Torrez v. Midland Credit Management Incorporated

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WO
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA
Fredrick Torrez,
Plaintiff,
v.
Midland Credit Management Incorporated,
Defendant.
No. CV-25-00206-TUC-RM
ORDER
Pending before the Court are Plaintiff’s Motion to Deem Requests for Admission
Nos. 1, 2, and 5 Admitted (Doc. 31) and Plaintiff’s Motion for Sanctions (Doc. 34). For
the following reasons, both Motions will be denied.
I. Motion to Deem Requests for Admission Nos. 1, 2, and 5 Admitted
Plaintiff previously filed a Motion to Determine Sufficiency of Responses to
Requests for Admission (Doc. 20), which this Court partially granted and partially denied
(Doc. 27). The Court ordered Defendant to serve amended responses to Plaintiff’s
Requests for Admission (“RFAs”) Nos. 1, 2, and 5. (Doc. 27 at 3-5, 10.) In the currently
pending Motion, Plaintiff argues that Defendant’s amended responses to RFAs Nos. 1, 2,
and 5 remain deficient, and that the Court should accordingly deem RFAs Nos. 1, 2, and 5
admitted. (Doc. 31.) Defendant argues in response that its amended responses to RFAs
Nos. 1, 2, and 5 are appropriate and sufficient, and that Plaintiff’s Motion seeks to compel
admissions on disputed statutory elements central to the merits of Plaintiff’s claims, which
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 36 does not require. (Doc. 33.)
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“The purpose of Rule 36(a) is to expedite trial by establishing certain material facts
as true and thus narrowing the range of issues for trial.” Asea, Inc. v. S. Pac. Transp. Co.,
669 F.2d 1242, 1245 (9th Cir. 1981). Under Rule 36(a), a party may serve a written request
to admit, for purposes of the pending action, the truth of any matters within the scope of
discovery relating to “facts, the application of law to fact, or opinions about either.” Fed.
R. Civ. P. 36(a)(1)(A). Although a party may request the admission of the application of
law to fact, id., requests for the admission of pure legal conclusions are impermissible,
Daniels v. G4S Secure Solutions USA, Inc., No. 8:20-cv-00283-JGB (JDEx), 2021 WL
3742039, at *10 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 4, 2021). The answering party must specifically deny any
matter not admitted “or state in detail why the answering party cannot truthfully admit or
deny” the matter. Fed. R. Civ. P. 36(a)(4). “[A] party may not refuse to admit or deny a
request for admission based upon a lack of personal knowledge if the information relevant
to the request is reasonably available to him.” Asea, Inc., 669 F.2d at 1245. The requesting
party “may move to determine the sufficiency of an answer or objection.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
36(a)(6). If the Court finds that an answer does not comply with Rule 36, it “may order
either that the matter is admitted or that an amended answer be served.” Id.
Plaintiff’s RFA No. 1 asks Defendant to admit that it is a debt collector as defined
by 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6). (Doc. 31-1 at 3.) Defendant’s amended response admits that the
principal purpose of its business is to collect debts, that it uses the mail to collect debts,
and that “at times and in certain circumstances it is a ‘debt collector’ as defined” in §
1692a(6). (Id.) However, Defendant states that it cannot admit or deny that it was a “debt
collector” as defined in § 1692a(6) with respect to this case, because it lacks sufficient
information to admit or deny that “the obligation it attempted to collect from Plaintiff in
this matter was a ‘debt’ as defined in 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(5).” (Id. at 3-4.) Defendant
explains that it lacks sufficient information to admit or deny that Plaintiff incurred the
obligation at issue “primarily for a personal, family, or household purpose.” (Id. at 4.)
Section 1692a(5) defines the term “debt” to mean “any obligation or alleged
obligation of a consumer to pay money arising out of a transaction in which the money,
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property, insurance, or services which are the subject of the transaction are primarily for
personal, family, or household purposes, whether or not such obligation has been reduced
to judgment.” That definition of “debt’ is incorporated into Section 1692a(6)’s definition
of “debt collector.” Defendant’s amended response to RFA No. 1 includes a partial
admission and a detailed explanation as to why Defendant cannot admit or deny that it is a
debt collector as defined in Section 1692(a)(6) for purposes of this specific case, namely
that Defendant lacks reasonable access to information regarding the purposes for which
Plaintiff assumed the obligation at issue. Defendant’s amended response complies with
Rule 36, and the Court will deny Plaintiff’s request to deem RFA No. 1 admitted.
Plaintiff’s RFA No. 2 asks Defendant to admit that it communicated with Plaintiff
regarding an alleged debt. (Id. at 4.) Defendant’s amended response admits that Defendant
communicated with Plaintiff regarding an outstanding debt owed by Plaintiff, but
Defendant states that it lacks sufficient information to determine whether the obligation it
attempted to collect was a “debt” as defined in 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(5). (Id.) Defendant’s
explanation for failing to fully admit or deny RFA No. 2 is sufficient, as Defendant lacks
reasonable access to information regarding the purposes for which Plaintiff assumed the
obligation at issue. Defendant’s amended response complies with Rule 36, and the Court
will deny Plaintiff’s request to deem RFA No. 2 admitted.
