Jarvis et al v. Assa Abloy Global Solutions Incorporated et al

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WO
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA
Joseph Emmanuel Jarvis, et al.,
Plaintiffs,
v.
Assa Abloy Global Solutions Incorporated,
et al.,
Defendants.
No. CV-25-08093-PCT-SMB
ORDER
The Court now considers Plaintiffs’ Motion to Vacate its Voluntary Dismissal (Doc.
72); Defendants’ Motion for Sanctions (Doc. 76); Plaintiffs’ Motion to Deny and Strike
Defendants’ Motion for Sanctions (Doc. 77); Plaintiffs’ Request for Expedited Ruling on
its Motion to Vacate (Doc. 80); and Plaintiff Joseph E. Jarvis’ Motion to Remove Plaintiff
Huiquin Du as a Plaintiff (Doc. 83) and his Motion to Remand to State Court (Doc. 85).
For the following reasons, the Court denies Plaintiffs’ Motion to Vacate its Voluntary
Dismissal (Doc. 72) and denies Defendants’ Motion for Sanctions (Doc. 76). The
remaining motions are thus rendered moot.
I. BACKGROUND
On March 3, 2025, Plaintiffs Joseph E. Jarvis and Huiquin Du1 filed a complaint
spanning over 700 pages and 3,400 paragraphs in Mohave County Superior Court in
Arizona. (Doc. 1-1.) On May 6, 2025, Defendants removed the case to this Court, asserting
1 Jarvis filed a Motion to Dismiss Du as a plaintiff. (Doc. 83.) The disposition of this
Order renders this Motion moot. However, Du is listed on the Complaint as a “potential
plaintiff” and is a signatory on most of the motions filed in this Court. (Doc. 1-1 at 22.)
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that this Court had federal question jurisdiction. (Doc. 1 at 2.) Defendants’ removal
spawned a flurry of activity, including Plaintiffs filing a Motion to Remand (Doc. 13).
On June 1, 2025, Plaintiffs filed a Notice of Voluntary Dismissal pursuant to Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure (“Rule”) 41(a)(1)(A)(i). (Doc. 46 at 1.) Rule 41(a)(1)(A)(i) allows
plaintiffs to “dismiss an action without a court order by filing a notice of dismissal before
the opposing party serves either an answer or a motion for summary judgment.”
Accordingly, the case was dismissed and thus rendered the then pending motions moot.
(Doc. 62 at 1.)
However, Plaintiffs continued filing documents with the Court. (Docs. 63, 64, 66,
67, 68.) The Court issued two Orders notifying Plaintiffs that no action would be taken on
those filings due to the voluntary dismissal. (Docs. 65, 69.) Plaintiffs appealed the second
Order (Doc. 70 at 1), but they voluntarily dismissed their appeal. (Doc. 73 at 1).
On July 31, 2025, Plaintiffs filed the present Motion to Vacate its Voluntary
Dismissal. (Doc. 72.) Plaintiffs argue that their voluntary dismissal should be vacated
pursuant to Rule 60(b)(1), (3), (4), and (6). (Id. at 1.) The Court now considers that
Motion.
II. MOTION TO VACATE
Rule 60(b) provides that “the court may relieve a party or its legal representative
from a final judgment, order, or proceeding.” “A Rule 41(a) voluntary dismissal without
prejudice qualifies as a final proceeding under Rule 60(b).” Waetzig v. Halliburton Energy
Servs., Inc., 604 U.S. 305, 311–12 (2025) (citation modified). Plaintiffs seek vacatur of
their voluntary dismissal under Rule 60(b)(1), (3), (4), and (6). The Court considers each
basis for vacatur in turn.
A. Rule 60(b)(1)
Rule 60(b)(1) allows courts to vacate voluntary dismissals based on “mistake,
inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect.” Although Plaintiffs cite Rule 60(b)(1) as a
basis to vacate its voluntary dismissal, they do not argue that their voluntary dismissal was
the product of “mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect.” See Segura v. City
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of La Mesa¸647 F. Supp. 3d 926, 934 (S.D. Cal. 2022) (“declining to sua sponte decide an
issue not specifically briefed” and noting that “it is not the Court’s role to make arguments
for any party” (citation modified)). That aside, Plaintiffs did not mistakenly file its Motion.
