Bradley Wealth LLC v. Scott et al

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WO
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA
Bradley Wealth LLC,
Plaintiff,
v.
Brandon Scott, et al.,
Defendants.
No. CV-25-03659-PHX-MTL
ORDER
Before the Court is a discovery dispute regarding Plaintiff’s request seeking a
forensic examination of Defendants’ electronic devices. (Doc. 72.) The Court construes
this filing as Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel. The Court will deny the Motion.
I.
Plaintiff Bradley Wealth, LLC is a Scottsdale-based financial advisory firm that has
provided investment and financial planning services since 2009. (Doc. 2 at 1.) On
September 	9, 	2025, 	three 	employees—Brandon 	Scott, 	Alex 	Cohen, 	and 	Jacob
Hall—abruptly resigned. (Id. at 4.) Less than a month later, on October 2, 2025, Plaintiff
filed this action against Scott, Cohen, Hall, and their new firm, 3Roots Wealth Partners,
LLC. 	(Doc. 1.) 	The 	complaint 	asserts 	numerous 	claims, 	including 	trade 	secret
misappropriation under federal and state law, computer fraud, breach of contract, breach
of fiduciary duty, aiding and abetting, tortious interference, conversion, civil conspiracy,
and unjust enrichment. (Id.)
On October 7, 2025, the Court granted a narrow injunction prohibiting Defendants
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from using Plaintiff’s trade secrets or confidential information to contact clients. (Doc. 12.)
A few weeks later, the Court entered the parties’ stipulated preliminary injunction on
similar terms. (Doc. 26.)
In November 2025, Defendants filed an amended answer and counterclaims against
Bradley Wealth, LLC, Michael Bradley, and several related entities. (Doc. 33.) The
counterclaims assert breach of fiduciary duty, breach of contract, breach of the implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing, fraudulent inducement, unjust enrichment, and
declaratory relief. (Id.) Defendants also seek relief under A.R.S. § 29-3701, as well as
accounting and indemnification. (Id.) The Court has since adjudicated two discovery
disputes: a motion to intervene from a nonparty who sought clarity on the terms of the
injunction (Doc. 43) and a motion to quash subpoenas (Doc. 54).
II.
District courts have broad discretion in controlling discovery. See Hallett v.
Morgan, 296 F.3d 732, 751 (9th Cir. 2002). Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 34(a),
a party may request another party to produce, and permit it to inspect, sample, test, and
copy electronically stored information (“ESI”) so long as it is within the scope of Rule
26(b). See Fed. R. Civ. P. 34. This is not meant to create a “routine right of direct access to
a 	party’s 	electronic 	information 	system.” 	Juul 	Labs, 	Inc. 	v. 	Chou, 	No.
2:21-CV-03056-DSF-PDX, 2022 WL 2161062, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 19, 2022) (citation
modified). 	Instead, “‘[a] forensic examination of 	an 	opposing 	party’s computer is
considered an extraordinary remedy.’” Id. at *2 (quoting MGA Ent., Inc. v. Nat’l Prods.
Ltd., No. CV 10-07083 JAK (SSx), 2012 WL 12886446, at *2 n.2 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 26,
2012)).
“The Ninth Circuit has not provided a specific standard for when a Court should
order 	a 	forensic 	examination.” 	P&B 	Franchise, 	LLC 	v. 	Dawson, 	No.
CV-23-00784-PHX-SMB, 2024 WL 326956, at *2 (D. Ariz. Jan. 29, 2024). “However,
several courts within the Circuit have only found forensic imaging warranted where there
is more than a suspicion that the opposing party has intentionally destroyed evidence or
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committed other discovery misconduct.” Id. (collecting cases).
Courts also “consider whether the examination will reveal relevant information that
is proportional to the needs of the case given any possible privacy or confidentiality
concerns.” Citizens Bus. Bank v. Mission Bank, No. 5:22-CV-01473-FLA (SPX), 2024 WL
3363593, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 15, 2024). “The party seeking to compel the forensic
examination must also demonstrate that the benefit outweighs the burden.” Id.
III.
Plaintiff requests a Court order compelling a forensic examination of Defendants’
electronic devices using the following framework. The requested order reads as follows:
(1) Defendants shall identify all electronic devices used during the period of
September 1, 2025, through October 31, 2025.
(2) The Parties shall agree upon a neutral forensic examiner to conduct the
examination of the identified devices.
(3) The Parties shall enter into a protocol reasonably designed to protect
attorney-client communications and the confidentiality of 3Roots customers
who were not formerly customers of Bradley Wealth. The temporal scope of
the examination shall be limited to data existing on Defendants’ devices
between September 1, 2025, and October 31, 2025.
(Doc. 72 at 4.)
Plaintiff argues that this framework will not provide “unrestricted access to
Defendants’ devices.” (Id.) Plaintiff notes that “Defendants admit they maintained Bradley
Wealth customer contact information on their personal cellphones.” (Id. at 3 (citing
Doc. 22 at 36-37 ¶¶ 14-15).) Defendants kept “a Tops Down report created by Defendant
Scott in June 2025 containing the name and approximate AUM of every Bradley Wealth
customer.” (Id. (citing Doc. 22 at 38, 46-47 ¶¶ 21, 78-79).) Plaintiff further argues that
Defendants gained unauthorized access to Plaintiff’s systems after resigning and through
September 29, 2025, resulting in thousands of allegedly deleted or modified documents
and emails and hundreds of accessed emails and attachments. (Id.)
