Iusipov v. Unknown Party et al

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
WO
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA
Rustam Iusipov,
Petitioner,
v.
David R Rivas, et al.,
Respondentss.
No. CV-26-01125-PHX-RM (ASB)
ORDER
Petitioner initiated this action challenging his immigration detention on February
17, 2026. (Doc. 1.) Respondents filed a response on March 4, 2026. (Doc. 6.) For the
following reasons, the Court will grant the Petition as to Petitioner’s request for a bond
redetermination hearing.
I. Background
Petitioner is a native and citizen of Russia. (Doc. 1 at 4.) On January 1, 2025,
Petitioner entered the United States at the Calexico, California port of entry pursuant to an
appointment scheduled through the CBP One app. (Id. at 5.) On January 2, 2025, the
Government initiated removal proceedings against Petitioner, which remain pending. (Id.;
Doc. 13.) Petitioner has remained in Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”)
custody since arriving in the United States on January 1, 2025. (Doc. 1 at 5.)
II. The Petition
In his Petition, Petitioner asserts that his present immigration detention is prolonged
and violates his due process rights. (Doc. 1.) He challenges his detention under Zadvydas
Case 2:26-cv-01125-RM--ASB Document 14 Filed 05/14/26 Page 1 of 13

- 2 -
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001). (Id.) He further requests that he be granted a bond hearing
if he is not granted release from ICE custody. (Id. at 6.)
In Response, Respondents argue that Zadvydas is inapplicable because Petitioner
does not have a final order of removal, that Petitioner is properly subject to mandatory
detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A), and that as an alien subject to the “entry fiction,”
Petitioner has no substantive due process right to freedom from confinement. (Doc. 6 at 2-
6.)
III. Discussion
a. Applicability of Zadvydas
After the entry of a final removal order, there is a 90-day period during which the
alien ordered removed must be detained. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(2)(A). If removal does not
occur during the 90-day period, further detention is statutorily authorized. 8 U.S.C. §
1231(a)(6). In Zadvydas, the Court held that detention beyond the 90-day removal period
is presumptively reasonable for 6 months; if an alien shows after the conclusion of the 6-
month period that there is no significant likelihood of his removal in the reasonably
foreseeable future, however, he should be released. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 701
(2001). The Court’s holding in Zadvydas is confined to § 1231(a)(6). Jennings v.
Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281, 298 (2018).
Here, Zadvydas is inapplicable to Petitioner because he lacks a final order of
removal and therefore is not detained pursuant to § 1231(a)(6). (See Docs. 1, 13.)
Petitioner’s Zadvydas claim will accordingly be denied.
b. Detention Pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)
“[I]n the case of an alien who is an applicant for admission, if the examining
immigration officer determines that an alien seeking admission is not clearly and beyond a
doubt entitled to be admitted, the alien shall be detained[.]” 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A). “An
alien present in the United States who has not been admitted or who arrives in the United
States . . . shall be deemed . . . an applicant for admission.” 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a). An alien
falling within the scope of § 1225(b) must be detained until the conclusion of the alien’s
Case 2:26-cv-01125-RM--ASB Document 14 Filed 05/14/26 Page 2 of 13

- 3 -
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
removal proceedings; the statute contains no limit upon the length of detention nor any
bond hearing requirement. Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281, 297 (2018).
Here, Petitioner is an applicant for admission, and is seeking admission, because he
has never been afforded lawful status in the United States and presented himself at a port
of entry with the goal of obtaining lawful entry into the United States. (See Doc. 1 at 5-6.)
When Petitioner presented himself at the Calexico port of entry on January 1, 2025, the
examining immigration officer determined that Petitioner is not clearly and beyond a doubt
entitled to be admitted to the United States, as evidenced by the commencement of removal
proceedings against Petitioner the following day. (Id.) Therefore, Petitioner falls within the
scope of § 1225(b)(2)(A).1 Accordingly, the Petition will be denied to the extent Petitioner
asserts he is not subject to mandatory detention under § 1225(b)(2)(A).
c. Due Process
The Court turns to Petitioner’s due process claim. The Court’s due process analysis
is separated into two steps: “[F]irst[, the Court] ask[s] whether there exists a liberty or
property interest of which a person has been deprived, and if so[, the Court] ask[s] whether
the procedures followed by the [government] were constitutionally sufficient.” Swarthout
v. Cooke, 562 U.S. 216, 219 (2011).
1. Liberty Interest
“A liberty interest may arise from the Constitution itself2 . . . or it may arise from
an expectation or interest created by state laws or policies.” Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S.
209, 221 (2005) (citations omitted). If a liberty interest is found, the Court then determines
1 The Court notes that in their discussion regarding the applicability of § 1225(b)(2)(A),
Respondents appear to misstate the facts of this case, stating that “[i]n January 2025
Petitioner presented herself at a port of entry and was released into the United States.”
(Doc. 6 at 4.) Elsewhere in the Response—consistent with the Petition—Respondents state
that Petitioner has remained detained since presenting himself at the Calexico port of entry
on January 1, 2025, and has never been released into the United States. (Doc. 6 at 1, Doc.
1 at 5.) Respondents are cautioned to carefully review every submission to the Court.
2 “Freedom from imprisonment—from government custody, detention, or other forms of
physical restraint—lies at the heart of the liberty that Clause protects.” Zadvydas, 533 U.S.
at 690.
Case 2:26-cv-01125-RM--ASB Document 14 Filed 05/14/26 Page 3 of 13

