Baker et al v. Pelham et al

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WO
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA
Angela Baker, et al.,
Plaintiffs,
v.
Henry Pelham, et al.,
Defendants.
No. CV-25-08259-PCT-DJH
ORDER
Plaintiffs Angela Baker (“Baker”) and Kevin Pittsinger (“Pittsinger”) (collectively,
“Plaintiffs”) each filed an Application to Proceed in District Court Without Prepaying Fees
or Cost (Docs. 2 & 3). Upon review, Plaintiffs’ Applications, signed under penalty of
perjury, indicates that they are financially unable to pay the filing fee. The Court will grant
Plaintiffs’ Applications and allow them to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”). The Court
will proceed to screen Plaintiffs’ Complaint (Doc. 1) under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2).
I. Legal Standard
When a party has been granted IFP status, the Court must review the complaint to
determine whether the action:
(i) is frivolous or malicious;
(ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or
(iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.
See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).1 In conducting this review, “section 1915(e) not only
1 “While much of § 1915 outlines how prisoners can file proceedings in forma pauperis,
§1915(e) applies to all in forma pauperis proceedings, not just those filed by prisoners.”
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permits but requires a district court to dismiss an [IFP] complaint that fails to state a claim.”
Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127 (9th Cir. 2000) (citation omitted).
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a) requires complaints to make “a short and plain
statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” While Rule 8 does
not demand detailed factual allegations, “it demands more than an unadorned, ‘the
defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me’ accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678
(2009). “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere
conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id. A complaint “must contain sufficient factual
matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. (quoting
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim is plausible “when the
plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that
the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).
A complaint is frivolous if it is based on a nonexistent legal interest or delusional
factual scenario. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327–30 (1989); see also Denton v.
Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 32–33 (1992) (dismissal is also appropriate when the facts alleged
are “clearly baseless,” “fanciful,” “fantastic,” or “delusional”). This Court has “not only
the authority to dismiss a claim based on an indisputably meritless legal theory, but also
the unusual power to pierce the veil of the complaint’s factual allegations and dismiss those
claims whose factual contentions are clearly baseless.” Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 328.
The Court must accept all well-pleaded factual allegations as true and interpret the
facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Shwarz v. United States, 234 F.3d 428,
435 (9th Cir. 2000). That rule, however, does not apply to legal conclusions. Iqbal, 556
U.S. at 678. The Court is mindful that it must “construe pro se filings liberally when
evaluating them under Iqbal.” Jackson v. Barnes, 749 F.3d 755, 763-64 (9th Cir. 2014)
(quoting Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 (9th Cir. 2010)).
Long v. Maricopa Cmty. College Dist., 2012 WL 588965, at *1 (D. Ariz. Feb. 22, 2012)
(citing Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126 n. 7 (9th Cir. 2000) (“[S]ection 1915(e) applies
to all in forma pauperis complaints[.]”)).
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II. Discussion
Plaintiffs’ claims all relate to the acquisition of a search warrant and the subsequent
execution of the search on Plaintiff Baker’s home. (See generally Doc. 1). Plaintiffs allege
that the warrant was obtained unlawfully, the search was conducted with excessive force,
and Plaintiff Baker was wrongfully prosecuted. (Id.) Additionally, they allege that
Plaintiff Pittsinger is an individual with a disability, who resided in a motor home on
Baker’s property, and during the search, Defendants failed to reasonably accommodate
Pittsinger’s disability. (Id. at ¶¶ 17–20). As a result, Plaintiffs have brought the following
claims for violations of either their Fourth or Fourteenth Amendment rights or the
Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) and the Rehabilitation Act: § 1983 claim for
judicial deception (Count I); § 1983 claim for “unreasonable investigation” (Count II); §
1983 claim for trespassory search (Count III); § 1983 claim for excessive force (Count IV);
§ 1983 claim for “exceeding scope” of a search warrant (Count V); § 1983 claim for
“failure to provide warrant” (Count VI); § 1983 claim for malicious prosecution (Count
VII); and violations of the ADA and Rehabilitation Act (Count VIII). (See id. at ¶¶ 28–
36). Plaintiffs additionally assert a Monell claim (Count IX) based on the Arizona
Department of Public Safety’s (“DPS”) failure to train. (Id. at ¶ 36). Alongside DPS,
Plaintiffs name Colonel Jeffrey Glover, Director of the DPS, as well as officers Henry
Pelham, Matthew Turriff, Kyle Creager, John Gigous, Max Perea, and John Does 1–20 in
their individual and official capacities as Defendants.
