Ellsworth v. Commissioner of Social Security Administration

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WO
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA
Jennifer M Ellsworth,
Plaintiff,
v.
Commissioner of Social Security
Administration,
Defendant.
No. CV-25-00114-TUC-RM
ORDER
Plaintiff Jennifer Ellsworth challenges the Commissioner of Social Security’s denial
of her application for disability insurance benefits. On December 8, 2025, Magistrate
Judge Maria S. Aguilera issued a Report and Recommendation (“R&R”), recommending
that the Commissioner’s decision be reversed and the matter remanded for a new hearing
and decision. (Doc. 22.) Plaintiff filed an Objection (Doc. 23), to which the Commissioner
did not respond.
I. Background
Plaintiff’s application for disability insurance benefits was denied at the initial level
and on reconsideration. (AR 201-225.) Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) Charles Davis
held a hearing and thereafter issued a decision finding Plaintiff not disabled. (AR 38-53,
177-200.) The Appeals Council denied review, rendering the ALJ’s decision the final
decision of the Commissioner. (AR 1.)
The ALJ followed the five-step sequential evaluation process set forth in the Social
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Security regulations. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a)(4).1 At Step One, the ALJ found that
Plaintiff has not engaged in substantial gainful activity since her alleged disability onset
date of August 13, 2019. (AR 41.) At Step Two, the ALJ found that Plaintiff has the
following severe impairments: rheumatoid arthritis, fibromyalgia, osteoarthritis of the
thumbs, degenerative disc disease, and headaches. (Id.) The ALJ found that Plaintiff’s
foot conditions, her carpal tunnel syndrome, her stroke history, her obesity, and her
depression were non-severe impairments. (AR 41-44.) At Step Three, the ALJ found that
Plaintiff does not have an impairment or combination of impairments that meets or
medically equals the severity of a listed impairment. (AR 44-45.)
At Step Four, the ALJ found that Plaintiff has the residual functional capacity to
perform sedentary work with the following limitations: Plaintiff can lift and carry up to ten
pounds occasionally and less than ten pounds frequently; she can do unlimited standing
and walking; she can sit approximately six hours in an eight-hour day; she can frequently
climb ramps and stairs, and occasionally climb ladders, ropes, and scaffolds; she can
frequently balance, stoop, and crouch, and occasionally kneel and crawl; she can frequently
overhead reach, bilaterally; she can frequently handle and finger, with braces as needed;
and she can have occasionally exposure to cold, wetness, vibration, and workplace hazards.
(AR 45-46.) In so finding, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff’s “medically determinable
impairments could reasonably be expected to cause her alleged symptoms” but that her
“statements concerning the intensity, persistence and limiting effects” of her alleged
symptoms were “not entirely consistent with the medical evidence and other evidence in
the record.” (AR 47.) The ALJ found that Plaintiff is unable to perform any past relevant
1 At Step One of this process, an ALJ must determine whether a claimant is doing
substantial gainful activity; if so, the claimant will be found not disabled. 20 C.F.R. §
416.920(a)(4)(i). At Step Two, the ALJ determines whether the claimant has a severe
medically determinable impairment that meets the duration requirement; if not, the
claimant will be found not disabled. Id. § 416.920(a)(4)(ii). At Step Three, the ALJ
determines whether the claimant has an impairment that meets or equals the severity of a
listed impairment; if so, the claimant will be found disabled. Id. § 416.920(a)(4)(iii). At
Step Four, the ALJ determines whether the claimant can perform past relevant work given
his or her residual functional capacity; if so, the claimant will be found not disabled. Id. §
416.920(a)(4)(iv). Finally, at Step Five, the ALJ determines whether the claimant can
adjust to other work given his or her residual functional capacity, age, education, and work
experience; if so, the claimant will be found not disabled. Id. § 416.920(a)(4)(v).
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work given her residual functional capacity, but at Step Five, the ALJ found that Plaintiff
is not disabled because she is capable of performing other jobs that exist in significant
numbers in the national economy. (AR 50-52.)
In her Opening Brief, Plaintiff challenges the ALJ’s rejection of her symptom
testimony and the ALJ’s residual functional capacity analysis. (Doc. 18.) The R&R agrees
with Plaintiff that the ALJ failed to provide clear and convincing reasons for rejecting
Plaintiff’s symptom testimony concerning her migraines, but the R&R finds that Plaintiff’s
other challenges to the ALJ’s decision fail. (Doc. 22.) The R&R recommends rejecting
Plaintiff’s request to remand for an immediate award of benefits, finding instead that
remand for a new hearing and decision is the appropriate remedy. (Id. at 15-16.)
II. Standard of Review
A district judge must “make a de novo determination of those portions” of a
magistrate judge’s “report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which
objection is made.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). The district judge “may accept, reject, or
modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate
judge.” Id. The advisory committee’s notes to Rule 72(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure state that, “[w]hen no timely objection is filed, the court need only satisfy itself
that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation”
of a magistrate judge. Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b) advisory committee’s note to 1983 addition.
See also Johnson v. Zema Sys. Corp., 170 F.3d 734, 739 (7th Cir. 1999) (“If no objection
or only partial objection is made, the district court judge reviews those unobjected portions
for clear error.”); Prior v. Ryan, CV 10-225-TUC-RCC, 2012 WL 1344286, at *1 (D. Ariz.
Apr. 18, 2012) (reviewing for clear error unobjected-to portions of Report and
Recommendation).
The Court must affirm the Commissioner’s decision “if it is supported by substantial
evidence and based on the application of correct legal standards.” Carmickle v. Comm’r,
Soc. Sec. Admin., 533 F.3d 1155, 1159 (9th Cir. 2008). “Substantial evidence is relevant
evidence which, considering the record as a whole, a reasonable person might accept as
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adequate to support a conclusion.” Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 948, 954 (9th Cir. 2002).
It is “more than a scintilla, but less than a preponderance.” Id. In determining whether the
Commissioner’s decision is supported by substantial evidence, the Court must “weigh both
the evidence that supports and the evidence that detracts from the ALJ’s factual
conclusions.” Gutierrez v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 740 F.3d 519, 523 (9th Cir. 2014) (internal
quotation marks omitted). The Court “must consider the entire record as a whole and may
not affirm simply by isolating a specific quantum of supporting evidence.” Hill v. Astrue,
698 F.3d 1153, 1159 (9th Cir. 2012) (internal quotation marks omitted). When evidence
“is susceptible to more than one rational interpretation, one of which supports the ALJ’s
decision,” this Court must uphold the ALJ’s conclusion. Thomas, 278 F.3d at 954. The
Court may may consider “only the reasons provided by the ALJ in the disability
determination and may not affirm the ALJ on a ground upon which he did not rely.” Revels
v. Berryhill, 874 F.3d 648, 654 (9th Cir. 2017).
If an ALJ finds that a “claimant has presented objective medical evidence of an
underlying impairment which could reasonably be expected to produce the pain or other
symptoms alleged,” and “there is no evidence of malingering, the ALJ can reject the
claimant’s testimony about the severity of symptoms only by offering specific, clear and
convincing reasons for doing so.” Lingenfelter v. Astrue, 504 F.3d 1028, 1036 (9th Cir.
2007) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Error in a social security determination is subject to harmless-error analysis. Stout
v. Comm’r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 454 F.3d 1050, 1054-56 (9th Cir. 2006). An error is harmless
if it “was inconsequential to the ultimate nondisability determination.” Id. at 1055.
III. Discussion
Plaintiff objects to the R&R’s evaluation of her headache disorder; her rheumatoid
arthritis, bilateral thumb osteoarthritis, and fibromyalgia conditions; her neck and back
pain; and her foot impairment. (Doc. 23.) She also argues that the R&R incorrectly framed
her argument regarding the narrative function-by-function requirement of SSR 96-8p. (Id.
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at 13.)2
A. Migraine and Headache Testimony
Plaintiff testified before the ALJ that she gets headaches that vary in duration and
migraines that “take [her] down for an entire day.” (AR 192.) As discussed above, the
R&R finds that the ALJ failed to provide clear and convincing reasons for discounting
Plaintiff’s symptom testimony concerning the severity of her migraines, and that as a result,
the Commissioner’s decision should be reversed and this matter remanded for a new
hearing and decision. (Doc. 22 at 8-10, 15-16.) The R&R notes that the record is unclear
regarding the nature and frequency of Plaintiff’s migraines and whether migraine-related
limitations would preclude employment. (Id. at 10, 16.)
Notwithstanding that the R&R finds in her favor on this issue, Plaintiff objects,
arguing that the R&R erroneously characterizes the ALJ’s “errors as factual deficiencies
rather than legal errors requiring reversal.” (Doc. 23 at 2.) Plaintiff argues that the “ALJ’s
migraine analysis was not merely incomplete—it was medically inaccurate, inconsistent
with SSR 19-4p, and grounded in mischaracterizations of the record.” (Id.) Plaintiff asks
the Court to remand with instructions to “(1) reevaluate Plaintiff’s headache disorder under
SSR 19-4p; (2) consider the neurological impact of her strokes; (3) assess the interactions
between migraines and her other impairments; and (4) incorporate migraine-related
functional limitations into” Plaintiff’s residual functional capacity. (Id. at 3-4.)
The Court will adopt the R&R’s recommendation to reverse the Commissioner’s
final decision and remand for a new hearing and decision due to the Commissioner’s failure
to provide clear and convincing reasons for discounting Plaintiff’s symptom testimony
concerning her migraines. Encompassed within this recommended remand is further
development of the record concerning Plaintiff’s headache disorder, reevaluation of
Plaintiff’s headache disorder under SSR 19-4p, and reassessment of Plaintiff’s residual
functional capacity. In reassessing Plaintiff’s residual functional capacity, the ALJ must
consider the limitations imposed by Plaintiff’s headache disorder and her other severe and
2 The Court finds that the unobjected-to portions of the R&R are not erroneous, and the
Court will accept and adopt those portions.
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non-severe impairments. See Carmickle, 533 F.3d at 1164.
The Court will deny as moot Plaintiff’s Objection to the R&R’s analysis of her
headache disorder, as the relief Plaintiff requests is already encompassed by the relief
recommended in the R&R.
B. Rheumatoid Arthritis, Bilateral Thumb Osteoarthritis, Fibromyalgia
Plaintiff testified before the ALJ that her “hands are almost non-functioning” and
“don’t operate.” (AR 185-186.) She further testified that she wears hand braces all the
time to stabilize her thumb and wrist; that she cannot open jars; that she cannot tie, button,
or buckle items; that she drops items; and that she cannot lift a gallon of milk. (AR 186-
188, 192-193.)
The ALJ discounted Plaintiff’s symptom testimony as inconsistent with the medical
evidence. (AR 47-48.) The ALJ discussed Plaintiff’s testimony that she has weakness in
her hands “and is unable to grasp, tie, or hold objects,” and contrasted that testimony to
medical evidence reflecting routine treatment of Plaintiff’s rheumatoid arthritis and
osteoarthritis—including examinations showing normal range of motion and indications
that symptoms were overall well-controlled with medication—as well as a lack of “medical
documentation of persistent debilitating fibromyalgia flare ups.” (Id.)
The R&R finds that the ALJ properly discounted Plaintiff’s testimony concerning
the severity of her hand limitations based on inconsistencies between that testimony and
the objective medical evidence. (Doc. 22 at 3-5.) The R&R further finds that, even if the
ALJ erred in discounting Plaintiff’s symptom testimony, the error was harmless, because
a vocational expert testified at Plaintiff’s hearing that Plaintiff could perform the job of
surveillance system monitor, which does not require any reaching, handling, fingering, or
feeling. (Id. at 5-6.)
In her objection, Plaintiff argues that the “R&R fundamentally mischaracterized
[her] argument by reducing it to a narrow dispute about ‘manipulative limitations,’ rather
than addressing . . . the ALJ’s failure to evaluate three distinct severe impairments—
rheumatoid arthritis, bilateral thumb osteoarthritis, and fibromyalgia—each of which
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required separate analysis[.]” (Doc. 23 at 4.) Plaintiff further argues that the R&R
improperly “treats the ALJ’s” residual functional capacity finding “as proof that Plaintiff’s
symptoms were ‘not as severe as alleged’”; that the R&R failed to “meaningfully review
the evidence” in finding that “little to no evidence” supports Plaintiff’s testimony that her
hands are “almost non-functioning”; that the ALJ failed to link specific testimony to
specific contradictory evidence in rejecting Plaintiff’s testimony concerning the severity of
her hand limitations; and that the ALJ failed to analyze Plaintiff’s thumb osteoarthritis
under Listing 1.18. (Id. at 4-5.) Plaintiff contends that the Court should remand for an
immediate award of benefits. (Id. at 7.)
The Court disagrees. The ALJ specifically analyzed Listing 1.18, finding that
Plaintiff’s impairment does not meet or medically equal the criteria of that listing, and the
ALJ separately evaluated Plaintiff’s inflammatory arthritis under Listing 14.09. (AR 45.)3
In evaluating Plaintiff’s symptom testimony and formulating her residual functional
capacity, the ALJ discussed specific testimony and specific contradictory medical
evidence. (AR 46-48.) The R&R does not treat the ALJ’s residual functional capacity
finding as proof that Plaintiff’s symptoms were not as severe as alleged; instead, the R&R
discusses inconsistencies between Plaintiff’s testimony that her hands are “almost non-
functioning” and medical records indicating that Plaintiff’s arthritis is well-controlled with
medication. (Doc. 22 at 3-4.) Furthermore, Plaintiff does not address in her Objection the
R&R’s alternative finding that, even if the ALJ erred in rejecting Plaintiff’s symptom
testimony regarding her hand limitations, the error was harmless because there are a
significant number of surveillance system monitor jobs nationwide, and that job does not
require any reaching, handling, fingering or feeling. (Id. at 5-6; see also AR 200.)
The Court will overrule Plaintiff’s objection to the R&R’s analysis of her hand
limitations arising from rheumatoid arthritis, bilateral thumb osteoarthritis, and
fibromyalgia.
. . . .
3 Furthermore, Plaintiff failed to raise in her Opening Brief any challenge to the ALJ’s
application of or failure to apply Listing 1.18 with respect to her thumb osteoarthritis.
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C. Neck and Back Pain
Plaintiff testified before the ALJ that her “cervical spine” and “neck” are “in pain
all the time,” and that she cannot sit or stand for long periods of time. (AR 186.) She
testified that she lies down for 4-5 hours per day. (AR 192.) The ALJ recognized
Plaintiff’s testimony that she reclines 4-5 hours per day due to neck pain but discounted
the testimony as inconsistent with the medical evidence and other evidence in the record.
(AR 46-48.) In so doing, the ALJ discussed medical evidence indicating that Plaintiff has
“received routine treatment and pain management for neck/back pain secondary to
degenerative disc disease,” that she has “had no complications secondary to treatment,”
and that “her physical examinations were mainly within normal limits.” (AR 48.) The
R&R finds that substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s conclusion that Plaintiff’s
testimony concerning the severity of her neck and back pain is inconsistent with the
objective medical evidence. (Doc. 22 at 6-8.)
In her Objection, Plaintiff argues that the “R&R’s analysis rests on
mischaracterization of Plaintiff’s testimony, reliance on non-exams and template language,
a legally impermissible use of ‘normal’ findings to reject pain testimony, and an improper
post hoc rationale that the ALJ never articulated.” (Doc. 23 at 7.) Plaintiff argues that the
ALJ failed to evaluate her specific spinal impairments when analyzing her degenerative
disc disease. (Id. at 9.) She further argues that the R&R and the ALJ cherry-picked medical
evidence and improperly relied on non-exams and boilerplate language in the medical
records. (Id. at 8-11.) Plaintiff asserts that “objective evidence alone can never constitute
a clear and convincing reason to reject symptom testimony.” (Id. at 9.) She also argues
that the “ALJ never found that objective evidence contradicted Plaintiff’s specific
limitations,” and that the R&R’s finding that the objective medical evidence contradicted
Plaintiff’s symptom testimony is therefore an improper “post hoc rationale that the ALJ
never gave.” (Id. at 10.)
Once a claimant has shown that she has a medically determinable impairment or
impairments that could reasonably be expected to produce her pain or other symptoms, her
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statements about the intensity, persistence, and effect of her pain or other symptoms cannot
be rejected “solely because the available objective medical evidence does not substantiate”
them. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1529(c)(2); see also Bunnell v. Sullivan, 947 F.2d 341, 346-47
(9th Cir. 1991) (an ALJ “may not discredit a claimant’s testimony of pain and deny
disability benefits solely because the degree of pain alleged by the claimant is not supported
by objective medical evidence”). However, an ALJ can rely on “contradictions between a
claimant’s subjective symptom testimony and the objective medical evidence in the record
to discount the symptom testimony.” Smartt v. Kijakazi, 53 F.4th 489, 498 n.1 (9th Cir.
2022). That is what the ALJ did here.
The Court agrees with the R&R that the ALJ offered specific examples of objective
medical evidence inconsistent with Plaintiff’s alleged symptom severity, and that the
examples cited by the ALJ are not cherry picked but, rather, representative of mainly
normal physical examinations. (Doc. 22 at 6-8.) The record does not support Plaintiff’s
argument that the R&R relied on a post hoc rationale that the ALJ never gave; both the
ALJ’s decision and the R&R discuss contradictions between Plaintiff’s symptom testimony
and her medical records. (Id.; AR 46, 48.) The Court will overrule Plaintiff’s Objection
to the R&R’s analysis of her neck and back pain.
D. Foot Impairment
Plaintiff testified before the ALJ that she cannot be on her feet long because “it hurts
to walk,” and her “foot will start swelling up” after about ten minutes of walking. (AR
187.) She testified that her foot surgeries did not “take,” and one foot is “totally deformed.”
(Id.)
The ALJ found at Step Two, with respect to Plaintiff’s “history of bunionectomy,
status post resection of middle phalanx and second right toe, and hammer toe deformities,”
that the foot impairment is non-severe because “the medical evidence indicates no post-
surgery complications and no issues with the claimant’s gait.” (AR 41.) The ALJ
discussed specific medical records indicating independent ambulation and normal gait.
(AR 41-42.) The R&R finds that Plaintiff forfeited any challenge to the ALJ’s Step Two
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analysis by failing to address it in her briefing. (Doc. 22 at 10.) The R&R further finds
that substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s conclusion that Plaintiff’s foot impairment is
non-severe and does not limit Plaintiff from standing and walking. (Id. at 10, 12.) The
R&R concludes that the “ALJ did not err in rejecting testimony about extreme limitations
arising from a nonsevere impairment.” (Id. at 10.)
Plaintiff argues in her Objection that the ALJ failed to evaluate her actual orthopedic
impairment, and that the R&R improperly treats template notations in non-pertinent
cardiology and neurology visit summaries as sufficient to uphold the ALJ’s residual
functional capacity finding of unlimited standing and walking. (Doc. 23 at 11.) Plaintiff
further argues that the R&R erroneously “suggest[s] that the ALJ was not required to
consider Plaintiff’s foot limitations in the [residual functional capacity finding] because the
impairment was found non-severe.” (Id. at 12.) Plaintiff contends that the ALJ failed to
address Listing 1.18 in connection with Plaintiff’s documented foot impairment, despite
evidence of post-reconstructive deformity and pain with ambulation. (Id. at 12.) Plaintiff
asks the Court to “remand with instructions requiring proper identification and evaluation
of Plaintiff’s foot impairment under Listing 1.18, consideration of all resulting functional
limitations” in Plaintiff’s residual functional capacity, “and a legally adequate
reassessment of [Plaintiff’s] symptom testimony.” (Id. at 12.)
An ALJ is required to compare a claimant’s impairment to the listed impairments
only if the ALJ determines that the impairment is severe. Batson v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec.
Admin., 359 F.3d 1190, 1194 (9th Cir. 2004). Here, the ALJ found at Step Two that
Plaintiff’s foot impairments are non-severe, and Plaintiff did not object to the R&R’s
conclusion that she forfeited any challenge to the ALJ’s Step Two finding. Because the
ALJ found Plaintiff’s foot impairments non-severe at Step Two, the ALJ was not required
to evaluate her foot impairments under Listing 1.18 at Step Three. Furthermore, Plaintiff
failed to raise in her Opening Brief any challenge to the ALJ’s application of or failure to
apply Listing 1.18 with respect to her foot impairments.
As discussed above, an ALJ must consider all medical impairments, including non-
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severe impairments, in formulating a claimant’s residual functional capacity. See 20 C.F.R.
§ 404.1545(a)(2); Carmickle, 533 F.3d at 1164. “Even though a non-severe impairment
standing alone may not significantly limit an individual's ability to do basic work activities,
it may—when considered with limitations or restrictions due to other impairments—be
critical to the outcome of a claim.” Carmickle, 533 F.3d at 1164 (internal quotation and
alteration marks omitted). Here, the ALJ did not discuss Plaintiff’s foot impairment when
formulating her residual functional capacity, nor did the ALJ specifically explain why he
rejected Plaintiff’s testimony that foot pain limits her ability to walk for extended periods.
When reassessing Plaintiff’s residual functional capacity on remand, the ALJ should
specifically evaluate the credibility of Plaintiff’s symptom testimony concerning her foot
impairments and evaluate whether the foot impairments, even though found non-severe at
Step Two, affect Plaintiff’s residual functional capacity.
E. SSR 96-8p Function-by-Function Assessment
The R&R concludes that the ALJ complied with SSR 96-8p’s narrative requirement
by providing a function-by-function assessment and supporting the findings with an
analysis of the objective medical evidence. (Doc. 22 at 11-12.) The R&R further finds
that the ALJ did not err in grouping “impairments that could cause related functional
limitations.” (Id. at 12.)
Plaintiff argues in her Objection that the R&R mischaracterizes her argument
regarding SSR 96-8p as asserting that the ALJ failed to provide a function-by-function
assessment, when Plaintiff’s argument is actually that the ALJ failed to provide a narrative
function-by-function explanation linking specific medical findings to specific functional
limitations. (Doc. 23 at 13.) However, the R&R finds that the ALJ supported its function-
by-function assessment with an analysis of the objective medical evidence of Plaintiff’s
impairments. Accordingly, the Court will overrule Plaintiff’s objection to the R&R’s
evaluation of her SSR 96-8p argument.
. . . .
. . . .
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F. Credit as True
Under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), the court has the power to affirm, modify, or reverse the
decision of the Commissioner, “with or without remanding the cause for a rehearing.”
Accordingly, “in appropriate circumstances courts are free to reverse and remand a
determination by the Commissioner with instructions to calculate and award benefits.”
Garrison v. Colvin, 759 F.3d 995, 1019 (9th Cir. 2014).
Under the credit-as-true rule, a court may remand for the immediate calculation and
award of benefits if:
(1) the record has been fully developed and further administrative
proceedings would serve no useful purpose; (2) the ALJ has failed to provide
legally sufficient reasons for rejecting evidence, whether claimant testimony
or medical opinion; and (3) if the improperly discredited evidence were
credited as true, the ALJ would be required to find the claimant disabled on
remand.
Id. at 1020. Further administrative proceedings generally are useful if “the record has not
been fully developed” or “there is a need to resolve conflicts and ambiguities.” Treichler
v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 775 F.3d 1090, 1101 (9th Cir. 2014) (internal quotation and
alteration marks omitted). Furthermore, even when all the conditions of the credit-as-true
rule are satisfied, the court may instead remand for further proceedings if “the record as a
whole creates serious doubt as to whether the claimant is, in fact, disabled within the
meaning of the Social Security Act.” Garrison, 759 F.3d at 1021.
In her Objection, Plaintiff argues that the Court should remand for an immediate
award of benefits due to errors in the ALJ’s analysis of limitations arising from her
rheumatoid arthritis, osteoarthritis, and fibromyalgia. (See Doc. 23 at 7.) However, as
explained above, the Court agrees with the R&R’s finding that the ALJ properly discounted
Plaintiff’s testimony concerning hand limitations arising from those conditions and that
any error was harmless. Plaintiff does not specifically object to the R&R’s conclusion that
remand for further proceedings is the appropriate remedy with respect to the ALJ’s failure
to provide clear and convincing reasons for discounting Plaintiff’s headache testimony.
The Court agrees with the R&R that remand for further proceedings is appropriate given
the need to further develop the record concerning Plaintiff’s headache disorder.
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IT IS ORDERED:
1. Plaintiff’s Objection (Doc. 23) is partially granted and partially
overruled, as set forth above.
2. The Report and Recommendation (Doc. 22) is accepted and adopted, with
the modification discussed above with respect to reevaluation of Plaintiff’s
foot impairment.
3. The final decision of the Commissioner is reversed, and this matter is
remanded to the agency for a new hearing and decision, as set forth above
and in the Report and Recommendation (Doc. 22).
4. The Clerk of Court is directed to enter a final judgment in favor of Plaintiff
and against the Commissioner, and to close this case.
Dated this 17th day of March, 2026.
Case 4:25-cv-00114-RM Document 24 Filed 03/18/26 Page 13 of 13