Berg v. Byers et al

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WO
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA
Justin Daniel Berg,
Plaintiff,
v.
David K. Byers, et al.,
Defendants.
No. CV-26-01453-PHX-JJT
ORDER
Before the Court is pro se Plaintiff Justin Daniel Berg’s In Forma Pauperis Request
Complaint for Violation of Civil Rights (42 U.S.C. § 1983) (“IFP Application”) (Doc. 2)
and TRO-Temporary Restraining Order In Forma Pauperis Complaint for Violation of
Civil Rights (42 U.S.C. § 1983) (“TRO Application”) (Doc. 3). Having determined that
Plaintiff is unable to pay the Court’s fees, the Court grants the IFP Application. However,
upon screening Plaintiff’s Complaint (Doc. 1, Compl.) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2),
the Court dismisses the Complaint and denies the TRO Application as moot.
I. BACKGROUND
“[I]n his capacity as a Private Attorney General,” Plaintiff sues multiple state
employees across various state governmental entities. (Compl. at 1.) He seeks to “restore
[his] parental rights” after “being medically emancipated from this fog” brought on by a
“Cognitive Cage.” (Id. at 2.) According to Plaintiff, on September 5, 2014, a state court
entered a child support order that was unsigned by the judicial officer (“2014 Order”). (Id.
at 6–7.) Since that time, Plaintiff has incurred $96,264 in child support arrears. (Id. at 7.)
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Plaintiff alleges that the 2014 Order and child support arrears stem from a faulty
electronic court record system maintained by the state court and other state entities. (Id. at
6.) This system is allegedly a “Bifurcated Record Architecture” designed to create a
“Shadow Track” system of orders that are unsigned by judicial officers. (Id.) By way of
example, Plaintiff attaches a February 9, 2026 order issued by Judge Rhonda Fisk of the
Superior Court of Maricopa County (“2026 Order”). (Doc. 1-1 at 2–4.) According to him,
the 2026 Order is unsigned and exemplifies the use of the “Shadow Track.” (Compl. at 9.)
The 2026 Order also “ratifies” a judicial policy of risk to his child’s physical safety after
his child self-harmed. (Id. at 7.)
Plaintiff conducted a “Forensic Audit” of his state court documents using his
“cognitive prosthetic,” an artificial intelligence platform called Google Gemini. (See id. at
7; Doc. 1-1 at 14–15.) This audit revealed that 45.9% of substantive orders lacked a judicial
signature, which he refers to as the “Signature Gap.” (Compl. at 6.) With the use of his
cognitive prosthetic, Plaintiff proposes a “Child-Centered Court Integrity Initiative” to
repair what he views as a broken system in a self-titled “Manifesto of Restorative Justice”
attached as an exhibit to the Complaint. (Doc. 1-1 at 21–56.)
Finally, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants denied him the use of his cognitive
prosthetic as accommodation for his traumatic brain injury. (Compl. at 7.) The denial of
his accommodation created a “Cognitive Cage” that disabled him from reporting the
Shadow Track system to federal authorities. (Id.)
Plaintiff brings six claims. All the claims except Count Five assert a violation of
Plaintiff’s civil rights under the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985. Count Five
asserts a failure to accommodate Plaintiff’s disability in violation of Title II of the
Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12132. He seeks the restitution of the child
support arrears he incurred, damages for his 251-day imprisonment that occurred at some
unknown time, and punitive damages in the amount of $10 million to be placed in trust for
the implementation of his Manifesto. (Id. at 11.) He also seeks declaratory judgment that
the 2014 Order is void, the “Signature Gap” constitutes a Monell custom that violates the
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Fourteenth Amendment, and the refusal of Plaintiff’s cognitive prosthetic constitutes an
ADA violation. (Id. at 11–12.) Finally, he demands that a “Special Master” be appointed
to audit the state electronic court record system to identify the “Signature Gap.” (Id. at 12.)
II. IFP APPLICATION
The Court may authorize a party to commence a civil action without prepaying court
fees—to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”)—if the person submits an affidavit attesting to
their poverty. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1). Although a plaintiff seeking IFP status need not be
“absolutely destitute,” he or she “must allege poverty with some particularity, definiteness
and certainty.” Escobedo v. Applebees, 787 F.3d 1226, 1234 (9th Cir. 2015) (citation
modified). “[T]here is no formula set forth by statute, regulation, or case law to determine
when someone is poor enough to earn IFP status.” Id. at 1235. The determination is within
the district court’s discretion. Cal. Men’s Colony v. Rowland, 939 F.2d 854, 858 (9th Cir.
1991), rev’d on other grounds by 506 U.S. 194 (1993). Here, Plaintiff submits an IFP
Application that reports no income at all and ongoing monthly expenses of $1,900 and
minimal property. (Doc. 2 at 3–4.). Plaintiff demonstrates an inability to pay filing fees, so
the Court will grant Plaintiff’s IFP Application.
