Horn v. Peterson et al

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS
HOT SPRINGS DIVISION
DUSTIN LEMUEL HORN 	PLAINTIFF
v. 	Civil No. 6:24-cv-06049-SOH-MEF
MRS. PETERSON
(Kitchen Supervisor, Omega Unit);
LIEUTENANT BENJAMIN MARTIN
(Omega Unit);
SERGEANT ANDERSON (Omega Unit);
MAJOR SECURITY FREDDIE OTTS;
WARDEN WALTER WHITE 	DEFENDANTS
MAGISTRATE JUDGE’S REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
This is a civil rights action filed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Pursuant to the provisions of 28
U.S.C. §§ 636(b)(1) and (3), the Honorable Susan O. Hickey, Chief United States District Judge,
referred this case to the undersigned for the purpose of making a Report and Recommendation.
The case is before the Court for preservice screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A.0F
1
Under § 1915A, the Court is required to screen any complaint in which a prisoner seeks redress
from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a).
I. 	BACKGROUND
Plaintiff filed his Complaint on April 10, 2024. (ECF No. 1). On April 24, 2024, the Court
entered an Order denying Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”). (ECF No. 3).
Plaintiff failed to submit his required filing fee by the deadline, instead submitting two premature
discovery motions. (ECF Nos. 6, 7). The undersigned entered a Report and Recommendation to
dismiss the case for failure to obey a Court Order and pay the filing fee in this case. (ECF No. 8).
1 Enacted as part of the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”).
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The Report and Recommendation was adopted on June 4, 2024, and Plaintiff’s case was dismissed
without prejudice. (ECF No. 14). Plaintiff filed a Notice of Appeal on June 13, 2024. (ECF No.
15). On August 22, 2024, the Eighth Circuit reversed and remanded the case, noting that Plaintiff
had submitted documents on appeal which indicated Plaintiff had attempted to pay and the failure
to pay had been beyond his control. (ECF No. 19).
On October 8, 2024, the Court entered an order directing Plaintiff to submit an Amended
Complaint to address deficiencies in his initial Complaint. (ECF No. 31). Plaintiff submitted his
Amended Complaint on October 17, 2024. (ECF No. 32).
Plaintiff raises one claim in his Amended Complaint, centered on his incarceration in the
Arkansas Division of Correction Omega Unit. He alleges that on March 24, 2024, he bit into a
metal foreign object in his food. 	(Id. at 4). 	He alleges he showed the object to Defendants
Anderson and Martin. (Id.). He also alleges he asked Anderson and Martin to take him to Medical
because he had either broken or chipped1F
2 his tooth, and his mouth was bleeding. 	(Id. at 4-5).
Plaintiff alleges Martin and Anderson contacted Medical, at which time they were informed that
Plaintiff “had to put in a sick call.” (Id.). Plaintiff alleges he put in a sick call and filed a grievance
because Martin and Anderson should have immediately escorted him to Medical because it was
an emergency and his pain was obvious. (Id. at 5). Instead, he alleges they sent him back to the
barracks without any medical treatment. (Id.). 	Plaintiff alleges he was treated “deliberately
indifference than other Residents.” (Id.). Plaintiff does not identify these other residents. Plaintiff
names Defendants Peterson, Martin, Anderson, White, and Otts for this claim. (Id. at 4). He does
not name any medical staff. The Court also notes that the initial Complaint in this case was signed
2 Plaintiff uses both words to describe the injury to his tooth in different sections of the claim.
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on March 24, 2024, thus Plaintiff apparently put in a sick call, filed a grievance, and started this
case on the same day. (ECF No. 1 at 7).
Plaintiff proceeds against Defendants in their official and individual capacities. (ECF No.
32 at 5). To support his official capacity claim, he alleges “all Defendants should have taken the
situation serious instead of blowing me off!! Instead they coirced [sic] with one another and denied
me medical treatment.” (Id.). Plaintiff seeks compensatory, punitive and other relief. (Id. at 6).
He asks to be compensated for pain and suffering as well as being denied medical treatment. (Id.).
He also asks that all taxes for the damages award be paid, as well as a donation of 10% of the
award be sent to a children’s cancer organization of the judge’s choosing. (Id.).
II. 	LEGAL STANDARD
Under § 1915A, the Court is obliged to screen the case prior to service of process being
issued. The Court must dismiss a complaint, or any portion of it, if it contains claims that: (1) are
frivolous, malicious, or fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or (2) seeks
monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b).
A claim is frivolous if “it lacks an arguable basis either in law or fact.” Neitzke v. Williams,
490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). An action is malicious when the allegations are known to be false, or
it is undertaken for the purpose of harassing or disparaging the named defendants rather than to
vindicate a cognizable right. 	Spencer v. Rhodes, 656 F. Supp. 458, 464 (E.D.N.C. 1987); In re
Tyler, 839 F.2d 1290, 1293-94 (8th Cir. 1988). A claim fails to state a claim upon which relief
may be granted if it does not allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007).