- 4 -
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
whether the administrative procedures are sufficient considering the “particular situation.”3
Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334 (1976) (quoting Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S.
471, 481 (1972)).
In the instant action, the parties disagree whether Petitioner possesses a cognizable
liberty interest. Respondents urge that Petitioner has no liberty interest in remaining outside
of immigration custody. Respondents further present an entry fiction argument alleging
that Petitioner’s sole liberty interest is in the procedures contained within the INA, which
does not include a bond hearing for noncitizens held pursuant to § 1225(b)(2).
The only Ninth Circuit decision upon which Respondents rely is Wong v.
Immigration and Naturalization Service., 373 F.3d 952 (9th Cir. 2004). (Doc. 6 at 6.) In
Wong, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals addressed whether a noncitizen has a liberty
interest in temporary parole. See Wong, 373 F.3d at 967. The court found that “[t]he INA
does not create any liberty interest in temporary parole that is protected by the Fifth
Amendment.” Id. at 968 (emphasis added). “Rather, the statute makes clear that whether
and for how long temporary parole is granted are matters entirely within the discretion of
the Attorney General.” Id.
The Court finds Respondents’ reliance on Wong misplaced. The Court declines to
conflate temporary parole with a request for a bond hearing before a neutral decisionmaker.
As to his due process claim, Petitioner does not assert a liberty interest in temporary parole.
Rather, Petitioner asserts a constitutional liberty interest in release from DHS custody or,
alternatively, a bond hearing. Hence, Wong is inapplicable.
Additionally, the Court does not find that the entry fiction doctrine forecloses
Petitioner’s due process claim as to his present detention. The entry fiction doctrine is based
upon the “distinction between those aliens who have come to our shores seeking admission,
such as Petitioner, and those who are within the United States after an entry, irrespective
3 The Court notes that due process is a flexible concept. This, however, “does not mean
that judges are at large to apply it to any and all relationships. Its flexibility is in its scope
once it has been determined that some process is due; it is a recognition that not all
situations calling for procedural safeguards call for the same kind of procedure.”
Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 481.
Case 2:26-cv-01125-RM--ASB Document 14 Filed 05/14/26 Page 4 of 13

- 5 -
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
of its legality.” Leng May Ma v. Barber, 357 U.S. 185, 187 (1958). The Supreme Court has
noted that the latter category of noncitizens have “additional rights and privileges not
extended to those in the former category who are merely ‘on the threshold of initial entry.’”
Id. (quoting Shaughnessy v. U.S. ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 212 (1953)); Dep’t of
Homeland Sec. v. Thuraissigiam, 591 U.S. 103, 139 (2020) (“Whatever the procedure
authorized by Congress is, it is due process as far as an alien denied entry is concerned”)
(quoting U.S. ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 544 (1950)). Those noncitizens
who are on the “threshold of initial entry” are not considered “to have ‘effected an entry[.]’”
Thuraissigiam, 591 U.S. at 140 (quoting Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 693). Put differently,
“[w]hen an alien arrives at a port of entry—for example, an international airport—the alien
is on U.S. soil, but the alien is not considered to have entered the country[.]” Thuraissigiam,
591 U.S. at 139. Therefore, while a citizen may physically be present within the country,
they may “still in theory of law” be “at the boundary line,” having “gained no foothold in
the United States[.]” Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 693 (quoting Kaplan v. Tod, 267 U.S. 228,
257–58 (1925)).
Numerous courts in this district and its sister districts have found that the entry
fiction doctrine is of limited application. Those courts have found that the entry fiction
doctrine solely applies to the procedural rights of noncitizens regarding admission, not
every procedure occurring in the immigration context—i.e., the entry fiction doctrine is
inapplicable to challenges regarding a petitioner’s length of detention. See D.V.D. v. U.S.
Dep’t of Homeland Sec., No. CV 25-10676-BEM, 2026 WL 521557, at *28–31 (D. Mass.
Feb. 25, 2026)4; see also Padilla v. U.S. Immigr. & Customs Enf’t, 704 F. Supp. 3d 1163,
1170–72 (W.D. Wash. 2023) (noting that when a petitioner “do[es] not challenge the
admission process in any way or assert a right to remain in the United States,” the entry
fiction doctrine is inapplicable).
4 Although D.V.D. is an out-of-circuit decision that is currently stayed by the First Circuit,
the Court is nonetheless persuaded by the analysis contained within D.V.D. Furthermore,
the undersigned does not stand alone within the District of Arizona in relying upon D.V.D.
See Guevara Serrano v. Bondi, No. CV-26-00110-PHX-DJH, at *3–4 (D. Ariz. Mar. 9,
2026).
Case 2:26-cv-01125-RM--ASB Document 14 Filed 05/14/26 Page 5 of 13

