Connors et al v. True Blue Car Wash LLC

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WO
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA
Monte Connors, et al.,
Plaintiffs,
v.
True Blue Car Wash LLC,
Defendant.
No. CV-25-02318-PHX-ROS
ORDER
Before the Court is Defendant True Blue Car Wash LLC’s Motion to Compel
Arbitration and Strike Class Allegations; or in the Alternative to Dismiss Count III. (Doc.
17.) Plaintiffs filed a Response, (Doc. 22), and Defendant filed a Reply, (Doc. 26).
For the reasons that follow, the Court will dismiss Count Three but deny
Defendant’s requests to compel arbitration and strike Plaintiffs’ class allegations.
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiffs Monte Connors, Dominque Dean, Melissa Millsaps, and Raja Bellani
brought this lawsuit individually and on behalf of a putative class of customers who
purchased car wash memberships from Defendant True Blue Car Wash LLC. Defendant
owns and operates over 70 car wash locations across four states, operating under the name
Rainstorm Car Wash in Illinois and Indiana, and under the name Clean Freak Car Wash in
Texas and Arizona. (Doc. 1 ¶¶ 29–31.) In 2022, more than 170,000 individuals were
subscribers to Defendant’s membership program, which provides unlimited car washes for
a monthly fee. (Id. ¶¶ 25, 28.) Plaintiffs allege Defendant’s practices related to its car wash
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memberships, including unauthorized renewals and improper billing, violated multiple
state consumer fraud statutes and resulted in Defendant’s unjust enrichment.
Customers can enroll in a car wash membership either online through Defendant’s
websites or in person at any of Defendant’s car wash locations. (Id. ¶ 34.) The four named
Plaintiffs1 each enrolled in Defendant’s membership program in person at a car wash
location. (Id. ¶¶ 70, 89, 104, 123.) Defendant alleges—and Plaintiffs dispute—that upon
enrolling, Plaintiffs were informed of how the membership works and were provided with
a receipt containing a link to the terms and conditions (“T&C”) governing Defendant’s
membership program. (Doc. 17-1 ¶¶ 6, 10, 16, 19.) In relevant part, Defendant’s T&C
contains a mandatory arbitration provision and a class action waiver. (Id. at 17–18, 34–35.)
Because the named Plaintiffs allegedly agreed to the T&C when enrolling in Defendant’s
car wash membership, Defendant argues that Plaintiffs are compelled to arbitrate their
claims and that Plaintiffs’ class claims must be stricken. (See Doc. 17.)
II. LEGAL STANDARD
A. Standard to Compel Arbitration
Under the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”), “[a] written provision . . . in a contract
evidencing a transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy
thereafter arising out of such contract or transaction, or the refusal to perform the whole or
any part thereof, . . . shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable.” 9 U.S.C. § 2.
“Notwithstanding the federal policy favoring it, ‘arbitration is a matter of contract
and a party cannot be required to submit to arbitration any dispute which he has not agreed
so to submit.’” Tracer Rsch. Corp. v. Nat’l Env’t Servs. Co., 42 F.3d 1292, 1294 (9th Cir.
1994) (quoting United Steelworkers of Am. v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S.
574, 582 (1960)). In determining whether to compel arbitration, a court must determine
“(1) whether a valid agreement to arbitrate exists and, if it does, (2) whether the agreement
encompasses the dispute at issue.” Cox v. Ocean View Hotel Corp., 533 F.3d 1114, 1119
1 Plaintiff Dean specifically alleges that she “intended to purchase a single car wash from
Defendant, but instead [s]he was signed up for an automatically renewing membership.”
(Doc. 1 ¶ 89.)
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(9th Cir. 2008). The validity of an agreement to arbitrate is governed by the state law
applicable to the agreement. First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 944
(1995).
The party seeking to compel arbitration bears the burden of proving the existence
of an agreement to arbitrate. Johnson v. Walmart, Inc., 57 F.4th 677, 681 (9th Cir. 2023).