“In evaluating whether a pro se plaintiff has asserted sufficient facts to state a claim, we
hold ‘a pro se complaint, however inartfully pleaded ... to less stringent standards than formal
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pleadings drafted by lawyers.’” 	Jackson v. Nixon, 747 F.3d 537, 541 (8th Cir. 2014) (quoting
Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007)). This means “that if the essence of an allegation is
discernable, even though it is not pleaded with legal nicety, then the district court should construe
the complaint in a way that permits the layperson’s claim to be considered within the proper legal
framework.” Jackson, 747 F.3d at 544 (cleaned up). The complaint must still allege specific facts
sufficient to support a claim. Martin v. Sargent, 780 F.2d 1334, 1337 (8th Cir. 1985).
III. 	ANALYSIS
A. 	Defendants Peterson, White and Otts
Plaintiff’s individual capacity claims against these Defendants are subject to dismissal.
“Liability under Section 1983 requires a causal link to, and direct responsibility for, the deprivation
of rights.” Madewell v. Roberts, 909 F.2d 1203, 1208 (8th Cir. 1990) (citing Rizzo v. Goode, 423
U.S. 362, 370 (1976)). Thus, to state a cognizable Section 1983 claim, a complaint must set forth
specific factual allegations showing what each named defendant allegedly did, or failed to do, that
allegedly violated the plaintiff’s federal constitutional rights. Plaintiff has not alleged a causal link
between any of these Defendants and his claims. See Martin, 780 F.2d 1337 (even a pro se Plaintiff
must allege specific facts sufficient to state a claim).
To the extent Plaintiff’s allegations could be inferred to state that kitchen supervisor
Defendant Peterson was responsible for the piece of metal in his food, Plaintiff's allegation still
fails to state a plausible personal capacity claim. “Constitutional standards require only that prison
authorities provide an inmate with well-balanced meals, containing sufficient nutritional value to
preserve health.” Berry v. Brady, 192 F.3d 504, 507 (5th Cir. 1999) (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted).
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An isolated incident involving a foreign object in the food does not state a claim of
constitutional dimension. See e.g., Wishon v. Gammon, 978 F.2d 446, 449 (8th Cir. 1992)
(prisoners have a right to nutritionally adequate food, but Wishon presented no evidence that the
food he was served was nutritionally inadequate or prepared in a manner presenting an immediate
danger to his health, or that his health suffered as a result of the food); Hamm v. DeKalb County,
774 F.2d 1567, 1572 (11th Cir. 1985) (“The fact that the food occasionally contains foreign objects
... does not amount to a constitutional deprivation”); Lunsford v. Reynolds, 376 F.Supp. 526, 527
(W.D. Va. 1974) (“The only contention concerning food which is detailed at all, is the inmates’
complaint that their food frequently contains insects. Nevertheless, occasional incidents of a
foreign object contained in food, while regrettable, do not present a question of constitutional
proportion”).
Here, Plaintiff alleges only that there was a foreign object in his food on a single occasion.
While it is regrettable that his mouth and tooth were injured, the incident does not rise to the level
of a constitutional violation.
B. 	Defendants Anderson and Martin
Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Anderson and Martin denied him medical care when they
followed the instructions of medical staff and returned him to the barracks to place a sick call. The
Eighth Amendment prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment prohibits deliberate indifference
to prisoners’ serious medical needs. Luckert v. Dodge County, 684 F.3d 808, 817 (8th Cir. 2012).
To prevail on his Eighth Amendment claim, Plaintiff must prove that Defendants acted with
deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976).
The deliberate indifference standard includes “both an objective and a subjective
component: ‘The [Plaintiff] must demonstrate (1) that [he] suffered [from] objectively serious
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medical needs and (2) that the prison officials actually knew of but deliberately disregarded those
needs.’” Jolly v. Knudsen, 205 F.3d 1094, 1096 (8th Cir. 2000) (quoting Dulany v. Carnahan, 132
F.3d 1234, 1239 (8th Cir. 1997)).
To show that he suffered from an objectively serious medical need Plaintiff must show he
“has been diagnosed by a physician as requiring treatment” or has an injury “that is so obvious
that even a layperson would easily recognize the necessity for a doctor’s attention.” 	Schaub v.
VonWald, 638 F.3d 905, 914 (8th Cir. 2011) (citation omitted).
For the subjective prong of deliberate indifference, “the prisoner must show more than
negligence, more even than gross negligence, and mere disagreement with treatment decisions
does not give rise to the level of a constitutional violation.” Popoalii v. Correctional Med. Servs.,
512 F.3d 488, 499 (8th Cir. 2008) (citation omitted). “Deliberate indifference is akin to criminal
recklessness, which demands more than negligent misconduct.” Id.