In a later filing, Plaintiffs clarified “that this case was in fact terminated by operation of
law on June 1, 2025, upon the filing of Plaintiffs’ notice of Voluntary Dismissal.” (Doc.
66 at 1.) Plaintiffs went on to remind the Court that their dismissal is “self-executing,
requires no court order, and immediately divests the court of jurisdiction.” (Id.) This is all
true. Accordingly, Plaintiffs were aware of the effect of their voluntary dismissal. The
Court thus finds that Rule 60(b)(1) does not provide a basis for vacatur.
B. Rule 60(b)(3)
Rule 60(b)(3) allows courts to vacate voluntary dismissals based on “fraud (whether
previously called intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation, or misconduct by an opposing
party.” “To prevail, the moving party must prove by clear and convincing evidence that
the verdict was obtained through fraud, misrepresentation, or other misconduct and the
conduct complained of prevented the losing party from fully and fairly presenting the
defense.” Trendsettah USA, Inc. v. Swisher Int’l, Inc., 31 F.4th 1124, 1136 (9th Cir. 2022)
(citation modified). Plaintiffs do not argue that its decision to voluntarily dismiss their case
was the product of “fraud, misrepresentation, or other misconduct.” See id. Although
unclear, it appears that Plaintiffs instead argue that Defendants’ removal constituted a
misrepresentation because this Court lacked jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ case. (Doc. 72
at 3–4.) This argument misses the mark. Plaintiffs do not argue that their dismissal was
the product of a misrepresentation; instead, Plaintiffs argue that their voluntary dismissal
was intended to combat Defendants’ alleged misrepresentation. The Court thus finds that
Rule 60(b)(3) does not provide a basis for vacatur.
C. Rule 60(b)(4)
Rule 60(b)(4) allows courts to relieve parties from a judgment when “the judgment
is void.” Plaintiffs argue that their own voluntary dismissal is a “void judgment” because
the Court lacked jurisdiction over the case due to it being improperly removed. (Doc. 72
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at 9.) The confusing nature of this argument aside, it is misguided.
Rule 60(b)(4) only applies to judgements that are “a legal nullity.” United Student
Aid Funds, Inc. v. Espinosa, 559 U.S. 260, 270 (2010). Additionally, Rule 60(b)(4) relief
for jurisdictional defects is reserved “only for the exceptional case in which the court that
rendered judgment lacked even an arguable basis for jurisdiction.” Id. at 271 (citation
modified) (emphasis added).
To start, a voluntary dismissal is not a judgement rendered by the Court.
Additionally, Plaintiffs fail to cite any authority establishing that a voluntary dismissal
becomes a legal nullity even assuming the Court lacked removal jurisdiction. Indeed,
plaintiffs have “the absolute right to dismiss an action without prejudice provided that the
defendant has not yet filed an answer or a motion for summary judgment.” See Duke
Energy Trading & Mktg., L.L.C. v. Davis, 267 F.3d 1042, 1048 (9th Cir. 2001) (emphasis
added). Plaintiffs fail to cite any authority establishing that a litigant’s right under Rule
41(a) is contingent on the court having removal jurisdiction. Thus, the Court thus finds
that Rule 60(b)(4) does not provide a basis for vacatur.
D. Rule 60(b)(6)
Rule 60(b)(6) allows courts to vacate voluntary dismissals based on “any other
reason that justifies relief.” Again, although Plaintiffs cite Rule 60(b)(6) as a basis to
vacate its voluntary dismissal, they fail to make any discrete arguments suggesting as
much. Thus, Plaintiffs fall short of their burden under Rule 60(b)(6) as “movant[s] seeking
relief under Rule 60(b)(6) must show extraordinary circumstances justifying the reopening
of a final judgment.” Henson v. Fid. Nat’l Fin., Inc., 943 F.3d 434, 444 (9th Cir. 2019)
(citation modified). Plaintiffs fail to demonstrate any extraordinary circumstances
justifying vacatur. Thus, the Court thus finds that Rule 60(b)(6) does not provide a basis
for vacatur.
