Landsberger v. Circle K Stores Incorporated et al

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA
Matthew Linus Lyle Landsberger,
Plaintiff,
v.
Circle K Stores Incorporated, et al.,
Defendants.
No. CV-26-00180-TUC-JEM
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
On December 27, 2025, pro se Plaintiff Matthew Linus Lyle Landsberger1 filed a
Complaint (Doc. 1-1)2 in the Arizona Superior Court, Santa Cruz (“State Court”) against a
number of entity Defendants. Over the following three months, Plaintiff filed successive
“Second,”3 “Third,” “Fourth,” and “Fifth” amended complaints. (Doc. 1-3 at 1-603.)
On March 10, 2026, Plaintiff filed a Request for Entry of Default Judgment
referencing a “Sixth” amended complaint in State Court, despite no “Sixth” amended
1 On April 27, 2026, Thomas Fink, Presiding Judge for the Arizona Superior Court, Santa
Cruz County, issued a Show Cause Order, stating that that court “believes that the above-
named pro se litigant [Landsberger] has engaged in vexatious conduct under A.R.S.
Section 12-3201.” See Landsberger v. Weidner Corp., Case No. 4:26-cv-00109-RM (Doc.
12 at p. 2; Doc. 12-6 at p. 2.) The State Court held a hearing on May 6, 2026 to determine
whether Plaintiff should be designated a vexatious litigant. The Show Cause Order
references four cases that Plaintiff has initiated in the Superior Court of Santa Cruz County:
Landsberger v. City of Nogales (CV-2025-452); Landsberger v. Weidner Corporation
(CV-0025-461); Landsberger v. Circle K (CV-2025-468); and In re the Matter of Matthew
Linus Lyle Landsberger (CV-2026-004). This case is one of the actions Plaintiff initiated
in State Court (Landsberger v. Circle K (CV-2025-468)).
2 The citation refers to the document and page number generated by the Court’s Case
Management/Electronic Case Filing system.
3 Plaintiff did not file a “First” amended complaint.
Case 4:26-cv-00180-RCC-PSOT Document 16 Filed 05/14/26 Page 1 of 14

- 2 -
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
complaint being filed. On March 14, 2026, Plaintiff emailed Chase Bank a copy of the
Fourth Amended Complaint only, requesting that Chase Bank accept of service. On March
25, 2026, Defendant Walmart filed a Motion to Dismiss the Fifth Amended Complaint in
the state court. (Doc. 1-3 at p. 612-624.)
On April 7, 2026, Chase Bank filed an Acceptance of Service of the Fourth
Amended Complaint (hereinafter, “Complaint”) and removed this action to the United
States District Court for the District of Arizona. (Doc. 1.) No Defendant has been served
with a Summons. Nor has any Defendant, other than Chase Bank, executed a waiver and
acceptance of service.
Briefly, the Complaint predominately alleges that at least 47 separate business
entities in Nogales, Arizona, along with the City of Nogales, the Santa Cruz County
Sheriff’s Office, the United States Drug Enforcement Administration, and the United States
Border Patrol along with agents, coordinated and conspired with each other to exclude
Plaintiff from private establishments in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
As explained below, this Court finds that the Complaint fails to allege any facts to
support Plaintiff’s conspiracy theory upon which diversity jurisdiction may exist. This
Court also finds that the Complaint otherwise fails to allege a basis for the exercise of
federal jurisdiction. This Court also finds that joinder of the close to 50 named Defendants
violates Rule 20 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Dismissal of all alleged federal claims and remand4 of this matter to the State Court
is recommended.