It is well settled that “[a] prisoner’s mere difference of opinion over matters of expert
medical judgment or a course of medical treatment fail[s] to rise to the level of a constitutional
violation.” Nelson v. Shuffman, 603 F.3d 439, 449 (8th Cir. 2010) (internal citation omitted). An
“inmate must clear a substantial evidentiary threshold to show the prison’s medical staff
deliberately disregarded the inmate’s needs by administering inadequate treatment.” Id. (internal
citations omitted). Despite this, issues of fact exist when there is a question of whether medical
staff exercised independent medical judgment, and whether the decisions made by medical staff
fell so far below the reasonable standard of care as to constitute deliberate indifference. See Smith
v. Jenkins, 919 F.2d 90, 93 (8th Cir. 1990).
Deliberate indifference may also be manifested by “prison guards in intentionally denying
or delaying access to medical care or intentionally interfering with the treatment once prescribed.”
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Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104–05. However, the “Constitution does not require jailers to handle every
medical complaint as quickly as each inmate might wish.” Jenkins v. County of Hennepin, Minn.,
557 F.3d 628, 633 (8th Cir. 2009). “A prisoner alleging a delay in treatment must present verifying
medical evidence that the prison officials ‘ignored an acute or escalating situation or that [these]
delays adversely affected his prognosis[,]’” Holden v. Hirner, 663 F.3d 336, 342 (8th Cir. 2011)
(citations omitted), unless the need for medical attention is obvious to a layperson, in which case
the plaintiff need not submit verifying medical evidence to show the detrimental effects of delay.
See Schaub, 638 F.3d at 919 (citing Roberson v. Bradshaw, 198 F.3d 645, 648 (8th Cir. 1999));
Aswegan v. Henry, 49 F.3d 461, 464 (8th Cir. 1995); cf. Boyd v. Knox, 47 F.3d 966, 969 (8th Cir.
1995) (“noting that a delay in treatment, coupled with knowledge that an inmate is suffering, can
support a finding of an Eighth Amendment violation”).
For the purposes of screening only, the Court will assume that Plaintiff’s chipped tooth and
bleeding mouth meet the first prong of the deliberate indifference test. 	His allegations fail,
however, to meet the second, subjective prong of the test. Nothing in Plaintiff’s allegations permit
the inference that his dental issue was an acute and escalating situation. 	Instead, he alleges
Defendant Anderson and Martin promptly contacted medical staff, who advised them that Plaintiff
should submit a sick call. They then followed the advice of medical staff and returned him to his
barracks to place that sick call. To the extent Plaintiff complains of the delay in medical care, he
fails to allege that his prognosis for his tooth or mouth were adversely affected by any delay in the
provision of medical care. The Court also notes that it is not possible to determine the extent of
any delay because Plaintiff does not provide this information. See Martin, 780 F.2d at 1337 (a pro
se plaintiff must still allege specific facts sufficient to support a claim.). 	Thus, Plaintiff fails to
state a plausible personal capacity claim against Defendants Anderson and Martin.
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C. 	Official Capacity Claims
All Defendants are identified as employees of the Arkansas Division of Correction, a state
agency. States and state agencies are not “persons” subject to suit under § 1983. Howlett v. Rose,
496 U.S. 356 (1990); Will v. Mich. Dept. of State Police, 491 U.S. 58 (1989); McLean v. Gordon,
548 F.3d 613, 618 (8th Cir. 2008). “This bar exists whether the relief sought is legal or equitable.”
Williams v. Missouri, 973 F.2d 599, 599-600 (8th Cir. 1992) (citing Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S.
265, 276 (1986)). “Congress did not abrogate constitutional sovereign immunity when enacting
the law that was to become section 1983.” Burk v. Beene, 948 F.2d 489, 493 (8th Cir. 1991) (citing
Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 342 (1979)). 	“A suit against state employees in their official
capacities is the functional equivalent of a suit against the State.” Zajrael v. Harmon, 677 F.3d
353, 355 (8th Cir. 2013). 	As Defendants are all are employees of the Arkansas Division of
Correction, Plaintiff’s official capacity claims against them are subject to dismissal.
IV. 	CONCLUSION
Accordingly, it is recommended that Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint (ECF No. 32) be
DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.
The parties have fourteen (14) days from receipt of the Report and Recommendation
in which to file written objections pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). The failure to file timely
objections may result in waiver of the right to appeal questions of fact. 	The parties are
reminded that objections must be both timely and specific to trigger de novo review by the
district court.
DATED this 3rd day of February 2025.
/s/
Mark E. Ford
HON. MARK E. FORD
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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