- 6 -
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
For example, the district court in D.V.D. noted that in cases that provide an
exception to the otherwise “geographic” scope of the Due Process Clause, “the due process
rights impacted are only those ‘regarding admission.’” Id. at *30 (quoting Thuraissigiam,
591 U.S. at 140). “This distinction arises near the very inception of the entry-fiction case
law.” Id. In Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228 (1896), the Supreme Court
“contrasted the case of an immigrant who could not challenge his immigration officer’s
‘exclusive authority to determine whether a particular alien seeking admission into this
country’ was so entitled, with another who could challenge, on due process grounds, the
imposition of an immigration-related term of hard labor.” Id. (quoting Wong Wing, 163
U.S. at 232–33, 235–38). The district court noted that although Wong Wing “presented the
particularly egregious circumstance of an ‘infamous punishment,’” the Supreme Court
expressed its holding in terms of the broader protections afforded by the Due Process
Clause:
Applying this reasoning to the fifth and sixth amendments, it must be
concluded that all persons within the territory of the United States are entitled
to the protection guarant[e]ed by those amendments, and that even aliens
shall not be held to answer for a capital or other infamous crime, unless on a
presentment or indictment of a grand jury, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or
property without due process of law.
Id. (quoting Wong Wing, 158 U.S. at 238). The court observed that “[i]t makes sense to
distinguish between ‘rights regarding admission’ and other interests that might be protected
by the Due Process Clause.” Id. (citing Thuraissigiam, 591 U.S. at 140).
“The Government’s countervailing interest, in the entry-fiction context, is its
sovereign authority to ‘admit [noncitizens] only in such cases . . . as it may see fit.’” Id.
(citation omitted). “Where that sovereign prerogative is not implicated, however, the legal
fiction loses its justification.” Id. (citing Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 699). “Unsurprisingly then,
more than a century of Supreme Court case law confirms that the proper application of an
entry fiction, where otherwise appropriate, is to preserve the Government’s authority over
the determination of a noncitizen’s admissibility.” Id. (emphasis in original). Accordingly,
Case 2:26-cv-01125-RM--ASB Document 14 Filed 05/14/26 Page 6 of 13