Pro Se Claimants
“The Court must liberally construe pleadings submitted by a pro se claimant,
affording the claimant the benefit of any doubt.” Ticktin v. C.I.A., No. CV08-998-PHX-
MHM, 2009 WL 976517, at *1 (D. Ariz. Apr. 9, 2009) (citing Karim–Panahi v. L.A. Police
4 Remand of a matter to state court is typically a non-dispositive pretrial matter that does
not terminate the litigation or dispose of any claims and is therefore appropriate for ruling
by a United States Magistrate Judge. See Haines v. Get Air Tucson Inc., No. CV-15-00002-
TUC-RM (EJM), 2015 WL 13755396, at *1, n.1 (D. Ariz. Apr. 15, 2015). However, since
this Court recommends dismissal of all claims alleged under federal law, this Court
proceeds on Report and Recommendation.
Case 4:26-cv-00180-RCC-PSOT Document 16 Filed 05/14/26 Page 2 of 14

- 3 -
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
Dep't, 839 F.2d 621, 623 (9th Cir.1988)). “However, the Court ‘may not supply essential
elements of the claim that were not initially pled.’” Ticktin, 2009 WL 976517, at *1
(quoting Ivey v. Bd. of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982).
Federal Jurisdiction
Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, and generally have jurisdiction as
authorized by the Constitution or by statute. Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of
America, 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). Courts presume that a case “lies outside this limited
jurisdiction, and the burden of establishing the contrary rests upon the party asserting
jurisdiction.” Id. Section 1446, Title 28, of the United States Code provides, in pertinent
part:
(a) Generally. -- A defendant or defendants desiring to remove any civil
action from a State court shall file in the district court of the United States
for the district and division within which such action is pending a notice of
removal signed pursuant to Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
and containing a short and plain statement of the grounds for removal [. . .].
(b) Requirements; generally. -- (1) The notice of removal of a civil action
or proceeding shall be filed within 30 days after the receipt by the defendant,
through service or otherwise, of a copy of the initial pleading setting forth
the claim for relief upon which such action or proceeding is based, or within
30 days after the service of summons upon the defendant if such initial
pleading has then been filed in court and is not required to be served on the
defendant, whichever period is shorter.
28 U.S.C. § 1446. “If at any time before final judgment it appears that the district court
lacks subject matter jurisdiction, the case shall be remanded.” 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c).
Sua Sponte Dismissal Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) is Appropriate
The Court may question subject matter jurisdiction at any time sua sponte. See
O’Brien v. Dept. of Justice, 827 F. Supp. 382, 384 (D. Ariz. 1995) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P.
12(h); Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 278, 97 S.Ct. 568,
571, 50 L.Ed.2d 471 (1977)). The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has
recognized that the district court may apply the substantiality doctrine to determine that it
lacks subject matter jurisdiction. See Patel v. Patel, 473F. Appx. 589, 590 (9th Cir. 2012).
Case 4:26-cv-00180-RCC-PSOT Document 16 Filed 05/14/26 Page 3 of 14

- 4 -
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
Under the substantiality doctrine, “federal courts are without power to entertain claims
otherwise within their jurisdiction if they are ‘so attenuated and unsubstantial as to be
absolutely devoid of merit,’ [are] ‘wholly insubstantial,’ [or are] ‘obviously frivolous,’…”
O’Brien v. Dept. of Justice, 827 F.Supp. 382, 384 (D. Ariz. 1995) (quoting Hagan v.
Lavine, 415 U.S. 528, 537 94 S.Ct. 1372, 1379, 39 L.Ed.2d 577 (1974)); see also Bell v.
Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 682-83, 66 S.Ct. 773, 776, 90 L.Ed. 939 (1946); Gilder v. PGA Tour,
Inc., 936 F.2d 417 (9th Cir. 1991).
In considering whether the Court has subject matter jurisdiction under Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), a district court “is not limited to the facts asserted in the
complaint, nor is the court required to assume the truthfulness of the factual allegations
within the complaint.” Ticktin, 2009 WL 976517, at *2 (quoting Taha v. C.I.A., 2007 WL
4287598, at *1 (D. Or. 2007) (citing Americopters, LLC v. FAA, 441 F.3d 729, 732 n.4 (9th
Cir. 2006) (recognizing that under Rule 12(b)(1), Fed. R. Civ. P., the district court is not
confined by the facts contained in the four corners of the complaint and it may consider
facts and need not assume the truthfulness of the complaint).
