Rye v. Equifax Information Services LLC et al

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WO
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA
Before the Court is Defendant Greater Texas Federal Credit Union’s Motion to
Dismiss the Complaint (Doc. 11), Plaintiff Robert Rye Sr.’s Response (Doc. 15), and
Defendant’s Reply (Doc. 19). For the following reasons, the Motion to Dismiss will be
granted.1
I. BACKGROUND
This case arises out of alleged violations of the Fair Credit Reporting Act (“FCRA”).
(Doc. 1 at 1, ¶ 1). Plaintiff brought suit against Equifax Information Services, LLC
(“Equifax”), which has since been dismissed from this case,2 and against Defendant
Greater Texas Federal Credit Union (“Defendant”). (See Doc. 1). Plaintiff opened a
1 Because it would not assist in resolution of the instant issues, the Court finds the
pending motion is suitable for decision without oral argument. See LRCiv. 7.2(f); Fed. R.
Civ. P. 78(b); Partridge v. Reich, 141 F.3d 920, 926 (9th Cir. 1998).
2 Plaintiff and Equifax filed a stipulation to dismiss Equifax as a party on February
20, 2026. (Doc. 33). The Court granted the Stipulation for Dismissal and dismissed Equifax
with prejudice on February 23, 2026. (Doc. 34).
Robert Rye, Sr.,
Plaintiff,
vs.
Equifax Information Services LLC, et
al.,
Defendants.
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No. CV-25-02903-PHX-SPL
ORDER
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checking and savings account with Defendant in 1982 when he was thirteen years-old and
living in Texas. (Doc. 15 at 3). Plaintiff opened a credit card account with Defendant in
2009 when he was living in Virginia and moved to Arizona the following year, where he
has lived since. (Id.). The reporting of Plaintiff’s credit card account (“the Account”) is at
issue here. (See Doc. 1).
On September 11, 2018, Plaintiff filed a Chapter 13 Bankruptcy in the District of
Arizona. (Id. at 10, ¶ 56). Plaintiff received an Order of Discharge on October 10, 2023
and alleges that the Account was discharged as part of the bankruptcy proceedings. (Id. at
10–11, ¶¶ 58, 69). During the bankruptcy case, Plaintiff avers that Defendant “filed two
proof of claims” and “accept[ed] payments from Plaintiff.” (Doc. 15 at 12).
After Plaintiff was discharged from the bankruptcy, Equifax prepared consumer
reports concerning Plaintiff. (Id. at 10–11). Plaintiff alleges that Equifax inaccurately
reported the Account as a “Charge-Off” account “with a balance of $24,938,” even though
the Account was discharged through the bankruptcy proceedings. (Id. at 11, ¶¶ 67–70).
Thus, Plaintiff alleges that Equifax inaccurately represented that Plaintiff was legally
responsible for a debt on the Account. (Id. at 12, ¶¶ 72–73). Plaintiff disputed the report
and informed Equifax that the Account was discharged through the bankruptcy
proceedings. (Id. ¶ 77). Plaintiff alleges that Equifax forwarded the dispute to Defendant,
but Defendant “failed to conduct a reasonable investigation” into the Account and instead
“continued to furnish inaccurate data to Equifax despite possessing information from which
[Defendant] could have reported [the Account] accurately.” (Id. at 13–14, ¶¶ 87–88).
Plaintiff alleges that in failing to investigate the status of the Account, Defendant violated
the FCRA, 15 U.S.C. § 1681s-2(a), (b). (Id. at 20–23).
Defendant filed a Motion to Dismiss, arguing that this Court does not have personal
jurisdiction over Defendant, which is a credit union based in Austin, Texas. (Doc. 11).
Plaintiff asks the Court to deny the Motion.
II. LEGAL STANDARD
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (“Rule”) 12(b)(2) authorizes dismissal for lack of
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personal jurisdiction. When a defendant moves to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction,
“the plaintiff bears the burden of demonstrating that jurisdiction is appropriate.”
Schwarzenegger v. Fred Martin Motor Co., 374 F.3d 797, 800 (9th Cir. 2004). When the
motion is based on written materials rather than an evidentiary hearing, as here, the Court
must determine “whether [the plaintiff’s] pleadings and affidavits make a prima facie
showing of personal jurisdiction.” Caruth v. International Psychoanalytical Ass’n, 59 F.3d
126, 128 (9th Cir. 1995). A plaintiff “cannot ‘simply rest on the bare allegations of its
complaint,’” but “uncontroverted allegations in the complaint must be taken as true.”
Schwarzenegger, 374 F.3d at 800 (citation omitted).