- 7 -
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
where an immigration detainee challenges neither his order of removal nor any of the
processes that produced those orders, his claims “do not implicate, nor even “relate[ ] to,”
the issue of [his] admissibility.” See id. at *31 (citing Johnson v. Guzman Chavez, 594 U.S.
523, 536 (2021)). Petitioner is a “‘person[]’ within the United States,” and the Fifth
Amendment therefore “imposes constraints” on any process that deprives him of his liberty
interests. Id.
In short, neither bond hearings nor release equates admissions. See Rincon v. Hyde,
810 F. Supp. 3d 101, 107 (D. Mass. 2025) (noting that, if a petitioner were released
following a bond hearing, they “will be subject to the same removal proceedings as before,
with no new right to remain”). “Thus, Petitioner does not purport to invoke any ‘rights
regarding admission.’” Id. at 110 (quoting Thuraissigiam, 591 U.S. at 140); D.V.D., 2026
WL 521557, at *30 (“It makes sense to distinguish between rights regarding admission and
other interests that might be protected by the Due Process Clause.”).
2. Due Process Rights Regarding Petitioner’s Prolonged Detention
In determining Petitioner possesses a liberty interest in freedom from detention, the
Court must decide what process is due. Courts in this circuit and beyond have grappled
over what test should be used to determine whether procedural due process requires relief
for a noncitizen held pursuant to § 1225(b). See Doe v. Andrews, 1:25-cv-00333-JLT-HBK,
at *15–17 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 23, 2026) (applying the 3-factor Lopez test); see also Galkin v.
Scott, No. 2:26-cv-00530-TLF, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 46838, at *7 (W.D. Wash. Mar. 6,
2026) (applying the 6-part Banda test) (citing Banda v. McAleenan, 385 F. Supp. 3d 1099,
1118 (W.D. Wash. 2019)); Leonteva v. Noem, No. 4:26-cv-00043-SEB-KMB, 2026 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 52217, at *22 (S.D. Ind. Mar. 13, 2026) (applying the same 6-factor test, but
calling it the Jamal A test) (citing Jamal A. v. Whitaker, 358 F. Supp. 3d 853, 858–59 (D.
Minn. 2019)); L.S. v. Warden, Otay Mesa Det. Ctr., No. 25-cv-3598-LL-BJW, 2026 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 10299, at *11–15 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 20, 2026) (applying the 3-part Mathews v.
Eldridge test) (citing Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335).
Out of the abovementioned tests, the Court finds the Banda test the most appropriate
Case 2:26-cv-01125-RM--ASB Document 14 Filed 05/14/26 Page 7 of 13

- 8 -
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
to the situation in this matter. Under the Banda test, the Court considers the following
factors:
(1) the total length of detention to date; (2) the likely duration of future
detention; (3) the conditions of detention; (4) delays in the removal
proceedings caused by the detainee; (5) delays in the removal proceedings
caused by the government; and (6) the likelihood that the removal
proceedings will result in a final order of removal.
Banda, 385 F. Supp. 3d at 1118.
The Court finds the Banda test more suitable than the Mathews5 and Lopez6 tests.
Beginning with Mathews, the Court concurs with other district courts that have found that
“while the Mathews factors may be well-suited to determining whether due process
requires a second bond hearing, they are not particularly dispositive of whether prolonged
mandatory detention has become unreasonable in a particular case.” Lopez, 631 F. Supp.
3d at 879. Put differently, the Mathews test is apt where the question is whether an
administrative procedure provided is “constitutionally sufficient,” but “[i]t does not resolve
the more fundamental issue of whether any procedure—such as a bond hearing—must be
provided.” Banda, 385 F. Supp. 3d at 1106–07.7
5 Under the Mathews test, the Court considers:
First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk
of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the
probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally,
the Government’s interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and
administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement
would entail.
Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335.
6 Under the Lopez test, “the Court will look to the total length of detention to date, the
likely duration of future detention, and the delays in the removal proceedings caused by
the petitioner and the government.” Lopez, 631 F. Supp. 3d at 879.
7 In any event, the outcome applying Mathews and Banda would be the same—i.e.,
Petitioner would be entitled to an individual bond hearing. Applying the first Mathews
element, the undersigned finds that Petitioner has a strong private interest in his liberty
from prolonged civil detention. See Hernandez v. Sessions, 872 F.3d 976, 993 (9th Cir.
2017) (“As to the first factor, the private interest at issue here is ‘fundamental’: freedom
from imprisonment is at the ‘core of the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause.’”)
(quoting Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 80 (1992)).
Case 2:26-cv-01125-RM--ASB Document 14 Filed 05/14/26 Page 8 of 13

