Moore v. Deakins et al

1
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS
FAYETTEVILLE DIVISION
SARAH MOORE 	PLAINTIFF
V. 	CASE NO. 5:25-CV-5123
PATRICK DEAKINS, in his official capacity
as WASHINGTON COUNTY JUDGE;
WASHINGTON COUNTY, ARKANSAS;
and RETURNING HOME, INC.,
an Arkansas Non-Profit Corporation 	DEFENDANTS
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Before the Court is a Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 23) and Brief in Support (Doc. 24)
filed by Defendants Patrick Deakins, in his official capacity as Washington County Judge,
and by Washington County, Arkansas (collectively, “Washington County Defendants”).
They ask that the Amended Complaint (Doc. 21) be dismissed for failure to state a
plausible claim of illegal exaction under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Plaintiff
Sarah Moore filed a Response in Opposition to the Motion (Doc. 25) and Brief in Support
(Doc. 26), and Washington County Defendants filed a Reply (Doc. 31). For the reasons
stated below, the Motion is GRANTED.
I. 	BACKGROUND
According to the Amended Complaint, various persons employed by Washington
County began discussing in the late summer or early fall of 2024 various ways to address
mental health and substance abuse programming for pretrial detainees housed in the
Washington County Detention Center (“WCDC”). Plaintiff Sarah Moore, the Executive
Director of a non-profit organization called the Arkansas Justice Reform Coalition became
Case 5:25-cv-05123-TLB Document 40 Filed 02/25/26 Page 1 of 10 PageID #:
<pageID>

2
aware of the County’s interest and wished to participate in the ongoing discussions. On
October 21, 2024, she submitted an Arkansas Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”)
request to Separate Defendant Patrick Deakins, the County Judge, requesting all
documents and communications concerning an inpatient mental health facility called the
“Washington County Crisis Stabilization Unit” (“CSU”), including the uses of its building
for programming by the WCDC, its service providers, and its funding from May 2024 to
the present. In response to the FOIA request, Ms. Moore only received a copy of an
Outlook calendar entry and several emails. (Doc. 21, ¶ 10).
About three months later, on January 14, 2025, County Judge Deakins signed a
County Court Order finding that:
• 	Washington County had recently secured grant funding for a drug treatment
program for the County’s pretrial detainee population;
• 	a non-profit service provider called Returning Home was uniquely situated to
operate a drug treatment program for County detainees at scale;
• 	other providers could offer some, but not all, of the services Returning Home could
provide; and
• 	no other local providers expressed interest in operating the program at this stage
and at the scale offered by Returning Home.
See id. ¶ 21. The County Court Order did not attach any documentation explaining why
the County had not subjected Returning Home’s contract to a competitive bidding
process.
On 	February 	20, 	2025, 	the 	Washington 	County 	Quorum 	Court 	passed 	an
ordinance creating the Community Rebuilding Initiative Grant Fund (“CRI Fund”), and
County Judge Deakins signed the ordinance into law. See Doc. 3, p. 12. This ordinance
Case 5:25-cv-05123-TLB Document 40 Filed 02/25/26 Page 2 of 10 PageID #:
<pageID>

3
recognized that the CRI Fund had been awarded a grant of $355,455.74 from the
Arkansas Department of Finance and Administration (“DFA”). Ms. Moore contends that
this grant money originated from the federal government—through the Department of
Justice’s Office of Justice Programs (“OJP”)—and was passed through the Arkansas DFA
for distribution to the County. In addition to the OJP/DFA funds, the County contributed
$575,000.00 to the CRI Fund from the County’s General Fund.
On November 20, 2025, the Quorum Court appropriated an additional $378,787.68
for the CRI Fund to be used by Returning Home for residential substance abuse
treatment. This second appropriation, like the first, was sourced from both federal OJP
funds (passed through the Arkansas DFA) and the County’s General Fund. See Doc. 36,
¶ 4.
Ms. Moore, in her capacity as a taxpayer residing in Washington County, now
brings suit against County Defendants for illegal exaction. Under Arkansas law, an illegal
exaction claim alleges the misapplication of public funds or recovery of funds wrongly
paid by the government. See Pledger v. Featherlite Precast Corp., 308 Ark. 124, 128
(1992). Ms. Moore contends that public funds generated from tax dollars have been
misapplied or misspent by the County to fund Returning Home’s substance abuse
treatment program for pretrial detainees. Her first argument is that County Defendants
violated 2 C.F.R. § 200.320, which requires that the recipient of federal funds engage in
a competitive bidding process or obtain advance OJP approval for noncompetitive
procurement. Ms. Moore believes that County Defendants were obligated to engage in
competitive bidding or get advance OJP permission before distributing CRI Fund money
Case 5:25-cv-05123-TLB Document 40 Filed 02/25/26 Page 3 of 10 PageID #:
<pageID>

