Navajo County Sheriff's Posse Incorporated v. Navajo County Hashknife Sheriff's Posse Search & Rescue et al

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WO
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA
Navajo County Sheriff's Posse Incorporated,
Plaintiff,
v.
Navajo County Hashknife Sheriff's Posse
Search & Rescue, et al.,
Defendants.
No. CV-24-08146-PCT-DJH
ORDER
Before the Court is Plaintiff Navajo County Sherriff’s Posse, Inc. (“Plaintiff”) and
Defendant Navajo County Hashknife Sheriff’s Posse Search & Rescue’s (“Defendant”)
(collectively the “parties”) Joint Motion to Seal (“Joint Motion”). (Doc. 61). The Joint
Motion seeks to seal the responses and replies to the parties’ pending cross-motions for
Attorneys’ Fees. (Docs. 57 & 59). For the reasons stated below, the Court will deny the
Joint Motion to Seal and the underlying Motions for Attorneys’ Fees.
I. Background
Plaintiff brought a lawsuit against Defendant for the following claims centered
around a dispute involving the use of certain logos and names: (1) trademark infringement
under 15 U.S.C. § 1114; (2) false association, false designation of origin, and false
advertising in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a); (3) federal trademark dilution in violation
of 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c); (4) common law trademark infringement; (5) state trademark
infringement under A.R.S. § 44-1451; (6) state trademark dilution and injury to business
reputation; (7) common law unfair competition; (8) unjust enrichment; and finally (9)
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prospective interference with business advantage. (Doc. 1 at 22–45). At that time,
Plaintiff’s main contention was that Defendant was using certain tradenames and
trademarks in contravention of Plaintiff’s legally held rights to use those marks and names.
(Doc. 1 at 3). To assert its rights to the tradenames and trademarks, Plaintiff also filed a
Motion for Preliminary Injunction trying to prevent Defendant from using any of the
disputed tradenames or trademarks. (Doc. 28). At the hearing for the preliminary
injunction Motion, Defendant stipulated to not using any Hashknife “mark, term, or logo,”
but maintained that it had a right to use the phrase “Navajo County Sheriff’s Posse Search
and Rescue,” and any iteration thereof. (Doc. 37 at 1–2). The Court’s preliminary
injunction Order focused solely on one thing: should a preliminary injunction issue against
Defendant for use of the terms “Navajo County Sheriff’s Posse Search and Rescue.” (Id.)
The Court answered that question in the negative and denied Plaintiff’s Motion. (Id. at 2).
The parties then found their way into settlement talks and did indeed settle. (Doc. 54).
Now, while seeking attorneys’ fees, the parties have filed a Joint Motion to Seal the
Responses to their Attorneys’ Fees Motions and Plaintiff’s Reply to Defendants’
Attorneys’ Fees Motion. (Doc. 61).
II. Legal Standard
The sealing of documents requires compelling reasons supported by specific factual
findings that outweigh the general history of access and the public policies favoring
disclosure.” Kamakana v. City and County of Honolulu, 447 F.3d 1172, 1178–79 (9th Cir.
2006) (cleaned up); see also Johnstech Int’l Corp. v. JF Microtechnology SDN BHD, 2016
WL 4091388, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 2, 2016) (stating that a party must provide “specific,
individualized reasons for the sealing”). Conclusory statements by a party about potential
harm from public disclosure, or mere hypothesis or conjecture, will not do. Kamakana,
447 F.3d at 1179; Hagestad v. Tragesser, 49 F.3d 1430, 1434 (9th Cir. 1995). “[J]udicial
records are public documents almost by definition, and the public is entitled to access by
default.” Kamakana, 447 F.3d at 1180 (citation omitted); see also Center for Auto Safety
v. Chrysler Group, LLC, 809 F.3d 1092, 1096 (9th Cir. 2016) (when considering a request
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to seal, “we start with a strong presumption in favor of access to court records.”) (quotation
omitted).
The Court will deny the Joint Motion to Seal because the Court finds that the parties
have not sufficiently identified for the Court their compelling reasons for sealing. In their
Joint Motion, the parties state that their Attorneys Fees Motions, Responses, and
Defendant’s Reply “contains or references sensitive, non-public, and confidential
information, including materials protected by attorney-client privilege, work product
doctrine, proprietary business information, and portions of the parties’ confidential
settlement agreement.” (Doc. 61 at 2). They further state that filing this information on
the public docket would jeopardize the confidential nature of this information and lead to
its unnecessary exposure. (Id.) The Court disagrees.
