Meraz v. Liles et al

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS
FAYETTEVILLE DIVISION
JEROME MERAZ 	PLAINTIFF
v. 	Civil No. 5:24-cv-05255-CDC
OFFICER J. LILES, Fayetteville Police
Department (FPD); JOHN DOE PATROL
OFFICER #1, FPD; OFFICER SERATT,
FPD; JANE DOE DISPATCHER, FPD;
OFFICER ELLIS DONALDSON, FPD;
JOHN DOE FPD OFFICER OR WASHINGTON
COUNTY DEPUTY; JOHN DOE PATROL
OFFICER #2; CHIEF OF POLICE MIKE
REYNOLDS, FPD; OFFICER J. HARRIS, FPD;
OFFICER J. FAUBUS, FPD; OFFICER BOYD,
FPD; OFFICER J. BAILEY, FPD; DEPUTY
CLIFFORD, Sebastian County Sheriff; OFFICER
S. CALVILLO, FPD; and OFFICER HUTSELL, FPD 	DEFENDANTS
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Plaintiff, Jerome Meraz (“Meraz”), an inmate of the Delta Regional Unit of the Arkansas
Division of Correction (“ADC”), filed this civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 	Meraz
proceeds pro se and in forma pauperis.
The case was directly assigned to the undersigned Magistrate Judge. 	However, because
not all parties to the action have consented to the jurisdiction of the undersigned, and this document
will be dispositive of certain of Meraz’s claims, this document will be filed as a Report and
Recommendation and the case will automatically be reassigned to United States District Judge
Timothy L. Brooks. 	28 U.S.C. § 636(c); Rule 73 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and
General Order 2024-02.
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The case is before the Court for preservice screening of the Amended Complaint (ECF No.
6) under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. 	Pursuant to § 1915A, the Court has the obligation to screen any
complaint in which a prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of
a governmental entity.
I. 	BACKGROUND
When Meraz filed this case, he was advised that his original complaint was deficient in
three ways. 	(ECF No. 3). 	First, he mentioned several officers in the statement of his claims that
he had not listed as Defendants. 	Id. 	If he intended to pursue claims against these individuals,
Meraz was advised he must list them as Defendants. 	Id. 	Second, Meraz failed to factually
describe how each named Defendant personally violated his federal constitutional rights. 	Id.
Third, Meraz failed to use the Court’s approved § 1983 complaint form. 	Id. 	Meraz was given
explicit instructions on what his Amended Complaint must contain. 	Id.
Meraz’s Amended Complaint is currently before the Court. 	(ECF No. 6). 	Claim One
concerns an incident occurring on August 13, 2022. 	Id. at 6. 	On this day, Meraz says he pulled
into an apartment complex on Leverett Street in Fayetteville which was adjacent to an apartment
complex where Rryna Mello (“Mello”) had lived. 	Id. 	Meraz states he was driving on auto pilot
because he had always parked at this complex when he stayed with Mello. 	Id. 	Meraz, who lived
in Berryville at the time, says he spent two to five nights a week there since June of 2021. 	Id. at
7. 	Because he could not see his car from Mello’s apartment, he always parked in the adjacent
complex’s lot. 	Id. 	Meraz indicates Mello was the only person he knew in Fayetteville. 	Id.
Earlier in the year, on April 2, 2022, Meraz was arrested for trespassing at Mello’s
apartment complex, 75 W. Sycamore, apartment 49, and served with a temporary order of
protection that Mello had obtained. 	(ECF No. 6 at 7). 	Meraz maintains the order of protection
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was based on lies Mello reported. 	Id. at 9. 	Meraz asserts Mello filed false reports about him on
July 31, 2021, October 16, 2021, and March 28, 2022.
Meraz indicates he had gotten his vehicle back from a mechanic, driven to Rogers, and
then was going to head to Clarksville but stopped in Fayetteville off Wedington Drive to contact
a man about another vehicle. 	(ECF No. 6 at 7). 	Meraz says he had his windows down, his music
up, and the sun was shining. 	Id. 	The next thing he knew he was pulling into the apartment
complex on Leverett Street. 	Id. at 7-8. 	Meraz indicates he made a U-turn and left. 	Id. 	Meraz
believed Mello no longer lived in the Sycamore complex based on her earlier statements and the
fact she had talked to management about moving out. 	Id. at 7.
