Johnson v. Commissioner of Social Security Administration

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WO
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA
Tiko A Johnson,
Plaintiff,
v.
Commissioner of Social Security
Administration,
Defendant.
No. CV-24-02870-PHX-SMB
ORDER
The Court now considers Plaintiff Tiko Johnson’s appeal from the Social Security
Administration’s denial of Plaintiff’s application for disability insurance benefits (“DIB”)
and supplemental security income (“SSI”). The Court reviewed the briefing, the
Administrative Record (“AR”), and the Administrative Law Judge’s (“ALJ”) decision (AR
20–34). The Court affirms the ALJ’s decision for the following reasons.
I. BACKGROUND
On July 7, 2021, Plaintiff applied for DIB under Title II, and on August 10, 2021,
and he applied for SSI under Title XVI of the Social Security Act (“SSA”), alleging a
disability onset date of March 16, 2021. (AR. 20.) Plaintiff’s claims were denied initially
and on reconsideration. (AR 20.) After an administrative hearing, an ALJ issued an
unfavorable decision on April 29, 2024, finding Plaintiff not disabled. (AR. 20–34.) The
Appeals Council denied review of that decision, making the ALJ’s determination the final
decision of the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration. (AR. 3–5.) Plaintiff
seeks review of the Commissioner's decision pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).
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II. LEGAL STANDARD
To determine whether a claimant is disabled for purposes of the Act, the ALJ
follows a five-step process. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a). The claimant bears the burden of
proof on the first four steps, but the burden shifts to the Commissioner at step five. Tackett
v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1098 (9th Cir. 1999). At the first step, the ALJ determines whether
the claimant is engaging in substantial gainful activity. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(i). If
so, the claimant is not disabled and the inquiry ends. Id. At step two, the ALJ determines
whether the claimant has a severe medically determinable physical or mental impairment.
20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(ii). If not, the claimant is not disabled and the inquiry ends.
Id. At step three, the ALJ considers whether the claimant’s impairment or combination of
impairments meets or medically equals an impairment listed in Appendix 1 to Subpart P
of 20 C.F.R. Part 404. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iii). If so, the claimant is
automatically found to be disabled. Id. If not, the ALJ proceeds to step four. At step four,
the ALJ assesses the claimant’s residual functional capacity (“RFC”) and determines
whether the claimant is still capable of performing past relevant work. 20 C.F.R.
§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iv). If so, the claimant is not disabled and the inquiry ends. Id. If not,
the ALJ proceeds to the fifth and final step, where he determines whether the claimant can
perform any other work based on the claimant’s RFC, age, education, and work experience.
20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(v). If so, the claimant is not disabled. Id. If not, the claimant
is disabled. Id.
The Court only reviews the issues raised by the party challenging the ALJ’s
decision. See Lewis v. Apfel, 236 F.3d 503, 517 n.13 (9th Cir. 2001). The Court will
uphold an ALJ’s decision “unless it contains legal error or is not supported by substantial
evidence.” Orn v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 625, 630 (9th Cir. 2007). “Substantial evidence is
more than a mere scintilla but less than a preponderance” and is such that “a reasonable
mind might accept [it] as adequate to support a conclusion.” Id. (first quoting Bayliss v.
Barnhart, 427 F.3d 1211, 1214 n.1 (9th Cir. 2005); and then quoting Burch v. Barnhart,
400 F.3d 676, 679 (9th Cir. 2005)). As a general rule, if the “evidence is susceptible to
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more than one rational interpretation,” the Court will affirm the ALJ’s decision. Burch,
400 F.3d at 679. That said, the Court should “consider the entire record as a whole and
may not affirm simply by isolating a specific quantum of supporting evidence.” Orne, 495
F.3d at 630 (citation modified).
III. DISCUSSION
Plaintiff raises two issues for the Court's consideration. She contends the ALJ:
(1) improperly discredited Plaintiff's symptom testimony; and (2) erred in evaluating the
medical opinion evidence. The Court addresses each argument in turn.
A. The ALJ Provided Clear and Convincing Reasons for Discrediting
Plaintiff’s Symptom Testimony
An ALJ employs a two-step process in evaluating a claimant’s symptom testimony.
Vasquez v. Astrue, 572 F.3d 586, 591 (9th Cir. 2009). First, “the ALJ must determine
whether the claimant has presented objective medical evidence of an underlying
impairment which could reasonably be expected to produce the pain or other symptoms
alleged.” Lingenfelter v. Astrue, 504 F.3d 1028, 1036 (9th Cir. 2007) (citation modified).
Second, if there is such objective evidence, and “no evidence of malingering, the ALJ can
reject the claimant’s testimony about the severity of [his] symptoms only by offering
specific, clear and convincing reasons for doing so.” Id. (citation modified). “The standard
isn’t whether [the] court is convinced, but instead whether the ALJ’s rationale is clear
enough that it has the power to convince.” Smartt v. Kijakazi, 53 F.4th 489, 499 (9th Cir.
2022).
