Ferrell v. ORCU

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS
HOT SPRINGS DIVISION
JAMES FERRELL 	PLAINTIFF
v. 	Civil No. 6:25-cv-06138-SOH-MEF
OUACHITA RIVER
CORRECTIONAL UNIT and
ANTONIO HICKS 	DEFENDANTS
MAGISTRATE JUDGE’S REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
This is a civil rights action filed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The case was directly assigned
to the undersigned Magistrate Judge pursuant to General Order 2024-02, but not all parties to the
action have consented to the jurisdiction of the undersigned. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). Accordingly,
for the purpose of preservice review pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a), the case will automatically
be reassigned to United States District Judge Susan O. Hickey and referred to the undersigned for
a report and recommendation pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. §§ 636(b)(1) and (3).
I. 	BACKGROUND
Plaintiff filed his Complaint in the Eastern District of Arkansas on December 23, 2025.
(ECF No. 2). It was transferred to this District on December 29, 2025. (ECF No. 4). On January
12, 2026, the Court entered an Order directing Plaintiff to submit a completed in forma pauperis
(“IFP”) application and an Amended Complaint. (ECF Nos. 7, 8). When Plaintiff failed to submit
his IFP and Amended Complaint by the deadline, the Court entered a Show Cause Order on
February 3, 2026. (ECF No. 10). Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint and IFP application were filed
the next day. (ECF Nos. 11, 12).
In his Amended Complaint, Plaintiff lists “Ouachita River Unit” (“ORCU”) in the caption
of the case. (ECF No. 11 at 1). He lists Antonio Hicks in the section of the Complaint form where
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he is to identify Defendants, but he provides no identifying information concerning this Defendant.
(Id. at 2). Page three of the Amended Complaint is missing.
For his first claim, Plaintiff identifies “ORCU P.O. Box 1630 Malvern AR 72104 medical”
as the Defendant. (ECF No. 11 at 3). He alleges that he was having chest pain, and they were
refusing to see him after three or four requests. (Id.). He also states there was blood on his bed
sheets from his eczema. 	(Id.). 	He lists the dates of November 11, 28, and December 1, 2025.
(Id.).
For his second claim, Plaintiff identifies “medical” as the Defendant. (ECF No. 11 at 5).
Plaintiff alleges that on December 1, 2025, he told “the officer at work” to call medical because
he was having chest pains and medical told him that “they were not going to see me.” (Id.).
For his third claim, Plaintiff identifies the Defendant as “visitation/phone.” (ECF No. 11
at 6). He appears to allege that he was denied the ability to talk to his father and brother, and his
brother is caring for Plaintiff’s two children. (Id. at 7). He lists various ADC rules in the section
of the form where he is to identify the constitutional rights being violated. (Id. at 6)
For all three claims, Plaintiff checked the section of the form to indicate that he was
proceeding against the Defendants in question in their individual and official capacities, but he
provided no information in the section of the form for the official capacity portion of the claim.
(ECF No. 11 at 4).
II. 	LEGAL STANDARD
Under § 1915A, the Court is obliged to screen the case prior to service of process being
issued. The Court must dismiss a complaint, or any portion of it, if it contains claims that: (1) are
frivolous, malicious, or fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or (2) seeks
monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b).
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A claim is frivolous if “it lacks an arguable basis either in law or fact.” Neitzke v. Williams,
490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). An action is malicious when the allegations are known to be false, or
it is undertaken for the purpose of harassing or disparaging the named defendants rather than
vindicating a cognizable right. Spencer v. Rhodes, 656 F. Supp. 458, 464 (E.D.N.C. 1987); In re
Tyler, 839 F.2d 1290, 1293-94 (8th Cir. 1988). A claim fails to state a claim upon which relief
may be granted if it does not allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007).
“In evaluating whether a pro se plaintiff has asserted sufficient facts to state a claim, we
hold ‘a pro se complaint, however inartfully pleaded ... to less stringent standards than formal
pleadings drafted by lawyers.’” 	Jackson v. Nixon, 747 F.3d 537, 541 (8th Cir. 2014) (quoting
Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007)). This means “that if the essence of an allegation is
discernable, even though it is not pleaded with legal nicety, then the district court should construe
the complaint in a way that permits the layperson’s claim to be considered within the proper legal
framework.” Jackson, 747 F.3d at 544 (cleaned up). The complaint must, however, still allege
specific facts sufficient to support a claim. Martin v. Sargent, 780 F.2d 1334, 1337 (8th Cir. 1985).
III. 	ANALYSIS
To begin, the Arkansas Division of Correction Ouachita River Unit is not a person or a
legal entity subject to suit under § 1983. See Owens v. Scott Cty. Jail, 328 F.3d 1026, 1027 (8th
Cir. 2003) (jails are not legal entities amenable to suit); see also Ketchum v. City of West Memphis,
Ark., 974 F.2d 81, 82 (8th Cir. 1992) (stating that “departments or subdivisions” of local
government are not “juridical entities suable as such”); De La Garza v. Kandiyohi Cty. Jail, 18 F.
