Jimenez-Bencebi et al v. Arizona, State of et al

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WO
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA
Bianca Jimenez-Bencebi, et al.,
Plaintiffs,
v.
State of Arizona, et al.,
Defendants.
No. CV-23-02075-PHX-DWL
ORDER
Pending before the Court is a motion for judgment on the pleadings filed by
Defendant Carin Patchin (“Patchin”), a case manager employed by the Arizona Department
of Child Safety (“DCS”). (Doc. 44.) The motion is fully briefed (Docs. 47, 48) and neither
side requested oral argument. For the reasons that follow, the motion is granted in part (as
to Count One) and denied in part (as to Count Two).
RELEVANT BACKGROUND
Although this case previously involved six plaintiffs (Jimenez-Bencebi, Zavaleta,
L.J., K.J., K.A.J., and J.A.J.), six defendants (Patchin, Davisson, Del Fiacco, Faust,
McKay, and the State of Arizona), and a sprawling array of federal and state-law claims,
the parties contend it has now been narrowed—following removal from state court and two
rounds of motion-to-dismiss briefing—to a pair of § 1983 claims asserted by two plaintiffs,
K.A.J. and J.A.J. (together, “Plaintiffs”), against a single defendant, Patchin. The two
remaining § 1983 claims identified by the parties are Count One, which is a claim for
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wrongful removal, and Count Two, which is a claim for judicial deception.1
As an initial matter, it is unclear how the parties arrived at the conclusion that the
case has been narrowed in this fashion. The order resolving the first motion to dismiss
clarified that the “[t]he remaining counts” included (1) “Count Two, which is asserted only
against Patchin by L.J., K.J., K.A.J., and J.A.J.”; (2) “Count Eight, which is asserted against
Patchin, Del Fiacco, Davisson, Faust, and McKay by all Plaintiffs (although it is time-
barred in part as to Jimenez-Bencebi and Zavaleta)”; and (3) “Count Thirteen, which is
asserted against the State, Davisson, Faust, and McKay by all Plaintiffs (although it is time-
barred in part as to Jimenez-Bencebi and Zavaleta).” (Doc. 17 at 71.) Meanwhile, in the
order resolving the second motion to dismiss, the only further narrowing of Count Two
was that L.J. was dismissed as a plaintiff. (Doc. 34 at 6-7.) It is therefore unclear why the
parties believe K.J. no longer has a claim against Patchin in Count Two.2 Turning to Count
Eight, the only further narrowing of that claim in the order resolving the second motion to
dismiss was to dismiss L.J. as a plaintiff for lack of standing (id. at 7), to dismiss McKay
and Faust (but not the other named defendants) for failure to state a claim (id. at 24), and
to order dismissal as to all of the minor plaintiffs (but not Jimenez-Bencebi and Zavaleta)
for failure to file a notice of claim (id. at 35-36). It is therefore unclear why the parties
believe Jimenez-Bencebi and Zavaleta no longer have a partially timely claim against
Patchin, Del Fiacco, and Davisson in Count Eight. Finally, turning to Count Thirteen, the
1 The parties have repeatedly expressed their view that the case is now limited in this
fashion. (Doc. 38 at 1-2, 5 [Rule 26(f) report]; Doc. 44 at 2 [“This Court already decided
two Motions to Dismiss (docs. 6, 17, 25, 34). The remaining parties are Plaintiffs K.A.J.
and J.A.J., and Defendant Patchin. The two remaining counts are Count One—alleged
wrongful removal of K.A.J. and J.A.J. and Count Two—alleged judicial deception.”]; Doc.
47 at 1 [“Plaintiffs agree with Defendants that the remaining claims are those of K.A.J. and
J.A.J. against Defendant Carin Patchin with respect to wrongful seizure and judicial
deception.”].)
2 The order resolving the second motion to dismiss did conclude that Patchin is
entitled to qualified immunity as to the portion of Count One premised on “the removal of
K.J. and J.M.J. in September 2018 because there is no allegation that Patchin had anything
to do with that removal (which occurred before she began serving as Plaintiffs’ DCS
caseworker).” (Doc. 34 at 19.) Although that logic may suggest that K.J.’s judicial
deception claim against Patchin in Count Two will meet a similar fate, no dismissal request
as to that claim has been made.