A short time later, Meraz was pulled over by Defendant Seratt and placed under arrest for
violating a no contact order. 	(ECF No. 6 at 8). 	At the time, Meraz says he was six miles from
the protected property. 	Id. 	Meraz maintains that in arresting him, Defendants Seratt and Liles
“went on the word of a liar” and had they investigated they would have discovered Mello’s reports
were false. 	Id. at 9. 	Further, he points out he had driven into an entirely different apartment
complex than the one Mello lived in. 	Id. at 10.
At the time of the arrest, Meraz was in possession of a knife with two-inch blade which he
always carried with him. 	(ECF No. 6 at 8). 	Even though he had the knife in his possession on
prior occasions when he encountered the law enforcement, on this occasion, Defendants Seratt and
Liles charged him with possession of a deadly weapon. 	Id. 	Meraz was on parole at the time.
Id. 	As a parolee, Meraz maintains he was entitled to possess a knife with a blade no longer than
four inches which was considered a tool. 	Id. 	Although these charges were eventually nolle
prossed on November 13, 2024, Meraz indicates he was incarcerated from the arrest on August
13, 2022, until November 12, 2024. 	Id. at 8 & 10. 	Further, Meraz says the new criminal charges
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triggered a parole revocation resulting in his current incarceration in the ADC. 	Id. at 8-9. 	Meraz
maintains Defendants Seratt and Liles were derelict in their duties, lacked probable cause to arrest
him, falsely imprisoned him, and maliciously prosecuted him. 	Id. at 6.
In Claim Two, Meraz includes incidents occurring on October 10, 2021, October 26, 2021,
April 2, 2022, and August 13, 2022. 	(ECF No. 6 at 11). 	On October 16, 2021, Meraz attempted
suicide by drinking half-a-gallon of “100 proof vodka” and taking 70, 50 mg. tablets of Tramadol.
Id. 	Defendants Donaldson, Calvillo, and Hutsell went to the Sycamore apartment complex and
spoke to witnesses. 	Id. 	They then went to Washington Regional Hospital to speak with Meraz.
Id. 	Meraz says he had been placed on a 72-hour medical hold in the intensive care unit. 	Id.
Defendants Donaldson, Calvillo, and Hutsell served Meraz with a trespass warning and had it
placed in the log. 	Id. 	At the time, Meraz maintains he was not in a stable mental condition or
sober. 	Id.
On or about October 20, 2021, Defendant John Doe Officer #2 (“Doe #2”) went to
Washington Regional Hospital to serve Meraz with a temporary order of protection. 	(ECF No. 6
at 11-12). 	However, Meraz had been released. 	Id. at 12. 	Meraz alleges Defendant Doe #2
convinced a staff member to violate the HIPPA1 laws and tell him where Meraz had gone. 	Id.
Defendant Doe #2 then asked a deputy to serve Meraz at Valley Behavioral in Sebastian County.
Id.
On October 26, 2021, Defendant Clifford served Meraz at the facility. 	(ECF No. 6 at 12).
Meraz then alleges an affidavit, by some unidentified person, indicates Meraz was never served,
given instruction on, or signed the paperwork in connection with the order of protection. 	Id.
1 The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996.
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Meraz indicates this affidavit was used in a lawsuit in which he maintained Officer Z. Tallon
lacked probable cause. 	Id.
The lawsuit Meraz is referring to is Meraz v. Tallon, No. 5:24-cv-05029. 	(ECF No. 6 at
13). 	Meraz states that on April 2, 2022, Defendants Bailey, Harris, Faubus, Boyd, and non-party
Officer Tallon approached him in the parking lot of the Sycamore apartment complex where
Officer Tallon arrested and charged him with trespassing and stalking. 	Id. at 12. 	Meraz
maintains he had been “trespassed from apartment 47” and not the entire complex. 	Id. at 13.
Meraz indicates the Defendant Jane Doe Dispatcher (“Defendant Dispatcher”) told Officer Tallon
that Meraz had been “trespassed” from the property. 	Id. 	However, Defendant John Doe #1
(“Doe #1) was told the trespass log identified apartment 47 as the “trespassed” property. 	Id.
Meraz asserts this can be confirmed from Defendant Doe #1’s body cam audio and Defendant
Donaldson’s report from October 16, 2021. 	Id. 	Meraz adds that an unknown officer could be
heard instructing Defendants Dispatcher to change the apartment number in the log from 47 to 49
because there had been a mistake. 	Id. 	Meraz further asserts that Defendant Dispatcher wrongly
read the NCIC reports and advised the officers he had been convicted of kidnapping and stalking
in Oklahoma in 2011 and involved in another stalking case in Arkansas in 2011. 	Id. at 13-14.