When “the making of the arbitration agreement” is at issue, the summary judgment
standard applies. Hansen v. LMB Mortg. Servs., Inc., 1 F.4th 667, 670 (9th Cir. 2021)
(quoting 9 U.S.C. § 4) (“The summary judgment standard is appropriate because the district
court’s order compelling arbitration is in effect a summary disposition of the issue of
whether or not there had been a meeting of the minds on the agreement to arbitrate.”) To
prevail, the party seeking to compel arbitration must show there is no genuine issue of
material fact as to whether a valid agreement to arbitrate was formed. Id. “Conversely, to
deny the motion to compel arbitration, rather than hold a trial on arbitration agreement
formation, the Court must find no reasonable trier of fact could find an agreement was
made.” Singh v. Adobe Inc., 797 F. Supp. 3d 1038, 1044 (N.D. Cal. 2025) (citing Hansen,
1 F.4th at 670); see also Keebaugh v. Warner Bros. Ent. Inc., 100 F.4th 1005, 1015 (9th
Cir. 2024) (noting that where the authenticity of the evidence “is not subject to factual
dispute, courts may decide the issue of constructive notice as a pure question of law”
(citation modified)).
B. Standard to Strike Class Allegations
Under Rule 12(f) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a “court may strike from
a pleading . . . any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter.” A motion to
strike under Rule 12(f), though “generally disfavored, . . . may be granted where necessary
to spare the parties the time and expense associated with ‘litigating spurious issues.’”
Cheatham v. ADT Corp., 161 F. Supp. 3d 815, 833 (D. Ariz. 2016) (quoting Sidney-
Vinstein v. A.H. Robins Co., 697 F.2d 880, 885 (9th Cir. 1983)). To succeed on a motion
to strike, the movant “must show that the law is clear beyond reasonable dispute and that
the relevant claim or defense could not succeed under any set of circumstances.” Id. at 834
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(citing Sanders v. Apple, Inc., 672 F. Supp. 2d 978, 990 (N.D. Cal. 2009)). A court
considering a motion to strike must “accept the non-moving party’s well-pleaded facts as
true and to draw all reasonable inferences in favor of that party.” Id. (citing Farm Credit
Bank of Spokane v. Parsons, 758 F. Supp. 1368, 1371 n.4 (D. Mont. 1990)).
A motion to strike class allegations is “particularly disfavored because it is rarely
easy to determine before discovery whether the allegations are meritorious.” Id.; see
Baughman v. Roadrunner Commc’ns, LLC, No. CV-12-565-PHX-SMM, 2013 WL
4230819, at *2 (D. Ariz. Aug. 13, 2013) (“’Motions to strike class allegations are
disfavored because a motion for class certification is a more appropriate vehicle’” in which
to consider the issue.” (quoting Thorpe v. Abbott Lab’ys, Inc., 534 F. Supp. 2d 1120, 1125
(N.D. Cal. 2008))). However, “class allegations may be stricken when it is clear from the
face of the complaint that no class can be certified.” Cheatham, 161 F. Supp. 3d at 834
(citing Baughman, 2013 WL 4230819, at *2).
C. Standard to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim
A complaint must contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the
pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). “To survive a motion to dismiss, a
complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief
that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl.
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (internal citations omitted)). If “the well-
pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct,
the complaint” has not adequately shown the pleader is entitled to relief. Id. at 679.
Although federal courts ruling on a Motion to Dismiss “must take all of the factual
allegations in the complaint as true,” they “are not bound to accept as true a legal
conclusion couched as a factual allegation.” Id. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555)
(internal quotations omitted).
III. ANALYSIS
A. Motion to Compel Arbitration
The first issue is which state’s law governs the validity of the arbitration agreement.
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Defendant asserts that Delaware law applies, as the T&C contains a Delaware Choice of
Law provision. (Doc. 17 at 9.) Plaintiffs argue that Arizona law applies because “Defendant
has provided no evidence whatsoever that Plaintiffs actually agreed to its T&C, let alone
to the Choice of Law provision in the T&C.” (Doc. 22 at 8–9.)
A choice of law provision in an agreement has no effect until it is determined as a
matter of law that a valid agreement was formed. See Trans-Tec Asia v. M/V Harmony
Container, 518 F.3d 1120, 1124 (9th Cir. 2008); Nguyen v. Barnes & Noble Inc., 763 F.3d
1171, 1175 (9th Cir. 2014). Thus, the Court applies “the choice-of-law rules of the forum
state,” which is Arizona, to determine the validity of the arbitration agreement. Pokorny v.
Quixtar, Inc., 601 F.3d 987, 994 (9th Cir. 2010). “Arizona follows the choice of law
principles identified in the Restatement (Second) Conflict of Laws.” Starr Indem. & Liab.
