Chandler #302671 v. Thornell et al

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WO
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA
Jamie Brent Chandler,
Petitioner,
v.
Ryan Thornell, et al.,
Respondents.
No. CV-24-03404-PHX-KML
ORDER
Magistrate Judge Deborah M. Fine issued a Report and Recommendation (“R&R”)
recommending petitioner Jamie Brent Chandler’s petition for writ of habeas corpus be
denied. (Doc. 32.) Chandler filed objections (Doc. 33), to which respondents filed
responses. (Doc. 36.) After reviewing de novo the portions of the R&R involving
timeliness, it is adopted.
BACKGROUND
The R&R provides a detailed factual background but the most crucial events for
present purposes are the following. After a jury trial, Chandler was convicted of four counts
of sexual conduct with a minor. (Doc. 28-1 at 8.) The four crimes occurred between
5/1/2001 and 8/31/2003. (Doc. 28-1 at 9.) On July 16, 2015, Chandler was sentenced to
four consecutive life sentences. (Doc. 28-1 at 9-10.) Chandler filed a notice of appeal but,
on June 21, 2016, the court of appeals affirmed his convictions. (Doc. 28-1 at 100.)
Chandler did not file a petition for review with the Arizona Supreme Court.
On August 17, 2016, Chandler filed a notice of post-conviction relief in state court.
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(Doc. 30 at 4.) After his lawyer found no colorable grounds to pursue, Chandler filed a pro
se petition. (Doc. 28-1 at 128, 131.) The trial court denied that petition on May 17, 2017.
(Doc. 28-1 at 156.) Chandler did not seek further relief regarding that petition, and instead
filed a second petition for post-conviction relief in early February 2018. (Doc. 28-1 at 159.)
The trial court denied that petition based in part on it being untimely. (Doc. 28-1 at 165.)
In November 2024, Chandler filed a third petition that was again deemed untimely. (Doc.
28-1 at 167; Doc. 10 at 9.) On December 3, 2024, Chandler filed his federal habeas corpus
petition. (Doc. 1.) In sum, Chandler’s direct appeal ended in 2016 and his first post-
conviction proceeding ended in 2017, but he did not file his federal petition until 2024.
Based on these facts, the R&R concludes the petition is untimely “by more than six
years unless equitable tolling and/or the actual innocence gateway applies.” (Doc. 32 at
13.) Chandler does not object to that conclusion, and it is adopted. The R&R then analyzes
Chandler’s circumstances and finds no basis for equitable tolling and that Chandlers cannot
satisfy the actual innocence gateway. Chandler objects, arguing his petition is timely under
either theory.
ANALYSIS
A district judge “may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or
recommendations made by the magistrate judge.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b). The district court
must review de novo the portions to which an objection is made. Id. But “[o]nly objections
that reference specific portions of the report and recommendation will trigger de novo
review—general or conclusory objections do not suffice.” Ali v. Grounds, 236 F. Supp. 3d
1241, 1249 (S.D. Cal. 2017). The court is not required to review those portions to which
no proper objection is made. See Schmidt v. Johnstone, 263 F. Supp. 2d 1219, 1226 (D.
Ariz. 2003) (“[D]e novo review of factual and legal issues is required if objections are
made, but not otherwise.”) (simplified) And even when a specific objection is made, the
court must conduct a de novo review but need not “provide individualized analysis of each
objection.” United States v. Ramos, 65 F.4th 427, 434 (9th Cir. 2023).
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I. Equitable Tolling
To establish equitable tolling, Chandler “bears the burden of establishing two
elements: (1) that he has been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary
circumstance stood in his way and prevented timely filing.” Smith v. Davis, 953 F.3d 582,
588 (9th Cir. 2020) (simplified). The first element requires Chandler show he was pursuing
his rights diligently both “before and after” the extraordinary circumstances existed. Id. at
599. And when evaluating the second element, the court must look to “all the circumstances
of the case before it.” Id. at 600.
Chandler’s objections point to the “difficulties he had to face acquiring the
Bankruptcy Records” that he believes support his claims for relief. (Doc. 33 at 7.) Chandler
also claims he has been proceeding pro se and he had “no understanding of the Federal
Rules,” and references restrictive housing that made it harder to review legal resources.
(Doc. 33 at 4-5.) And he argues Martinez v. Ryan, 566 U.S. 1 (2012) established the lack
of assistance from counsel qualifies as an extraordinary circumstance. The R&R analyzed
and correctly rejected these arguments.
