King v. Julia Owner LLC et al

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WO
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA
Troy King,
Plaintiff,
v.
Julia Owner LLC, et al.,
Defendants.
No. CV-25-03686-PHX-KML
ORDER
Plaintiff Troy King, proceeding in forma pauperis, amended his complaint after the
court dismissed his original complaint with limited leave to amend. (Docs. 6, 7.) Screening
the amended complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1), King still does not state any claims
on which he might be able to obtain relief. His amended complaint is therefore dismissed,
this time without leave to amend.
I. Factual and Procedural Background
The first screening order provides the factual background that can be discerned from
King’s complaints. (Doc. 6 at 1–2.) It is clear he is a Black male who began living at an
apartment complex managed by defendant The Julia Owner LLC in around July 2021.
(Doc. 6 at 1; Doc. 7 at 4.) King’s relationship with The Julia’s management appears to have
been troubled almost from the start, with King alleging he witnessed The Julia’s staff
quoting a White family a lower rate in September 2021. (Doc. 6 at 1; Doc. 7 at 4.) King
filed a complaint with the Arizona Attorney General’s Office alleging racial discrimination
on October 19, 2021. (Doc. 7 at 1.) Several months later in May 2022, he filed another
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complaint with the Arizona Attorney’s Office alleging racial discrimination and
harassment because The Julia’s former management “became irate” when he visited the
office and threatened to make false allegations that King harassed management staff. (Doc.
7 at 4.) King also filed a complaint with the former management company’s onsite property
manager in October 2022 when a maintenance worker “had an attitude” and failed to repair
his sink. (Doc. 7 at 5.)
Greystar Management took over managing the complex in August 2023. (Doc. 7 at
5.) King’s relationship with Greystar was no less troubled, and he alleges The Julia
fraudulently denied him a lease renewal in September 2023, filed an unlawful eviction
action against him, and “knowingly and maliciously filed fraudulent court documents”
during that eviction action. (Doc. 7 at 6.) At some point afterwards, he filed a complaint
against The Julia’s lawyer with the State Bar of Arizona and the lawyer “made a racially
charged rant” during the bar proceedings when she said “There was a witness who would
support the allegations in the breach notice. However, this witness refused to testify for
fear of retaliation.” (Doc. 7 at 6.)
This court screened King’s previous complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1) and
dismissed it with leave to amend only his Fair Housing Act (FHA), 42 U.S.C. § 1981
discriminatory contracting, Arizona Civil Rights Act (ACRA), fraud, and conspiracy
claims. (Doc. 6 at 7.) That order provided specific details on what King’s complaint was
lacking to properly allege the elements of each claim. (See Doc. 6 at 4–6.) King amended
his complaint on October 31, 2025. (Doc. 7.)
II. Screening Standard
The same standard applies now as in the initial screening order. King may pursue
his claims only if the amended complaint contains “sufficient factual matter, accepted as
true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,
678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (internal
citations omitted)). This is not a “probability requirement,” but a requirement that the
factual allegations show “more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted
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unlawfully.” Id. A claim is facially plausible “when the plaintiff pleads factual content that
allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
misconduct alleged.” Id. Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim is “a
context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience
and common sense.” Id. at 679.
III. King’s Amended Claims
A. Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1981, and Arizona Civil Rights Act
The court explained in its original screening order that King’s claims failed because
although he claimed racially-discriminatory statements existed and quoted some of The
Julia’s purported statements, none of those statements actually appeared to be connected
to his race. (Doc. 6 at 5.) Accordingly, King failed to allege sufficient facts to show The
Julia engaged in intentional discrimination, an element required under the FHA, § 1981,
and ACRA. (Doc. 6 at 5.) His amended complaint fares no better.