Here, the Complaint alleges an implausible conspiracy between: Circle K,
International House of Pancakes, McDonald’s, Chase Bank, Walmart, Hobby Lobby,
Safeway, Carl’s Jr., Hotel Mariposa, Dunkin’ [Donuts], Panda Express, Holiday Inn
Express, OKIROKI Suchi Wings, Jack In the Box, Fasttrip, Chipotle Mexican Grill,
Subway, Candlewood Suites Nogales by IHG, J.C. Penny, CSL Plasma, Motel 6 Nogales,
KFC, Ragazzi Italian Restaurant, Crossroads Nogales Mission, HOPE, Inc., Ross, Planet
Fitness, Inc., AT & T Mobility, LLC, AT & T Authorized Retail Location, Pilot Travel
Center, Caracu LLC, Dollar Tree, Next Care Urgent Care, CrossFit Tutuli, LLC, JRS
Jumpin’ Jack, Nogales Market #1, Santa Cruz County Sheriff’s Office, Starbucks, United
Staes Border Patrol, Nogales Public Library, Nogales Recreation Center, Nogales Fire
Department, United States Drug Enforcement Administration. (Doc. 1-3 at p. 467-469.)
Plaintiff summarily alleges, in relevant part, that Defendants “acted jointly with, conspired
with, or relied upon state actors to effectuate unlawful exclusions and detentions.” (Doc.
1-3 at p. 459.)
Case 4:26-cv-00180-RCC-PSOT Document 16 Filed 05/14/26 Page 4 of 14

- 5 -
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
To state a conspiracy claim, a plaintiff must allege “specific facts to support the
existence of the claimed conspiracy.” Burns v. County of King, 883 F.2d 819, 821 (9th Cir.
1989). A plaintiff must plausibly allege an agreement or “meeting of the minds” to violate
constitutional rights. See Crowe v. Cnty. of San Diego, 608 F.3d 406, 440 (9th Cir. 2010).
Allegations of parallel conduct, standing alone, are insufficient. See Bell Atlantic Corp.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556-57 (2007) (rejecting conspiracy claims based on conduct that
is merely consistent with agreement).
Plaintiff’s attempt to plead a multi-defendant conspiracy fails as a matter of law
because the Complaint contains no non-conclusory factual allegations showing the
existence of any agreement involving Defendants. The Complaint alleges no facts showing
that any Defendant entered into any agreement—express or implied—with any other
Defendant. Plaintiff does not allege any communication, coordination, or shared objective
involving the numerous Defendants. Instead, Plaintiff relies on a series of unrelated
incidents involving different businesses and the Court is left to speculate as to the existence
of a coordinated scheme.
For instance, Plaintiff alleges that while he was “lawfully present in Nogales,
Arizona” he observed coordinated surveillance and tracking by multiple Nogales Police
Department units.” (Doc. 1-3 at p. 490.) He alleges that patrol vehicles #800 and #796 were
observed “multiple times in close proximity to [his] movements.” Id. at p. 491. He alleges
that vehicle #796 was observed near an area where he “recently exited[.]” Id. He alleges
these actions created an unconstitutional seizure. Id.
Plaintiff alleges that he observed “an individual inside a haircut establishment who
identified himself as Joe Bunting, appearing to be an undercover police officer.” Id. at p.
492. Plaintiff alleges that the individual was in street clothes “yet appear[ed] to possess a
badge and firearm.” Id. Plaintiff alleges “[w]hen asked directly whether he was a police
officer, he responded evasively and confrontationally.” Id. Plaintiff alleges these actions
violated Arizona state law. Id.
