Vargas-Murillo v. Bondi et al

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WO
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA
Maria Aide Vargas-Murillo,
Petitioner,
v.
Pamela Bondi, et al.,
Respondents.
No. CV-25-03396-PHX-MTL (CDB)
ORDER
Petitioner filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus under § 2241 and Complaint
for Injunctive and Declaratory Relief and a Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and
Preliminary Injunction challenging her immigration detention.1 (Docs. 1-2.) The Court
ordered expedited briefing on the motion for injunctive relief. The motion for injunctive
relief is fully briefed and the Court notifies the parties it intends to consolidate the request
for preliminary injunction with the merits in this action under Rule 65(a)(2) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure. The Court held oral argument on the motion on November 20,
2025. The Court will grant the Petition and order Respondents to either release Petitioner
from custody or provide a bond hearing within seven days.
I. Background
Petitioner is a citizen of Mexico who entered the United States in January 2004.
(Doc. 1 at 6.) She was detained by Immigrations and Customs Enforcement in July 2025.
(Doc. 7, Ex. A, Decl. of Melissa Ramirez ¶ 5.) On July 23, 2025, Petitioner’s request for
1 Petitioner paid the filing fee for a habeas corpus action.
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custody redetermination was denied. The Immigration Judge denied the request on the
basis that she lacked jurisdiction to grant Petitioner bond because the Department of
Homeland Security (DHS) classified her as being detained under § 1225(b)(2)(A) and
therefore subject to mandatory detention. (Id. ¶ 12; Doc. 1-2 at 4-5.) The Immigration
Judge’s ruling follows a recent Board of Immigration Appeals decision in Matter of Yajure
Hurtado, 29 I&N 216 (B.I.A. 2025). Under Matter of Yajure Hurtado, noncitizens present
without admission are now subject to mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b), rather
than discretionary detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), because, under 8 U.S.C. §
1225(a)(1), they are now deemed “applicant[s] for admission.”
Petitioner filed her Petition challenging her detention as violative of her due process
rights, the Administrative Procedures Act, the Suspension Clause, and as constituting a
state-created danger. (Doc. 1 at 22-24.) Petitioner requests release from custody or an
order directing Respondents to provide her a bond hearing.
II. Analysis
A. Jurisdictional Arguments
In their response to the motion for injunctive relief, and again at oral argument,
Respondents maintain the Court lacks jurisdiction over Petitioner’s claims. (Doc. 7 at 6
(“8 U.S.C. §§ 1252(g) and (b)(9) preclude review of Petitioner’s claims.”).) First,
§ 1252(g)2 “does not preclude jurisdiction over the challenges to the legality of [an alien’s]
detention.” Kong v. United States, 62 F.4th 608, 609 (1st Cir. 2023). See also Hasan v.
Crawford, 2025 WL 2682255, *4 (E.D. Va. 2025) (“Because Hasan’s custody proceedings
are independent of, and collateral to, the removal process, § 1252(g) does not serve as a
jurisdictional bar. Accordingly, the Court finds that it possesses jurisdiction to entertain
Hasan’s Petition to the extent he challenges the constitutionality of his detention.”).
Indeed, the Supreme Court has rejected Respondents’ expansive reading of § 1252(g) as
covering “‘all claims arising from deportation proceedings’” or imposing “‘a general
2 “[N]o court shall have jurisdiction to hear any cause or claim by or on behalf of any
alien arising from the decision or action by the Attorney General to commence
proceedings, adjudicate cases, or execute removal orders.” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g).
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jurisdictional limitation.’” Dept. of Homeland Sec. v. Regents of the U. of Cal., 591 U.S.
1, 14 (2020) (quoting Reno v. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 471,
482 (1999)). The Ninth Circuit recently reiterated this proposition, explaining a court has
“jurisdiction to decide a ‘purely legal question’ that ‘does not challenge the Attorney’
General’s discretionary authority . . . even if the answer to that legal question . . . forms the
backdrop against which the Attorney General later will exercise discretionary authority.”
Ibarra-Perez v. United States, No. 24-631, ___ F.4th ___, 2025 WL 2461663, at *6 (9th
Cir. Aug. 27, 2025) (quoting United States v. Hovsepian, 359 F.3d 1144, 1155 (9th Cir.
2004)). Petitioner is not challenging the commencement or adjudication of removal
proceedings but, rather, her detention without a bond hearing pending the resolution of
those proceedings. Thus, § 1252(g) does not apply. Id. at *6-7.
Nor do §§ 1252(b)(9)3 or 1252(a)(5) apply to Petitioner’s claims. As discussed at
oral argument, the Supreme Court noted it would make little sense to challenge unlawful
pre-removal-order detention after issuance of a final order of removal. See Jennings v.
Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281, 291-293 (2018). (“By the time a final order of removal was
eventually entered, the allegedly excessive detention would have already taken place. And
of course, it is possible that no such order would ever be entered in a particular case,
depriving that detainee of any meaningful chance for judicial review.”)
Finally, 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(5)4 also does not apply. See Singh v. Gonzales, 499
F.3d 969, 977-78 (9th Cir. 2007) (citing Puri v. Gonzales, 464 F.3d 1038, 1041 (9th Cir.
2006, and holding that “the REAL ID Act’s jurisdiction-stripping provisions . . . does [sic]
not apply [if the] claim is not a direct challenge to an order of removal”). Because there is
3 “Judicial review of all questions of law and fact … arising from any action taken or
proceeding brought to remove an alien from the United States under this subchapter shall
be available only in judicial review of a final order under this section.” 8 U.S.C.
§ 1252(b)(9).