Co. v. Rolls-Royce Corp., 725 F. App’x 592, 593 (9th Cir. 2018) (citing Bates v. Superior
Ct., 749 P.2d 1367, 1369 (Ariz. 1988) (en banc)). In determining the applicable law,
considerations include (1) “the place where the injury occurred,” (2) “the place where the
conduct causing the injury occurred,” (3) “the domicil, residence, nationality, place of
incorporation and place of business of the parties,” and (4) “the place where the
relationship, if any, between the parties is centered.” Restatement (Second) Conflict of
Laws § 145(2) (A.L.I. 1971). Here, Plaintiffs purchased their memberships and were
injured in Illinois, Indiana, and Texas, so the first, third, and fourth factors could suggest
any one of these state’s laws applies. As to the third factor, Plaintiffs are residents of
Illinois, Indiana, and Texas, while Defendant is incorporated in Delaware and has its
principal place of business—its headquarters—in Arizona. Given that the Plaintiffs were
injured in different states, the Court will apply Arizona law as the state where Defendant
is headquartered and operates some of its car washes. See id. § 145 cmt. e (“[W]ith respect
to most issues, a corporation’s principal place of business is a more important contact than
the place of incorporation, and this is particularly true in situations where the corporation
does little, or no, business in the latter place.”).
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Under Arizona law, a valid contract requires mutual assent or intent to be bound by
all material terms. Schade v. Diethrich, 760 P.2d 1050, 1058 (Ariz. 1988) (en banc); Hill-
Shafer P’ship v Chilson Family Trust, 799 P.2d 810, 814 (Ariz. 1990) (en banc) (“It is
well-established that before a binding contract is formed, the parties must mutually consent
to all material terms. A distinct intent common to both parties must exist without doubt or
difference, and until all understand alike there can be no assent.”). Thus, for Plaintiffs to
be bound by the arbitration provision in the T&C, Defendant bears the burden of showing
Plaintiffs were given sufficient notice2 of the T&C and manifested assent to the T&C by
purchasing a car wash membership.
Here, Defendant asserts that Plaintiffs were provided a paper receipt after purchase
that allegedly contains a link to the T&C on Defendant’s website and informs customers
that enrolling in the membership plan manifests assent to the T&C and the arbitration
provision therein. Although the Declaration from Steve Jones (“Jones Declaration”),
Defendant’s Regional Director of Operations, contends that Plaintiffs each received
conspicuous notice of the T&C, the attached exhibits contradict this assertion. (See Doc.
17-1.)
First, there is no admissible evidence establishing that Plaintiffs received these
receipts. The Court will assume hypothetically Defendant could proffer admissible
business records or other evidence authenticating these receipts for each of Plaintiffs’
transactions. But even if the receipts were in fact generated after each Plaintiff’s purchase,
there is no admissible evidence that Plaintiffs received these receipts and thus received
notice of the T&C. None of the receipts bear a signature or other mark3 confirming that
2 Defendant does not assert that Plaintiffs had actual notice—that is, that Plaintiffs read and
understood the arbitration provision. Thus, Defendants must show that Plaintiffs had
constructive notice because they were aware of the existence of the T&C made available
on Defendant’s website and understood that their purchase and use of the car wash
membership constituted assent to the T&C, regardless of whether Plaintiffs ever read the
T&C. See generally Main I Ltd. P’ship v. Venture Capital Constr. & Dev. Corp., 741 P.2d
1234, 1237 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1987) (“‘Constructive notice’ is neither notice nor knowledge
but is a policy determination that under certain circumstances a person should be treated as
if he had actual notice.”).
3 For example, the following language appears at the bottom of two of the receipts: “Please
verify or complete the following vehicle and contact information.” (Doc. 17-1 at 40, 45.)
Had there been some evidence—which there is not—confirming Plaintiffs verified or
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Plaintiffs received them. And unlike in the online context where notice of T&C can be a
permanent and unavoidable feature of the webpage, notice of T&C provided on a printed
receipt post-purchase may not have been provided to the customer on every occasion or
could simply be thrown away—by the customer or the cashier—without the customer ever
receiving sufficient notice. Cf. United States v. Watson, 611 F. App’x 647, 659 (11th Cir.
2015) (“It is not unusual for people to discard receipts—think of trips to the ATM or gas
station where one instinctively hits ‘No’ to the prompt ‘Would you like your receipt?’”).