Case 4:26-cv-00180-RCC-PSOT Document 16 Filed 05/14/26 Page 5 of 14

- 6 -
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
He alleges that the Nogales Fire Department “responds to an extinguishes only
approximately one actual fire every two years.” (Doc. 1-3 at p. 554.) He claims that despite
“this low incident of structural fires” the fire department vehicles “repeatedly travel up and
down streets in Nogales, including near [his] residence . . . with sirens blaring at high
volume several time per day, often without apparent justification tied to imminent life-
threatening emergencies.” Id. Plaintiff alleges that this startles him and that the City’s
failure to limit siren use to “genuine emergencies” constitutes a reckless disregard for
public safety. Id.
Plaintiff also alleges that while purchasing something from Starbucks he was 42
cents short. Id. at p. 493-494. He claims to have mistaken the Starbucks employee tip jar
for a jar of loose change and took the 42 cents from the tip jar. Id. at p. 494. He claims a
Starbucks employee indicated this was not a problem but a Starbucks employee called the
police anyway. Id. He alleges Starbucks’ actions were unreasonable, disproportionate, and
foreseeably likely to result in [his] detention, arrest, and exclusion[.]” Id.
Plaintiff alleges that while he was in a Circle K restroom an individual who was not
clearly identified as an employee unlocked the door without his consent. Id. at p. 497. He
claims he was accused of illegal drug use and the police were called. Id. He came back to
Circle K the next day “for lawful purposes” and was told by a Circle K employee that he
had to leave. Id. at p. 498.
Plaintiff alleges that in “the early morning hours” he was in a Walmart parking lot
when he “reasonably believed he was being followed or surveilled by an unfamiliar
vehicle” and he was in fear for his safety. Id. at p. 495. Walmart’s doors were locked and
Plaintiff claims that an employee let him in an “alternate entrance.” Id. He went into the
bathroom and “within approximately ten minutes” a Walmart manager came into the
bathroom and told him to leave. Id. at p. 496. Police were called and Plaintiff was
trespassed from Walmart. Id.
Plaintiff alleges that he was at McDonald’s when he was confronted by an
employee. Id. at p. 499. Plaintiff alleges the employee wanted Plaintiff to go outside and
Case 4:26-cv-00180-RCC-PSOT Document 16 Filed 05/14/26 Page 6 of 14

- 7 -
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
fight him. (Doc. 1-3 at p. 499.) According to Plaintiff, the employee changed his mind
about fighting and Plaintiff reported to McDonald’s management that he was challenged
to a fight by an employee. Id. Plaintiff alleges that McDonald’s management called the
police and he was “trespassed from the restaurant without explanation[.]” Id.
In sum, Plaintiff’s Complaint asserts claims against numerous unrelated Defendants
based on his exclusion from various businesses at various times and under different
circumstances. See also, Doc. 1-3 at p. 502 (Plaintiff alleges he was told by a Panda Express
employee that he could take a cup for water but a Panda Express employee called police
when he did so and he was trespassed from the restaurant); Id. at p. 504 (alleging Plaintiff
was trespassed from Fasttrip when he “attempted to interact with other patrons in a lawful
manner, advising them to communicate in English”); Id. at p. 503 (alleging Plaintiff was
trespassed from J.C. Penny when he was suspected of stealing cologne); Id. at 504-505
(alleging Plaintiff was trespassed from Ross for allegedly remaining in the restroom
without purchasing anything “despite the fact that he picked up trash in front of the store
each morning in good faith to show respect and consideration for the premises[.]”).
This Court finds Plaintiff’s claim of a vast conspiracy amongst the named
Defendants to be frivolous. See Zukowska v. United States Department of Homeland
Security, Case No. 3:17-cv-00354-AC, 2018 WL 8017163, at *7 (D. Or. Dec. 28, 2018),
report and recommendation adopted, No. 3:17-CV-00354-HZ, 2019 WL 1586754 (D. Or.
