Gonzales v. Commissioner of Social Security Administration

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WO
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA
Christopher C Gonzales,
Plaintiff,
v.
Commissioner of Social Security
Administration,
Defendant.
No. CV-21-08107-PCT-MTL
ORDER
Before the Court is Plaintiff’s Attorney Frederick J. Daley, Jr.’s (“Daley”) Petition
for Attorney Fees Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 406(b)(1) (“Petition”).* (Doc. 29.) The
Commissioner of the Social Security Administration (“Commissioner”) neither supports
nor opposes Daley’s request. (Doc. 30 at 2.) The Court will grant the Petition.
I. BACKGROUND
The Commissioner initially denied Plaintiff Christopher Gonzalez’s (“Gonzalez”)
request for Social Security Benefits, and he sought review of that decision in this Court.
(Doc. 1 at 3.) After the parties traded briefs, the Court granted the parties’ Stipulation to
Remand for Further Administrative Action Pursuant to Sentence Four of 42 U.S.C.
§ 405(g). (Doc. 24.) The Clerk entered judgment in favor of Gonzalez and ordered the
Commissioner to remand the case to an administrative law judge (“ALJ”) for further action.
(Doc. 25.) On Gonzalez’s motion, the Court then granted the parties’ Stipulation for Award
* The Petition requests relief under § 206(b)(1) of the Social Security Act, which is codified
as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 406(b)(1). The Court refers to § 406(b)(1) rather than the § 206
of the Act for clarity and consistency.
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of Attorney Fees Pursuant to the Equal Access to Justice Act (“EAJA”), 28 U.S.C.
§ 2412(d), in the amount of $5,685.87. (Doc. 27.)
On remand, the ALJ found that Gonzalez was entitled to monthly disability benefits
beginning in March 2019. (Doc. 29-1 at 1.) In its Notice of Award, the Social Security
Administration (“SSA”) notified Gonzalez that it was withholding $30,777.75 in case it
needed to pay his attorney. (Id. at 3 (“We usually withhold 25 percent of past due benefits
in order to pay the approved representative’s fee.”)) Daley now asks the Court to award
him and his team $30,777.75, minus the $5,685.87 EAJA fee, for a total award of
$25,091.88 pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 406(b). (Doc. 29 at 8.)
II. LEGAL STANDARD
When an attorney obtains a favorable judgment for a represented Social Security
claimant in court, the court can award a reasonable fee for the representation, provided the
fee does not exceed 25% of the total of past-due benefits. 42 U.S.C. § 406(b)(1)(A). The
court gives primacy to a contingent-fee arrangement between the claimant and his attorney.
Gisbrecht v. Barnhart, 535 U.S. 789, 793 (2002). A court then determines reasonableness
based on the character of the representation and the results achieved. Id. at 808; Crawford
v. Astrue, 586 F.3d 1142, 1149, 1151 (9th Cir. 2009). A court can adjust downward if “the
attorney provided substandard representation or delayed the case, or if the requested fee
would result in a windfall.” Crawford, 586 F.3d at 1151.
The SSA has no direct interest in how much of the award goes to counsel, so district
courts have an affirmative duty to determine whether the fee is reasonable. Id. at 1149. If
a claimant’s attorney receives fees under both EAJA and § 406(b), the claimant’s attorney
must “refund to the claimant the amount of the smaller fee.” Gisbrecht, 535 U.S. at 796.
III. DISCUSSION
The requested $30,777.75 is reasonable under the Gisbrecht factors. Gonzalez
agreed to allow Daley to withhold 25% of recovered past-due benefits, which Daley now
requests. (Doc. 29-2 at 1.) While the Notice of Award does not provide the total amount of
past-due benefits awarded to Gonzalez, the Court infers that the Commissioner’s
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withholding $30,777.75 as 25% of the total results in an award of $123,111.00. Maske v.
Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., No. CV-18-04891-PHX-DWL, 2026 WL 242858, at *1 (D.
Ariz. Jan. 29, 2026) (“In the Court’s experience, the amount withheld is consistently 25%
of the total amount.”). Daley’s itemization of services indicates that he and his team spent
31.45 hours providing services to Gonzalez, resulting in a request for $978.62 per hour
($30,777.75/31.45).
While the record contains no indication of substandard representation or delay, the
provided time log does contain entries for clerical tasks by non-lawyers working with
Daley. (Doc. 29-3 at 5–6; Doc. 29-4 at 1.) Legal assistant David Solomonik and case
manager Anjali Rathore logged 3.4 and 2.1 hours, respectively, completing various
administrative tasks (such as faxing release forms, mailing service packets, and
downloading various documents) and “noting” observations about the case. (Doc. 29-4
at 1.) These clerical tasks are not legal services calculable into a § 406(b) request.
Nadarajah v. Holder, 569 F.3d 906, 921 (9th Cir. 2009); Solomon v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec.
Admin., No. CV-18-00306-PHX-DWL, 2021 WL 4355635, at *2 (D. Ariz. Sep. 24, 2021)
(“Time billed for clerical tasks should not be included in the [§ 406(b)] award because such
tasks should be subsumed in firm overhead rather than billed.”); Neil v. Comm’r Soc. Sec.
Admin., 495 Fed. App’x 845, 847 (9th Cir. 2012) (denying attorney’s fees for “purely
clerical tasks such as filing documents and preparing and serving summons”). The Court
accordingly subtracts Solomonik’s and Rathore’s logged time (5.5 hours) from the
reasonableness calculation.
The resulting 25.95 hours of legal work done by Daley and Stephen Sloan, the other
attorney representing Gonzalez, provides an hourly rate of $1,186.04 ($30,777.75/25.95).
Even subtracting this time, $1,186.04 is a reasonable hourly rate in the District of Arizona.
See Norris v. Comm’r Soc. Sec. Admin., No. CV-21-08204-PCT-DJH, 2025 WL 3089008,
at *2 (D. Ariz. Nov. 5, 2025) (holding that an hourly rate of $1,284.33 was reasonable);
Williams v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., No. CV-20-00136-PHX-JAT, 2025 WL 1342821,
at *2 (holding that an hourly rate of $1,482.05 was reasonable). Daley and Sloan were also
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able to achieve the results that Gonzalez requested, namely that he received Social Security
benefits. Gisbrecht, 535 U.S. at 808. This award would also not result in a windfall for
Plaintiff’s attorneys. Id. Accordingly, considering the Gisbrecht reasonableness factors, the
Court finds that the requested $30,777.75 fee award is reasonable.
Because Daley also received an EAJA award, he must “refund to the claimant the
amount of the smaller fee.” Id. at 796. In lieu of sending the refund himself, Daley requests
that the Court permit him to retain the $5,685.87 EAJA fee and direct the Commissioner
to subtract it from the total withheld, and to refund the net balance ($25,091.88) to
Gonzalez. (Doc. 29 at 8.) But Gisbrecht directs the claimant’s attorney to refund the
smaller fee award; the Commissioner cannot do it for him. See 535 U.S. at 796. While it
would result in the same awards to the parties involved, the Court must therefore deny
Daley’s request.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Attorney’s Petition for Attorney
Fees (Doc. 29) is GRANTED in the amount of $30,777.75.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff’s counsel must, after receipt of the
above awarded fee, refund to Plaintiff the fee previously awarded under the EAJA in the
amount of $5,685.87.
Dated this 27th day of February, 2026.
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