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only further narrowing of that claim in the order resolving the second motion to dismiss
was to dismiss L.J. as a plaintiff for lack of standing (id. at 7) and to order dismissal as to
all of the minor plaintiffs (but not Jimenez-Bencebi and Zavaleta) for failure to file a notice
of claim (id. at 35-36). In contrast, the Court rejected the request of Faust, McKay, and the
State to dismiss Count Thirteen under principles of Eleventh Amendment immunity. (Id.
7-12.) It is therefore unclear why the parties believe Jimenez-Bencebi and Zavaleta no
longer have a partially timely claim against the State, Davisson, Faust, and McKay in Count
Thirteen.
At any rate, turning back to Plaintiffs’ § 1983 claims against Patchin in Counts One
and Two, the most recent dismissal order acknowledged that Patchin would be entitled to
qualified immunity with respect to Count One if the challenged removals occurred pursuant
to a court order but held that Patchin was not entitled to qualified immunity “on this record
and at this stage of the case” because she had not supplied proof that such court orders
existed or sought judicial notice of them. (Id. at 17.) In her motion for judgment on the
pleadings, Patchin now includes the relevant court orders and argues she is entitled to
judgment on Count One as a result of them. (Doc. 44.) Patchin also argues that, for other
reasons, she is entitled to judgment on the pleadings on Count Two. (Id.) Plaintiffs, in
turn, concede that Patchin is entitled to judgment on the pleadings as to Count One but
defend the sufficiency of Count Two. (Doc. 47.) The Court will thus limit its analysis to
Plaintiffs’ claims against Patchin in Count Two.
DISCUSSION
I. Legal Standard
A motion for judgment on the pleadings under Rule 12(c) is “functionally identical”
to a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. United States ex rel. Cafasso v. Gen. Dynamics C4
Sys., Inc., 637 F.3d 1047, 1054 n.4 (9th Cir. 2011) (citations omitted). See also Harris v.
Cnty. of Orange, 682 F.3d 1126, 1131 (9th Cir. 2012) (“Iqbal applies to Rule 12(c)
motions.”) (citation omitted). Therefore, a motion for judgment on the pleadings “is
properly granted when, taking all the allegations in the non-moving party’s pleadings as
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true, the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fajardo v. Cnty. of Los
Angeles, 179 F.3d 698, 699 (9th Cir. 1999). See also Elvig v. Calvin Presbyterian Church,
375 F.3d 951, 955 (9th Cir. 2004) (when ruling on a Rule 12(c) motion, the court must
“accept as true all allegations in [the plaintiff’s] complaint and treat as false those
allegations in the answer that contradict [the plaintiff’s] allegations”). Ordinarily, if a
district court considers evidence outside the pleadings in ruling on a motion for judgment
on the pleadings, it must convert the motion into a motion for summary judgment and give
the nonmovant an opportunity to respond. United States v. Ritchie, 342 F.3d 903, 907 (9th
Cir. 2003). A district court may, however, consider “[c]ertain written instruments attached
to pleadings” in ruling on such a motion, as well as “matters of judicial notice.” Id. at 908.
II. Judicial Notice
Patchin seeks judicial notice of various documents. (Doc. 44 at 2 n.2.)3 Plaintiffs
do not object to this request and, indeed, seek to rely on certain facts from the “documents
attached to Defendant’s motion.” (Doc. 47 at 2.)
Exhibit 44-1 and Exhibit 44-2 both contain an “Application and Declaration for Ex-
Parte Removal of Child” filed in the Superior Court of Arizona for Maricopa County
(“Superior Court”), as well as an order granting the request for removal issued by the
Superior Court. Exhibit 44-10 contains a Dependency Petition filed by DCS and includes
a sworn verification signed by non-party DCS case manager Ricardo Camacho-Gutierrez
(“Camacho-Gutierrez”).4 Exhibit 44-11 contains a “Team Decision Making (TDM)
Summary Report” (“TDM”) issued by DCS, with the DCS case manager in participation
listed as Camacho-Gutierrez.
