USA v. Luis-Azamar

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WO
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA
United States of America,
Plaintiff,
v.
Isaac Luis-Azamar,
Defendant.
No. CR-26-00084-001-PHX-SHD
ORDER
Before me is Defendant Isaac Luis-Azamar’s Motion for Release (Doc. 87) and the
Government’s Response (Doc. 96). On June 25, 2026, I held a hearing on the Motion for
Release and on Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss (Docs. 65, 78). This Order addresses only
the Motion for Release. For the reasons stated on the record and as set forth below, the
Motion for Release will be denied.
I. BACKGROUND
Defendant was arrested on January 30, 2026, and charged with one count of
assaulting, resisting, or impeding a federal officer in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 111(a).
(Docs. 1, 6.) Defendant appeared before the court for his initial appearance on February 2,
2026, and the Government requested to have him detained. (See Doc. 2.) On February 5,
2026, United States Magistrate Judge Alison S. Bachus held a detention hearing and
ordered Defendant detained pending trial, finding by a preponderance of the evidence that
Defendant posed a serious risk of nonappearance and that no condition or combination of
conditions would reasonably assure his appearance. (Doc. 12.)
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Trial was originally set for June 9, 2026. (Doc. 15.) On June 8, 2026, Defendant
filed a supplemental motion to dismiss alleging witness intimidation and Fifth and Sixth
Amendment violations. (Doc. 78.) Following a status conference, I continued trial on my
own motion under 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7) based on three grounds: (1) the need for full
briefing on Defendant’s supplemental motion, which raises serious allegations of
governmental misconduct and seeks dismissal or, in the alternative, an adverse jury
instruction; (2) a potential issue under United States ex rel. Touhy v. Ragen, 340 U.S. 462
(1951), concerning a defense witness; and (3) the Government’s late disclosure of
approximately fifty pages of documents and a ten-minute audio recording, portions of
which Defendant asserts are helpful to the defense. (Doc. 84.) Defendant filed the instant
Motion on June 12, 2026 (Doc. 87), and the Government responded on June 18, 2026 (Doc.
96). I held a hearing on the Motion on June 25, 2026. (Doc. 99.)1
II. PROCEDURAL POSTURE
Defendant invokes two procedural vehicles: review of the Detention Order under
18 U.S.C. § 3145(b), and reopening of the detention hearing under 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f)(2).
Neither is available on this record.
Review under § 3145(b) must be sought within fourteen days of the magistrate
judge’s order, and failure to timely object waives the right to review. Fed. R. Crim. P.
59(a); 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); see also United States v. Adams, 2022 WL 14813734, at *2
(D. Ariz. 2022). The Detention Order was entered February 5, 2026; Defendant’s Motion
was filed 127 days later. The request for § 3145(b) review is untimely.
Reopening under § 3142(f)(2) requires the movant to establish two things: (1) that
information exists that was not known to the movant at the time of the prior hearing, and
(2) that the information has a material bearing on whether conditions of release exist that
will reasonably assure the defendant’s appearance. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f)(2); see United
States v. Holloway, 2011 WL 4625962, at *1 (D. Ariz. 2011). Defendant’s defense-of-
1 At the hearing, the parties proceeded by proffer, and the Government confirmed
compliance with the victim’s rights provisions of the Crime Victims’ Rights Act.
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others theory and his alternative explanation that he fled out of fear of immigration
consequences rather than to evade arrest were both raised at the February 5, 2026 detention
hearing. (Doc. 96 at 7–11.) The additional discovery he identifies supports positions
already argued. The alleged witness intimidation, even if accepted as true, bears on the
underlying motion to dismiss—not on whether conditions of release exist that would
reasonably assure Defendant’s appearance—and so it fails the second prong as well.
Defendant has not satisfied either prong of § 3142(f)(2).
I nonetheless retain authority to review the Magistrate Judge’s order de novo, sua
sponte, and without any finding of error. Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 154 (1985). Given
the trial continuance and the resulting prolongation of Defendant’s pretrial detention, I
exercise that authority here.
III. DISCUSSION
The Bail Reform Act requires release under the least restrictive conditions that will
reasonably assure the defendant’s appearance. 18 U.S.C. § 3142; United States v. Gebro,
948 F.2d 1118, 1121 (9th Cir. 1991). The Government “bears the burden of showing by a
preponderance of the evidence that the defendant poses a flight risk.” Gebro, 948 F.2d at
1121; see § 3142(f)(2). In assessing whether the Government has met its burden, I consider
the four factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g): (1) the nature and circumstances of the
offense; (2) the weight of the evidence; (3) the history and characteristics of the defendant;
and (4) the nature and seriousness of the danger posed by release. I have considered each
factor under § 3142(g).