- 9 -
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
Turning next to the Lopez test, the Court notes that this test “concern[s] due process
challenge[s] to mandatory detention under § 1226(c), [and] are, in essence, a truncated
version of the factors enumerated in Banda[.]” Andrews, 1:25-cv-00333-JLT-HBK, at *14.
Because the six-factor Banda test is more detailed than Lopez and is better suited for
noncitizens held pursuant to § 1225(b), the Court accordingly elects to apply it.
i. Length of Detention.
The first Banda factor is the length of detention, “which is the most important
factor.” Banda, 385 F. Supp. 3d at 1118. “It is important to bear in mind the context: The
detention that is being examined here is the detention of a human being who has never been
found to pose a danger to the community or to be likely to flee if released.” Id. (quoting
Jamal A., 358 F. Supp. 3d at 859).
Petitioner has been held in DHS custody for approximately 15 months. Under the
first Banda factor, where a petitioner’s current detention exceeds a six-month threshold the
“detention[] become less and less reasonable.” Haidari v. Immigr. & Customs Enf’t Field
Off. Dir., No. 2:26-cv-00039-TL, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 56882, at *8 (W.D. Wash. Mar.
18, 2026) (quoting L.B.O.M. v. Hermosillo, No. 2:25-cv-02695-GJL, 2026 U.S. Dist.
Turning to the second element, considering the prolonged nature of Petitioner’s detention,
the Court finds a large risk of erroneous deprivation in the absence of an individualized
bond hearing. See Rodriguez v. Robbins, 715 F.3d 1127, 1144 (9th Cir. 2013) (noting that
the discretionary parole system envisioned under the Immigration and Naturalization Act
is insufficient “to overcome the constitutional concerns raised by prolonged mandatory
detention”). Hence, an individualized bond hearing would greatly mitigate the risk of a
continued constitutional violation.
Finally, regarding the third Mathews factor, the government interest in detaining Petitioner
without an individualized bond hearing is low. First, “[p]roviding petitioner with a bond
hearing would not impede respondents’ interest in effecting removal or protecting the
public, as the purpose of the bond hearing is to determine whether petitioner is a danger or
flight risk.” Jensen v. Garland, No. 5:21-CV-01195-CAS (AFM), 2023 WL 3246522, at
*6 (C.D. Cal. May 3, 2023). Second, the fiscal burden of providing an individualized bond
hearing is low. See Abduraimov v. Andrews, No. 1:25-CV-00843-EPG-HC, 2025 WL
2912307, at *7 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 14, 2025) (“Courts generally have found that the cost of
providing a bond hearing is relatively minimal, and there is nothing in the record before
this Court demonstrating that providing Petitioner with a bond hearing would be fiscally
or administratively burdensome.”). Therefore, the third factor minimally favors the
government. Accordingly, applying the Mathews test to Petitioner’s 20-month detention,
undersigned concludes that due process requires he be provided with an individualized
bond hearing.
Case 2:26-cv-01125-RM--ASB Document 14 Filed 05/14/26 Page 9 of 13

- 10 -
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
LEXIS 21291, at *8 (W.D. Wash. Feb. 2, 2026)). Petitioner has been detained for
approximately 15 months. This is well beyond the six-month threshold, and well beyond
the length of confinement other courts have found to be prolonged. See, e.g., Kadir v.
Larose, No. 25cv1045-LL-MMP, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 203614, at *13 (S.D. Cal. Oct.
15, 2025) (noting that 13 months without a bond hearing is prolonged); cf. Banda, 385 F.
Supp. 3d at 1118 (“Petitioner has been in detention for approximately 17 months, which is
a very long time.”). In light of these decisions, and based upon the facts of the instant
action, the Court finds the length of Petitioner’s detention strongly favors granting relief.
ii. Likely Duration of Future Detention
The second factor requires the Court to “consider[] how long the detention is likely
to continue absent judicial intervention; in other words, the anticipated duration of all
removal proceedings—including administrative and judicial appeals.” Banda, 385 F. Supp.
3d at 1119 (citation omitted). “When the alien’s removal proceedings are unlikely to end
soon, this suggests that continued detention without a bond hearing is unreasonable.”
Akmal v. Warden of Cal. City Det., No. 1:25-CV-01921-DC-DMC-HC, 2026 WL 657606,
at *7 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 9, 2026) (quoting German Santos v. Warden Pike Cnty. Corr.
Facility, 965 F.3d 203, 211 (3d Cir. 2020)).
While the length of future detention is uncertain considering Petitioner’s pending
appeal before the BIA, the Court finds that the likely duration of future detention is
sufficiently lengthy for this factor to favor Petitioner. See Kadir, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
203614, at *8 (“Petitioner’s future detention can last several more months or even years
during the adjudication of Respondents’ appeal to the BIA.”).
iii. Conditions of Detention
The third factor requires the Court to consider the conditions of confinement.
Banda, 385 F. Supp. 3d at 1119. “The more that the conditions under which the [noncitizen]
is being held resemble penal confinement, the stronger his argument that he is entitled to a
bond hearing.” Id. (citation omitted). Neither party has addressed Petitioner’s condition of
confinement. Hence, this factor is neutral.
Case 2:26-cv-01125-RM--ASB Document 14 Filed 05/14/26 Page 10 of 13