At the request of Patchin, and without objection by Plaintiffs, the Court takes
judicial notice of the exhibits specified above. Reyn’s Pasta Bella, LLC v. Visa USA, Inc.,
3 The Court need not take judicial notice of all the attached documents because some
are unnecessary for ruling on the motion for judgment on the pleadings. The Court will
address those that are necessary.
4 Exhibit 44-10 also contains a Temporary Custody Notice (“TCN”) for K.J. and
J.M.J. (Doc. 44-10 at 20.) The Court does not find the TCN necessary in resolving the
motion for judgment on the pleadings.
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442 F.3d 741, 746 n.6 (9th Cir. 2006) (“[Courts] may take judicial notice of court filings
and other matters of public record. . . . While some of these documents are filed under
seal, they nonetheless are readily verifiable and, therefore, the proper subject of judicial
notice.”). The only limitation, at least at this stage, is that the Court may not take judicial
notice of any disputed facts contained within such records. Khoja v. Orexigen
Therapeutics, Inc., 899 F.3d 988, 999 (9th Cir. 2018) (“Just because the document itself is
susceptible to judicial notice does not mean that every assertion of fact within that
document is judicially noticeable for its truth.”). Thus, to the extent Plaintiffs dispute facts
contained within these exhibits, the Court may not take judicial notice of those facts.
III. Count Two
As noted, Count Two is a § 1983 claim against Patchin for judicial deception. “[A]s
part of the right to familial association, parents and children have a ‘right to be free from
judicial deception’ in child custody proceedings and removal orders.” David v.
Kaulukukui, 38 F.4th 792, 800 (9th Cir. 2022) (citation omitted). See also Costanich v.
Dep’t of Soc. & Health Servs., 627 F.3d 1101, 1108 (9th Cir. 2010) (“[D]eliberately
fabricating evidence in civil child abuse proceedings violates the Due Process clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment when a liberty or property interest is at stake . . . .”). “To state a
violation of the constitutional right to familial association through judicial deception, a
plaintiff must allege (1) a misrepresentation or omission (2) made deliberately or with a
reckless disregard for the truth, that was (3) material to the judicial decision. A
misrepresentation or omission is material if a court would have declined to issue the order
had the defendant been truthful.” David, 38 F.4th at 801 (cleaned up).
A. The Two Motion-To-Dismiss Orders
In the June 10, 2024 order, the Court concluded that Plaintiffs failed to state a claim
against Davisson in Count Two because the then-operative complaint failed to “plausibly
establish that Davisson was personally involved in the alleged constitutional deprivations
or had knowledge of the wrongfulness of the acts that would lead to those deprivations.”
(Doc. 17 at 39-40.) The Court also concluded that Del Fiacco was entitled to qualified
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immunity as to Count Two. (Id. at 61-63.) In contrast, the Court concluded that Patchin
was “not entitled to qualified immunity as to Count Two at this stage of the proceedings.”
(Id. at 57-61.) Specifically, the Court held that the alleged false statements identified by
Plaintiffs “make it plausible that but-for Patchin’s statements, K.J., K.A.J., and J.A.J.
would not have been removed from Jimenez-Bencebi’s and Zavaleta’s care.” (Id. at 60.)
In the December 9, 2024 order, the Court affirmed the dismissal of Davisson and
Del Fiacco with respect to Count Two based on qualified immunity. (Doc. 34 at 22.) The
Court went on to note that “[i]n the portion of [Defendants’] motion seeking dismissal of
Count Two under Rule 12(b)(6), Defendants only address the sufficiency of the allegations
as to Del Fiacco and Davisson.” (Id. at 32.) The Court also found, in relation to Count
One, that “there is no allegation that Patchin had anything to do with [the] removal [of K.J.
and J.M.J.] (which occurred before she began serving as Plaintiffs’ DCS caseworker).” (Id.
at 19.)
B. The Parties’ Arguments
Patchin argues that Plaintiffs “do not state a claim for judicial deception against
[her].” (Doc. 44 at 9.) More specifically, Patchin argues that Count Two “fails because
Plaintiffs cannot demonstrate that the alleged misrepresentations made during [her]
testimony and in court filings were material to any judicial decision for three reasons. First,
most of the statements originated from a prior DCS investigator and are not attributed to
[her]. Second, the juvenile court did not terminate the parents’ parental rights to K.A.J. or
J.A.J. Third, [Jimenez-Bencebi] stipulated to the dependency of J.A.J. and [Zavaleta]
entered a no contest plea to the dependency.” (Id. at 2, cleaned up.)