Defendants respond that those points do not justify compelled forensic imaging of
their personal devices. Although they admit that they maintained customer contact
information on their cellphones, they contend Plaintiff “encouraged employees to use their
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personal devices for work and did not treat client contact information as confidential.” (Id.
at 6 (citing Doc. 22 at 36-37 ¶¶ 14-15).) They further assert that the “Tops Down Report is
similarly not confidential and was created by Defendants themselves in the event Bradley
or Bradley Wealth lost their licenses.” (Id. (citing Doc. 22 at 14-15, 38-39 ¶¶ 18-25).) And
they dispute Plaintiff’s characterization of the post-resignation access evidence, arguing
Plaintiff’s supporting declaration is “misleading” because it “(1) references files that were
already on their computers and accessed as part of their normal workday on September 9,
2025, and (2) does not include any allegation that Scott, Cohen or Hall downloaded or
transferred any confidential Bradley Wealth files (and they did not).” (Id.)
The Court agrees with Defendants that compelled forensic imaging of their personal
electronic devices is a drastic and extraordinary remedy that is not warranted on this record.
See Moser v. Health Ins. Innovations, Inc., No. 17cv1127-WQH(KSC), 2018 WL 6735710,
at *5 (S.D. Cal. Dec. 21, 2018) (“Forensic examination is generally regarded as a drastic
step.” (citation modified)). Plaintiff’s proposed protocol narrows the request in some
respects, but it does not solve the basic problem: Plaintiff has not made a sufficient showing
that searching Defendants’ personal devices is likely to uncover relevant evidence
unavailable through less intrusive means.
To begin, Plaintiff has not identified what confidential or trade secret information it
believes remains on Defendants’ personal devices, as opposed to information already
available from other sources. That matters because the Stipulated Preliminary Injunction
prohibits Defendants from “[c]ontacting or soliciting, in any way, form, or manner, any
current or former Bradley Wealth client or potential client using Bradley Wealth’s
Confidential Information.” (Doc. 26 at 1.) Yet Plaintiff’s Motion does little more than
broadly assert that Defendants had client information and allegedly accessed Plaintiff’s
systems after resigning. (See Doc. 72 at 3-4.)
Nor has Plaintiff made the stronger showing of misconduct that courts typically
require before ordering forensic imaging. Plaintiff points to Defendants’ possession of
client contact information, the Tops Down report, and evidence of post-resignation system
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activity. But those facts, even taken together, do not amount to specific, concrete evidence
that Defendants concealed, destroyed, or wrongfully withheld discoverable ESI on their
personal devices. At most, they support Plaintiff’s suspicion that relevant information may
exist there. That is not enough. See Sophia & Chloe, Inc. v. Brighton Collectibles, Inc., No.
12cv2472-AJB(KSC), 2013 WL 5212013, at *2 (S.D. Cal. Sep., 13, 2013) (“[A]bsent
specific, concrete evidence of concealment or destruction of evidence, courts are generally
cautious about granting a request for a forensic examination of an adversary’s computer.”
(citation modified)).
Defendants, for their part, offer an alternative explanation—that the activity reflects
access to files already on their work computers during the ordinary course of September 9,
2025, and does not show that any confidential Bradley Wealth files were downloaded or
transferred. (Doc. 72 at 5-6.) At this stage, the Court need not resolve that factual dispute.
It is enough that Plaintiff’s evidence does not clearly establish the kind of intentional
spoliation or discovery misconduct that would justify direct forensic access to an
adversary’s personal devices. See Juul Labs, 2022 WL 2161062, at *2.
Proportionality and privacy concerns further weigh against the request. Even with a
neutral examiner and a time limitation, compelled imaging of personal phones and other
personal devices risks exposure of substantial private material. See Jones v. Riot Hosp.
Grp. LLC, 95 F.4th 730, 737 (9th Cir. 2024) (noting that in the context of a motion to
compel a forensic examination of phones, “there is a strong privacy interest in the contents
of mobile phones”); Henson v. Turn, Inc., No. 15-CV-01497-JSW (LB), 2018 WL
5281629, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 22, 2018) (collecting cases considering privacy in the
proportionality analysis). Plaintiff has not shown that the likely benefit of that intrusion
outweighs the burden here.
That is especially so because Plaintiff already has Defendants’ work laptops in its
possession. (See Doc. 72 at 6.) Those devices are the more obvious and less intrusive source
for determining what Defendants accessed, retained, or used while employed by Plaintiff
and around the time of their departure. Plaintiff has not adequately explained why
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examination of those work laptops, together with ordinary document discovery and other
available discovery tools, is insufficient before resorting to imaging personal devices.
For these reasons, Plaintiff has not satisfied its burden to show sufficient misconduct
to justify the “extraordinary” and “drastic step” of compelled forensic examination of
Defendants’ personal devices. The Court, in its discretion, will therefore deny the request
to compel this discovery.
IT 	IS 	THEREFORE 	ORDERED 	denying 	Plaintiff’s 	Motion 	to 	Compel
(Doc. 72).
Dated this 1st day of April, 2026.
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