To start, conclusory statements about work product, attorney client privilege, and
confidential information, without more, are not sufficient to grant a sealing motion.
Kamakana, 447 F.3d at 1178 (emphasizing that conclusory statements about
confidentiality are not enough to grant a motion to seal). Further, comparing the redacted
versions of the Motions, Reponses, and Defendant’s Reply filed by the parties, and the
unredacted versions, the Court cannot glean the type of work product, attorney client
privilege, or confidential information the parties seek to protect. Plaintiff’s Motion for
Attorneys Fees redacts entire portions of the procedural history in this case. (Compare
Doc. 59 at 2–9 with Doc. 60 at 2–9). That procedural history was openly disclosed and
filed on the docket when Plaintiff first filed this lawsuit and later when Plaintiff filed its
Preliminary Injunction. (Docs. 1 & 28). Plaintiff also cites to exhibits in its Motion for
Attorneys Fees, and yet none are attached to the Motion itself. An entire paragraph
designed to support Plaintiff’s argument about why it is a prevailing party is also redacted
from its Motion. (Doc. 59 at 12 & Doc. 60 at 12). Portions of the Motion referring to the
Lanham Act, the statute under which Plaintiff says it is entitled to attorneys fees, are also
redacted. (Doc. 59 at 12 & Doc. 60 at 12). Defendant, on the other hand, mainly redacted
portions of its Motion for Attorneys Fees that reference the underlying settlement
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agreement. (Doc. 60 at 13). But even then, neither party has articulated compelling reasons
for why any of the redacted information is necessary to file under seal. And the mere
existence of an underlying settlement agreement is not enough to warrant the sealing of
either the agreement itself or anything that references the agreement or its terms. Doe I-
XIX v. Boy Scouts of Am., 2017 WL 9288099, at *8 (D. Idaho Nov. 20, 2017) (“Similarly,
courts have declined to seal court-approved settlement agreements merely because they
contain confidentiality agreements, even where those agreements are integral to the parties'
agreement to a negotiated settlement.”). This is true even if the parties decide to keep the
terms of the agreement confidential. Id. Therefore, the Court will deny the parties Joint
Motion to Seal. Because the parties ask for entire portions of their briefing to be sealed,
the Court will also deny the pending Attorneys’ Fees Motion. These Motions will be
denied without prejudice to renew with proper documentation.
Notwithstanding, and without addressing the entire merits of the parties’ Motions
for Attorneys Fees, the Court serious questions that either party is entitled to to fees here.
Two types of movement impacted the case: a preliminary injunction hearing and the
parties’ settlement. (Doc. 37, Jan. 13, 2025, Order denying Plaintiff’s Motion for
Preliminary Injunction; Doc. 54, June 3, 2025, Notice of Settlement). Despite both parties
now laying claim to attorney fees from the other side, nothing on the public record suggests
that either party is a “prevailing party” for purposes of a preliminary injunction or for
purposes of the underlying settlement. See Lackey v. Stinnie, 604 U.S. 192, 200 (2025)
(highlighting the differences between the likelihood of success on the merits determination
at the preliminary injunction stage and the ultimate merits determination at other stages of
the lawsuit); see also Chidester v. City of Huntington Beach, 2025 WL 2633081, at *12
(C.D. Cal. Aug. 25, 2025), report and recommendation adopted sub nom. Chidester v. City
of Huntington Beach, 2025 WL 3691839 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 17, 2025) (“a dismissal resulting
from a negotiation, settlement or agreement is generally not deemed a favorable
termination of the proceedings because such a settlement specifically avoids a
determination on the merits”). But for now, the Court will simply deny the parties’ Joint
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Motion to Seal and the underlying Motions for Attorneys’ Fees without prejudice to renew.
Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED that Defendant Navajo County Hashknife Sheriff’s Posse Search
& Rescue’s and Plaintiff Navajo County Sherriff’s Posse, Inc.’s Joint Motion to Seal
(Doc. 61) is denied.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant Navajo County Hashknife Sheriff’s
Posse Search & Rescue’s Motion for Attorney Fees and Costs (Doc. 57) and Plaintiff
Navajo County Sherriff’s Posse, Inc.’s Motion for Attorney Fees and Costs (Doc. 59) are
denied without prejudice.
Dated this 23rd day of March, 2026.
Honorable Diane J. Humetewa
United States District Judge
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