4
to Returning Home. Her second argument is that County Defendants violated Arkansas
Code § 14-22-106(22)(B) by failing to attach documentation to County Judge Deakins’s
January Order to prove that competitive bidding was not necessary, since only one
provider—Returning Home—was equipped to provide the inpatient drug treatment
services the County needed.
In addition to her illegal exaction claim, Ms. Moore argues that the County’s award
of federal and state funding to Returning Home violates Equal Protection because
Returning Home only serves male pretrial detainees, so female pretrial detainees cannot
benefit from the program. Ms. Moore seeks a declaratory judgment that the County’s
contract for services with Returning Home is void and its funding method illegal because
the County failed to comply with federal and state procurement laws. She also requests
injunctive relief to stop County Defendants from disbursing CRI Funds to Returning Home
and to force Returning Home to refund the money it already received from the County.
In the Motion to Dismiss now before the Court, County Defendants argue that Ms.
Moore has failed to state a plausible illegal exaction claim based on a violation of either
federal or state law. Beginning with federal law, County Defendants observe that the
competitive-bidding regulation at 2 C.F.R. § 200.320 contains certain exceptions, and Ms.
Moore admits that the January 2025 Order explained reasons why Returning Home’s
contract qualified as an exceptional case. See Doc. 21, ¶ 12. County Defendants contend
that Ms. Moore does nothing more than speculate that the County’s reasons were
unfounded and that competitive bidding was, in fact, required. They claim she points to
no community organizations that were similarly situated to Returning Home and that
Case 5:25-cv-05123-TLB Document 40 Filed 02/25/26 Page 4 of 10 PageID #:
<pageID>

5
would have been interested in engaging in competitive bidding. Along the same lines,
they believe there are no facts to show that Returning Home was not the only possible
source for the County’s particular inpatient substance abuse service needs. They
disagree with Ms. Moore that Arkansas law required County Judge Deakins to attach
supporting documentation to the Order awarding the contract to Returning Home.
Ms. Moore opposes the Motion to Dismiss and believes she has stated enough
facts to plausibly show that County Defendants were obligated to engage in competitive
bidding before allocating federal funds to Returning Home and that Arkansas law required
County Judge Deakins to actually attach documentation supporting his noncompetitive
procurement decision to the January 2025 Order.
II. 	LEGAL STANDARD
To avoid dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6), “a complaint must contain sufficient factual
matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft
v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544
(2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility when the pleaded factual content allows the court
to draw reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). A pleading containing mere
“labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action
will not do.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555; see also Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (“Threadbare
recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements,
do not suffice” and are “not entitled to the assumption of truth.”). Instead, “[t]he complaint
Case 5:25-cv-05123-TLB Document 40 Filed 02/25/26 Page 5 of 10 PageID #:
<pageID>

6
must allege facts, which, when taken as true, raise more than a speculative right to relief.”
Benton v. Merrill Lynch & Co., Inc., 524 F.3d 866, 870 (8th Cir. 2008).
III. DISCUSSION
A. Illegal Exaction
Ms. Moore contends that County Defendants misapplied or illegally spent tax
dollars in violation of: (1) federal law, namely, the competitive bidding requirements of 2
C.F.R. § 200.320, and (2) Arkansas law, namely, the documentation requirements of
Arkansas Code § 14-22-106(22)(B) and the competitive bidding requirements of §§ 14-
22-101 to 14-22-115. The Court addresses each argument below.
1. 	Federal Law
According to the Amended Complaint, County Defendants committed illegal
exaction by failing to adhere to the procurement rules for using federal funds, as set forth
at 2 C.F.R. § 200.320. They allocated over $250,000.00 in federal funds to pay Returning
Home for providing drug treatment services to the County’s pretrial detainees. Ms. Moore
reads the regulation as requiring competitive bidding before funds of that magnitude may
be allocated, or at the very least, advance written approval by a federal agency or pass-
through entity to forgo competitive bidding.
2 	C.F.R. 	§ 	20.320(c)(2) 	states 	that 	a 	recipient 	of 	federal 	funds—such 	as
Washington 	County—“may 	use 	a 	noncompetitive 	procurement 	method” 	if 	“[t]he
procurement transaction can only be fulfilled by a single source.” According to the
Amended Complaint, on January 14, 2025, the County made an official determination
memorialized 	in 	a 	County 	Court 	Order 	signed 	by 	County 	Judge 	Deakins 	that 	a
Case 5:25-cv-05123-TLB Document 40 Filed 02/25/26 Page 6 of 10 PageID #:
<pageID>

7
noncompetitive procurement method was appropriate because Returning Home was
uniquely capable of operating a drug treatment program at the contemplated scale for
pretrial county detainees, no other providers offered all aspects of the contemplated
program, and no other providers had expressed interest in operating the program at this
stage and at this scale. (Doc. 21, ¶ 12).
If the assertions in County Judge Deakins’s Order are factually supported, then
§ 20.320(c)(2)’s exception applies, and the County was not required to engage in
competitive bidding. Ms. Moore contends this exception does not apply. But her say-so is
not enough to state a claim. Instead, she must point to facts to indicate Returning Home
was not the only source for these services, other providers could have offered these
services, or other providers were consulted and did not express interest in providing these
services. Her pleadings contain no such facts. She relies exclusively on the FOIA request
she sent to County Judge Deakins in October 2024 seeking:
1. 	Any and all documents and communications for the Washington County
Crisis Stabilization Unit for county uses to include jail or programming
uses, 	other 	building 	uses, 	building 	improvements 	or 	needs, 	and
providers of services using the building from May 2024 to present
2. 	Any and all communications and documents from any Washington
county official or staff to/from any Arkansas state legislator about a CSU
or the CSU building for providers, funding, or other uses from May 2024
to present
3. 	Any and all communications and documents from any Washington
county official or staff to/from any programming or service provider about
a CSU or the CSU building for providers, funding, or other uses from
May 2024 to present
Case 5:25-cv-05123-TLB Document 40 Filed 02/25/26 Page 7 of 10 PageID #:
<pageID>