A. Rule 8
Initially, Plaintiffs do not make it clear, which claims are brought against which
Defendants. Plaintiffs have listed numerous Defendants but, with the exception of Count
VIII for ADA and Rehabilitation Act violations and Count IX for Monell claims, they do
not identify which Defendants are implicated under each claim. 2
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 requires that a complaint gives sufficient facts to
2 Counts I, II, and VII do not state against whom they are brought, but based on the
allegations supporting the claims, it can be seen that the claims are brought against
Defendant Pelham.
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give a defendant fair notice of the claims against them. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47
(1957). Rule 8 also requires that a complaint clearly establish the claims and parties such
that a defendant would have “no difficulty in responding to the claims with an answer
and/or with a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss.” Hearns v. San Bernardino Police Dep’t,
530 F.3d 1124, 1132 (9th Cir. 2008). The purpose of Rule 8 is defeated unless a complaint
contains “clear and concise averments stating which defendants are liable to plaintiffs for
which wrongs, based on the evidence[.]” McHenry v. Renne, 84 F.3d 1172, 1178 (9th Cir.
1996). Several claims in the Complaint here fail to meet these standards: Counts III, IV,
V, and VI fail to specify any particular Defendant, including unnamed defendants, that the
claim is brought against. (See Doc. 1 at ¶¶ 30–33). By not specifying which claims are
brought against which Defendants and for what relief, the Court is unable to assess the
viability of Plaintiffs’ claims. Therefore, Plaintiffs’ Count III for trespassory search, Count
IV for excessive force, Count V for “exceeding scope,” and Count VI for “failure to provide
warrant” are dismissed without prejudice.
Moreover, to state a cognizable claim against individual defendants, a plaintiff must
“set forth specific facts as to each individual defendant’s” role in depriving a plaintiff of
their protected rights. See Leer v. Murphy, 844 F.2d 628, 634 (9th Cir.1988). Furthermore,
liability may be imposed only if the plaintiff can allege and show that the defendant actually
and proximately caused the deprivation of a federally protected right. See id. Here, the
Complaint is devoid of any allegations as to how Officers Matthew Turriff, Kyle Creager,
John Gigous, and Max Perea violated either Plaintiff’s constitutional rights. In fact, with
one exception, after being named as parties to this action, not a single one of the
aforementioned officers is mentioned again in the Complaint. (See generally Doc. 1).
Plaintiffs claim that Kyle Creager “initially reported ‘no seizable [sic] evidence’ in Trailer
B.” (Id. at ¶ 22). However, this alleged action did not deprive either Plaintiff of any
constitutional right. As a result, Defendants Matthew Turriff, Kyle Creager, John Gigous,
and Max Perea are dismissed as Defendants from this matter without prejudice.