Here, the ALJ considered Plaintiff’s testimony and found “that the claimant’s
medically determinable impairments could reasonably be expected to cause the alleged
symptoms.” (AR 26.) However, the ALJ ultimately found that Plaintiff’s “statements
concerning the intensity, persistence and limiting effects of these symptoms are not
reasonably consistent with the medical evidence and other evidence in the record. (AR
26.) The ALJ’s determination is supported by substantial evidence.
The ALJ explained that Plaintiff failed to follow a prescribed course of treatment
and that Plaintiff’s provided testimony was inconsistent with objective medical evidence,
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treatment history, and daily activities. These are recognized bases for discounting
subjective symptom testimony. See Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 958–59 (9th Cir.
2002). (holding that inconsistencies between subjective complaints and objective medical
evidence is a clear and convincing reason for discounting claimant’s testimony);
Wellington v. Berryhill, 878 F.3d 867, 876 (9th Cir. 2017) (“[E]vidence of medical
treatment successfully relieving symptoms can undermine a claim of disability.”);
Tommasetti v. Astrue, 533 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 2008) (noting that “unexplained or
inadequately explained failure to seek treatment or to follow a prescribed course of
treatment” can affect the weight afforded to a claimant’s symptom testimony (citation
modified)); Bray v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 554 F.3d 1219, 1227 (9th Cir. 2009) (“In
reaching a credibility determination, an ALJ may weigh inconsistencies between the
claimant’s testimony and his or her conduct, daily activities, and work record, among other
factors.”).
Regarding Plaintiff’s claims of back, neck, hands, hips, and knee pain, the record
reflects that diagnostic testing generally revealed mild findings. (AR 26–27, 764, 798, 801,
811, 864, 872, 935.) The record also reflects that Plaintiff received treatment on multiple
instances that successfully mitigated the severity of her symptoms. (AR 27, 1323, 1440.)
The record also reflects that Plaintiff engaged in increased daily activity since receiving
positive treatment. (AR 27, 71, 1440.) Finally, the record reflects that the severity of some
of Plaintiff’s symptoms were caused by medical noncompliance. (AR 29, 388.) At bottom,
the ALJ adequately identified which aspects of Plaintiff’s testimony were inconsistent with
the record and provided clear and convincing reasons, supported by substantial evidence,
for discounting the severity of her subjective symptom allegations.
B. The ALJ Did Not Err in Weighing Medical Source Opinion Evidence
The Court now addresses Plaintiff’s argument that the ALJ failed to properly
address medical opinion evidence offered by Dr. Pat Chan and Dr. Abraham Cole. (Doc.
11 at 19.)
An ALJ “must consider all medical opinion evidence.” Tommasetti, 533 F.3d
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at 1041 (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(b)). In examining medical evidence, an ALJ must
articulate how persuasive he or she finds the medical opinions from each doctor or other
source. Kitchen v. Kijakazi, 82 F.4th 732, 739 (9th Cir. 2023). Under the revised
regulations applicable here,1 supportability and consistency are the “most important”
factors for an ALJ to consider in this analysis. Woods, 32 F.4th at 791 (quoting 20 C.F.R.
§ 404.1520c(a)). Supportability means the extent to which a medical source supports the
medical opinion by explaining the relevant objective medical evidence. 20 C.F.R. §
404.1520c(c)(1). Consistency measures how a medical source compares with others; “[t]he
more consistent a medical opinion(s) or prior administrative medical finding(s) is with the
evidence from other medical sources and nonmedical sources in the claim, the more
persuasive the medical opinion(s) or prior administrative medical finding(s) will be.” 20
C.F.R. § 404.1520c(c)(1); § 404.1520c(c)(2). “[A]n ALJ need only provide ‘an
explanation supported by substantial evidence,’” not account for every possibility. See
Kitchen, 82 F.4th at 740 (quoting Woods, 32 F.4th at 792).
The ALJ was persuaded by Dr. Chan and Colb’s medical opinions insofar as they
opined that “light work is the most appropriate for the claimant as it is consistent with the
medical evidence” and that “the claimant’s paresthesia further supports the need for
occasional postural actions and environmental restrictions as determined by Dr. Colb.”
(AR 31.) However, the ALJ did “not find consistent with the evidence [Dr. Colb’s]
determination that the claimant can stand and walk for only 4 hours.” (AR 31.) The ALJ’s
did not err in being less persuaded by this conclusion.
The ALJ noted, and the record supports, that Plaintiff “did experience some
improvement in her symptoms with treatment” and that “diagnostic imaging reports
characterize most findings as mild, with the most severe findings characterized as
mild-to-moderate.” (AR 31.) Additionally, Dr. Chan opined that Plaintiff could stand and
walk for six hours. (AR 72.) Accordingly, the ALJ adequately explained her evaluation
1 Plaintiff filed their benefits application after March 27, 2017, so the revised SSA
regulations govern how the ALJ evaluates and considers medical opinions. Woods v.
Kijakazi, 32 F.4th 785, 790 (9th Cir. 2022).
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of Dr. Chan’s and Colb’s opinions under the applicable regulations, and substantial
evidence supports her finding that the opinion was only partially persuasive.
IV. CONCLUSION
Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED affirming the ALJ’s April 29, 2024 decision.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED directing the Clerk to enter final judgment
consistent with this Order and close this case.
Dated this 11th day of March, 2026.
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