Federal courts ordinarily “appl[y] the law of the state in which the district court
sits.” Id. “Arizona’s long-arm jurisdictional statute is co-extensive with federal due process
requirements; therefore, the analysis of personal jurisdiction under Arizona law and federal
due process is the same.” Biliack v. Paul Revere Life Ins. Co., 265 F. Supp. 3d 1003, 1007
(D. Ariz. 2017). For a court to exercise personal jurisdiction, federal due process requires
that a defendant have “certain minimum contacts” with the forum state “such that
maintenance of the suit does not offend ‘traditional notions of fair play and substantial
justice.’” Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (citation omitted).
Personal jurisdiction can be general or specific. Biliack, 265 F. Supp. 3d at 1007.
The Ninth Circuit applies a three-prong test for specific personal jurisdiction:
(1) The non-resident defendant must purposefully direct his
activities or consummate some transaction with the forum or
resident thereof; or perform some act by which he purposefully
avails himself of the privilege of conducting activities in the
forum, thereby invoking the benefits and protections of its
laws;
(2) the claim must be one which arises out of or relates to the
defendant’s forum-related activities; and
(3) the exercise of jurisdiction must comport with fair play and
substantial justice, i.e. it must be reasonable.
Schwarzenegger, 374 F.3d at 802. The plaintiff bears the burden of establishing the first
two prongs. Id. If the first two prongs are satisfied, the burden shifts to the defendant “to
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‘present a compelling case’ that the exercise of jurisdiction would not be reasonable.” Id.
(quoting Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 476–78 (1985)).
III. DISCUSSION
In the Motion to Dismiss, Defendant argues that this Court lacks both general and
specific personal jurisdiction over Defendant. (Doc. 11 at 3–11). Plaintiff concedes that
Defendant is not subject to general personal jurisdiction in the District of Arizona.3 (Doc.
14 at 8). Thus, the parties dispute whether Defendant has sufficient minimum contacts such
that there is specific personal jurisdiction in the District of Arizona.
Turning to the first prong of the specific personal jurisdiction analysis, Plaintiff must
demonstrate that Defendant “either (1) ‘purposefully availed’ himself of the privilege of
conducting activities in the forum, or (2) ‘purposefully directed’ his activities toward the
forum.” Pebble Beach Co. v. Caddy, 453 F.3d 1151, 1155 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting
Schwarzenegger, 374 F.3d at 802). Both parties appear to agree that purposeful direction
test applies here. (See Docs. 11, 15, 19). “In tort cases, we typically inquire whether a
defendant ‘purposefully direct[s] his activities’ at the forum state, applying an ‘effects’ test
that focuses on the forum in which the defendant’s actions were felt, whether or not the
actions themselves occurred within the forum.” Mavrix Photo, Inc. v. Brand Techs., Inc.,
647 F.3d 1218, 1228 (9th Cir. 2011) (alteration in original) (citation omitted). The effects
test, which determines if the purposeful direction element is met, requires that “the
defendant allegedly must have (1) committed an intentional act, (2) expressly aimed at the
forum state, (3) causing harm that the defendant knows is likely to be suffered in the forum
state.” Id. (citation omitted).
Plaintiff argues that “[b]y not investigating Plaintiff’s dispute, and confirming
inaccurate information to Equifax, [Defendant] was committing an intentional act aimed at
3 Defendant points out that Plaintiff alleged in his Complaint that “[v]enue in the
District of Texas is proper.” (Doc. 11 at 2 (citing Doc. 1 at 2)). Because Plaintiff filed the
Complaint in the District of Arizona and argues in his Response that this Court has personal
jurisdiction over Defendant, the Court will interpret that allegation as error, rather than as
a concession.
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Plaintiff in Arizona.” (Doc. 15 at 12). Plaintiff also asserts that Defendant “engaged in
transactions with Plaintiff in the State or Arizona” because Plaintiff “made deposits,”
“withdrew money,” “received credit,” and “received monthly bank statements” from
Defendant. (Id. at 11). Further Plaintiff argues that Defendant knew Plaintiff resided in
Arizona because it “filed two proof of claims” in Plaintiff’s bankruptcy case in Arizona
and that by “accepting payments from Plaintiff during Plaintiff’s bankruptcy,” Defendant
engaged in intentional acts aimed at Arizona. (Id. at 12).