- 11 -
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
iv. Delays in Removal Proceedings
Next, the Court shall analyze the “fourth and fifth [Banda] factors—both which
consider delays caused by the parties—together.” Maliwat v. Scott, No. 2:25-CV-00788-
TMC, 2025 WL 2256711, at *6 (W.D. Wash. Aug. 7, 2025).
The fourth factor requires the Court to consider the nature and extent of any delays
caused by Petitioner. “Courts should be sensitive to the possibility that dilatory tactics by
the removable noncitizen may serve not only to put off the final day of deportation, but
also to compel a determination that the noncitizen must be released because of the length
of his incarceration.” Banda, 385 F. Supp. 3d at 1119 (cleaned up). Respondents do not
contend Plaintiff has caused any delays in this action. Consequently, this factor is neutral.
The fifth factor considers the delays in removal caused by the government. Banda,
385 F. Supp. 3d at 1120. “[I]f immigration officials have caused delay, it weighs in favor
of finding continued detention unreasonable . . . Continued detention will also appear more
unreasonable when the delay in proceedings was caused by the immigration court or other
non-ICE government officials.” Galkin, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 46838, at *11 (quoting
Sajous v. Decker, No. 18-CV-2447 (AJN), 2018 WL 2357266, at *10–11 (S.D.N.Y. May
23, 2018)). It is unclear to what extent the delay is caused by the BIA’s delay in resolving
Petitioner’s appeal. Therefore, the fifth factor is also neutral.
v. Likelihood of Removal
The final Banda factor requires the Court to consider “the likelihood that the final
proceedings will culminate in a final order of removal.” Banda, 385 F. Supp. 3d at 1120
(citation omitted). “[W]here a noncitizen has asserted a good faith challenge to removal,
‘the categorical nature of the detention will become increasingly unreasonable.’” Id.
(quoting Sajous, 2018 WL 2357266, at *11). Based on the current record, Petitioner has
not established he is likely to prevail in his appeal before the BIA. Therefore, the sixth
factor favors Respondents.
vi. Conclusion
Two factors favor Petitioner, including one that strongly favors him; three factors
Case 2:26-cv-01125-RM--ASB Document 14 Filed 05/14/26 Page 11 of 13

- 12 -
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
are neutral; and one factor favors Respondents. Based on these factors, the Court concludes
that Petitioner’s continued detention under § 1225(b)(2) has become unreasonable.
Therefore, Petitioner is entitled to relief.
3. Remedy.
Where a noncitizen’s detention under § 1225(b)(2) has become unreasonable, the
proper remedy is an individualized bond hearing before a neutral immigration judge. See
Galkin, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 46838, at *12 (finding that “there is no authority”
supporting relief in the form of immediate release, but there is authority supporting relief
in the form of a bond hearing) (cleaned up); see also Lopez, 631 F. Supp. 3d at 882 (“The
Court finds, consistent with other post-Jennings cases, that the appropriate remedy is a
bond hearing before an immigration judge rather than immediate release.”); Kaur v. Lyons,
2:26-cv-00217-KML, at *1 (D. Ariz. Apr. 9, 2026) (adopting the magistrate judge’s
recommendations for a 1225(b)(2) petitioner and granting a bond hearing). At the bond
hearing, Respondents bear the burden of proving that Petitioner is a danger or flight risk
by clear and convincing evidence. Singh v. Holder, 638 F.3d 1196, 1203–05 (9th Cir.
2011).
Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED that the Petition (Doc. 1) is granted as to Petitioner’s request for
a bond hearing, and denied as to Petitioner’s request for immediate release.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Petitioner shall receive a bond hearing within
seven (7) days of the date this Order is filed. The bond hearing shall comport with the
procedural requirements of Singh v. Holder, 638 F.3d 1196 (9th Cir. 2011). There must be
a contemporaneous record of the hearing, and the Government bears the burden of proving
by clear and convincing evidence that Petitioner is a flight risk or danger to the community.
In the alternative, the Government shall immediately release Petitioner under appropriate
conditions of release.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Respondents shall file a notice of compliance
within two (2) days of Petitioner’s bond hearing or release.
Case 2:26-cv-01125-RM--ASB Document 14 Filed 05/14/26 Page 12 of 13

- 13 -
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Petitioner’s Motion for Temporary Restraining
Order (Doc. 9) is denied as moot.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk of Court is directed to enter judgment
in Petitioner’s favor and close this case.
Dated this 14th day of May, 2026.
Case 2:26-cv-01125-RM--ASB Document 14 Filed 05/14/26 Page 13 of 13