E. Miscellaneous Arguments
The Court briefly addresses Plaintiffs’ underlying assumption that this Court lacked
removal jurisdiction. While this may be true, it is an argument better suited for a motion
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for remand. While Plaintiffs filed a Motion to Remand (Doc. 13), it appears Plaintiffs
abandoned their Motion on the mistaken assumption that it could file a voluntary dismissal
to the same effect. Indeed, Plaintiffs argue that they voluntarily dismissed their case “with
a clear reservation of rights—explicitly stating that all rights were preserved to return to
state court.” (Doc. 72 at 6.) Plaintiffs’ ipse dixit reservation of rights does not provide a
legitimate basis for this Court to remand their case back to State Court. And as noted,
Plaintiffs were well aware of the effect of a voluntary dismissal. Accordingly, the Court
denies Plaintiffs Motion to Vacate its Voluntary Dismissal (Doc. 72).
III. MOTION FOR SANCTIONS
The Court turns next to Defendants’ Motion for Sanctions (Doc. 76). Defendants’
Motion is based on Plaintiff Jarvis’ conduct in this case and in previous cases filed in State
and Federal Court. (Id. at 2.) Defendants “ask the Court to impose sanctions on Plaintiffs
for their frivolous filing by imposing a vexatious litigant order or in the alternative impose
a standing order that Defendants shall not be required to respond to Plaintiffs’ future filings
unless ordered by the Court to respond.” (Id. at 9.) Defendants further request that the
Court award Defendants their attorneys’ fees in having to respond to Plaintiffs’ frivolous
motions. (Id.)
A. Vexatious Litigant
The Court begins with Defendants’ request for a vexatious litigant order. “Federal
courts can regulate the activities of abusive litigants by imposing carefully tailored
restrictions under appropriate circumstances.” Ringgold-Lockhart v. County of Los
Angeles, 761 F.3d 1057, 1061 (9th Cir. 2014) (citation modified). “Enjoining litigants with
abusive and lengthy litigation histories is one such restriction that courts may impose.” Id.
(citation modified). “Restricting access to the courts is, however, a serious matter. The
right of access to the courts is a fundamental right protected by the Constitution.” Id.
(citation modified).
“Out of regard for the constitutional underpinnings of the right to court access,
pre-filing orders should rarely be filed, and only if courts comply with certain procedural
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and substantive requirements.” Id. at 1062 (citation modified). Thus, vexatious litigant
orders can only be entered if the Court:
(1) give[s] litigants notice and an opportunity to oppose the order before it is
entered; (2) compile[s] an adequate record for appellate review, including a
listing of all the cases and motions that led the district court to conclude that
a vexatious litigant order was needed; (3) make[s] substantive findings of
frivolousness or harassment; and (4) tailor[s] the order narrowly so as to
closely fit the specific vice encountered.
Id. at 1062 (citation modified).
Ultimately, the Court will not dub Plaintiffs vexatious litigants because their actions
do not rise to the level of being “frivolous” or “harassing”—terms which take on a
particular meaning in this context. “To determine whether the litigation is frivolous,
district courts must look at both the number and content of the filings as indicia of the
frivolousness of the litigant's claims.” Id. at 1064 (citation modified). While the Ninth
Circuit has “not established a numerical definition for frivolousness,” it has noted “that
even if a litigant’s petition is frivolous, [courts] must make a finding that the number of
complaints was inordinate.” Id. (citation modified). Courts have found an “inordinate”
number of filings to include anywhere from fifty frivolous cases to thirty-five actions filed
in thirty jurisdictions. See id. at 1065 (citing cases). Ultimately, Defendants point to
Plaintiffs’ conduct in this case, a previous case Plaintiffs filed in this District alleging
similar claims against similar defendants, and three other unrelated lawsuits—two of which
were also in this District. (Doc. 76 at 4–5.) The Court finds that Plaintiffs’ conduct has
not yet risen to the level of “frivolous.”
“As an alternative to frivolousness, the district court may make an alternative
finding that the litigant’s filings show a pattern of harassment.” Ringgold, 761 F.3d
at 1064. “Courts must be careful not to conclude that particular types of actions filed
repetitiously are harassing and must instead discern whether the filing of several similar
types of actions constitutes an intent to harass the defendant or the court.” Id. (citation
modified). While Plaintiffs’ behavior is trending towards harassment, the Court is not yet
convinced that Plaintiffs intended to harass Defendants or the Court; at least not in the
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capacity necessary to be dubbed vexatious litigants.
Ultimately, this is a case in which “other, less restrictive options,” short of a
vexatious litigant designation, is “adequate to protect the court and parties.” Id. at 1064.