Chandler’s difficulties obtaining the “Bankruptcy Records” are not sufficient to
establish equitable tolling. Even accepting it took time for him to obtain the records,
Chandler has not established he was diligent for the entire period after his first post-
conviction relief petition was denied in 2017 and he filed his federal petition in 2024.
Without evidence of diligence for that entire period, equitable tolling is not applicable.
Beyond a lack of diligence, Chandler’s lack of understanding of the legal system does not
qualify as an extraordinary circumstances. See Rasberry v. Garcia, 448 F.3d 1150, 1154
(9th Cir. 2006) (“[A] pro se petitioner’s lack of legal sophistication is not, by itself, an
extraordinary circumstance warranting equitable tolling.”); Ramirez v. Yates, 571 F.3d 993,
998 (9th Cir. 2009) (limitations on access to legal resources due to restrictive housing are
not extraordinary circumstances). And the R&R correctly explained “federal courts have
consistently rejected the argument that Martinez” is a basis for equitable tolling. (Doc. 32
at 17 (citing cases).) Even viewed together, Chandler’s difficulties in obtaining the
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“Bankruptcy Records,” his lack of legal sophistication, and Martinez v. Ryan, do not
provide a basis to allow equitable tolling.
II. Actual Innocence
Chandler also objects to the R&R’s conclusion that he cannot take advantage of the
“actual innocence gateway” to render his claims timely. McQuiggin v. Perkins, 569 U.S.
383, 386 (2013). “[T]enable actual-innocence gateway pleas are rare.” Id. To take
advantage of the gateway, Chandler “must show that it is more likely than not that no
reasonable juror would have convicted him in the light of the new evidence.” Id. at 399
(simplified). According to Chandler, he has new evidence that “calls into question the
sufficiency of the evidence presented to the jury.” (Doc. 33 at 9.) Chandler believes that
evidence “proves that both 2001 and 2002 were impossible and therefore no crime could
ever have occurred.” (Doc. 33 at 9.)
Chandler’s new evidence consists of “Federal Bankruptcy Records” from a
bankruptcy filing in 2001. (Doc. 31 at 15.) The R&R explains these records “are not
exculpatory evidence establishing actual evidence nor are they new.” (Doc. 32 at 19.) In
his objections, Chandler seems to argue the magistrate judge erred because the bankruptcy
records cast doubt on where Chandler was living in 2001. (Doc. 33 at 10.) That is not
enough.
To take advantage of the actual innocence gateway Chandler would need to present
“new reliable evidence—whether it be exculpatory scientific evidence, trustworthy
eyewitness accounts, or critical physical evidence—that was not presented at trial.” Schlup
v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 324 (1995). Even assuming the bankruptcy court records cast some
doubt on certain evidence at trial, they do not “show that it is more likely than not that no
reasonable juror would have found petitioner guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. at 327.
There was other evidence—including testimony from the victim—that a reasonable jury
could have believed to conclude the charged crimes occurred in Arizona within the charged
timeframe. State v. Chandler, No. 1 CA–CR 15–0520, 2016 WL 3456432, at *1 (Ariz. Ct.
App. June 21, 2016). The R&R’s conclusion regarding the actual innocence gateway is
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adopted.
III. Additional Grounds
The R&R also analyzes Chandler’s claims and concludes they are procedurally
defaulted. (Doc. 32 at 20-31.) Chandler objects to some of that analysis, although the bases
for his objections are not clear. Because Chandler’s claims are time-barred, there is no need
to address whether they are also procedurally defaulted. See Blackman v. Cisneros, 122
F.4th 377, 381 (9th Cir. 2024) (“The timeliness of a claim . . . is a threshold question that
must be decided before reaching the merits.”).
IT IS ORDERED the Report and Recommendation (Doc. 32) is ADOPTED to the
extent the amended petition for writ of habeas corpus is barred by the statute of limitations.
The amended petition for writ of habeas corpus is DENIED and DISMISSED WITH
PREJUDICE. The Clerk of Court shall enter judgment and close this case.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED leave to proceed in forma pauperis and a certificate
of appealability are DENIED because dismissal of the petition is justified by a plain
procedural bar and reasonable jurists would not find the ruling debatable.
Dated this 8th day of April, 2026.
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