Desai v. Walmart Inc.

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS
FAYETTEVILLE DIVISION
MIRANT DESAI 	PLAINTIFF
V. 	CASE NO. 5:25-CV-5099
WALMART, INC. 	DEFENDANT
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Before the Court are Defendant Walmart, Inc.’s Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State
a Claim (Doc. 43) and Brief in Support (Doc. 44), Plaintiff Mirant Desai’s Response in
Opposition (Doc. 45), and Walmart’s Reply (Doc. 48). For the reasons explained below,
the Motion is GRANTED.
I. 	BACKGROUND
Mr. Desai alleges in his Amended Complaint (Doc. 38) that Walmart, his former
employer, discriminated against him based on his national origin,1 subjected him to a
hostile work environment, retaliated against him—after he was fired—by suing him in
state court for violating his Non-Disclosure Agreement (“NDA”), and interfered with his
contractual rights under the NDA because of his national origin, in violation of 42 U.S.C.
§ 1981.
Walmart recruited Mr. Desai in August 2023 to work on a project to enhance
Walmart’s profitability. See Doc. 38, ¶¶ 10–11. His performance evaluations in early 2024
were positive. See id. ¶ 12. However, in April 2024, he was wrongly blamed for a
colleague’s error, which he characterizes as “scapegoating.” See id. ¶¶ 13, 59. In
response, a supervisor “threatened disciplinary action” and “made a remark referencing
1 Mr. Desai indicates in his EEOC Charge that his national origin is Indian. See Doc. 2-
1, p. 1.
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[Mr. Desai’s] national origin in a derogatory manner.” Id. ¶ 14. Sometime after that, Mr.
Desai’s “colleagues began making altered versions of [his] name in a derogatory way,
also referencing his national origin and implying unemployment or lack of value.” Id. ¶ 15.
These comments were “unwelcome.” Id. ¶ 16. At another point in time, Mr. Desai says “a
supervisor and peers” made “intentionally worded remarks and comparisons referencing
[his] national origin, phrased to imply foreignness and lack of belonging within the
workplace culture.” Id. ¶ 33.
On August 8, 2024, Walmart’s CFO held a town-hall meeting where he “hinted at
a workforce reduction.” Id. ¶ 17. The following day, August 9, Mr. Desai was summoned
to a meeting with his supervisor and “accused of communication issues and declining a
meeting, accusations he disputes and believes were manufactured to justify adverse
action.” Id. ¶ 18. Just prior to that, Mr. Desai was blamed for “creat[ing] productivity issues
for another team.” Id. ¶ 19. He insists that this accusation “was exaggerated” and “arose
from a trivial and routine interaction” with another colleague, id., but admits that Walmart
identified numerous other problems with his work, including: (1) “a processing lag in a
large-volume spreadsheet formula,” id. ¶ 34; (2) failing to meet a deadline for an “ad-hoc,
time 	sensitive 	task”—though 	Mr. 	Desai 	maintains 	“the 	urgency 	surrounding 	the
assignment was manufactured,” id. ¶ 35; (3) “communication issues” that caused
“discomfort” in his colleagues, id. ¶¶ 36, 41; (4) “anomalies” in Mr. Desai’s “supplier-
resolution work,” id. ¶ 37; (5) “repetitive communications,” id. ¶ 38; and (6) issues with his
“professionalism and directness,” which Walmart described as “negative traits,” id. ¶ 41.
On October 29, 2024, Mr. Desai was advised that he had “six weeks to find another
role within Walmart or be separated.” Id. ¶ 20. He applied to more than ten positions within
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Walmart but was never offered any interviews, which he blames on “an internal
reputational campaign to erode his standing and foreclose reemployment opportunities.”
Id. ¶ 27. He was fired on December 20, 2024.
After his 	termination, Mr. 	Desai brought a 	timely 	charge of 	national 	origin
discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. After receiving his
right-to-sue-letter, he filed the instant lawsuit. Attached to the original complaint (Doc. 1)
were several exhibits that Walmart believed contained confidential and proprietary
information covered by Mr. Desai’s NDA. Mr. Desai explains that he only attached those
exhibits to his complaint to “demonstrate meritocracy in his career trajectory.” Id. ¶ 9. He
also admitted sharing these documents with a third party, the Stanford Business School,
as part of an application he submitted for the school’s leadership program. See id.
Walmart’s position was that the NDA prohibited Mr. Desai from taking copies of any of
these documents with him after he was fired and from disclosing them to any members
of the public—including in federal court filings on the public docket. Accordingly, Walmart
moved to seal the exhibits from public view, and the Court granted the motion. See Doc.
7 (Motion to Seal); Doc. 11 (Text Order Sealing Exhibits). Shortly after that, Walmart sued
Mr. Desai in state court for violating the NDA and the Arkansas Trade Secrets Act and
committing the torts of misappropriation and conversion of a laptop.
In the instant federal suit, Mr. Desai brings claims for national origin discrimination
under Title VII, a hostile work environment under Title VII, and the violation of 42 U.S.C.