In response, Plaintiffs argue that Patchin made “numerous misrepresentations
deliberately or with reckless disregard for their truth” and “that these claims may have
‘originated’ with someone else does not insulate Patchin from responsibility for her
repeated repetition of these statements.” (Doc. 47 at 8-9.) Plaintiffs assert that “[t]here
was no factual basis for the false claims, or [the claims] could be easily checked and shown
to be false.” (Id. at 8.) Plaintiffs also argue that Patchin “not only repeated these earlier
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claims over and over again in her court reports, but built on them with more falsehoods.”
(Id. at 9.) Finally, Plaintiffs contend that “Patchin’s misrepresentations were material to
both the initial removal decisions, as well as the numerous decisions that kept the two
children in out-of-home custody for several years.” (Id. at 9-10.)
In reply, Patchin argues that “[n]o constitutional violation occurred because Patchin
was not reckless in relying on information supplied to her . . . and she cannot be found to
have deliberately fabricated a statement that she was simply repeating.” (Doc. 48 at 5.) As
for the statements “[o]riginating with Patchin,” Patchin argues that “Plaintiffs incorporate
insufficient facts to demonstrate that these statements are false,” that the statements
“resulted in a constitutional violation,” or “that any of them were material to any Court
decision.” (Id.)5
C. Analysis
Plaintiffs allege that Patchin made the following “misrepresentations and/or
omissions to the court which were deliberate falsehoods and/or which demonstrated a
reckless disregard for the truth”:
a. [Jimenez-Bencebi] was homeless for several months in 2018;
b. J.M.J. was so severely malnourished he was feeble and could barely
sit up;
c. J.M.J. had a flat head, distended stomach and non-accidental bruising
all over his back;
d. [Jimenez-Bencebi] did not like J.M.J. because [he] was a baby
conceived by rape;
e. K.J. had scratches on her face evidencing abuse;
f. [Jimenez-Bencebi] was aggressive;
g. [Jimenez-Bencebi] had been convicted of felonious child abuse in
5 Patchin also argues that judicial deception claims are subject to a heightened
pleading standard under Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b) (Doc. 48 at 6), but arguments raised for the
first time in a reply brief are forfeited. Zamani v. Carnes, 491 F.3d 990, 997 (9th Cir. 2007)
(“The district court need not consider arguments raised for the first time in a reply brief.”).
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Missouri in 2017;
h. on one occasion in July 2019 [Jimenez-Bencebi] shouted at her
therapist, Dr. Hanley;
i. on one occasion, while in labor in the hospital, [Jimenez-Bencebi]
stated she would name J.A.J. “Motherfucker;”
j. [Jimenez-Bencebi] has gender dysmorphic disorder;6 and
k. [Jimenez-Bencebi] willfully neglected J.M.J. because she hates boys.
(Doc. 21 ¶ 160.)
Patchin relies on judicially noticeable documents to assert, and Plaintiffs do not
appear to dispute, that a subset of these alleged misrepresentations—statements [a] through
[f]—originated from another DCS employee, Camacho-Gutierrez. Exhibit 44-10, the
Dependency Petition, includes the following passage:
At the time of removal, [Jimenez-Bencebi] was with [J.M.J.] at an adoption
agency. [Jimenez-Bencebi] admitted to not wanting to parent child, [J.M.J.],
and wanted to put him up for adoption. There were clear and observable
signs of malnourishment, underdevelopment, and the baby having a 2 cm
scar on his left [of his] cheek to which [Jimenez-Bencebi] said he did it
himself. DCS took the child to Phoenix Child[ren’s] Hospital. Medical staff
found [J.M.J.] to be underweight, malnourished, failure to thrive with
bruising and scratches. There were scratches to his neck and lower face; a
small .75 cm bruise to left lateral cheek; bruising to his chest, body, and right
posterior thigh with 3 bruises. [J.M.J.] was found to be in the 1% for
development and weight. He is currently hospitalized. [Jimenez-Bencebi]
does not have stable housing. [Jimenez-Bencebi] was asked to leave the
homeless shelter due to her behaviors. [Jimenez-Bencebi] left the shelter and
at the time of the removal refused to give DCS a current address. . . .