Apr. 11, 2019) (finding Plaintiff’s contention that Defendants orchestrated and perpetrated
a massive conspiracy, necessitating the participation of seemingly hundreds of agents, for
the purpose of violating Plaintiff's constitutional rights and causing her physical,
emotional, and financial harm that, while sincere, “are of the sort considered by other courts
to be wholly insubstantial and devoid of merit,” and dismissing complaint for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction).
“Joint Action” Allegations Based on 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Fail to State a Claim
Plaintiff summarily alleges “joint action” allegations against some of the named
Defendants. See e.g., Doc. 1-3 at p. 559 (against Starbucks); Id. at p. 561 (against Walmart);
Case 4:26-cv-00180-RCC-PSOT Document 16 Filed 05/14/26 Page 7 of 14

- 8 -
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
at p. 562-563 (against McDonald’s); Id. at p. 563-564 (against Chase Bank); Id. at p. 564
(against Panda Express); Id. at p. 565 (against Fasttrip); Id. at p. 565-566 (against J.C.
Penny); Id. at p. 566-567 (against Hotel Mariposa); and Id. at pp. 567-568 (against Ross).
In these allegations, Plaintiff claims that by either involving law enforcement or invoking
police authority, Defendants acted in concert with “state actors.” See Id.
The joint action test asks, “whether the state has ‘so far insinuated itself into a
position of interdependence with [the private entity] that it must be recognized as a joint
participant in the challenged activity.’ ” O'Handley v. Padilla, 579 F. Supp. 3d 1163, 1180
(N.D. Cal. 2022), aff'd sub nom. O'Handley v. Weber, 62 F.4th 1145 (9th Cir. 2023) (citing
Gorenc v. Salt River Project Agr. Imp. & Power Dist., 869 F.2d 503, 506 (9th Cir. 1989)
(quoting Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 725, 81 S.Ct. 856, 6 L.Ed.2d
45 (1961)). “[A] bare allegation of such joint action” is insufficient to state a claim.
O'Handley, 579 F. Supp. 3d at 1180 (quoting DeGrassi v. City of Glendora, 207 F.3d 636,
647 (9th Cir. 2000)). The Supreme Court has explained:
[A] State normally can be held responsible for a private decision only when
it has exercised coercive power or has provided such significant
encouragement, either overt or covert, that the choice must in law be deemed
to be that of the State. Mere approval of or acquiescence in the initiatives of
a private party is not sufficient to justify holding the State responsible for
those initiatives.
O'Handley, 579 F. Supp. 3d at 1180 (quoting Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1004–05,
102 S.Ct. 2777, 73 L.Ed.2d 534 (1982)).
The Ninth Circuit has required “substantial cooperation” or that the private entity's
and government's actions be “inextricably intertwined.” O'Handley, 579 F. Supp. 3d 1180
(quoting Brunette v. Humane Society of Ventura Cnty., 294 F.3d 1205, 1211 (9th Cir.
2002)). “A conspiracy between the State and a private party to violate constitutional rights
may also satisfy the joint action test.” O'Handley, 579 F. Supp. 3d at 1180 (citing Brunette,
294 F.3d at 1211). The private and government actors must have actually agreed to “violate
Case 4:26-cv-00180-RCC-PSOT Document 16 Filed 05/14/26 Page 8 of 14

- 9 -
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
constitutional rights.” O'Handley, 579 F. Supp. 3d at 1180 (citing Fonda v. Gray, 707 F.2d
435, 438 (9th Cir. 1983)).
Plaintiff’s bare allegation of joint action is insufficient to state a claim under 42
U.S.C. § 1983. See O'Handley, 579 F. Supp. 3d at 1181 (holding that “[o]ne party supplying
information to another party does not amount to joint action.” (citing Lockhead v.