§ 1981—because in Mr. Desai’s opinion, the NDA permitted him to file confidential
documents on the public docket, and Walmart’s state court suit concerning the NDA was
brought for discriminatory reasons related to his national origin.
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II. 	LEGAL STANDARD
To avoid dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6), “a complaint must contain sufficient factual
matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft
v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544
(2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility when the pleaded factual content allows the court
to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). A pleading containing mere
“labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action
will not do.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555; see also Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (“Threadbare
recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements,
do not suffice” and are “not entitled to the assumption of truth.”). Instead, “[t]he complaint
must allege facts, which, when taken as true, raise more than a speculative right to relief.”
Benton v. Merrill Lynch & Co., Inc., 524 F.3d 866, 870 (8th Cir. 2008).
III. 	DISCUSSION
A. Title VII National Origin Discrimination
It is black-letter law that an at-will employee may be fired for any reason, provided
it is not a discriminatory one. See Hill v. St. Louis Univ., 123 F.3d 1114, 1120 (8th Cir.
1997) (“Title VII [is] not meant to transform ‘at will’ employment into perpetual employment
where equal treatment is guaranteed to all employees and termination is legal only ‘for
cause.’”). Furthermore, courts do not “sit as super-personnel departments reviewing the
wisdom or fairness of the business judgments made by employers.” Guimaraes v.
SuperValu, Inc., 674 F.3d 962, 977 (8th Cir. 2012) (citation omitted).
A review of Mr. Desai’s Amended Complaint reveals that out of 95 paragraphs of
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facts, only three—Paragraphs 14, 15, and 33—contain any references to national origin.
The rest of the paragraphs either anticipate (and deflect) Walmart’s critiques of Mr.
Desai’s job performance or explain why Walmart’s state court suit was improper.
When assessing a Title VII claim at the pleading phase, “the elements of the prima
facie case are not irrelevant to a plausibility determination”; rather, those elements, as set
forth in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973), “may be used as
a prism to shed light upon the plausibility of the claim.” Warmington v. Bd. of Regents of
Univ. of Minn., 998 F.3d 789, 796 (8th Cir. 2021) (citation modified). “Through this prism,
the complaint must include sufficient factual allegations to provide the grounds on which
the claim rests.” Id. (citation modified).
A prima facie case of national-origin discrimination requires facts sufficient to show
the employee was a member of the protected class, was qualified for his job, suffered an
adverse 	employment 	action, 	and 	the 	circumstances 	give 	rise 	to 	an 	inference 	of
discrimination. See McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802. The only facts in the Amended
Complaint that allegedly give rise to an inference of discrimination are as follows: (1) in
April 2024, eight months before Mr. Desai was fired, “a supervisor threatened disciplinary
action and made a remark referencing [Mr. Desai’s] national origin in a derogatory
manner,” (Doc. 38, ¶ 14); (2) Mr. Desai’s colleagues made “altered versions of [his] name
in a derogatory way” and “referenc[ed] his national origin” such as to imply his “lack of
value” to the company, id. ¶ 15; and (3) on an unspecified date, “a supervisor and peers
made intentionally worded remarks and comparisons referencing [Mr. Desai’s] national
origin, phrased to imply foreignness and lack of belonging within the workplace culture,”
id. ¶ 33. Based on these facts, Mr. Desai concludes “that discriminatory bias influenced
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managerial perception” that he was not performing adequately and led to an “eventual
termination” decision.” Id.
First, the Court finds that the Amended Complaint fails to allege that Mr. Desai’s
“colleagues” and “peers” who made these remarks had any influence in the decisional
process that resulted in Mr. Desai’s termination. But even if they had, stray comments
alluding to an employee’s “foreignness” and “lack of belonging within the workplace
culture”—though isolating—do not plausibly create an inference that a termination
decision was motivated by discriminatory animus. The Eighth Circuit has carefully
distinguished between comments “demonstrating discriminatory animus in the decisional
process”—which are actionable—and “stray remarks in the workplace, statements by
nondecisionmakers, 	or 	statements 	by 	decisionmakers 	unrelated 	to 	the 	decisional
process”—which are not actionable. Clearwater v. Indep. Sch. Dis. No. 166, 231 F.3d
1122, 1126 (8th Cir. 2000). “Not all comments that may reflect a discriminatory attitude
are sufficiently related to the adverse employment action in question to support . . . an
inference [of discrimination].” Walton v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 167 F.3d 423, 426 (8th
Cir. 1999). The Court concludes that in the case at bar, the stray remarks described in
Paragraphs 15 and 33 do not plausibly support a prima facie case of national-origin
discrimination.
Second, the supervisor’s “remark referencing [Mr. Desai’s] national origin in a
derogatory manner,” was uttered in April 2024, shortly after the supervisor “wrongly
blamed” Mr. Desai for a “colleague’s errors.” (Doc. 38, ¶¶ 13–14). It follows that this
remark—whatever it was2—occurred approximately eight months before Mr. Desai’s
2 Mr. Desai’s Response to the Motion never discloses the derogatory remark. He claims
“[t]he exact phrasing is a discovery issue.” (Doc. 45, pp. 5–6).