[Jimenez-Bencebi] was asked to leave the homeless shelter due to her rude
and aggressive behavior.
(Doc. 44-10 at 5-6.) Exhibit 44-11, the TDM, includes the statements “J.M.J.] . . . also had
an inflated stomach and a flat head in the back” and “[Jimenez-Bencebi] states that she is
6 Patchin asserts that “[t]he Application completed by Patchin states that . . .
[Jimenez-Bencebi] had a gender preference disorder,” not a gender dysmorphic disorder.
(Doc. 44 at 10 n.5.) The outcome here does not turn on this alleged discrepancy.
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looking at an adoptive plan for [J.M.J.] due to her feelings toward him. There is no bond.”
(Doc. 44-11 at 1-2.) Finally, as for the remaining statements attributable to her—
statements [g] through [k]—Patchin contends they were accurate and/or immaterial.
Patchin is not entitled to judgment on the pleadings on this basis. First, Patchin’s
position with respect to statements [a] through [f] seems to be that she could not have acted
with the requisite knowing or reckless mindset because she was simply repeating facts she
learned from Camacho-Gutierrez. But the law on this topic is more nuanced. True, the
Ninth Circuit has held, in the context of intra-agency reliance, that “[a]bsent some
indication to a supervisor that an investigation was inadequate or incompetent, supervisors
are not obliged either to undertake de novo investigations or to cross examine subordinates
reasonably believed to be competent as to whether their investigations were negligent.”
Motley v. Parks, 432 F.3d 1072, 1081 (9th Cir. 2005) (citation omitted), overruled in part
on other grounds by United States v. King, 687 F.3d 1189 (9th Cir. 2012). But that
principle only applies when “[t]here is no evidence in the record that [the defendant] knew
or had any reason to believe that the investigation . . . was inadequate or incompetent.” Id.
See also Daschke v. Hartenstein, 420 F. Supp. 3d 919, 944 (D. Ariz. 2019) (granting
summary judgment to DCS caseworkers accused of judicial deception for “reiterat[ing]
false statements provided by” a police detective but emphasizing that there was no evidence
that “the DCS Defendants would have had any cause to doubt the veracity of the
information provided by law enforcement”). Here, Plaintiffs allege that “exculpatory
evidence” regarding J.M.J.’s weight and medical status, which was contained in “hospital
records available to DCS” and contradicted Camacho-Gutierrez’s factual representations
on those topics, was “immediately evident to [Patchin], but she knowingly or recklessly
ignored it.” (Doc. 21 ¶¶ 64, 134.) For example, Plaintiffs allege that J.M.J.’s medical
records from the day of his removal in September 2018 “note that J.M.J. could sit on his
own, pull to stand, and was active, crawling, playful, and happy”; that J.M.J. had only one
small scratch, one small bruise on his cheek, and three small bruises on his right thigh; and
that J.M.J. had a normal, not flat, shaped head. (Id. ¶¶ 59, 60.) Plaintiffs further allege that
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“J.M.J. lost weight one week after he was taken into DCS custody” and that his “mild or
moderate malnutrition in September 2018 was most likely attributable to this feeding
issue.” (Id. ¶¶ 71(e), 71(g).) Plaintiffs have thus sufficiently alleged that Patchin had
reason to believe, at the time she repeated Camacho-Gutierrez’s factual assertions in her
various submissions to the juvenile court, that the investigation by Camacho-Gutierrez was
inadequate or incompetent. As a result, Patchin cannot escape responsibility (at least at
this stage of the case) for the falsity of statements [a] through [f] by claiming she was just
repeating facts she heard from Camacho-Gutierrez.
Second, turning to statements [g] through [k]—which Patchin does not seek to
attribute to Camacho-Gutierrez—Plaintiffs have plausibly alleged that Patchin knew at
least some of those statements were false. As for statement [g], which falsely attributed a
felony conviction to Jimenez-Bencebi, Patchin does not advance any explanation for how
she could have reasonably believed that statement to be true. (Doc. 44 at 11 [“Except for
confusing ‘felony’ and ‘misdemeanor,’ the statement is accurate.”].) Patchin also fails to
explain why statement [i], which was that Jimenez-Bencebi threatened to name one of her
children “Motherfucker,” or statement [j], which was that Jimenez-Bencebi had gender
dysmorphic disorder, cannot be viewed as knowingly or recklessly false—instead, Patchin
largely focuses on those statements’ materiality. (Id.)