III. SCREENING OF COMPLAINT
For cases like this one in which a party is permitted to proceed IFP, 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(e)(2) provides that a district court must screen that party’s complaint for, inter alia,
whether it states a claim for which relief may be granted. Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122,
1127–29 (9th Cir. 2000). A complaint must include “a short and plain statement of the claim
showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2), and contain “sufficient
factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face,’”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
544, 570 (2007)). The Court is to construe a pro se plaintiff’s complaint “liberally” and afford
the plaintiff “the benefit of any doubt.” Watison v. Carter, 668 F.3d 1108, 1112 (9th Cir.
2012) (citation omitted). In addition to screening IFP complaints under § 1915, “[f]ederal
courts have an independent obligation to ensure that they do not exceed the scope of their
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jurisdiction, and therefore they must raise and decide jurisdictional questions that the
parties either overlook or elect not to press.” Henderson ex rel. Henderson v. Shinseki, 562
U.S. 428, 434 (2011). “If the court determines at any time that it lacks subject-matter
jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the action.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). The plaintiff bears
the burden of establishing the court’s jurisdiction over his claims.
A. Rooker-Feldman Doctrine
The Rooker–Feldman doctrine provides that a federal district court lacks subject-
matter jurisdiction to consider an appeal from the final judgment of a state court. Noel v.
Hall, 341 F.3d 1148, 1154–55 (9th Cir. 2003). A disappointed party may not seek reversal
of a state court judgment by appealing to a federal district court. Id. at 1155. Known as de
facto appeals, suits in which “the adjudication of the federal claims would undercut the
state ruling” are barred under this doctrine. Bianchi v. Rylaardsam, 334 F.3d 895, 898 (9th
Cir. 2003). Thus, Rooker–Feldman “looks to federal law to determine whether the injury
alleged by the federal plaintiff resulted from the state court judgment itself or is distinct
from that judgment.” Id. at 901 (citation modified). And when refusing to consider a
forbidden de facto appeal, a federal district court must also decline “to decide any issue in
the suit that is ‘inextricably intertwined’ with an issue resolved by the state court in its
judicial decision.” Noel, 341 F.3d at 1159 (quoting D.C. Ct. of Appeals v. Feldman, 460
U.S. 462, 483 n.16 (1983)). “If a federal plaintiff has brought a de facto appeal from a state
court decision—alleging legal error by the state court and seeking relief from the state
court’s judgment—he or she is barred by Rooker-Feldman.” Kougasian v. TMSL, Inc., 359
F.3d 1136, 1142 (9th Cir. 2004).
Whether Rooker–Feldman bars Plaintiff’s claims turn on what he alleges is his harm
and from where that harm arose. At the heart of Plaintiff’s allegations underlying Counts
One, Three and Six is the unsigned 2014 Order. For example, Plaintiff’s first claim asserts
that the unsigned nature of the 2014 Order deprived him of “Liberty, Parental Rights, and
Property ($96,264).” (Compl. at 8.) Relatedly, Plaintiff’s third and sixth claims assert that
Defendants conspired to interfere with his parental rights by entering and enforcing the
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“Ghost Order” (id. at 9), which resulted in an “extraction of $96,264 in human capital,”
“child endangerment,” and “Conceal[ed] Jurisdictional Nullities” (id. at 10). Plaintiff
essentially seeks the Court’s review of the 2014 Order and to rule it void for lack of
signature. But this would impermissibly “undercut the state ruling” and is precisely the
kind of appellate review that Rooker-Feldman prohibits.
B. Failure to State a Claim
1. Monell Claims
In order to establish a claim under Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436
U.S. 658 (1978), a plaintiff must allege: “(1) that the plaintiff possessed a constitutional
right of which she was deprived; (2) that the municipality had a policy; (3) that this policy
amounts to deliberate indifference to the plaintiff’s constitutional right; and, (4) that the
policy is the moving force behind the constitutional violation.” Plumeau v. Sch. Dist. No.
40 Cnty. of Yamhill, 130 F.3d 432, 438 (9th Cir. 1997) (citation modified).
In his second and fourth claims, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants’ use of the Shadow
Track system blocks his right to petition the courts for redress, which violates his First and
Fourteenth Amendment rights.1 (Id. at 8) According to Plaintiff, this custom was ratified
by Judge Fisk in the unsigned 2026 Order and amounts to an unconstitutional practice
under Monell. (Id. at 9.)
Even taking these allegations as true, Plaintiff fails to allege sufficient facts to
establish a civil rights violation claim under Monell. Plaintiff’s primary grievance is that
the unsigned state court orders “block his right” to access the courts. But whether a state
court order is signed does not, on its own, imply that Plaintiff was denied access to a court
system. In fact, his own allegations and attached exhibit demonstrate that he has accessed
the courts. In or around February 2026, Plaintiff was actively litigating his family law
matter in state court and requested a change of judge, which was ultimately denied by Judge
Fisk.2 (Doc. 1-1 at 2–4.) Plaintiff still had his day in court notwithstanding the fact that the
1 Plaintiff also alleges that Defendants have a practice of “Deep-Freezing evidence within
the CJC/AG administrative purgatory” (Compl. at 8), but there is no explanation of what
“evidence” he refers to, what “deep-freezing” means, or what the “purgatory” is.