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termination. That fact substantially weakens the plausibility of there being a causal nexus
between the remark and the termination decision. Moreover, as previously noted, a stray
remark, “standing alone” without other circumstantial evidence, does not “give rise to an
inference of discrimination” as a matter of law. Fisher v. Pharmacia & Upjohn, 225 F.3d
915, 922 (8th Cir. 2000). Mr. Desai points to no evidence other than the supervisor’s
unspecified remark to support a claim that he was fired because of his national origin,
and therefore, the Title VII discrimination claim is DISMISSED.
B. Title VII Hostile Work Environment
Next, Mr. Desai contends he was subjected to a hostile work environment based
on the workplace comments noted above. A prima facie case for hostile work environment
requires facts to show that workplace harassment affected a term, condition, or privilege
of employment. See Hesse v. Avis Rent A Car Sys., Inc., 394 F.3d 624, 629 (8th Cir.
2005). According to the Eighth Circuit, the conduct “must be extreme to amount to a
change in the terms and conditions of employment.” Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524
U.S. 775, 788 (1998) (emphasis added). In evaluating a claim, courts must consider the
totality of the circumstances, “including the ‘frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its
severity; whether it is physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance;
and whether it unreasonably interferes with an employee's work performance.’” Id. at
787–88.
Here, Mr. Desai points to a couple of “derogatory” references to his national origin,
some isolating comments about his “foreignness” and lack of acceptance into the
workplace culture, and an incident in which his name was said or spelled incorrectly which
presumably insulted him. Assuming those facts are true, they fail to meet the level of
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frequency or severity needed to allege a plausible hostile workplace claim. See Burkett
v. Glickman, 327 F.3d 658, 662 (8th Cir. 2003) (“Offhand commands and isolated
incidents of offensive conduct (unless extremely serious) do not constitute a hostile work
environment.”). This claim is therefore DISMISSED.
C. Violation of 42 U.S.C. §1981
Mr. Desai’s § 1981 claim is difficult to understand. He insists that Walmart’s state
court lawsuit against him was motivated by national origin discrimination and somehow
interfered with his ability to enforce and benefit from his NDA. Section 1981 assures that
all persons “have the same right . . . to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties,
give evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security
of persons and property as is enjoyed by white citizens . . . .” 42 U.S.C. §1981(a). But in
general, § 1981 concerns discrimination on the basis of race or color and “does not
authorize discrimination claims based on national origin.” Torgerson v. City of Rochester,
648 F.3d 1031, 1053 (8th Cir. 2011).
Although it is true that in some cases, discrimination based on national origin may
fairly equate to race discrimination, the instant case does not fit that mold. The Amended
Complaint does not suggest that Mr. Desai experienced discrimination on the basis of
race or color at Walmart; and, as noted above, he failed to state a claim for national-origin
discrimination. Finally, Mr. Desai never explains how Walmart impaired his ability to make
or enforce any contract, including his NDA, or impaired his ability to sue, give evidence,
or enjoy equal benefit of the laws. The § 1981 claim is therefore DISMISSED.
D. Retaliation
Mr. Desai’s last claim for Title VII/§ 1981 retaliation is also subject to dismissal. A
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prima facie claim of retaliation requires facts to show: (1) the employee engaged in
protected conduct; (2) the employer retaliated against him, and (3) the retaliation was
causally linked to the protected conduct. See Brenneman v. Famous Dave's of Am.,
Inc., 507 F.3d 1139, 1146 (8th Cir. 2007). Mr. Desai argues that he engaged in protected
conduct by filing the instant federal lawsuit, and Walmart retaliated by filing suit against
him in state court for breach of the NDA. However, the link between these two lawsuits is
temporal rather than causal. Walmart first suspected that Mr. Desai had violated his NDA
when he filed confidential and proprietary Walmart documents in the federal suit on the
public docket. This was when Walmart concluded that Mr. Desai had retained the
documents after he was fired—allegedly in violation of his NDA.
In addition, Mr. Desai challenged the propriety of the state court suit in a separate
federal action. He accused Walmart of abuse of process, obstruction of justice, and the
violation of his constitutional rights. See Desai v. Walmart, Case No. 5:25-CV-5190 (W.D.
Ark.). The Court dismissed that case under Rule 12(b)(6), see id. (ECF 13), and the Eighth
Circuit affirmed, see id. (ECF 20). For all these reasons, Mr. Desai’s retaliation claim is
DISMISSED.
IV. 	CONCLUSION
IT IS ORDERED that the Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim (Doc. 43)
is GRANTED, and the case is DISMISED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.
IT IS SO ORDERED on this 13th day of April, 2026.
_______________________________________
TIMOTHY L. BROOKS
CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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