Layfield v. Guttierez et al

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA
Philip James Layfield,
Petitioner,
v.
Mark Guttierez, et al.,
Respondents.
No. CV-25-00680-TUC-AMM (JEM)
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Before the Court is Petitioner’s Motion for Entry of Partial Final Judgment Pursuant
to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(b) (“Motion”). (Doc. 27.) Respondent filed his
response to Petitioner’s Motion. (Doc. 28.) Petitioner did not file a reply and the time for
filing a reply has elapsed. This matter is on referral to the undersigned United States
Magistrate Judge for report and recommendation. (Doc. 14.) For the reasons set forth
below, this Court recommends that the district court deny Petitioner’s Motion.
I. Background
On December 8, 2025, Petitioner filed, inter alia, a Petitioner Under 28 U.S.C. §
2241 for a Writ of Habeas Corpus (“Petition”) raising five grounds for relief. (Doc. 1.) On
January 15, 2026, the district court entered an Order, inter alia, dismissing Grounds One
and Five and requiring Respondent to answer Grounds Two through Four of the Petition.
(Doc. 14.) The district court found Petitioner’s allegations in Ground One to be as follows:
Petitioner alleges he was unlawfully denied release under the Coronavirus
Aid, Relief, and Economic Security (“CARES”) Act. [Doc. 1.] Petitioner
contends Congress enacted the CARES Act during the COVID-19 pandemic
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to expand home confinement and argues the “law and the directives were
clear: [the Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”)] was to move people out, not keep
them in.” [Doc. 1 at p. 17.] Petitioner contends BOP “subverted” the CARES
Act through the “invented . . . 50 Percent Rule,” which required “a prisoner
[to] serve 50% of the sentence before being considered for CARES Act home
confinement.” (Id.) Petitioner contends the rule appears nowhere in the
statute or the United States Attorney General’s April 3, 2020 memorandum
regarding the CARES Act. (Id.) Petitioner argues BOP “invented the 50%
barrier” because of the costs associated with home confinement. (Id. at p.
18.) Petitioner claims President Biden “issued blanket clemency to
individuals on CARES Act home confinement who met certain criteria,” and
Petitioner would have qualified for this clemency but for “BOP’s unlawful
refusal to transfer him to CARES [Act] home confinement.” (Id. at p. 20.)
(Doc. 14 at p. 2.)
The district court dismissed Ground One without prejudice finding that it lacked
jurisdiction over the claim. (Doc. 14 at pp. 4-5.) The district court recognized “the CARES
Act allowed the Director of BOP to lengthen the maximum amount of time for which home
confinement of a prisoner was authorized under 18 U.S.C. § 3624(c)(2) ‘as the Director
determines appropriate.’ CARES Act, Pub. L. No. 116-136 § 12003(b)(2) (2020).” Id. at
p. 4. The district court further recognized, however, that “the [CARES] Act expanded the
[BOP’s] power to ‘place a prisoner in home confinement’ . . . but reserved the
determination of ‘suitable candidates’ for home confinement to the Bureau . . . The act
carved out no role for the courts in making such determinations.” Id. (citations omitted).
Accordingly, the district court dismissed Ground One of the Petition. (Doc. 14 at p.
5.) Petitioner’s subsequent motion for reconsideration was denied. (Doc. 22.)
II. The Motion
Petitioner asks for entry of partial final judgment, pursuant to Rule 54(b) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, on the district court’s Order dismissing Ground One of
his Petition. (Doc. 27.) He argues that no portion of his CARES Act claim remains pending
and he seeks to immediately appeal the district court’s dismissal of Ground One. Id.
Respondent argues that Rule 54(b) does not apply to the Petition because, inter alia, the
Petition does not allege multiple claims. (Doc. 28.)
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III. Legal Standard
Rule 54(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that “[w]hen an action
presents more than one claim for relief—whether as a claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or
third-party claim—or when multiple parties are involved, the court may direct the entry of
a final judgment as to one or more, but fewer than all, claims or parties only if the court
expressly determines that there is no just reason for delay.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b).
“Judgments under Rule 54(b) must be reserved for the unusual case in which the
costs and risks of multiplying the number of proceedings and of overcrowding the appellate
docket are outbalanced by the pressing needs of the litigants for an early and separate
judgment as to some claims or parties.” First Amend. Coal. of Arizona, Inc. v. Ryan, No.
CV-14-01447-PHX-NVW, 2016 WL 4236373, at *1 (D. Ariz. Aug. 10, 2016) (quoting
Frank Briscoe Co. v. Morrison–Knudsen Co., 776 F.2d 1414, 1416 (9th Cir. 1985); see
also Gausvik v. Perez, 392 F.3d 1006, 1009 n. 2 (9th Cir. 2004) (“in the interest of judicial
economy Rule 54(b) should be used sparingly”)). “The burden is on the party endeavoring
to obtain Rule 54(b) certification to demonstrate that the case warrants certification.” First
Amend. Coal. of Arizona, Inc., 2016 WL 4236373, at *1 (quoting Braswell Shipyards, Inc.
v. Beazer E., Inc., 2 F.3d 1331, 1335 (4th Cir. 1993) (citation omitted)).