2 To the extent Plaintiff challenges the denial of his request, that claim would be barred
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2026 Order was unsigned, and he fails to allege sufficient facts to support an inference
otherwise.
Plaintiff also alleges that there is an unconstitutional “No Obligation” policy that
supersedes mandated reporter obligations and child safety. (Compl. at 9.) According to
Plaintiff, Judge Fisk ratified this policy in the 2026 Order. (Id. at 7, 9.) But the Court cannot
infer from this singular, conclusory allegation that the 2026 Order3 ratified such a policy
or that policy even exists among state actors.
2. ADA Claims
Title II of the ADA provides that “no qualified individual with a disability shall, by
reason of such disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the
services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any
such entity.” 42 U.S.C. § 12132. “To state a claim of disability discrimination under Title
II, the plaintiff must allege four elements: (1) the plaintiff is an individual with a disability;
(2) the plaintiff is otherwise qualified to participate in or receive the benefit of some public
entity’s services, programs, or activities; (3) the plaintiff was either excluded from
participation in or denied the benefits of the public entity’s services, programs, or activities,
or was otherwise discriminated against by the public entity; and (4) such exclusion, denial
of benefits, or discrimination was by reason of the plaintiff’s disability.” Thompson v.
Davis, 295 F.3d 890, 895 (9th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 538 U.S. 921 (2003) (citation
modified).
Plaintiff’s fifth claim asserts a violation of Title II of the ADA when Defendants
denied him use of his cognitive prosthetic for “effective communication” that prevented
him “from reporting the $96,264 extraction and the [] Signature Gap.” (Compl. at 9.)
According to Plaintiff, Defendant Byers, as the director of the Administrative Office of the
Courts, is the “Architect of the ECR Code” that uses “Ghost Orders” that make up the
under Rooker-Feldman because the Court would have to hold that the state court was
wrong to deny him a change of judge, which is an impermissible appeal. Doe & Assocs.
Law Offices v. Napolitano, 252 F.3d 1026, 1030 (9th Cir. 2001).
3 The 2026 Order, which Plaintiff attaches to his Complaint, does not mention any
mandatory reporting obligations or child safety. (See Doc. 1-1 at 2–4.)
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“Signature Gap” (id. at 3), Defendant Alvardo-Thorson, as the Director of the Arizona
Department of Administration, delegated “the authority to deny mandatory cognitive
prosthetics” (id. at 4), and persons named Elliot and Quiroz “explicitly refus[ed] ADA-
mandated cognitive prosthetics despite actual knowledge of the Plaintiff’s TBI-related
barriers” (id. at 7).
Even assuming the truth of this allegation, Plaintiff fails to allege the elements of an
ADA claim. First, Plaintiff’s allegations regarding the “Signature Gap” have to do with
unsigned state court orders and have no logical bearing upon whether Plaintiff was denied
an accommodation for his disability. Second, Plaintiff fails to assert facts detailing what
benefit Plaintiff was excluded from or how Alvarado-Thorson’s delegation of authority
excluded him from the benefit. Third, neither Elliot nor Quiroz are named as defendants,
and their role and the specific actions they took are unknown. Without more context, it is
impossible to discern how Plaintiff was discriminated against in the purported denial of a
public entity’s services, programs, or activities.
IV. CONCLUSION
While the Court grants Plaintiff leave to proceed in forma pauperis, the Court must
dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction and failure to state claims
upon which relief may be granted. Accordingly, the TRO Application will be denied as
moot.
Ordinarily, a plaintiff is entitled to amend the complaint upon dismissal if the
defective complaint can be cured. See Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1130. But no amount of pleading
can save Counts One, Three or Six of the defects under Rooker-Feldman because the root
injury of those claims arises from the state court judgment itself. Those claims are
dismissed with prejudice. It is possible, however, that Plaintiff can plead additional facts
that state a claim under Counts Two, Four, and Five. If he so chooses, Plaintiff may file an
amended complaint no later than fourteen days from the date of this Order amending only
Counts Two, Four, and Five to cure them of the defects identified herein. Otherwise, the
Clerk of Court shall dismiss this matter without further notice.
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IT IS ORDERED granting Plaintiff’s In Forma Pauperis Request Complaint for
Violation of Civil Rights (42 U.S.C. § 1983) (Doc. 2).
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED dismissing Complaint for Violation of Civil Rights
(42 U.S.C. § 1983) (Doc. 1).
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED denying Plaintiff’s TRO-Temporary Restraining
Order In Forma Pauperis Complaint for Violation of Civil Rights (42 U.S.C. § 1983)
(Doc. 3) as moot.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that, no later than fourteen days from the date of
this Order, Plaintiff may file an amended complaint amending only Counts Two, Four, and
Five to cure the pleading defects identified herein. If Plaintiff fails to do so, the Clerk of
Court shall dismiss this matter without further notice.
Dated this 6th day of March, 2026.
Honorable John J. Tuchi
United States District Judge
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