As noted, Defendants have requested that this Court “impose a standing order that
Defendants shall not be required to respond to Plaintiffs’ future filings unless ordered by
the Court to respond.” (Doc. 76 at 9.) The Court will grant that request.
B. Attorneys’ Fees
Defendants, seek the attorneys’ fees they incurred “in having to respond to
Plaintiffs’ frivolous motions.” 2 (Doc. 76 at 9.) “Federal courts possess certain ‘inherent
powers,’ not conferred by rule or statute, to manage their own affairs so as to achieve the
orderly and expeditious disposition of cases.” Am. Unites for Kids v. Rousseau, 985 F.3d
1075, 1088 (9th Cir. 2021) (citation modified) (quoting Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v.
Haeger, 581 U.S. 101, 107 (2017)). “That authority includes the ability to fashion an
appropriate sanction for conduct which abuses the judicial process.” Id. (citation modified)
(quoting Goodyear, 581 U.S. at 107). As relevant here, a district court may award
attorneys’ fees “when a party has acted in bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly, or for
oppressive reasons.” Id. at 1090. The Court, in its discretion, will not award attorneys’
fees against Plaintiff. However, the Court admonishes Plaintiff for his conduct in this case
which borders on the edge of bad faith.
At bottom, Plaintiffs engaged in a pattern of behavior that serves no legitimate
purpose and directly contravenes this Court’s orders. It is clear that Plaintiffs believe their
case should have been tried in State Court. It is equally clear that Plaintiffs were not
satisfied with the pace of the Federal Judiciary. However, that does not give Plaintiffs
license to ignore this Court’s orders and attempt to willfully misuse legal procedures to
2 The Court will not address Plaintiffs’ arguments pertaining to Rule 11 as Defendants do
not request sanctions pursuant to Rule 11. The Court also notes that Plaintiffs’ make these
arguments in a so-called Motion to Strike pursuant to Rule 12(f). (Doc. 77at 3.) However,
“[m]otions to strike under Rule 12(f) are directed to pleadings only” and are “not available
to strike material contained in motions and other briefs.” Goodwin v. AT&T, No.
2:23-CV-01950-GMN-DJA, 2024 WL 2866895, at *1 (D. Nev. June 6, 2024). This is
grounds to have the Motion stricken, see id. at 2, but the Court will treat the Motion as a
responsive brief.
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achieve their desired outcome. The Court provides an overview of Plaintiffs’ conduct thus
far.
On May 8, 2025, Plaintiffs filed its First Motion to Remand that included a request
for an expedited ruling (Doc. 13). On May 14, the Court issued an Order notifying
Plaintiffs that it would rule on the Motion in the normal course of business (Doc. 25 at 1).
On May 20, Plaintiffs filed it Second Motion to Remand (Doc. 30). On May 23, Plaintiffs
filed a Motion again seeking an expedited ruling on its First Motion to Remand (Doc. 36).
The Court notes that the First Motion to Remand had only been fully briefed since May 21,
two days before Plaintiffs’ renewed request for an expedited ruling. It appears that
Plaintiffs misconstrued this Court’s intention to rule on the Motion to Remand in due
course to mean that it would rule on the motion “within one day of receiving responses to
the motions.” (Doc. 36 at 1.) It is unclear why Plaintiffs were under that impression.
Then, on May 29, Plaintiffs filed a “Demand for Immediate Ruling on Motion to
Remand” (Doc. 40). On May 30, Plaintiffs filed multiple documents similarly demanding
an expedited ruling on their First Motion to Remand. (Docs. 44, 45.) Then, on June 1,
Plaintiffs dismissed their case on the mistaken assumption that their voluntary dismissal
compelled the Court to remand their case. (Doc. 46 at 2.) The Court notes that less than
one month elapsed between Plaintiffs filing their First Motion to Remand and their
Voluntary Dismissal. Between that time, Plaintiffs filed a myriad of other filings besides
those mentioned above, most of which either requested remand or requested this court to
consider the remand request on an expedited basis. Many of these filings were filed after
Plaintiffs dismissed their case, including a Third Motion to Remand (Doc. 57).
