Moore v. Machado et al

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JL
WO
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA
Bryson Moore,
Plaintiff,
v.
Diego Machado, et al.,
Defendants.
No. CV-25-04281-PHX-JAT (DMF)
ORDER
On July 8, 2025, Plaintiff Bryson Moore, who is confined in the Arizona State
Prison Complex-Tucson (ASPC-Tucson), filed through counsel, a Complaint in Pima
County Superior Court against the State of Arizona and Diego Machado. (Doc. 1-1 at 15-
23.) On August 12, 2025, Plaintiff filed a First Amended Complaint. (Id. at 28-36.) On
August 26, 2025, the State answered the First Amended Complaint. (Id. at 39-49.)
Subsequently, the case was transferred to the Maricopa County Superior Court. (Id. at 52-
53.) On November 14, 2025, Defendant Machado filed a Notice of Removal and removed
the case to this Court. (Doc. 1.) On November 21, 2025, Defendant Machado filed a
Motion for Extension of Time to file an answer to the First Amended Complaint, which
the Court granted that same day. (Docs. 4, 5.)
The Court will dismiss the Eighth Amendment claim without prejudice and remand
the state-law claims to the Maricopa County Superior Court.
. . . .
. . . .
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I. Removal
A state court defendant may remove to federal court any civil action brought in the
state court over which the federal district courts would have original jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C.
§ 1441(a). In his First Amended Complaint, Plaintiff alleges, among other things, that
Defendant Machado violated his Eighth Amendment rights. This Court’s jurisdiction
extends to such claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (a federal court has original jurisdiction “of
all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States”).
II. Statutory Screening of Prisoner Complaints
Although Plaintiff is represented by counsel, the Court is required to screen
complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a governmental entity or an officer
or an employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss
a complaint or portion thereof if a plaintiff has raised claims that are legally frivolous or
malicious, fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seek monetary relief
from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1)–(2).
A pleading must contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the
pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) (emphasis added). While Rule 8 does
not demand detailed factual allegations, “it demands more than an unadorned, the-
defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678
(2009). “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere
conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id.
“[A] complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a
claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Id. (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly,
550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim is plausible “when the plaintiff pleads factual content
that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
misconduct alleged.” Id. “Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for
relief [is] . . . a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial
experience and common sense.” Id. at 679. Thus, although a plaintiff’s specific factual
allegations may be consistent with a constitutional claim, a court must assess whether there
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are other “more likely explanations” for a defendant’s conduct. Id. at 681.
III. First Amended Complaint
In his three-count First Amended Complaint, Plaintiff sues the State of Arizona and
Correctional Officer II Diego Machado. (Doc. 1-1 at 29.) Plaintiff asserts an Eighth
Amendment failure-to-protect claim against Defendant Machado, a negligence/gross
negligence claim against Machado, and a vicarious liability claim against the State. (Id. at
31-36.) Plaintiff seeks compensatory and punitive damages, pre- and post-judgment
interest, and his attorney’s fees and costs. (Id. at 36.)
Plaintiff alleges the following:
Plaintiff is a prisoner in the Arizona Department of Corrections, Rehabilitation and
Reentry (ADCRR). On October 24, 2024, Plaintiff was housed alone in a cell within a
close custody unit at ASPC–Tucson, Cimarron Unit. (Id. ¶ 10.) ADCRR regulations
prohibit a close custody prisoner from entering another close custody prisoner’s cell and
prohibit officers from unlocking cell doors for the purpose of granting close custody
prisoners access to other close custody prisoners’ cells. (Id. ¶¶ 11-12.)
At approximately 8:00 p.m., while Plaintiff was asleep in his cell, Defendant
Machado unlocked the door to Plaintiff’s cell and allowed two prisoners to enter the cell,
although those prisoners were not assigned to live in that cell. (Id. ¶ 13.) The two prisoners
had told Machado that they wanted to roll cigarettes with Plaintiff. (Id. ¶ 14.) By allowing
those prisoners to enter Plaintiff’s cell, Defendant Machado “violated” his training and
ADCRR rules, regulations, policies, procedures, and orders. (Id. ¶ 13.)