App’x 436, 437 (8th Cir. 2001) (affirming district court dismissal of county jail and sheriff’s
department as parties because they are not suable entities); Zar v. S.D. Bd. of Exam'rs of
Psychologists, 976 F.2d 459, 464 (8th Cir. 1992) (state departments not “persons” under § 1983).
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Similarly, other inanimate objects such as a phone and an ADC policy are not persons or legal
entities subject to suit. See, e.g., Stewart v. WCI, No. CV JRR-24-2388, 2024 WL 4335725, at *1
(D. Md. Sept. 25, 2024) (“Many courts have held that inanimate objects such as buildings,
facilities, and grounds do not act under color of state law and are not subject to suit under § 1983.”).
Plaintiff listed the individual Antonio Hicks as a Defendant, but he did not identify him
other than listing his name, and no factual allegations against him are made. 	“Liability under
Section 1983 requires a causal link to, and direct responsibility for, the deprivation of rights.”
Madewell v. Roberts, 909 F.2d 1203, 1208 (8th Cir. 1990) (citing Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362,
370 (1976)). Thus, to state a cognizable Section 1983 claim, a complaint must set forth specific
factual allegations showing what each named defendant allegedly did, or failed to do, that allegedly
violated the plaintiff’s federal constitutional rights. Plaintiff has not alleged a causal link between
Defendant Hicks and his claims. See Martin, 780 F.2d 1337 (even a pro se Plaintiff must allege
specific facts sufficient to state a claim).
Wellpath LLC provides medical care at the ADC Units. To the extent Plaintiff’s Amended
Complaint can be construed to be against this medical contractor, it is a suable entity under § 1983.
Plaintiff did not, however, allege sufficient facts to support a denial or delay of medical care claim
against Wellpath LLC. 	The Eighth Amendment prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment
prohibits deliberate indifference to prisoners’ serious medical needs. 	Luckert v. Dodge County,
684 F.3d 808, 817 (8th Cir. 2012). 	To prevail in his Eighth Amendment claim, Plaintiff must
prove that Defendants acted with deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs. Estelle v.
Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976).
Thus, Plaintiff must demonstrate (1) that he had an objectively serious medical need, and
(2) that the Defendants actually knew of, but deliberately disregarded, that serious medical need.
See Ivey v. Audrain Cty., Mo., 968 F.3d 845, 848 (8th Cir. 2020). “A serious medical need is one
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that has been diagnosed by a physician as requiring treatment, or one that is so obvious that even
a layperson would easily recognize the necessity for a doctor’s attention.” Coleman v. Rahija, 114
F.3d 778, 784 (8th Cir. 1997) (internal quotations omitted). 	“To demonstrate that a defendant
actually knew of, but deliberately disregarded, a serious medical need, the plaintiff must establish
a mental state akin to criminal recklessness: disregarding a known risk to the [detainee’s] health.”
Barton v. Taber, 908 F.3d 1119, 1124 (8th Cir. 2018) (internal quotations and citations omitted).
The Eighth Circuit has stated that this “onerous standard requires a showing more than negligence,
more than even gross negligence, but less than purposefully causing or knowingly bringing about
a substantial risk of serious harm to the inmate.” Thompson v. King, 730 F.3d 742, 747 (8th Cir.
2013) (internal quotations and citations omitted).
Here, Plaintiff failed to allege anything other than he reported some chest pains of unknown
severity to an unidentified individual or individuals, and that he had some blood on his sheets he
attributed to his eczema. Notably, he does not allege that he had been diagnosed with a medical
condition for which chest pain would be a concern. Nor does he allege that he presented such a
poor or alarming condition that a layperson would have easily recognized the need for immediate
medical care. Thus, his allegations do not meet the objective prong of the deliberate indifference
test. Nor do Plaintiff’s allegations satisfy the second subjective prong, because he does not identify
anyone who was purported to know about his claims. Finally, Plaintiff has not alleged that any
delay or denial of care adversely affected his prognosis. See, Holden v. Hirner, 663 F.3d 336, 342
(8th Cir. 2011) (“A prisoner alleging a delay in treatment must present verifying medical evidence
that the prison officials ignored an acute or escalating situation or that these delays adversely
affected his prognosis”) (internal quotations omitted). The Court will not engage in speculation
as to what Plaintiff could be trying to allege. See Bell A. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555
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(2007) (a complaint must contain sufficient factual allegations “to raise a right to relief above the
speculative level”).
IV. 	CONCLUSION
For these reasons, it is RECOMMENDED that: (1) the case be dismissed pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1) for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted; (2)
Plaintiff/Petitioner is warned that, in the future, this dismissal may be counted as a strike for
purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g), and thus, the Clerk is directed to place a § 1915(g) strike flag on
the case for future judicial consideration; and (3) the Court certify pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
1915(a)(3) that any appeal from this dismissal would not be taken in good faith.
Referral Status: This case should not remain referred because all matters have been
recommended for dismissal in this Report and Recommendation.
The parties have fourteen (14) days from receipt of the Report and Recommendation
in which to file written objections pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). The failure to file timely
objections may result in a waiver of the right to appeal questions of fact. 	The parties are
reminded that objections must be both timely and specific to trigger de novo review by the
district court.
DATED this 17th day of February 2026.
/s/
Mark E. Ford
HON. MARK E. FORD
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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