4 “Notwithstanding any other provision of law (statutory or nonstatutory), including section
2241 of title 28, or any other habeas corpus provision, and sections 1361 and 1651 of such
title, a petition for review filed with an appropriate court of appeals in accordance with this
section shall be the sole and exclusive means for judicial review of an order of removal
entered or issued under any provision of this chapter, except as provided in subsection (e).”
8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(5).
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no final order of removal issued as to Petitioner, and Petitioner does not challenge any
order of removal, § 1252(a)(5) does not strip this Court of jurisdiction over her challenge
to the lawfulness of her detention. Respondents’ jurisdictional arguments are rejected.
B. Section 1225(b)(2)(A)
As to the merits, Respondents argue Petitioner is subject to mandatory detention
under “the plain text” of 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A) asserting that she is an “applicant for
admission” because she is “alien present in the United States who has not been admitted or
who arrives in the United States.” (Doc. 7 at 12.)
The Court acknowledges viewing the language in § 1225(b)(2)(A) in isolation is
supportive of Respondents’ argument, but “[i]n determining whether Congress has
specifically addressed the question at issue, the court should not confine itself to examining
a particular statutory provision in isolation. Rather, it must place the provision in context,
interpreting the statute to create a symmetrical and coherent regulatory scheme.” FDA v.
Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 121 (2000). See also Roberts v. Sea-
Land Services, Inc., 566 U.S. 93, 101-02 (2012) (“Statutory language . . . cannot be
construed in a vacuum. It is a fundamental canon of statutory construction that the words
of a statute must be read in their context and with a view to their place in the overall
statutory scheme.”) (cleaned up). And when the Court views § 1225(b)(2)(A) in the
context of the broader statutory scheme and in light of the statement by the Supreme Court
in Jennings that characterized § 1226(a) as the “default rule” governing “the process of
arresting and detaining” aliens who are already “inside the United States,” the Court
reaches the conclusion that Petitioner is subject to detention under § 1226.5 Id. at 288.
Dozens of other district courts have reached the same conclusion that immigration
petitioners present in the United States without admission are not applicants for admission
5 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) provides “On a warrant issued by the Attorney General, an alien may
be arrested and detained pending a decision on whether the alien is to be removed from the
United States. Except as provided in subsection (c) and pending such decision, the Attorney
General— (1) may continue to detain the arrested alien; and (2) may release the alien . . .
.” Id. (emphasis added.) At oral argument, counsel for Respondents conceded that if the
Court determined Petitioner was subject to detention under § 1226 she would be entitled
to a bond hearing. That concession obviates the need to analyze whether § 1226(a) itself
requires a bond hearing.
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under § 1225(b)(2)(A) and, therefore, are not subject to mandatory detention. See, e.g.,
Quinapanta v. Bondi, 2025 WL 3157867, *6 (W.D. Wisc. 2025) (“[M]ore than 45 district
courts have now rejected similar arguments made by respondents here and ordered bond
hearings for noncitizens who, like petitioner, were apprehended within the United States
years after entering without admission or inspection unless implicated by any criminal
activity covered by § 1226(c). These decisions, along with a growing number of others
have concluded that the statutory text, the statute’s history, Congressional intent, and
§ 1226(a)’s application for the past three decades support its application to noncitizens in
petitioner’s position.”) (cleaned up). Another Judge in this district recently reached the
same conclusion and this Court agrees with its conclusion. Francisco Echevarria v. Pam
Bondi, et al., CV-25-03252-PHX-DWL (ESW), 2025 WL 2821282, at *9 (D. Ariz. October
3, 2025).6 For all these reasons, the Petition is granted, and Petitioner must receive a bond
hearing without application of Matter of Yajure Hurtado, 29 I&N 216 (B.I.A. 2025).7
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED:
1. Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(a), the decision on Petitioner’s
Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction (Doc.
2) is consolidated with the merits.
2. Petitioner’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Doc. 1) is granted as to her
First Claim for Relief. The Petition is otherwise denied without prejudice as
moot.
. . . .
6 The Court is aware that several district courts have adopted Respondents’ position.
Valencia v. Chestnut, 2025 WL 3205133 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 17, 2025); Alonzo v. Noem, 2025
WL 3208284 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 17, 2025); Mejia Olalde v. Noem, 2025 WL 3131942 (E.D.
Mo. Nov. 10, 2025); Sandoval v. Acuna, 2025 WL 3048926 (W.D. La. Oct. 31, 2025);
Rojas v. Olson, 2025 WL 3033967 (E.D. Wisc. Oct. 30, 2025); Garibay-Robledo v. Noem,
No. 1:25-CV-177-H, Doc. 9 (N.D. Tex. Oct. 24, 2025; Vargas Lopez v. Trump, 2025 WL
2780351 (D. Neb. Sept. 30, 2025); Chavez v. Noem, 2025 WL 2730228 (S.D. Cal. Sept.
24, 2025); Pipa-Aquise v. Bondi, No. 25-1094, 2025 WL 2490657, at *1 (E.D. Va. Aug. 5,
2025); Pena v. Hyde, No. 25-11983, 2025 WL 2108913, at *2 (D. Mass. July 28, 2025).
But despite the lack of complete uniformity among the judges who have considered this
issue, Respondents’ view remains the minority position.
7 Because the Court grants relief under Petitioner’s First Claim for Relief, it will deny the
remainder of the Petition as moot.
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3. Respondents must provide Petitioner a bond redetermination hearing within
ten days or otherwise release her from custody under the same conditions
that existed before her detention.
4. Respondents must provide a Notice of Compliance within three days of
releasing Petitioner or providing her a bond hearing.
5. Petitioner’s Motion to Supplement (Doc. 14) is granted.
6. The Clerk shall enter judgment in Petitioner’s favor and close this case.
Dated this 25th day of November, 2025.
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