8
(Doc. 3, p. 9). Ms. Moore claims she received a paltry number of documents in response
to her request, which leads her to believe the County never meaningfully explored other
programming sources than Returning Home.
The above is supposition on Ms. Moore’s part and is insufficient to state a claim.
Her FOIA request was issued months before the County Judge’s Order and did not
request the specific documents upon which the Order now relies. She does not claim she
issued a FOIA request for the documents supporting the Order, and without them, the
Amended Complaint’s allegations are mere speculation. “Factual allegations must be
enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.
The plausibility standard requires “more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has
acted unlawfully.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Ms. Moore’s legal exaction claim based on the
violation of federal law fails to survive legal scrutiny.
2. 	State Law
Ms. Moore also alleges that County Defendants have committed an illegal exaction
by failing to adhere to the service procurement procedures required under Arkansas law.
Specifically, she points to Arkansas Code § 14-22-106(22)(B), which states that if a
government entity asserts that a service may only be purchased “from a single source”—
as is the case here—such a purchase “shall be supported with”:
(i) Documentation concerning the exclusivity of the single source; and
(ii) A county court order filed with the county clerk that sets forth the basis
for the single source procurement.
Ark. Code Ann. § 14-22-106(22)(B)(i)–(ii).
Case 5:25-cv-05123-TLB Document 40 Filed 02/25/26 Page 8 of 10 PageID #:
<pageID>

9
Ms. Moore agrees that the second part of the test has been satisfied, in that County
Judge Deakins filed a County Court Order setting forth the bases for single source
procurement from Returning Home. But as to the first part of the test, Ms. Moore believes
County Defendants violated the law by “fail[ing] to attach documentation” to the Order “as
to the exclusivity of a single source.” (Doc. 21, ¶ 40c.). County Defendants insist they
were not required to attach any documentation to the Order.
Defendants clearly have it right: The statute does not contain the word “attach,”
much as Ms. Moore would like it to. Instead, the statute says that a purchase “shall be
supported with . . . Documentation.” Ark. Code Ann. § 14-22-106(22)(B)(i). The statute
only requires supporting documentation to exist and, presumably, to be maintained in
County Defendants’ possession if requested. Therefore, the Amended Complaint fails to
plausibly allege a violation of Arkansas law sufficient to support an illegal exaction claim.
B. Equal Protection Claim
“A fundamental principle of equal protection is that the Constitution only prohibits
intentional or purposeful discrimination by the state.” Klinger v. Dep’t of Corr., 31 F.3d 727,
733 (8th Cir. 1994). Ms. Moore does not contend that County Defendants intentionally or
purposefully 	sought 	to 	discriminate 	against 	female 	pretrial 	detainees 	when 	they
awarded CRI Funds to Returning Home. Quite the contrary: She acknowledges in her
Supplement to the Amended Complaint that the County recently awarded more than
$350,000.00 to a residential substance abuse provider serving the female pretrial
detainee population. See Doc. 36, ¶ 20. She simply finds it “curious” that the County
submitted the women’s services contract for competitive bidding, but not the men’s. Id
Case 5:25-cv-05123-TLB Document 40 Filed 02/25/26 Page 9 of 10 PageID #:
<pageID>

10
Setting aside Ms. Moore’s curiosity in favor of the facts, the Amended Complaint
does not plausibly suggest that County Defendants violated federal or state law in
procuring funds for men’s substance abuse services without competitive bidding. And as
for the equal protection claim, it is not viable due to Ms. Moore’s lack of standing. A
taxpayer whose tax money is used in a discriminatory manner suffers no injury under the
Equal Protection Clause unless and until the state’s expenditure of funds facilities
discrimination against her, personally. See Booth v. Hvass, 302 F.3d 849, 854 (8th Cir.
2002) (citing Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 103 (1968)). Here, Ms. Moore does not assert
that she is a pretrial detainee at the WCDC or is likely to be eligible for the County’s
substance abuse services. Accordingly, the equal protection claim is subject to dismissal.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons explained above, IT IS ORDERED that Defendants’ Motion to
Dismiss (Doc. 23) is GRANTED, and the case is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE
for failure to state a claim. All other pending motions are TERMINATED, and the CASE
IS CLOSED.
IT IS SO ORDERED on this 25 th day of February, 2026.
________________________________
TIMOTHY L. BROOKS
CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Case 5:25-cv-05123-TLB Document 40 Filed 02/25/26 Page 10 of 10 PageID #:
<pageID>