Relatedly, it is true that Plaintiffs are not required to know the identity of every
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defendant at the outset. “Nonetheless, to state a claim against a Doe defendant, plaintiff
must be able to pinpoint the individual who caused him harm, even if he does not know the
individual’s name.” Grace v. Samuels, 2023 WL 8168823, at *4 (C.D. Cal. 2023); Segura
v. City of La Mesa, 647 F. Supp. 3d 926, 941 (S.D. Cal. 2022) (“Plaintiff must nevertheless
still allege specific facts showing how each particular [DOE] defendant violated [her]
rights.”) (internal quotations and citation omitted). Indeed, “when a plaintiff has claims
against an unknown defendant, the plaintiff must still meet federal pleading standards when
alleging facts against such defendants.” Lomeli v. Cnty. of San Diego, 637 F. Supp. 3d
1046, 1058 (S.D. Cal. 2022). Despite listing Doe Defendants 1–20, Plaintiffs make no
factual allegations against any specific, unnamed defendant in the Complaint, much less
identify which claims are brought against them. Therefore, the Complaint is insufficient
to allow Plaintiffs to proceed against any Doe Defendants, and Doe Defendants will be
dismissed from this matter without prejudice.
B. Remaining Claims
Presently, Count I for judicial deception, Count II for unreasonable investigation,
Count VII for malicious prosecution, Count VIII for ADA and Rehabilitation Act
violations, and IX under Monell remain in Plaintiffs’ Complaint. Counts I, II, and VII are
§ 1983 claims against Defendant Pelham for violations of the Fourth Amendment. Count
VIII regards Plaintiff Pittsinger and is brought under the ADA and Rehabilitation Act
against Defendants DPS and Glover in his official capacity. Finally, Count IX is a Monell
claim brought against Defendants DPS and Glover in his official capacity. At this time,
the Court finds that Plaintiffs may proceed with Count I for judicial deception against
Defendant Pelham in his individual capacity and Count VIII for violations of the ADA
against Defendants DPS and Glover. Counts II, VII, and IX are dismissed for the following
reasons.
1. Count II for Unreasonable Investigation/Failure to Consider
Exculpatory Evidence Against Pelham
As to Count II, Plaintiffs brings a claim under the Fourth Amendment against
Detective Pelham for “Unreasonable Investigation and Failure to Consider Exculpatory
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Evidence” (Count II). (Doc. 1 at ¶ 29). Plaintiffs assert that Defendant Pelham
“unreasonable ignored readily available exculpatory facts and failed to undertake
minimally adequate investigative steps before seeking a warrant[.]” (Id.) To the extent
that Plaintiffs’ claim is based on Defendant Pelham ignoring exculpatory evidence, the
Court was unable to locate any authority that supports such a claim under the Fourth
Amendment. While caselaw says that an officer’s willful failure to divulge exculpatory
evidence that resulted in a plaintiff’s unusually long detention can be a due process
violation, see Tatum v. Moody, 768 F.3d 806, 819–20 (9th Cir. 2014), the Complaint is
clear that Baker was not arrested (Doc. 1 at ¶ 24), so no such claim is feasible here.
To the extent that Plaintiffs’ claim is based on Defendant Pelham’ failure to conduct
a more thorough investigation before seeking a warrant, it likewise fails. Plaintiffs allege
that Defendants “failed to undertake minimally adequate investigative steps before seeking
a warrant[.]” (Doc. 1 at ¶ 29). However, “[o]nce he has probable cause, an officer is not
ordinarily required to continue to investigate or seek further corroboration.” Ewing v. City
of Stockton, 588 F.3d 1218, 1227 (9th Cir. 2009); U.S. v. Thoms, 2011 WL 87337, at *3
(D. Alaska 2011) (“An officer seeking a search warrant has no obligation to conduct a
thorough investigation as to an alleged crime before seeking a search warrant to obtain
evidence of the crimes being investigated.”). Consequently, Plaintiffs have not alleged a
violation of Baker’s Fourth Amendment rights, and Count II is dismissed with prejudice.
2. Count VII for Malicious Prosecution against Pelham
“In order to prevail on a § 1983 claim of malicious prosecution, a plaintiff ‘must
show that the defendants prosecuted [her] with malice and without probable cause, and that
they did so for the purpose of denying [her] equal protection or another specific
constitutional right.’ ” Awabdy v. City of Adelanto, 368 F.3d 1062, 1066 (9th Cir. 2004)
(quoting Freeman v. City of Santa Ana, 68 F.3d 1180, 1189 (9th Cir.1995)). “Malicious
prosecution actions are not limited to suits against prosecutors but may be brought, as here,
against other persons who have wrongfully caused the charges to be filed.” Id.
Plaintiffs allege that “Baker was prosecuted without probable cause and based on
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judicial deception and unlawful searches” and assert that “the criminal case terminated
favorably by dismissal. (Doc. 1 at ¶ 34). Plaintiffs further allege that “Pelham’s conduct
violated the Fourth Amendment and proximately caused Baker’s damages.” (Id.)
However, earlier in the Complaint, Plaintiffs made it clear that a “stolen-vehicle report”
had been opened regarding a vehicle that was in Baker’s possession. (Id. at ¶¶ 11–12).
Although she may not have known the vehicle was reported stolen, the officers discovered
Baker in possession of the vehicle reported stolen. (Id. at ¶ 24). By Plaintiffs’ own account,
the officers seized “a small amount of methamphetamine,” along with the reportedly stolen
vehicle. (Id.) Based on these allegations, the “two felonies” Baker was charged with did
not lack probable cause, even if they were later dismissed. See, e.g., Hawkins v. Douglas
Cnty., 2017 WL 5709568, at *5 (E.D. Wash. 2017) (“[T]he officers discovered [the
plaintiff] in possession of the stolen farm equipment, categorically demonstrating the
existence of probable cause.”). As a result, Plaintiffs cannot maintain their malicious
prosecution claim, and it is dismissed with prejudice.
3. Count IX for Monell Violations against Defendants DPS and
Glover in his Official Capacity as DPS Director
Lastly, Plaintiffs’ Monell claim, Count IX, is brought against Defendants DPS and
Glover. A municipality or other local government entity may be sued for constitutional
torts committed by its officials according to an official policy, practice, or custom. Monell
v. N.Y. City Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690–91 (1978). However, DPS is an
Arizona agency, and Defendant Glover acts as its Director and the Supreme Court has
rejected the argument that a plaintiff can pursue a Monell claim against an arm of a state.
Will v. Michigan Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989); see also Mukaida v. Hawaii,
159 F. Supp. 2d 1211, 1227 (D. Haw. 2001), aff’d, 85 Fed. Appx. 631 (9th Cir. 2004) (“A
suit against a state official in that person’s official capacity is the same as an action against
a state.”). “Monell claims are only cognizable against municipalities or local governments,
not state entities or officials.” Smithson v. Hammond, 2023 WL 7110554, at *12 (W.D.
Wash. 2023). Thus, Count IX is dismissed with prejudice as it is brought against Arizona,
not a municipality or local government.
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Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiffs Baker and Pittsinger’s Applications to Proceed in
District Court Without Prepaying Fees or Costs (Docs. 2 & 3) are GRANTED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the following claims: § 1983 claim for
“unreasonable investigation” (Count II); § 1983 claim for trespassory search (Count III);
§ 1983 claim for excessive force (Count IV); § 1983 claim for “exceeding scope” of a
search warrant (Count V); § 1983 claim for “failure to provide warrant” (Count VI); § 1983
claim for malicious prosecution (Count VII); and Monell violations (Count IX) are
DISMISSED. Plaintiffs may proceed with Counts I for judicial deception against
Defendant Pelham and VIII for violations of the ADA against Defendants DPS and Glover.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Matthew Turriff, Kyle Creager, John Gigous,
Max Perea, and John Does 1–20 are DISMISSED as Defendants from this matter.
IT IS FINALLY ORDERED that Plaintiffs shall be responsible for the service of
all necessary documents.
Dated this 14th day of May, 2026.
Honorable Diane J. Humetewa
United States District Judge
Case 3:25-cv-08259-DJH Document 7 Filed 05/14/26 Page 8 of 8