendment
1. Excessive Force
The Eighth Amendment protects prisoners from inhumane methods of punishment and
from inhumane conditions of confinement. Morgan v. Morgensen, 465 F.3d 1041, 1045 (9th Cir.
2006). The unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain violates the Cruel and Unusual
Punishments Clause of the Eighth Amendment. Hudson v McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 5 (1992)
(citations omitted). Although prison conditions may be restrictive and harsh, prison officials must
provide prisoners with food, clothing, shelter, sanitation, medical care, and personal safety.
Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832–33 (1994) (quotations omitted).
“[W]henever prison officials stand accused of using excessive physical force in violation
of the [Eighth Amendment], the core judicial inquiry is...whether force was applied in a good-
faith effort to maintain or restore discipline, or maliciously and sadistically to cause harm.”
Hudson, 503 U.S. at 6-7. Relevant factors for this consideration include “the extent of injury... [,]
the need for application of force, the relationship between that need and the amount of force used,
the threat ‘reasonably perceived by the responsible officials,’ and ‘any efforts made to temper the
severity of a forceful response.’ ” Id. (quoting Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 1078, 1085 (1986) ).
Finally, because the use of force relates to the prison's legitimate penological interest in

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maintaining security and order, the court must be deferential to the conduct of prison officials.
See Whitley, 475 U.S. at 321–22. Not “every malevolent touch by a prison guard gives rise to a
federal cause of action.” Id. at 9. De minimis uses of physical force do not violate the constitution
provided that the use of force is not of a sort “repugnant to the conscience of mankind.” Whitley
v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 327 (1986) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976).
Liberally construing the allegations in the second amended complaint, Plaintiff states a
cognizable claim against correctional officer Borrego for excessive force in handcuffing Plaintiff
using force sufficient to break Plaintiff’s finger while Plaintiff was not resisting the handcuffs.
2. Failure to Protect
A prisoner may state a § 1983 claim under the Eighth Amendment against prison officials
only where the officials acted with “deliberate indifference” to the threat of serious harm or injury
to an inmate by another prisoner, Berg v. Kincheloe, 794 F.2d 457, 459 (9th Cir. 1986); see also
Valandingham v. Bojorquez, 866 F.2d 1135, 1138 (9th Cir. 1989) (deliberately spreading rumor
that prisoner is snitch may state claim for violation of right to be protected from violence while in
state custody), or by physical conditions at the prison. The official must both be aware of facts
from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he
must also draw the inference. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837, 114 S.Ct. 1970. Mere negligent
failure to protect an inmate from harm is not actionable under Section 1983. See Farmer, 511
U.S. at 835, 114 S.Ct. 1970.
Liberally construing the allegations in the second amended complaint, as the Court must
at this juncture, Plaintiff states a cognizable claim against correctional officer Hurd for failure to
protect for failing to address Plaintiff’s repeated concerns about unsafe housing.
Plaintiff is informed that any claim premised on the failure to house Plaintiff at a
particular institution or in particular housing fails because Plaintiff is not entitled to be housed in
any particular institution. See Olim v. Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 238, 245 (1983); Meachum v. Fano,
427 U.S. 215, 225 (1976). In general, prison officials’ housing and classification decisions do not
give rise to federal constitutional claims encompassed by the protection of liberty and property
guaranteed by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. Montayne v. Haymes, 427 U.S. 236, 242

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(1976) (It is well settled that prisoners have no constitutional right to placement in any particular
prison, to any particular security classification, or to any particular housing assignment); accord
King v. Lemos, No. 1:20-CV-01837-NONE-BAM (PC), 2021 WL 2038187, at *6 (E.D. Cal. May
21, 2021). Therefore, any claim that Plaintiff was not housed or was housed at a certain security
level correctional facility is not a cognizable claim.
Injunctive Relief
Plaintiff seeks to have defendants fired. This is a request for prospective injunctive relief.
Requests for prospective relief are further limited by 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(1)(A) of the Prison
Litigation Reform Act [“PLRA”], which requires that the Court find the “relief [sought] is
narrowly drawn, extends no further than necessary to correct the violation of the Federal right,
and is the least intrusive means necessary to correct the violation of the Federal right.” In cases
brought by prisoners involving conditions of confinement, any injunction “must be narrowly
drawn, extend no further than necessary to correct the harm the court finds requires preliminary
relief, and be the least intrusive means necessary to correct the harm.” 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(2).
Moreover, where, as here, “a plaintiff seeks a mandatory preliminary injunction that goes beyond
maintaining the status quo pendente lite, ‘courts should be extremely cautious’ about issuing a
preliminary injunction and should not grant such relief unless the facts and law clearly favor the
plaintiff.” Committee of Central American Refugees v. I.N.S., 795 F.2d 1434, 1441 (9th Cir.
1986), quoting Martin v. International Olympic Committee, 740 F.2d 670, 675 (9th Cir. 1984).
Plaintiff's request to fire Defendants is not narrowly drawn and is not the least intrusive means
necessary to correct the harms alleged.
V. Conclusion and Recommendation
Based on the above, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s second amended complaint
states a cognizable claim against correctional officer Borrego for excessive force and
against correctional officer Hurd for failure to protect, in violation of the Eighth
Amendment. However, Plaintiff’s second amended complaint fails to state any other
cognizable claims for relief against any other defendants. Despite being provided with the
relevant pleading and legal standards, Plaintiff has been unable to cure the deficiencies in

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the second amended complaint. Further leave to amend is not warranted. Lopez v. Smith,
203 F.3d 1122, 1130 (9th Cir. 2000).
Accordingly, it is HEREBY RECOMMENDED that:
1. This action proceed on Plaintiff’s second amended complaint, filed August 14, 2025,
(ECF No. 35), against correctional officer Borrego for excessive force and against
correctional officer Hurd for failure to protect, in violation of the Eighth Amendment; and
2. All other claims and defendants be dismissed based on Plaintiff’s failure to state claims
upon which relief may be granted.
* * *
These Findings and Recommendations will be submitted to the United States District
Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of Title 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Within
fourteen (14) days after being served with these Findings and Recommendations, the parties may
file written objections with the court. The document should be captioned “Objections to
Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Objections, if any, shall not exceed
fifteen (15) pages or include exhibits. Exhibits may be referenced by document and page
number if already in the record before the Court. Any pages filed in excess of the 15-page
limit may not be considered. The parties are advised that failure to file objections within the
specified time may result in the waiver of the “right to challenge the magistrate’s factual
findings” on appeal. Wilkerson v. Wheeler, 772 F.3d 834, 838–39 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing Baxter
v. Sullivan, 923 F.2d 1391, 1394 (9th Cir. 1991)).
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: December 19, 2025 /s/ Barbara A. McAuliffe _
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE