Kline v. Tucson, City of et al

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA
James David Kline,
Plaintiff,
v.
City of Tucson, et al.,
Defendants.
No. CV-26-00018-TUC-JGZ (JR)
REPORT & RECOMMENDATION
Pending before the Court is Pro Se Plaintiff James David Kline’s Emergency
Motion for Temporary Restraining Order, Order to Show Cause, and Memorandum
Regarding Record Sufficiency and Immunity. (Doc. 27.) This matter is referred to United
States Magistrate Judge Jacqueline Rateau for Report and Recommendation pursuant to
Local Rule 72.1 and 72.2 of the Local Rules of Civil Procedure. (Doc. 12.) As more fully
set forth below, the undersigned recommends that the district court, after its independent
review, deny the Motion.
I. Background
On January 8, 2026, the Plaintiff filed his original complaint and an Application to
Proceed in District Court Without Prepaying Fees or Costs. (Docs. 1, 2.) On April 9, 2026,
the undersigned issued a Report and Recommendation (R&R) recommending the district
court grant Plaintiff in forma pauperis (IFP) status and dismiss the Complaint with leave
to amend for failure to state a claim in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2).1 (Doc. 13.)
1 Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), in a case in which a plaintiff has been granted in
forma pauperis status, the district court shall dismiss the case “if the court determines that
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On April 23, 2026, prior to the district court ruling on the R&R, Plaintiff filed his First
Amended Complaint. (Doc. 16.) On April 27, 2026, the district court accepted and adopted
in full the R&R, dismissing the Plaintiff’s original Complaint and granting Plaintiff IFP
status. 2 (Doc. 15.)
On May 23, 2026, the Plaintiff filed a Motion for Leave to File a Second Amended
Complaint (Doc. 26) and a Motion for Temporary Restraining Order, Order to Show Cause,
and Memorandum Regarding Record Sufficiency and Immunity (“TRO”). (Doc. 27).
Attached as an exhibit to the Motion for Leave to File a Second Amended Complaint is
Plaintiff’s proposed SAC. (Doc. 26-1.) Because Plaintiff has not yet filed the proposed
SAC on the docket, the Court will analyze the TRO in the context of both the FAC and the
proposed SAC.
A. First Amended Complaint
In the FAC, Plaintiff alleges five counts against the defendants for violation of his
substantive due process rights, his First, Fourth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights,
and a Monell3 claim against the City of Tucson. (Doc. 16 at 10-12.) In Count I, Plaintiff
claims that Defendants Maldonado, D’Arquea, Arevello, and Cuezas “acted in concert to
execute a Predetermined Adjudication” to violate Plaintiff’s procedural due process in
violation of 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985. (Id. at 10-11.) In Count II, Plaintiff claims that
the Defendants’ violated 42 U.S.C. § 1983 through the “willful defiance of 50-year
narrowing construction…to criminalize protected expression constitutes [which] an
arbitrary abuse of power that shocks the conscience” and violates his Fourteenth and First
Amendment rights. (Id. at 11.) In Count III, Plaintiff claims that his Sixth and Fourteenth
Amendment rights were violated because “Defendant D’Arquea’s injection of moral
turpitude elevated the offense to serious[,]” and “Defendant Maldonado willfully denied
court-appointed counsel to prevent interference with the Predetermined Adjudication.”
. . . (B) the action . . . (i) is frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to state a claim on which relief
maybe granted; or (iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such
relief.”
2 Because Plaintiff has been granted IFP status, this court must also screen Plaintiff’s
amended complaints. Accordingly, no complaint has yet been served on the Defendants.