A. Nature and Circumstances of the Offense
Defendant is charged under 18 U.S.C. § 111(a), which carries a maximum term of
imprisonment of eight years. When ICE Enforcement and Removal Operations officers
attempted to stop the vehicle Defendant was driving, Defendant initially stopped, continued
driving a short distance, and then came to a complete stop. Defendant and his father then
fled on foot. After officers apprehended Defendant’s father, there was physical contact
between Defendant and the ICE agents, the precise nature of which is disputed. Following
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that contact, Defendant again fled—running multiple blocks, jumping multiple fences, and
crossing Indian School Road, a major Phoenix street—before being apprehended by
pursuing officers.
The offense involves a charged crime of violence against a federal officer, and the
circumstances reflect two separate instances of flight from law enforcement within a single
encounter. Both features weigh in favor of detention, with the sustained foot pursuit
bearing directly on the flight-risk inquiry.
B. Weight of the Evidence
The weight of the evidence is the least important § 3142(g) factor and is not a
pretrial determination of guilt. Gebro, 948 F.2d at 1121; United States v. Motamedi, 767
F.2d 1403, 1408 (9th Cir. 1985). Certain facts are not in dispute: Defendant fled from law
enforcement both before and after the physical contact with the ICE officers. His asserted
reasons—fear of immigration consequences, and protecting his father—may differ from
the Government’s characterization, but the fact of flight is undisputed.
What is in dispute, and what lies at the heart of the underlying charge, is the nature
of the physical contact between Defendant and the ICE officers and whether Defendant’s
conduct was justified as defense of another. That dispute bears more directly on
dangerousness than on flight risk—and the Government does not seek detention on
dangerousness grounds. Because the evidence on the flight-risk question is undisputed,
this factor weighs in favor of detention notwithstanding the genuine factual disputes that
remain for trial.
C. History and Characteristics of the Defendant
Defendant is a citizen of Mexico who has lived in the United States without lawful
status since he was a child. His father, whose immigration arrest gave rise to this case, has
since been removed and resides in Mexico, where Defendant also has additional family.
Defendant works as a day laborer, which provides less in the way of stable employment
ties than steady, documented employment typically does. Although Defendant has three
minor children in Phoenix, he does not reside with them, and Pretrial Services reports that
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his contact with them is only occasional. (Doc. 10 at 2.) Pretrial Services itself assessed
Defendant as a risk of nonappearance and recommended detention. (Id. at 4.)
Alienage alone cannot support detention, but it is a permissible factor in the
individualized risk-of-flight analysis. United States v. Santos-Flores, 794 F.3d 1088,
1090–93 (9th Cir. 2015). Here, alienage is not standing alone. It combines with
Defendant’s family ties to Mexico, the recent removal of his father to that country, the
absence of stable employment, and the realistic prospect that release would expose him to
immigration detention and possible removal—an outcome that would create a strong
practical incentive to abscond before trial. Defendant’s lack of prior criminal history and
the availability of a third-party custodian are points in his favor, but they do not
meaningfully reduce these flight incentives, particularly given Defendant’s already-
demonstrated willingness to flee from law enforcement when confronted. This factor
weighs in favor of detention.
D. Nature and Seriousness of the Danger
As Magistrate Judge Bachus found, the record does not suggest that Defendant set
out on the day of his arrest to engage in physical contact with law enforcement. Rather,
the contact occurred in the context of, and as a reaction to, the arrest of Defendant’s father.
The Government no longer seeks detention on dangerousness grounds, and I reach no
different conclusion on de novo review. Because detention here rests on flight risk rather
than danger, this factor neither supports nor undermines the basis for continued detention.
E. Conclusion
Considering the matter de novo and weighing all of the § 3142(g) factors, I conclude
that the Government has met its burden of establishing by a preponderance of the evidence
that Defendant poses a serious risk of nonappearance and that no condition or combination
of conditions will reasonably assure his appearance at future proceedings.
Accordingly,
///
///
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IT IS ORDERED that Defendant’s Motion for Release (Doc. 87) is DENIED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant shall remain in the custody of the
Attorney General or his designated representative pending further proceedings, on the
terms set forth in the Magistrate Judge’s Order of Detention (Doc. 12).
Dated this 25th day of June, 2026.
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