In Myers v. Bennett Law Offs., 238 F.3d 1068, 1074 (9th Cir. 2001), the Ninth
Circuit evaluated specific personal jurisdiction in the context of FCRA claims. The Ninth
Circuit determined that the defendant in Myers purposefully availed itself in the forum state
because “the primary damage is the mental distress” which could “only be felt where
Plaintiffs’ ‘sensibilities’ reside.” Id. (citations omitted). It determined that the state where
the plaintiff lived “is the focal point of both the credit report inquiry and of the harm
suffered.” Id. (citations and alterations omitted). However, other courts have noted that this
rule does not square with the United States Supreme Court’s more recent decision in
Walden v. Fiore, 571 U.S. 277, 285 (2014), in which the Court held that “the plaintiff
cannot be the only link between the defendant and the forum.” See, e.g., Zellerino v.
Roosen, 118 F. Supp. 3d 946, 951 (E.D. Mich. 2015); Deveroux v. TT Marketing, Inc., No.
1:18-CV-487 AWI SAB, 2018 WL 3968249, at *5 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 16, 2018). Indeed, the
Ninth Circuit has since clarified: “Following Walden, we now hold that while a theory of
individualized targeting may remain relevant to the minimum contacts inquiry, it will not,
on its own, support the exercise of specific jurisdiction, absent compliance with what
Walden requires.” Axiom Foods, Inc. v. Acerchem Intern., Inc., 874 F.3d 1064, 1070 (9th
Cir. 2017).
Here, Plaintiff has failed to show that Defendant’s acts were expressly aimed at the
forum state. The theory behind Plaintiff’s claim is that Defendant “failed to conduct a
reasonable investigation” into the status of the Account and “continued to furnish
inaccurate data to Equifax despite possessing information” to the contrary. (Doc. 1 at 13–
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14, ¶¶ 87–88). But Plaintiff does not plead, or explain in the briefing, how this the failure
to investigate or the reporting to Equifax constitutes an act expressly aimed at Arizona.
(See Docs. 1, 15). Plaintiff argues that there is purposeful direction because Defendant
knew Plaintiff was a resident of Arizona, as evidenced by Defendant’s participation in the
bankruptcy case and the fact that Defendant engaged in banking transactions with Plaintiff.
(Doc. 15 at 11–12). However, the fact that Defendant knew Plaintiff resided in Arizona
when it furnished the credit information to Equifax does not establish purposeful direction
because “the mere knowledge that plaintiff lived in [the forum state] or that the effects of
[the act] would be felt here is not sufficient, without something more, to establish personal
jurisdiction.” Kambarov v. Accurate Background, LLC, No. 3:23-cv-01103-YY, 2024 WL
5395289, at *5 (D. Or. Dec. 2, 2024); see also Deveroux, 2018 WL 3968249, at *5
(concluding that “direct targeting alone is not sufficient” when the plaintiff alleged that the
defendant misreported the debt, knowing that the plaintiff was a resident of the forum
state).
Moreover, the other acts Plaintiff identifies, such as Defendant’s participation in the
bankruptcy proceedings and furnishing of monthly reports to Plaintiff, are not sufficient to
confer personal jurisdiction. “There must be contacts by the defendant with the forum, not
merely with a forum resident.” Deveroux, 2018 WL 3968249, at *5. Plaintiff has not
provided examples of any of Defendant’s own acts that would constitute purposeful
direction or purposeful availment in Arizona. Cf. Zavala v. First Advantage Background
Servs. Corp., No. 2:23-cv-02637-SPG-PD, 2025 WL 2324629, at *5 (C.D. Cal. May 27,
2025) (“By advertising the availability of services in California, entering into a contract to
conduct a public records search in California, and actually conducting the search in the
state, with knowledge that the search would be used to determine the employment of a
California resident by a California company, [the defendant] purposefully directed its
activities at California.”). Finally, to the extent that Defendant’s participation in the
bankruptcy proceedings constitute an intentional act aimed at the forum state, Plaintiff does
not allege that those acts caused harm, nor can it be said that the claim arises out of those
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acts. See Mavrix Photo, 647 F.3d at 1228; Schwarzenegger, 374 F.3d at 802. Therefore,
Plaintiff has not shown that the first prong of the specific personal jurisdiction test is
satisfied. See Schwarzenegger, 374 F.3d at 802.
IV. CONCLUSION
For all these reasons, Plaintiff has failed to establish that Defendant expressly aimed
any intentional acts toward Arizona. There is no general or personal jurisdiction over
Defendant in this district. The Court will grant the Motion and dismiss Defendant Greater
Texas Federal Credit Union from this action.
Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED that Defendant Greater Texas Federal Credit Union’s Motion to
Dismiss the Complaint (Doc. 11) is granted. Plaintiff’s claim against Defendant Greater
Texas Federal Credit Union is dismissed without prejudice.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk of Court shall terminate this action
accordingly.
Dated this 31st day of March, 2026.
Honorable Steven P. Logan
United States District Judge
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