3 Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs. of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 667 (1978)
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(Id.) In Count IV, Plaintiff claims that his Fourth Amendment rights were violated when
“Defendants Stout and Sublette coordinated their physical movements to perform a
warrantless search[,]” and “[Defendant] Stout…manipulated his [Body Worn Camera] to
obstruct the forensic record.” (Id. at 12.) In Count V, Plaintiff asserts municipal liability
against Defendant City of Tucson under Monell alleging the City “ratified the
unconstitutional customs and conspiracy. (Id.) For relief, Plaintiff asks for compensatory
damages, punitive damages, restorative injunctive relief “for full restoration , including a
new residential structure and remediation of the park environment,” global injunctive relief
“enjoining operation of the Tucson City Court and City Attorney’s Office until they
demonstrate a verified, constitutional procedural architecture,” and declaratory relief
“declaring the conspiracy and constitutional violations as a matter of law.” (Id. at 14-15.)
B. Proposed Second Amended Complaint
In the proposed SAC alleges five new counts against the defendants. In Count I,
Plaintiff alleges Defendants Maldonado, Klotz, Metcalf, Arevello, and City of Tucson
violated his due process rights in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 “through a sequence in
which punishment was recorded without completed adjudicative predicates and an
extrajudicial condition was incorporated into the written sentencing record, in a proceeding
Plaintiff alleges was conducted outside the lawful reach of A.R.S. § 13-2904 as narrowed
by controlling Arizona authority.” (Doc. 26-1 at 47.)
In Count II, Plaintiff alleges all Defendants violated 42 U.S.C. § 1985 by “act[ing]
in concert to obstruct justice and deprive the Plaintiff of equal protection.” Plaintiff alleges
the Defendants’ “[o]vert acts include the creation of the police narrative, the continuation
of the prosecution despite the body-worn-camera evidence, the generation of punishment
records with incomplete adjudicative predicates, the inclusion of an unpronounced
condition, the post-divestment alteration of the record, and the submission of the
‘Honorable Division’ document.” (Doc. 26-1 at 47-48.) Plaintiff further alleges that
Defendant Arizona Commission on Judicial Conduct (“ACJC”) ratified the actions of the
other defendants by failing to act. (Id. at 48.)
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In Count III, Plaintiff alleges Defendant ACJC was negligent under 42 U.S.C. §
1986 by failing to prevent the conspiracy contemplated in Count II. (Id.) Plaintiff alleges
the ACJC “possessed the power and the duty to prevent or aid in preventing the
continuation of the constitutional injuries” but “[d]espite receiving formal notice via
‘Regina's Packet’ and related documentation, they neglected or refused to exercise their
authority to intervene.” (Id.)
In Count IV, Plaintiff asserts municipal liability against Defendant City of Tucson
under Monell alleging that the constitutional depravations which he alleges he suffered
“resulted from municipal policies, customs, practices, ratification, and failures of training
and supervision…and that these customs were the moving force behind his injuries.” (Id.
at 48-49.)
In Count V, Plaintiff seeks “prospective relief” against the State of Arizona “solely
for purposes of prospective declaratory and injunctive relief through its responsible
officials.” (Id. at 49.)
C. Motion for Temporary Restraining Order
On June 23, 2026, Plaintiff filed the immediate Emergency Motion for Temporary
Restraining Order and Request for Preservation of Evidence to Protect Litigation Integrity.
(Doc. 27.) In his Motion, Plaintiff requests the Court issue an order barring the Defendants
from: (1) “Arresting, detaining, or initiating any new criminal action against Plaintiff that
employs the same narrative framework, the same actors, or the same institutional sequence
documented in the self-authenticating record of CM25002372[;]” (2) “Taking any new
enforcement action that derives from or relies upon the conviction and sentence in
CM25002372[;]” (3) “Generating, amending, supplementing, or altering the record of
CM25002372 outside the lawful authority of the court with jurisdiction over that record[;]”
(4) “Engaging in or facilitating the prospective categories of conduct identified in the
Prayer for Relief of the Verified Second Amended Complaint[;]” and (5) “Seizing,
searching, accessing, copying, or compelling the surrender of Plaintiff's electronic
devices[.]” (Id. at 3-5.)