“[F]or Rule 54(b) to apply, ‘claims must be multiple and at least one must have been
adjudicated finally.’ ” Nat'l Fire Ins. Co. of Hartford, 2013 WL 1367347, at *2 (quoting
Ariz. State Carpenters Pension Trust Fund v. Miller, 938 F.2d 1038, 1039 (9th Cir. 1991)
(additional citation omitted). Under Rule 54(b), “claim” has a specific meaning. Nat'l Fire
Ins. Co. of Hartford, 2013 WL 1367347, at *2. “[A] complaint asserting only one legal
right, even if seeking multiple remedies for the alleged violation of that right, states a single
claim for relief.” Nat'l Fire Ins. Co. of Hartford, 2013 WL 1367347, at *2 (quoting Liberty
Mutual Ins. Co. v. Wetzel, 424 U.S. 737, 743 n. 4, 96 S.Ct. 1202, 47 L.Ed.2d 435 (1976)).
“Claim” is not synonymous with “argument” or “theory.” Nat'l Fire Ins. Co. of Hartford,
2013 WL 1367347, at *2 (citing CMAX, Inc. v. Drewry Photocolor Corp., 295 F.2d 695,
697 (9th Cir. 1961) (recognizing that “[t]he word ‘claim’ in Rule 54(b) refers to a set of
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facts giving rise to legal rights in the claimant, not the legal theories of recovery based
upon those facts.”)). “Claim” is defined in Black’s Law Dictionary as “[a] demand for
money, property, or a legal remedy to which one asserts a right; esp., the part of a complaint
in a civil action specifying what relief the plaintiff asks for.” See CLAIM, Black's Law
Dictionary (12th ed. 2024). “Ground” is defined in Black’s Law Dictionary as “[t]o provide
a basis for (something, such as a legal claim or argument)[.]” See GROUND, Black's Law
Dictionary (12th ed. 2024).
IV. Analysis
Challenges to the validity of any confinement or to particulars affecting its duration
are the province of habeas corpus. Muhammad v. Close, 540 U.S. 749, 750, 124 S.Ct. 1303,
159 L.Ed.2d 32 (2004) (citing Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 500, 93 S.Ct. 182, 36
L.Ed.2d 439 (1973)). A federal prisoner challenging the execution of his sentence is
required bring a § 2241 habeas petition. White v. Gutierrez, No. CV-23-0180-TUC-JCH
(EJM), 2024 WL 3349115, at *4 (D. Ariz. May 28, 2024), report and recommendation
adopted, No. CV-23-00180-TUC-JCH, 2024 WL 3345424 (D. Ariz. July 8, 2024),
reconsideration denied, No. CV-23-00180-TUC-JCH, 2024 WL 4452961 (D. Ariz. Oct. 9,
2024) (citing Rogers v. United States, 180 F.3d 349 (1st Cir. 1999) (Section 2241 petition
is the appropriate vehicle to challenge the correctness of a jail-time credit determination
once administrative remedies have been exhausted)) (additional citations omitted).
As set forth above, Ground One alleges the BOP unlawfully failed to transfer
Petitioner to CARES Act home confinement, (Doc. 1 at p. 20); Ground Two alleges the
BOP failed to credit Petitioner with pretrial home confinement under 18 U.S.C. § 3585,
Id.; Ground Three contends that the BOP’s policies deprived Petition of 365 days of First
Step Act credit for projected home confinement, Id. at p. 26; and Ground Four alleges that
Petitioner has been denied First Step Act credits for future home confinement, Id. at p. 27.
This Court finds that there is a single claim alleged in the habeas Petition—the claim that
the BOP has erred in its execution of Petitioner’s sentence.
Because this Court finds this habeas action does not present multiple claims, it does
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not reach whether Petitioner has met his burden to establish that this is “the unusual case
in which the costs and risks of multiplying the number of proceedings and of overcrowding
the appellate docket are outbalanced by the pressing needs of the litigants for an early and
separate judgment as to some claims or parties.” First Amend. Coal. of Arizona, Inc., 2016
WL 4236373, at *1. However, if this Court were to reach the issue of whether Petitioner
has met his burden, it would find that he has not. Petitioner’s Motion summarily states that
because he is a pro se prisoner “challenging the lawfulness of his continued custody, delay
in appellate review imposes concrete and on[-]going prejudice.” (Doc. 27 at p. 9.) The
Court finds this statement insufficient to support a finding that this is “the unusual case in
which the costs and risks of multiplying the number of proceedings and of overcrowding
the appellate docket” is “outbalanced by the pressing needs” of Petitioner for “an early and
separate judgment” on Ground One of his habeas Petition.
Grounds Two, Three, and Four of the Petition remain pending before the district
court and appeal of the district court’s dismissal of Ground One would improperly result
in piecemeal litigation. See Nat'l Fire Ins. Co. of Hartford, 2013 WL 1367347, at *4
(recognizing that “[i]t would be an abuse of Rule 54(b) to allow a party to appeal piecemeal
the [c]ourt’s disposition of each argument on a single claim.”). Petitioner’s request for entry
of partial judgment pursuant to Rule 54(b) should be denied.
V. Recommendation
For the foregoing reasons, the Magistrate Judge RECOMMENDS that the district
court enter an order DENYING the Petitioner’s Motion for Entry of Partial Final Judgment
Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(b) (Doc. 27).
Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(b)(2), any party may serve and file
written objections within fourteen days of being served with a copy of the Report and
Recommendation. A party may respond to the other party=s objections within fourteen
days. No reply shall be filed unless leave is granted by the district court. If objections are
not timely filed, they may be deemed waived. Failure to file timely objections to any factual
or legal determination of the Magistrate Judge may be considered a waiver of a party's right
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to de novo consideration of the issues. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114,
1121 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc). If objections are filed, the parties should use the following
case number: CV-25-680-AMM.
Dated this 22nd day of April, 2026.
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