Ngaruiya v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.

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WO
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA
Josephine Ngaruiya,
Plaintiff,
v.
Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.,
Defendant.
No. CV-26-01336-PHX-SHD
ORDER
Pending before the Court is Plaintiff Josephine Ngaruiya’s application to proceed
In Forma Pauperis (“IFP”), (Doc. 3), and motion to allow electronic filing, (Doc. 6). For
the reasons stated below, Ngaruiya’s IFP application will be granted, and her Complaint,
(Doc. 1), will be dismissed with prejudice. Her motion to allow electronic filing will be
denied as moot.
I. IFP APPLICATION
“There is no formula set forth by statute, regulation, or case law to determine when
someone is poor enough to earn IFP status.” Escobedo v. Applebees, 787 F.3d 1226, 1235
(9th Cir. 2015). “An affidavit in support of an IFP application is sufficient where it alleges
that the affiant cannot pay the court costs and still afford the necessities of life.” Id. at 1234
(citing Adkins v. E.I. Dupont de Nemours & Co., 335 U.S. 331, 339 (1948)).
Having reviewed the application to proceed IFP, (Doc. 3), I find Ngaruiya cannot
pay court costs and still afford necessities. Thus, the motion to proceed IFP will be granted.
Case 2:26-cv-01336-SHD Document 8 Filed 04/09/26 Page 1 of 3

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II. SCREENING THE COMPLAINT
Because Ngaruiya is proceeding IFP in this case, I must screen her Complaint.
A. Legal Standard
Congress provided with respect to in forma pauperis cases that a district court
“shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines” that the
“allegation of poverty is untrue” or that the “action or appeal” is “frivolous
or malicious,” “fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted,” or
“seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.”
28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). While much of section 1915 outlines how prisoners
can file proceedings in forma pauperis, section 1915(e) applies to all in forma
pauperis proceedings, not just those filed by prisoners. Lopez v. Smith, 203
F.3d 1122, 1127 (9th Cir. 2000). “It is also clear that section 1915(e) not only
permits but requires a district court to dismiss an in forma pauperis complaint
that fails to state a claim.” Id. Therefore, this court must dismiss an in forma
pauperis complaint if it fails to state a claim or if it is frivolous or malicious.
Kennedy v. Andrews, 2005 WL 3358205, at *2 (D. Ariz. 2005).
“The standard for determining whether a plaintiff has failed to state a claim
upon which relief can be granted under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is the same as the
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) standard for failure to state a
claim.” Watison v. Carter, 668 F.3d 1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 2012); see also
Wilhelm v. Rotman, 680 F.3d 1113, 1121 (9th Cir. 2012) (noting that
screening pursuant to § 1915A “incorporates the familiar standard applied in
the context of failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(6)”).
Hairston v. Juarez, 2023 WL 2468967, at *2 (S.D. Cal. 2023).
B. Ngaruiya’s Complaint
Ngaruiya brings several claims against Defendant Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.,
principally under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, arising out of alleged sexual harassment,
employment discrimination, pay discrimination, and retaliation. (See Docs. 1, 7.)
Ngaruiya has, however, brought these claims before. See Ngaruiya v. Wells Fargo Bank
et al., No. 2:24-cv-00773-SMM, Doc. 1 at 16 (D. Ariz. April 5, 2024). Indeed, as Ngaruiya
acknowledges, (Doc. 1 at 3; Doc. 7 at 1), Judge McNamee dismissed her claims under
§ 1915(e) with prejudice, declining to grant her further leave to amend, (id. at Doc. 25).
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And as Judge Tuchi recently held in dismissing yet another case Ngaruiya filed, here she
“simply attempts to bring a new case raising the same or substantially similar claims to
those the Court already dismissed without leave to amend,” and “[t]he Court must therefore
dismiss [Ngaruiya’s] present Complaint.” Ngaruiya v. Urgent Psychiatric Ctr., No. 2:26-
cv-01332-JJT, Doc. 6 at 2 (D. Ariz. February 26, 2026).
“A dismissal with prejudice precludes a party from reiterating the same claims in a
later case.” Procopio-Bey v. Arizona, 2021 WL 2451669, at *1 (D. Ariz. 2021) (citing
Leon v. IDX Systems Corp., 464 F.3d 951, 962 (9th Cir. 2006)). Ngaruiya’s Complaint
raises the same claims asserted in her prior case, which was dismissed with prejudice on
January 28, 2026. Her present Complaint will therefore be dismissed. Because any
amendment would be futile, she will not be granted leave to amend. Bonin v. Calderon,
59 F.3d 815, 845 (1995) (“Futility of amendment can, by itself, justify the denial
of . . . leave to amend.”).
Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED granting Ngaruiya’s Application for Leave to Proceed IFP, (Doc.
3).
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED dismissing Ngaruiya’s Complaint, (Doc. 1), with
prejudice.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED denying the Motion to Allow Electronic Filing,
(Doc. 6), as moot.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED directing the Clerk of Court to enter judgment
accordingly and close this case.
Dated this 9th day of April, 2026.
Case 2:26-cv-01336-SHD Document 8 Filed 04/09/26 Page 3 of 3