King’s amended complaint once again alleges The Julia used “racial slurs,
stereotypes, and discriminatory policies,” conducted a “racially motivated attack” through
“truthful testimony” as part of a civil standby, and undertook “a malicious, racially
motivated attempt to deceive the judicial system.” (Doc. 7 at 2–3.) But exactly as in his
original complaint, the statements and actions of which he complains are not obviously (or
even tangentially) connected to his race. (See Doc. 7 at 3 (citing a cease-and-desist letter
claiming he “engaged in loud, obnoxious, or harassing behavior, inappropriately entered
the rental office on September 27, 2023, . . . acted aggressively and threateningly towards
the leasing office, and used vulgar language that the maintenance staff heard in his unit”),
Doc. 7 at 3–4 (citing former management’s false statements that nothing prevented King
from entering the rental office—when in fact a cease and desist letter did—and claiming
he “harass[ed]” people in the rental office), Doc. 7 at 6 (discussing The Julia’s attorney’s
statement in response to King’s Arizona Bar complaint that “There was a witness who
would support the allegations in the breach notice. However, this witness refused to testify
for fear of retaliation.”).) King’s amended complaint does not allege any other facts
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suggesting The Julia engaged in intentional discrimination. Accordingly, his amended
FHA, § 1981, and ACRA claims are dismissed.
IV. The “Tort of Fraud”
The court dismissed the fraud claim in King’s original complaint because he “did
not provide any specific details regarding the allegedly fraudulent acts” and therefore failed
to meet Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b)’s heightened pleading standard for claims involving fraud.
(Doc. 6 at 5–6.) The screening order cautioned that to state a fraud claim in his amended
complaint, King needed to provide “an account of the time, place, and specific content of
the false representations as well as the identities of the parties to the misrepresentations.”
(Doc. 6 at 5 (quoting In re Cloudera, Inc., 121 F.4th 1180, 1187 (9th Cir. 2024).)
King provided slightly more detail regarding the alleged false representations in his
amended complaint, claiming The Julia submitted unsigned or altered lease agreements to
“the judicial system” (presumably during his immediate eviction proceedings). (Doc. 7 at
10–11, 13.) But despite apparently having access to the eviction filings, King still does not
allege the time or place of the false representations, nor specify what content within those
lease agreements was altered or omitted. Without these details, King’s amended fraud
allegations are once again conclusory and insufficient to meet Rule 9(b)’s heightened
standard. See United States v. United Healthcare Ins. Co., 848 F.3d 1161, 1180 (9th Cir.
2016) (holding “mere conclusory allegations” and “[b]road allegations that include no
particularized supporting detail” are insufficient to state a fraud claim) (simplified). King’s
fraud claim is dismissed.
V. Conspiracy (Civil Tort)
As the court previously told King, a state-law claim for conspiracy requires factual
allegations showing “two or more individuals agree[d] and thereupon accomplish[ed] an
underlying tort which the alleged conspirators agreed to commit.” (Doc. 6 at 6 (quoting
Wells Fargo Bank v. Arizona Laborers, Teamsters & Cement Masons Loc. No. 395 Pension
Tr. Fund, 38 P.3d 12, 36 (Ariz. 2002)).) Because his amended complaint does not allege
an underlying tort, King’s conspiracy claim is dismissed again.
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VI. Leave to Amend
The screening order dismissing King’s original complaint made clear the required
factual allegations for each of the claims it allowed King to amend. Despite that order’s
specificity, King’s amended complaint made no headway in meeting those requirements.
In this situation, amendment would be futile. See Kendall v. Visa U.S.A., Inc., 518 F.3d
1042, 1051-52 (9th Cir. 2008) (affirming denial of leave to amend as futile where district
court’s order dismissing original complaint put plaintiffs “on notice . . . of the same defects”
that led to dismissal of amended complaint). All of King’s claims are dismissed without
leave to amend.
IT IS ORDERED the amended complaint (Doc. 7) is dismissed without leave to
amend for failure to state a claim. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1). The Clerk of Court shall
enter judgment accordingly and close this case.
Dated this 5th day of November, 2025.
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