Third, given this backdrop, Plaintiffs have done enough at this early stage of the
case to plausibly allege that Patchin’s knowingly or recklessly false statements were
material. Although Patchin raises a fair point that “[t]he facts, as plead,” are “unclear . . .
[as to] when the misrepresentations were first offered to the Court” (Doc. 48 at 8), the
judicially noticeable materials establish that Patchin signed and filed the removal
application regarding J.A.J. on February 13, 2020. (Doc. 44-2.)7 That document contains
many of the alleged false statements. (Id.) Additionally, Patchin acknowledges that she
would have been required to file periodic written reports with the juvenile court between
7 In contrast, the judicially noticeable materials establish that Patchin did not sign and
file the removal application regarding K.A.J. on March 17, 2019—that document was
signed by a different DCS employee. (Doc. 44-1.)
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October 2018 and March 2021 due to her status as the DCS case specialist. (Doc. 48 at 3
n.3, 5.) Plaintiffs allege, albeit with less than ideal precision, that those filings also
contained the alleged false statements. (Doc. 21 ¶ 67, emphasis added [“Patchin . . .
perpetuated the following false narrative in the DCS petition, reports to the juvenile court,
and in sworn testimony . . . .”].)
Patchin nevertheless contends that her challenged statements could not have had a
material effect on the proceedings because the juvenile court ultimately decided, in May
2022, “not [to] terminate the parents’ parental rights to K.A.J. or J.A.J.” (Doc. 44 at 2.)
But this argument overlooks Plaintiffs’ theory of liability. Plaintiffs argue that “Patchin’s
claims ensured that not only were K.A.J. and J.A.J. removed from their parents
immediately after birth but were kept from their parents for years. . . . The needless
removal of K.A.J. and J.A.J. from their parents for many months may have resulted in
psychological harm that could extend into adulthood and impact their relationships for their
entire lives.” (Doc. 47 at 5.)
In the alternative, Patchin contends that her challenged statements could not have
had a material effect on the proceedings because J.A.J.’s parents either stipulated to, or did
not oppose, the dependency petition. (Doc. 44 at 2.) Although this argument has surface
appeal, Plaintiffs persuasively explain in their response that it ignores that “the juvenile
dependency process is a fluid process. There is not a ‘single’ ruling by the juvenile court
in either the dependency or severance portion of the proceedings. Rather, throughout a
dependency proceeding (such as this matter), there are numerous hearings and court
proceedings where the trial court must consider [DCS’s] continued custody of the child; in
a case of this duration (September 2018 to May 2023), there were literally dozens of court
hearings. . . . So here, in her 2½ years of managing the juvenile case, Defendant Patchin
authored dozens of court reports, most (or all) of which were provided to the juvenile court,
who was required to review them.” (Doc. 47 at 10.) Under these circumstances, it is
plausible that Patchin’s alleged false statements, repeated many times over the course of a
multi-year proceeding, had a material effect in that they were the but-for cause of K.A.J.
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and J.A.J. remaining out of their parents’ custody for longer than they otherwise would
have been. Cf. David, 38 F.4th at 802 (“Additionally, David alleges that ‘had the presiding
judge in the Family Court been informed of the Custody Order, Defendant Keahiolalo’s
application for a temporary restraining order would not have been granted as to B.D.’ In
other words, she claims that but-for Kaulukukui’s misrepresentation or omission, David
would not have been deprived of custody over B.D., meaning that the omission was
material. Thus, we conclude that David has successfully stated a claim for violation of her
and B.D.’s right to familial association based on judicial deception.”) (cleaned up).
Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED that Defendant’s motion for judgment on the pleadings (Doc.
44) is granted in part and denied in part as set forth above.
Dated this 20th day of November, 2025.
Case 2:23-cv-02075-DWL Document 51 Filed 11/20/25 Page 12 of 12