Additionally, and contrary to Defendant’s assertion, there is no evidence that
Plaintiffs were informed of the T&C “at the time of signup.” (Doc. 26 at 6.) Rather,
Plaintiffs were allegedly provided with a receipt only after purchasing a membership that
purported to bind them to the T&C: “By enrolling in your automatic recharge plan you are
agreeing to the terms found at rainstormcarwash.com/terms-and-conditions/.”4 (Doc. 17-1
at 40, 45.) The law provides that post-purchase disclosure of T&C in this manner is
generally not sufficient to bind customers to T&C. See, e.g., Seneca v. Homeaglow, Inc.,
No. 8:23-cv-02308-CJC-ADS, 2024 WL 750029, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 7, 2024), aff’d, No.
24-887, 2025 WL 852896 (9th Cir. Mar. 19, 2025) (finding T&C were not presented in a
reasonably conspicuous manner because a consumer “would have no reason to expect the
post-hoc imposition of terms and conditions to the previous purchase of the cleaning
voucher and automatically renewing membership” when the consumer is “not purchasing
anything further” but “merely scheduling a cleaning they’ve already purchased”). And the
receipt contains no mention or even a hint in the reference to T&C that consumers are
agreeing to compelled arbitration. Only once a consumer returns home, accesses the
internet through a computer or other device—assuming they have one—and reads the T&C
could they finally learn of the arbitration provision. But even if consumers then objected
to compelled arbitration and cancelled their membership, they have already paid for a
completed the information as requested, this might be sufficient to show Plaintiffs received
the receipt.
4 The receipt attached as Exhibit D to the Jones Declaration merely stated “Terms and
conditions can be found at Rainstormcarwash.com. (Doc. 17-1 at 47.) The receipt attached
as Exhibit E lacks any reference or link to the T&C. (Id. at 49.)
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month of car washes, and Defendant would seemingly argue that consumers are still
compelled to arbitrate any claims arising out of that first month.
Moreover, the T&C notice was inconspicuous among the other text on the receipt.
It was Defendant’s burden to provide “notice of the terms to which they wish to bind
consumers,” Nguyen, 763 F.3d at 1179, and the T&C notice on the receipt was not
prominently and conspicuously set off from the surrounding text in a manner that would
provide a reasonably prudent customer notice of the T&C. See Berman v. Freedom Fin.
Network, LLC, 30 F.4th 849, 857 (9th Cir. 2022) (noting consumers “are entitled to assume
that important provisions—such as those that disclose the existence of proposed contractual
terms—will be prominently displayed, not buried in fine print”); see also, e.g., Broomes v.
FullBeauty Brands Operations, LLC, No. 24-cv-03558-RFL, 2025 WL 3548680, at *3
(N.D. Cal. Dec. 11, 2025) (notice was inconspicuous because it lacked “underlines,
capitalizations, size, or font differences”).
Lastly, “each Plaintiff has executed a declaration stating they were never shown any
disclosures related to the terms of the arbitration agreement and never received or signed
any receipts at the time of purchase.” (Doc. 22 at 15; see Docs. 23-1 to -3.) It may very
well be that Defendant’s “standard protocol” is to provide customers notice of the T&C
through “both receipts and follow-up emails.” (See Doc. 26 at 7.) But this assertion does
little to prove, as a matter of law, that these particular Plaintiffs in fact received notice of
the T&C through receipts and follow-up emails. Indeed, even assuming each Plaintiff
received both a receipt and an email, some of the proffered receipts lack any notice that the
customer’s purchase constitutes assent to the T&C.5 And Mr. Connors is the only Plaintiff
for whom Defendant provides any proof that he received follow-up emails; but despite
including information on how to cancel a membership, these emails make no mention of
the T&C whatsoever. (See Doc. 17-1 at 42–43.) Even if the Court were to take every
5 Two of the receipts allegedly containing a link to the T&C clearly do not, in fact, contain
any such link. The receipt attached as Exhibit D of the Jones Declaration merely provides
a link to Rainstorm Car Wash’s homepage, stating the T&C “can be found at
Rainstormcarwash.com.” (Doc. 17-1 at 47.) And the receipt attached as Exhibit E of the
Jones Declaration contains no mention of or link to the T&C whatsoever. (Id. at 49.)
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reasonable inference in Defendant’s favor, there is simply no factual basis for Defendant
to boldly assert that the T&C were “repeatedly presented” to Plaintiffs, (see Doc. 26 at 6),
let alone presented a single time in a manner sufficient to provide Plaintiffs with
constructive notice of the T&C. Defendant is arguably a sophisticated business that should
have been aware of the law establishing how to provide sufficient notice of T&C to
customers, and it “should not be rewarded for its failure to do what was necessary to create
a binding arbitration agreement.” Wulff v. Safe-Guard Prods. Int’l LLC, No. CV 2021-
051101, 2021 Ariz. Super. LEXIS 809, at *7 (Maricopa Cnty. Super. Ct. June 1, 2021).