Once inside his cell, the two unidentified prisoners assaulted Plaintiff, fracturing his
jaw and causing him to suffer extensive and visible facial trauma and “serious medical
needs.” (Id. ¶ 16.) The prisoners then left Plaintiff’s cell, and Plaintiff crawled into the
hallway, reported the incident to Defendant Machado, and requested medical help. (Id.
¶ 17.) Defendant Machado told Plaintiff, “give me a minute.” (Id. ¶ 18.) Defendant
Machado’s work shift ended, and he left the ADCRR premises without providing or
seeking medical attention for Plaintiff, without activating an incident command system
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(“ICS”),1 and without notifying his colleagues, supervisor(s), or ADCRR medical
personnel about Plaintiff’s injuries. (Id. ¶ 22.)
Plaintiff was left untreated for approximately 90 minutes until a corrections officer
on the next shift “discovered Plaintiff’s peril” and activated an ICS. (Id. ¶ 23.) Plaintiff
was transported to St. Mary’s Hospital, and then to St. Joseph’s Hospital, where he was
diagnosed with a left mandibular condyle fracture and a right mandibular angle fracture.
(Id. ¶ 24.) Plaintiff underwent open reduction and internal fixation jaw surgery with his
jaw being wired shut and metal jaw locks being placed. (Id. ¶ 25.) Plaintiff endured
significant post-operative complications, was “forced to endure a full liquid diet,” and
sustained weight loss, persistent pain, infection, and a retained fixation screw for which he
had to undergo another surgical procedure to remove the screw. (Id. ¶¶ 26-27.) Plaintiff
also experienced profound emotional distress, including fear of repeated attacks and
psychological trauma associated with his restricted speech and swallowing ability resulting
from having his jaw wired shut. (Id. ¶ 28.)
ADCRR initiated an investigation of the assault. (Id. ¶ 29.) During his investigative
interview, Defendant Machado admitted that his actions had been “improper.” (Id. ¶ 30.)
Defendant Machado failed to provide the investigator with a rationale for his failure to
render aid to Plaintiff, and he ultimately told the investigator, “I fucked up.” (Id.)
Plaintiff alleges that his untreated injuries were likely to, and in fact did, result in
further significant injury and the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain. (Id. ¶ 19.)
Plaintiff asserts that Defendant Machado had received training and instruction about close
custody prisoners being housed alone and about not letting prisoners into cells they were
not assigned to, but Machado “purposefully, deliberately, willfully, recklessly and cruelly
failed follow his training and instead provided access for other inmates into Plaintiff’s
cell.” (Id. ¶ 20.) Plaintiff also claims that Defendant Machado had received training and
instruction about activating ADCRR’s incident command system (“ICS”) for inmate
1 An ICS is an Arizona Department of Corrections, Rehabilitation and Reentry
process “to prepare for, prevent, respond to, recover from, and mitigate incidents and
emergencies.” See Department Order (DO) 706 at 1 [https://perma.cc/B8LH-UEJT].
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medical emergencies, but he “purposefully, deliberately, willfully, recklessly and cruelly
failed and refused to activate the ICS or otherwise provide or summon medical assistance
for Plaintiff.” (Id. ¶ 21.)
In Count One, Plaintiff asserts a negligence/gross negligence claim against
Defendant Machado. In Count Two, Plaintiff asserts an Eighth Amendment claim against
Machado. Plaintiff alleges that Machado was deliberately indifferent to Plaintiff’s safety
and well-being by: unlocking Plaintiff’s cell door while he was asleep in a closed custody
unit where Plaintiff was housed alone and inmates were not permitted to enter one
another’s cells; failing to protect Plaintiff from a known risk of allowing and facilitating
other inmates’ entry into his cell; ignoring the likelihood that Plaintiff faced a substantial
risk of suffering serious harm as a result of other inmates being in his cell; ignoring the
likelihood that Plaintiff faced a substantial risk of suffering serious harm by not being
provided timely medical care; failing to render or summon medical aid for Plaintiff; and
leaving the ADCRR premises without first arranging for Plaintiff to receive medical care.