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II. Legal Standard – Temporary Restraining Order
A party seeking preliminary injunctive relief under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
65 must show that: (1) he is likely to succeed on the merits; (2) he is likely to suffer
irreparable harm in the absence of injunctive relief; (3) the balance of equities tips in his
favor; and (4) an injunction is in the public interest. Pom Wonderful LLC v. Hubbard, 775
F.3d 1118, 1124 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7,
20 (2008)); see Stuhlbarg Int’l Sales Co. v. John D. Brush & Co., Inc., 240 F.3d 832, 839
n.7 (9th Cir. 2001) (noting that the standard for issuing a preliminary injunction is
substantially identical to the standard for issuing a TRO). The balance of equities and
public interest factors “merge when the Government is the opposing party.” Nken v.
Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 435 (2009).
However, the Ninth Circuit has explained that “there must be a sufficient nexus
between the claims raised in a motion for injunctive relief and the claims set forth in the
underlying complaint itself” for a district court to have the authority to grant the relief
requested. Pac. Radiation Oncology, LLC v. Queen's Med. Ctr., 810 F.3d 631, 636 (9th
Cir. 2015). “The relationship between the preliminary injunction and the underlying
complaint is sufficiently strong where the preliminary injunction would grant ‘relief of the
same character as that which may be granted finally.’ ” Id. (quoting De Beers Consol.
Mines v. United States, 325 U.S. 212, 220 (1945)). “Though new assertions of misconduct
might support additional claims against a defendant, they do not support preliminary
injunctions entirely unrelated to the conduct asserted in the underlying complaint.” Id.
(citing Devose v. Herrington, 42 F.3d 470, 471 (8th Cir. 1994)).
III. Discussion
As described above, Plaintiff’s Motion requests the Court issue an order prohibiting
the Defendants from (1) “Arresting, detaining, or initiating any new criminal action against
Plaintiff that employs the same narrative framework, the same actors, or the same
institutional sequence documented in the self-authenticating record of CM25002372[;]”
(2) “Taking any new enforcement action that derives from or relies upon the conviction
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and sentence in CM25002372[;]” (3) “Generating, amending, supplementing, or altering
the record of CM25002372 outside the lawful authority of the court with jurisdiction over
that record[;]” (4) “Engaging in or facilitating the prospective categories of conduct
identified in the Prayer for Relief of the Verified Second Amended Complaint[;]” and (5)
“Seizing, searching, accessing, copying, or compelling the surrender of Plaintiff's
electronic devices[.]” (Doc. 27 at 3-5.)
Here, the Plaintiff is asking for “a remedy that will not be provided if [Plaintiff]
succeeds in [his] underlying [suit].” Pac. Radiation Oncology, LLC, 810 F.3d at 637.
Accordingly, the relief requested is not “of the same character” as the relief requested in
the FAC nor the proposed SAC, and therefore there is not therefore a “sufficient nexus” as
a matter of law for the district court to have the authority to grant such relief. See Id. 636-
37. As such, the undersigned recommends the district court deny the Motion with
prejudice.
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RECOMMENDATION
For the foregoing reasons, the Magistrate Judge RECOMMENDS that the district
court, after its independent review, enter an order ADOPTING this Report and
Recommendation and DENYING Plaintiff’s Emergency Motion for Temporary
Restraining Order (Doc. 27).
Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(b)(2), any party may serve and file
written objections within fourteen days of being served with a copy of the Report and
Recommendation. A party may respond to the other party’s objections within fourteen
days. No reply shall be filed unless leave is granted by the district court. If objections are
not timely filed, they may be deemed waived. Failure to file timely objections to any factual
or legal determination of the Magistrate Judge may be considered a waiver of a party's right
to de novo consideration of the issues. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114,
1121 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc). If objections are filed, the parties should use the following
case number: CV-26-18-TUC-JGZ.
Dated this 29th day of June, 2026.
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