Plaintiff’s RFA No. 5 asks Defendant to admit that it is not in possession of any debt
instrument signed by Plaintiff that evidences the alleged obligation. (Id. at 5.) Defendant’s
amended response admits that Defendant does not have an agreement bearing Plaintiff’s
handwritten signature but avers that Defendant possesses documents sufficient to
substantiate the debt, Defendant’s ownership of the same, and Plaintiff’s obligation to pay.
(Id.) Defendant objects to and denies any implication that a signed “debt instrument” was
required. (Id.) To the extent Plaintiff is seeking Defendant to admit that a signed “debt
instrument” is required under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, the request calls for
the admission of a pure legal conclusion, which is impermissible under Rule 36.
Defendant’s amended response to RFA No. 5 complies with Rule 36, and the Court will
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deny Plaintiff’s request to deem RFA No. 5 admitted.
II. Motion for Sanctions
On January 21, 2026, Defendant filed a Motion for Extension of Deadlines, seeking
a 30-day extension of the pending deadlines in the Court’s Scheduling Order. (Doc. 28.)
Defendant noted in the Motion that it had expended substantial time and resources
responding to Plaintiff’s extensive discovery requests and motions. (Id. at 2.) Defendant
further averred that defense counsel underwent surgery in December 2025, with 2.5 weeks
recovery time, and that the holiday season further impacted defense counsel’s availability
to advance discovery. (Id.) Finally, Defendant averred that it required additional time to
complete discovery in light of the Court’s Order requiring amended responses to Plaintiff’s
RFPs Nos. 1, 2, and 5. (Id. at 3.) The Court granted Defendant’s Motion for Extension of
Deadlines, finding good cause for the 30-day time extension requested. (Doc. 32.)
In his Motion for Sanctions, Plaintiff seeks sanctions against Defendant under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11, arguing that Defendant’s Motion for Extension of
Deadlines was frivolous and misleading, and that it was presented for the improper purpose
of delay. (Doc. 34.) Plaintiff argues that the Motion for Extension of Deadlines failed to
acknowledge that Defendant controlled the timing and substance of its discovery
responses, that Plaintiff’s Motions were necessitated by Defendant’s deficient discovery
responses, and that the Court had ruled on the cited Motions before the original discovery
cut-off. (Id. at 3.) Plaintiff also complains that Defendant waited until two weeks before
the original discovery cut-off to seek a stipulation to extend time, and Plaintiff argues that
neither defense counsel’s surgery nor the holiday season necessitated any delay in this case.
(Id. at 3-5.)
Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s Motion for Sanctions is procedurally improper
because Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 expressly excludes discovery-related conduct
from its scope; that the Motion for Sanctions is legally unsupported; and that the Motion is
directly contradicted by the Court’s prior ruling granting Defendant’s Motion for Extension
of Deadlines upon a finding of good cause. (Doc. 35.) Defendant asks the Court to deny
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Plaintiff’s Motion for Sanctions and award Defendant its reasonable attorneys’ fees and
costs incurred in responding to the Motion. (Id. at 5.)
Rule 11(b) provides that, by presenting a written motion to the Court, “an attorney
or unrepresented party certifies that to the best of the person’s knowledge, information, and
belief, formed after an inquiry reasonable under the circumstances,” the motion is not being
presented for any improper purpose, the legal contentions in the motion are nonfrivolous,
the factual contentions have (or, if specifically so identified, likely will have) evidentiary
support, and the denials of factual contentions are warranted. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b).
The Court may impose appropriate sanctions for a violation of Rule 11(b). Fed. R. Civ. P.
11(c). However, Rule 11 “does not apply to disclosures and discovery requests, responses,
objections, and motions under Rules 26 through 37.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(d).
The Court finds that Defendant’s Motion for Extension of Deadlines was brought
under Rule 16(b)(4), which states that a scheduling order “may be modified only for good
cause and with the judge’s consent.” Accordingly, the Court is not convinced by
Defendant’s argument that Plaintiff’s Motion for Sanctions is procedurally improper based
on the exclusion in Rule 11(d) of discovery requests, responses, and objections, and
motions under Rules 26 through 37.
However, the Court agrees with Defendant that Plaintiff’s Motion for Sanctions is
meritless. This Court already found that Defendant established good cause for the modest
30-day time extension sought in its Motion for Extension of Deadlines. (Doc. 32.) Plaintiff
has not shown that the Motion for Extension of Deadlines included any frivolous legal
contentions or any factual contentions that lacked evidentiary support, and although the
motion resulted in a modest extension of deadlines, Plaintiff has not shown that Defendant
brought the Motion for the improper purpose of causing needless delay.
In light of Plaintiff’s pro se status, the Court declines at this time to grant
Defendant’s request for an award of the fees and costs that Defendant incurred in
responding to Plaintiff’s Motion for Sanctions. However, the Court warns Plaintiff that if
he files another frivolous motion for sanctions in the future, the Court may require him to
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reimburse Defendant for the fees and costs incurred in responding.
IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion to Deem Requests for Admission Nos. 1,
2, and 5 Admitted (Doc. 31) and Plaintiff’s Motion for Sanctions (Doc. 34) are denied.
Dated this 8th day of April, 2026.
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