(Id. ¶ 40.)
In Count Three, Plaintiff asserts a vicarious liability claim against the State of
Arizona.
IV. Failure to State a Federal Claim
To prevail in a § 1983 claim, a plaintiff must show that (1) acts by the defendants
(2) under color of state law (3) deprived him of federal rights, privileges or immunities and
(4) caused him damage. Thornton v. City of St. Helens, 425 F.3d 1158, 1163-64 (9th Cir.
2005) (quoting Shoshone-Bannock Tribes v. Idaho Fish & Game Comm’n, 42 F.3d 1278,
1284 (9th Cir. 1994)). In addition, a plaintiff must allege that he suffered a specific injury
as a result of the conduct of a particular defendant and he must allege an affirmative link
between the injury and the conduct of that defendant. Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 371-
72, 377 (1976).
A. Failure to Protect
The Eighth Amendment requires prison officials to take reasonable measures to
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guarantee the safety of prisoners because being assaulted in prison “is simply not part of
the penalty that criminal offenders pay for their offenses against society.” Farmer v.
Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832–34 (1994); Clem v. Lomeli, 566 F.3d 1177, 1181 (9th Cir.
2009). To state a failure-to-protect claim, a plaintiff must allege that: (1) the deprivation
was, objectively, sufficiently serious, and (2) the official was, subjectively, deliberately
indifferent to the prisoner’s safety or acted with “a sufficiently culpable state of mind.”
Farmer, 511 US at 834; Johnson v. Lewis, 217 F.3d 726, 731 (9th Cir. 2000) (internal
citation omitted).
Under the objective prong, “[w]hat is necessary to show sufficient harm for the
purposes of the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause depends on the claim at issue.”
Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 8 (1992). For a failure-to-protect claim, the prisoner
must show that he was placed in conditions that posed a substantial risk of serious harm.
Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834 (quoting Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298 (1991)).
Under the subjective prong, the requisite state of mind is “deliberate indifference.”
See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834. Deliberate indifference is a higher standard than negligence
or lack of ordinary due care for the prisoner’s safety. Id. at 835. “Neither negligence nor
gross negligence will constitute deliberate indifference.” Clement v. California Dep’t of
Corrs., 220 F. Supp. 2d 1098, 1105 (N.D. Cal. 2002). A plaintiff must allege facts to
support that the official knew of and disregarded an excessive risk to prisoner safety.
Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. To satisfy the knowledge component, “the official must both be
aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious
harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.” Id. Although deliberate indifference
“does not require that the [prison] official believe to a moral certainty that one inmate
intends to attack another at a given place at a time certain before that officer is obligated to
take steps to prevent such an assault,” it does require that the official “have more than a
mere suspicion that the attack will occur.” Berg v. Kincheloe, 794 F.2d 457, 459 (9th Cir.
1986) (citation omitted).
In addition, a plaintiff alleging deliberate indifference must “demonstrate that the
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defendants’ actions were both an actual and proximate cause of [his] injuries.” Lemire v.
Cal. Dep’t of Corrs. and Rehab., 726 F.3d 1062, 1074 (9th Cir. 2013). “The requisite
causal connection can be established not only by some kind of direct personal participation
in the deprivation, but also by setting in motion a series of acts by others which the actor
knows or reasonably should know would cause others to inflict the constitutional injury.”
Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743-44 (9th Cir. 1978).
Plaintiff’s allegations do not support that Defendant Machado was aware of and
disregarded a substantial risk of serious harm to Plaintiff before Machado allowed the two
prisoners to enter Plaintiff’s cell. The allegation that the prisoners told Machado that they
wanted to roll cigarettes with Plaintiff suggests that Machado had no reason to believe
those particular prisoners posed any threat to Plaintiff, and generalized safety concerns
with respect to all close custody prisoners cannot support Machado’s personal liability for
failing to protect Plaintiff from assault. Even if Machado was negligent or grossly
negligent, that is insufficient to state an Eighth Amendment claim. And even if Machado
violated ADCRR policy, that does not amount to a constitutional violation. See Cousins v.