Weinstein, 24 Fed. Appx 805, 806 (9th Cir. 2001) (“[M]ere furnishing of information to
police officers does not constitute joint action”); Fed. Agency of News LLC v. Facebook,
Inc., 432 F. Supp. 3d 1107, 1124 (N.D. Cal. 2020) (“supplying information to the state
alone [does not amount] to conspiracy or joint action”); Deeths v. Lucile Slater Packard
Children's Hospital at Stanford, No. 1:12-cv-02096-LJO, 2013 WL 6185175, at *8, 9 (E.D.
Cal. Nov. 26, 2013) (“Even if Dr. Stirling made false statements to Kern County social
workers regarding the need to remove R.D. from Plaintiff's care, supplying information
alone does not amount to conspiracy or joint action under color of state law.”)
Sovereign Immunity/Bivens Claims
“The doctrine of sovereign immunity applies to federal agencies and to federal
employees acting within their official capacities.” Hodge v. Dalton, 107 F.3d 705, 707 (9th
Cir. 1997). “Absent a waiver, sovereign immunity shields the Federal Government and its
agencies from suit.” FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 475 (1993).
Plaintiff asserts claims against the United States Drug Enforcement Administration
and the United States Border Patrol. (Doc. 1-3 at p. 469, 538-540, 546-547.) Plaintiff also
attempts to allege claims against Doe Defendant agents. Id. at p. 456. Broadly construed,
the Complaint purports to assert a Bivens action, which enables victims to sue individual
federal officers for damages resulting from violations of constitutional rights. Bivens v. Six
Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 389, 397 (1971).
A Bivens action arises out of illegal or inappropriate conduct on the part of a federal
official or agent in violation of a clearly established constitutional right. Balser v. Dep't of
Justice, Office of U.S. Trustee, 327 F.3d 903, 909 (9th Cir. 2003). To prevail on a Bivens
claim, Plaintiff must allege and establish: (1) s/he was deprived of a right secured by the
Case 4:26-cv-00180-RCC-PSOT Document 16 Filed 05/14/26 Page 9 of 14

- 10 -
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
constitution, and (2) Defendants acted under color of federal law. Morgan v. United States,
323 F.3d 776, 780 (9th Cir. 2003). A Bivens claim is not available against a federal agency.
Meyer, 510 U.S. at 486. A Bivens claim is available against officers only in their individual
capacities, not their official capacities. Morgan, 323 F.3d at 780 n.3; Vaccaro v. Dobre, 81
F.3d 854, 857 (9th Cir. 1996).
To the extent that Plaintiff asserts claims against Defendants United States Drug
Enforcement Administration and the United States Border Patrol, he has failed to
demonstrate that the federal government has waived its sovereign immunity and,
consequently, that the district court has subject matter jurisdiction over his claims. See
Balser, 327 F.3d at 907 (holding that any agency of the United States is immune from suit
unless it has waived immunity); Rodriguez v. Hemit, Case No. C16-778 RAJ, 2018 WL
3618260, at *3 (W.D. Wash. July 30, 2018) (dismissing non-specific and vague
constitutional claims brought pursuant to § 1983 against individual defendants, U.S. Post
Office and other federal agencies for lack of subject matter jurisdiction).
Plaintiff has also failed to allege that any federal officers acted in their individual
capacities. Indeed, Plaintiff affirmatively alleges that “each DOE Border Patrol Defendant
acted within the scope of their federal employment and/or under the appearance of official
authority.” (Doc. 1-3 at p. 466.)
The Complaint fails to state a Bivens claim.
Eighth Amendment Deliberate Indifference Claim
Plaintiff alleges a deliberate indifference claim against Defendant Nogales Police
Department. See Doc. 1-3 at p. 481-482. He claims that he was deprived of his personal
property for four (4) days, from December 25, 2025 (the day he was released from custody)
to December 29, 2025 (the day he received his property).
Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, to maintain an Eighth Amendment claim based on prison
medical treatment, an inmate must show “deliberate indifference to serious medical needs.”
Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104, (1976). In the Ninth Circuit, the test for deliberate
indifference consists of two parts. McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d 1050, 1059 (9th Cir. 1991),
Case 4:26-cv-00180-RCC-PSOT Document 16 Filed 05/14/26 Page 10 of 14

- 11 -
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
overruled on other grounds by WMX Techs., Inc. v. Miller, 104 F.3d 1133 (9th Cir. 1997)
(en banc). First, the plaintiff must show a “serious medical need” by demonstrating that
“failure to treat a prisoner's condition could result in further significant injury or the
‘unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.’ ” Id. at 1059 (citing Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104,
97 S.Ct. 285). Second, the plaintiff must show the defendant's response to the need was
deliberately indifferent. McGuckin, 974 F.2d at 1060. This second prong—the defendant's
response to the need was deliberately indifferent—is satisfied by showing (a) a purposeful
act or failure to respond to a prisoner's pain or possible medical need and (b) harm caused
by the indifference. Id. Indifference “may appear when prison officials deny, delay or
intentionally interfere with medical treatment, or it may be shown by the way in which
prison physicians provide medical care.” Id. at 1059 (quoting Hutchinson v. United States,
838 F.2d 390, 392 (9th Cir. 1988)).
Plaintiff’s deliberate indifference claim alleges he was deprived of his personal
property for four (4) days from Christmas Day 2025 to December 29, 2025. Plaintiff fails
to allege both a serious medical need and that Defendants’ response to his serious medical
need was deliberately indifferent.
The Complaint fails to allege a deliberate indifference claim against the City of
Nogales.
Allegations Against Stanta Cruz County Sheriff’s Office
Plaintiff appears to assert claims against the Santa Cruz County Sheriff’s Office
related to alleged events that occurred while he was at a Pilot Gas Station (Doc. 1-3 at pp.
505-507; 508-510), at the Superior Court (Id. at p. 507-508; 510-511); and in custody at
the Santa Cruz County Jail (Id. at p. 512-524). After describing a number of alleged events
that occurred over a period of time at the Pilot Gas Station, the Superior Court, and in the
Santa Cruz County Jail, Plaintiff recites what he styles as a legal framework for failure to
protect claims. (Doc. 1-3 at p. 520-522.) This Court finds that Plaintiff’s allegations, while
numerous, fail to properly allege a federal claim. See Stefani v. Longhorn, No. 2:23-CV-
00343-HL, 2023 WL 11842588, at *1 (D. Or. Mar. 22, 2023) (holding that, [t]he [c]ourt
Case 4:26-cv-00180-RCC-PSOT Document 16 Filed 05/14/26 Page 11 of 14

- 12 -
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
must be able to determine from a short and plain statement the grounds for federal
jurisdiction. [The plaintiff’s] [c]omplaint lists a total of 24 statutory sections without any
explanation for how any of these sections support the [c]ourt's jurisdiction. Compl. II(A).
Throughout [the plaintiff’s] claims for relief, he relists multiple statutory sections after
statements of facts but again fails to provide any short and plain statement describing a
federal cause of action. Compl. Ex. 1. Listing a series of 24 different statutory sections
after various factual paragraphs fails Rule 8’s short and plain statement requirement.”).
Americans With Disabilities Act and Discrimination in Public Accommodation
Claims
Plaintiff summarily alleges certain Defendants violated the Americans With
Disabilities Act (“ADA”). See, e.g., Doc. 1-3 at p. 586 (ADA claim against Defendant
NextCare Urgent Care); Id. at p. 591 (ADA claim against Defendant Nogales Market #1).
Plaintiff also summarily alleges certain Defendants discrimination against him in “Public
Accommodation.” See, e.g., Doc. 1-3 at p. 590 (public accommodation claim against
Defendant Nogales Market #1); Id. at p. 593 (public accommodation claim against
Defendant KFC “and similar Defendants”).
Plaintiff’s allegations are assertions that a Defendant violated the law and do not
state a plausible claim. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) (holding that “the
pleading standard Rule 8 announces does not require ‘detailed factual allegations,’ but it
demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.”
quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. 544.)