As such, no reasonable trier of fact could find an agreement to arbitrate was made,
and the Court will deny Defendant’s request to compel arbitration. See Singh, 797 F. Supp.
3d at 1044.
B. Motion to Strike Class Allegations
Defendant moves to strike the class claims on two grounds. First, Defendant asserts
the class claims are subject to a class waiver in the T&C. (Doc. 17 at 12.) This argument
fails because, as previously discussed, no reasonable trier of fact could find Plaintiffs had
notice of and assented to the T&C, so Plaintiffs are not bound by the class waiver.
Second, Defendant argues that even if the class claims are not barred by the
arbitration agreement, the class claims should be stricken nonetheless because they are
facially deficient. (Id. at 12–14.)
The Complaint asserts claims on behalf of three subclasses:
Illinois Sub-Class: All persons in Illinois who, within the applicable statute
of limitations period, were automatically enrolled in a Rainstorm Car Wash
membership and were charged at least one renewal fee by Defendant.
Indiana Sub-Class: All persons in Indiana who, within the applicable statute
of limitations period, were enrolled in a Rainstorm Car Wash membership
where the price of the monthly membership was increased and/or where they
were charged a membership fee after they cancelled the membership.
Texas Sub-Class: All persons in Texas who, within the applicable statute of
limitations period, were enrolled in a Clean Freak Car Wash membership
where the price of the monthly membership was increased and/or where they
were charged a membership fee after they cancelled the membership.
(Doc. 1 ¶ 131.)
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Put simply, Defendant argues the Illinois Subclass lacks numerosity, and that all
three subclasses are overbroad and lack commonality, making them “insufficient for
certification under Rule 23.” (Doc. 17 at 14.) Defendant hereby admits their grounds for
striking the class claims are more appropriately considered as grounds for denying class
certification under Rule 23. “[C]ourts have held that resort to Rule 12(f) is improper ‘where
the issues raised in the motion to strike are the same ones that would be decided in
connection with determining the appropriateness of class certification under Rules 23(a)
and 23(b).’” Abboud v. Circle K Stores Inc., 731 F. Supp. 3d 1094, 1108 (D. Ariz. 2024)
(quoting Rahman v. Smith & Wollensky Rest. Grp., Inc., No. 06 Civ. 6198(LAK)(JCF),
2008 WL 161230, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 16, 2008)); cf. Whittlestone, Inc. v. Handi-Craft
Co., 618 F.3d 970, 974 (9th Cir. 2010) (“Were we to read Rule 12(f) in a manner that
allowed litigants to use it as a means to dismiss some or all of a pleading (as Handi–Craft
would have us do here), we would be creating redundancies within the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, because a Rule 12(b)(6) motion (or a motion for summary judgment at a
later stage in the proceedings) already serves such a purpose.”).
Thus, because it is not “clear from the face of the complaint that no class can be
certified,” see Cheatham, 161 F. Supp. 3d at 834 (emphasis added), striking Plaintiffs’ class
allegations under Rule 12(f) would be improper.
C. Motion to Dismiss Count Three
Defendant alternatively moves to dismiss Count Three of the Complaint as time-
barred. (Doc. 17 at 14–15.) Count Three alleges violations of the Indiana Deceptive
Consumer Sales Act (“IDCSA”) on behalf of Plaintiff Millsaps and the Indiana Sub-Class.
(Doc. 1 at 34–36.)
Plaintiffs do not contest Defendant’s argument that Count Three is time-barred.
(Doc. 22 at 7 n.1.) Moreover, Plaintiffs note that Millsaps “will no longer be pursuing any
claims against Defendant.” (Id. at 15 n.2.) As such, the Court will dismiss Count Three and
Plaintiff Millsaps without reaching the merits of Defendant’s argument.
Accordingly,
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IT IS ORDERED Defendant True Blue Car Wash LLC’s Motion to Compel
Arbitration and Strike Class Allegations; or in the Alternative to Dismiss Count III (Doc.
17) is GRANTED IN PART as to dismissing Count Three and DENIED IN PART as to
compelling arbitration and striking the class allegations.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED Count Three of Plaintiffs’ Complaint (Doc. 1) is
DISMISSED. The Clerk of Court is hereby directed to dismiss Plaintiff Millsaps from this
case.
Dated this 23rd day of April, 2026.
Honorable Roslyn O. Silver
Senior United States District Judge
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