Lockyer, 568 F.3d 1063, 1070 (9th Cir. 2009) (departmental regulations do not establish a
federal constitutional violation) (emphasis in original).
B. Failure to Obtain Medical Care
Not every claim by a prisoner relating to inadequate medical treatment states a
violation of the Eighth Amendment. To state a § 1983 medical claim, a plaintiff must show
(1) a “serious medical need” by demonstrating that failure to treat the condition could result
in further significant injury or the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain and (2) the
defendant’s response was deliberately indifferent. Jett v. Penner, 439 F.3d 1091, 1096 (9th
Cir. 2006).
“Deliberate indifference is a high legal standard.” Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d
1051, 1060 (9th Cir. 2004). To act with deliberate indifference, a prison official must both
know of and disregard an excessive risk to inmate health; “the official must both be aware
of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm
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exists, and he must also draw the inference.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. Deliberate
indifference in the medical context may be shown by a purposeful act or failure to respond
to a prisoner’s pain or possible medical need and harm caused by the indifference. Jett,
439 F.3d at 1096. Deliberate indifference may also be shown when a prison official
intentionally denies, delays, or interferes with medical treatment or by the way prison
doctors respond to the prisoner’s medical needs. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104-05
(1976); Jett, 439 F.3d at 1096.
As noted, deliberate indifference is a higher standard than negligence or lack of
ordinary due care for the prisoner’s safety. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 835. “Neither negligence
nor gross negligence will constitute deliberate indifference.” Clement, 220 F. Supp. 2d at
1105; see also Broughton v. Cutter Labs., 622 F.2d 458, 460 (9th Cir. 1980) (mere claims
of “indifference,” “negligence,” or “medical malpractice” do not support a claim under
§ 1983). A mere delay in medical care, without more, is insufficient to state a claim against
prison officials for deliberate indifference. See Shapley v. Nev. Bd. of State Prison
Comm’rs, 766 F.2d 404, 407 (9th Cir. 1985). The indifference must be substantial. The
action must rise to a level of “unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.” Estelle, 429
U.S. at 105.
With respect to the allegation that Defendant Machado failed to obtain medical
assistance for Plaintiff, Plaintiff fails to allege facts to support that his injuries were so
obvious to Machado that failing to immediately call for medical assistance was anything
more than negligent or grossly negligent. Plaintiff also alleges that the delay in treatment
resulted in further injury to him, but he does not describe how the delay further injured
him, or facts to support that Machado knew or should have known that such further injury
was likely. Plaintiff does not allege any facts to support that his injuries would not have
been as severe if he had been treated immediately. Moreover, Plaintiff alleges that when
he reported the assault to Defendant Machado, Machado initially told Plaintiff to “give
[him] a minute,” but Plaintiff alleges no other facts concerning anything Machado did or
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said after that but before his shift ended. As presented, Plaintiff fails to state an Eighth
Amendment claim against Machado for failure to obtain medical assistance.
For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff fails to state an Eighth Amendment claim in the
First Amended Complaint.
V. Remand of State Law Claims
The Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s state-law
claims because he has failed to state a federal claim. See Ove v. Gwinn, 264 F.3d 817, 826
(9th Cir. 2001) (“A court may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over related
state-law claims once it has ‘dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction.’”
(quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3))); Gini v. L.V. Metro. Police Dep’t, 40 F.3d 1041, 1046
(9th Cir. 1994) (when federal law claims are eliminated before trial, the court generally
should decline jurisdiction over state law claims and dismiss them without prejudice).
The Court will therefore remand Counts One and Three to the state court.
IT IS ORDERED:
(1) Count Two is dismissed without prejudice.
(2) Counts One and Three are remanded to the Maricopa County Superior
Court.
(3) The Clerk of Court must mail a certified copy of this Order to:
Joseph W. Malka
Clerk of the Superior Court
Maricopa County, Arizona Superior Court
201 West Jefferson
Phoenix, Arizona 85003-2205
. . . .
. . . .
. . . .
. . . .
. . . .
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(4) The Clerk of Court must close this federal case.
Dated this 5th day of December, 2025.
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