Joinder of the Numerous Named Defendants is Improper
Permissive joinder is governed by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 20(a)(2), which
requires that claims arise out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions
or occurrences and present a common question of law or fact. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 20(a)(2).
Where claims involve distinct events and unrelated conduct, joinder is improper under Rule
20, Fed. R. Civ. P. If the requirements of Rule 20(a) are met, a district court must examine
Case 4:26-cv-00180-RCC-PSOT Document 16 Filed 05/14/26 Page 12 of 14

- 13 -
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
whether permissive joinder would ‘comport with the principles of fundamental
fairness[.]’” Coleman v. Quaker Oats Co., 232 F.3d 1271, 1296 (9th Cir. 2000).
The Complaint alleges numerous separate incidents involving different businesses,
Government agencies, locations, time periods, and personnel. This Court finds that the
incidents alleged, some of which are mentioned above, share no transactional nexus.
Additionally, this Court finds that joinder of the almost 50 named Defendants would not
comport with the principles of fundamental fairness.
Dismissal of Federal Claims and Remand to State Court is Recommended
Dismissal with prejudice is appropriate where amendment would be futile or where
a plaintiff has repeatedly failed to cure deficiencies. See Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178,
182 (1962) (leave to amend may be denied for futility); Gonzalez v. Planned Parenthood
of Los Angeles, 759 F.3d 1112, 1116 (9th Cir. 2014) (repeated failure to cure deficiencies
supports denial of leave). Plaintiff has amended his complaint multiple times yet continues
to rely on conclusory allegations and legally deficient theories. Given these repeated
failures, it appears that further amendment would be futile. This Court recommends
dismissal of the federal claims.
The Complaint purports to assert state law claims which this Court, in its discretion,
declines to review finding that it would not exercise supplemental jurisdiction over these
claims. This Court recommends remand of the alleged state court claims to the State Court.
See Acri v. Varian Assocs., Inc., 114 F.3d 999, 1001 (9th Cir.), supplemented, 121 F.3d
714 (9th Cir. 1997), as amended (Oct. 1, 1997) (recognizing that “[w]hile discretion to
decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims is triggered by the
presence of one of the conditions in [28 U.S.C.] § 1367(c), it is informed by the [United
Mine Workers v.] Gibbs[, 383 U.S. 715 (1966),] values “of economy, convenience,
fairness, and comity.”).
Plaintiff initiated this action, and therefore chose to litigate this action, in State
Court. Plaintiff appears to be a resident of Nogales, Arizona, and he seeks to bring claims
against predominately local entities. Thus, it appears that the State Court is a convenient
Case 4:26-cv-00180-RCC-PSOT Document 16 Filed 05/14/26 Page 13 of 14

- 14 -
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
forum for the parties. Remand of this action will also further principles of comity as remand
will not interfere the State Court’s consideration of this action in its determination of
whether Plaintiff will be designated a vexatious litigant. See n.1, supra.
RECOMMENDATION5
For the foregoing reasons, it is RECOMMENDED that the district court DISMISS
the federal claims alleged in the Complaint and REMAND the remaining alleged claims
under state law to State Court.
Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(b)(2), any party may serve and file
written objections within fourteen days of being served with a copy of the Report and
Recommendation. A party may respond to the other party’s objections within fourteen
days. No reply brief shall be filed on objections unless leave is granted by the District
Court. If objections are not timely filed, they may be deemed waived. If objections are
filed, the parties should use the following case number: 26-cv-180-RCC.
Dated this 14th day of May, 2026.
5 General Order 21-25 directs the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge to prepare a
Report and Recommendation to the appropriate designee. Accordingly, the undersigned
directs this Report and Recommendation to Senior United States District Court Judge
Raner C. Collins.
Case 4:26-cv-00180-RCC-PSOT Document 16 Filed 05/14/26 Page 14 of 14