On June 11, the Court issued an Order recognizing Plaintiffs’ voluntary dismissal,
and ordered the case terminated. (Doc. 62 at 11.) Plaintiffs persisted in filing more
documents with the Court which included yet another request for this Court to remand the
case. (Doc. 63.) The Court issued another Order notifying Plaintiffs that the case was
terminated according to their voluntary dismissal and that no further action would be taken
on the matter. (Doc. 65.) Plaintiffs then filed their Fourth Motion to Remand (Doc. 67)
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and an Objection to this Court’s second Order notifying Plaintiffs that their case was
terminated (Doc. 66). Plaintiffs, in their Objection, went so far as to “clarify that this case
was in fact terminated by operation of law on June 1, 2025, upon the filing of Plaintiffs’
Notice of Voluntary Dismissal.” (Doc. 67 at 1.) Plaintiffs also took it upon themselves to
remind the Court that their voluntary dismissal “is self-executing, requires no court order,
and immediately divests the court of jurisdiction.” (Id.) Ironically, by this point, the Court
had issued two Orders recognizing that Plaintiffs’ case was terminated by operation of their
dismissal. However, Plaintiffs’ Objection prompted this Court to enter a third Order in
which the Court provided that “[u]pon Notice of Voluntary Dismissal, this Court lost
jurisdiction and may not address the merits of claims nor issue further orders pertaining to
them.” (Doc. 69 at 1.) Plaintiffs appealed this third Order, (Doc. 70.), but dismissed their
appeal (Doc. 73). At bottom, Plaintiffs submitted multiple duplicative filings requesting
their case to be remanded, many of which were filled with caustic language, openly
admonishing this Court, Defendants, and opposing counsel. These filings culminated in
Plaintiffs’ present Motion to Vacate its Voluntary Dismissal. (Doc. 72). However,
Plaintiffs’ Motion is really yet another thinly disguised motion to remand.
The Court is sympathetic to Plaintiffs’ desire to have their matter handled promptly.
However, this desire does not justify the serial filing of duplicative documents in defiance
of this Court’s orders. Although Plaintiffs insist that the Court lacked removal jurisdiction,
Plaintiffs’ conduct remains inappropriate.
The Court draws particular attention to Plaintiffs’ Motion to Vacate. As discussed,
Plaintiffs’ Motion is really yet another motion to remand. Plaintiffs openly admonish the
Court for failing to remand the case and claims that it committed “clear legal error.” (Doc.
72 at 6.) However, a motion to vacate a voluntary dismissal is an inappropriate vehicle to
challenge removal jurisdiction. Additionally, Plaintiffs’ Motion does not meaningfully
attempt to argue that dismissal is subject to vacatur under Rule 60(b). At bottom, Plaintiffs
Motion is another example of Plaintiffs deliberately ignoring this Court’s orders without
any cognizable legal basis to do so. Thus, Plaintiffs’ litigation conduct is quintessentially
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obdurate.
In light of the foregoing, the Court admonishes Plaintiffs for their conduct. This
case thus remains terminated, which precludes Plaintiffs from filing any additional motions
in this case. In the event Plaintiffs ignore this instruction, Defendants are not required to
respond to these motions unless this Court orders them to do so. The Court reminds
Plaintiffs that future filings may warrant the imposition of financial sanctions.
Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ Motion to Deny and Strike Defendants’ Motion for
Sanctions (Doc. 77), Plaintiffs’ Request for Expedited Ruling on its Motion to Vacate
(Doc. 80), Plaintiff Joseph E. Jarvis’ Motion to Remove Huiquin Du as a Plaintiff (Doc.
83), and his Motion to Remand to State Court (Doc. 85) are rendered moot.
IV. CONCLUSION
Accordingly,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED denying Plaintiffs’ Motion to Vacate its Voluntary
Dismissal (Doc. 72).
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED denying Defendants’ Motion for Sanctions (Doc.
76).
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED denying the following Motions as moot:
• Plaintiff’s Motion to Deny and Strike Defendants’ Motion for Sanctions (Doc. 77)
• Notice that Motions are Fully Briefed and Request for Ruling (Doc. 80)
• Motion to Correct the Record Regarding Non-Party Status of Huiqin Du (Doc. 83)
• Motion for Status Conference/Request for Ruling (Doc. 85)
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendants are not required to respond to any
future filings in this case unless ordered by the Court to respond.
Dated this 9th day of March, 2026.
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