Meraz alleges he gave unknown Officer #3 his bank statement with fraudulent charges
made by Mello highlighted. 	(ECF No. 6 at 14). 	While Officer #3 questioned Mello, he then let
the matter drop .2 	Id. 	Meraz indicates it could have been easily verified that Mello had made
these charges had Officer #3 bothered. 	Id. at 14-15. 	Meraz indicates when he checked he was
told the matter had been dropped for lack of evidence. 	Id. at 15. 	Meraz indicates he was never
2 Meraz did not identify Officer #3 as a Defendant.
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asked for more information. 	Id.
Meraz maintains the Defendant officers all allowed wrong doing to go on, wrote wrong
dates in their reports, did not follow-up on reports, did not fact check, and did not properly
investigate. 	(ECF No. 6 at 15). 	Meraz alleges Defendant Reynolds employs the officers and
allows the misinformation and dereliction of duty to take place. 	Id. at 15-16. 	Further, Meraz
asserts Defendant Reynolds has “nothing in place” to make sure personnel can read and understand
the reports they access daily. 	Id. at 16.
II. 	APPLICABLE STANDARD
The Court must dismiss a complaint, or any portion of it, if it contains claims that: (1) are
frivolous, malicious, or fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or (2) seek monetary
relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 	28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b).
A claim is frivolous if “it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.” 	Neitzke v.
Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). 	A claim fails to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted if it does not allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). 	“In evaluating whether a pro se plaintiff
has asserted sufficient facts to state a claim, we hold ‘a pro se complaint, however inartfully
pleaded ... to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.’” 	Jackson v.
Nixon, 747 F.3d 537, 541 (8th Cir. 2014) (quoting Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007)).
However, even a pro se plaintiff must allege specific facts sufficient to support a claim. 	Martin
v. Sargent, 780 F.2d 1334, 1337 (8th Cir. 1985).
III. 	DISCUSSION
Section 1983 provides a federal cause of action for the deprivation, under color of law, of
a citizen’s “rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws” of the United
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States. 	To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that (1) each defendant
acted under color of state law, and (2) that he or she violated a right secured by the constitution.
West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42 (1988); Dunham v. Wadley, 195 F.3d 1007, 1009 (8th Cir. 1999).
Keeping these principles in mind, the Court turns to an examination of the Amended
Complaint. 	For ease of discussion, the Court will group the majority of Meraz’s claims by date
of occurrence.
1. 	October 2021 Claims
Any claims stemming from incidents occurring in October 2021 are barred by the statute
of limitations. “Congress did not establish a statute of limitations or a body of tolling rules
applicable to actions brought in federal court under § 1983—a void which is commonplace in
federal statutory law.” 	Bd. of Regents of Univ. of State of N.Y. v. Tomanio, 446 U.S. 478, 483
(1980). 	Instead, causes of action under § 1983 are governed by “the most appropriate or
analogous state statute of limitations.” 	Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 268 (1985). 	In
Arkansas, this is the three-year personal injury statute of limitations, codified at Ark. Code Ann.
§ 16-56-105(3). 	See Miller v. Norris, 247 F.3d 736, 739 (8th Cir. 2001).
Meraz did not file this action until December 10, 2024, more than three years after the
incidents occurring in October 2021. 	Any claims Meraz has asserted against Defendants
Donaldson, Calvillo, Hutsell, Doe #2, and Clifford, or any other Defendant stemming from the
October 2021 incidents are barred by the statute of limitations and therefore fail to state claims
upon which relief may be granted.
2. 	HIPPA Claim
HIPPA does not expressly or impliedly create a private cause of action. 	Dodd v. Jones,
623 F.3d 563, 569 (8th Cir. 2010) (“HIPPA does not create a private right of action”). 	Thus, to
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the extent Meraz is asserting violations of HIPPA as a cause of action, the claims cannot proceed
as a matter of law.
3. 	April 2, 2022, Claims
Meraz’s arrest on April 2, 2022, was the subject of Meraz v. Tallon, No. 5:24-cv-05029.
In that case, the Court ruled that Officer Tallon had probable cause to arrest Meraz for the crimes
of trespassing and stalking. 	Judgement was entered in favor of Officer Tallon and the case
dismissed. 	Meraz did not appeal.
In Elbert v. Carter, 903 F.3d 779 (8th Cir. 2018), the Court outlined the requirements of
res judicata. 	It said:
Under federal common law, the doctrine of res judicata, or claim preclusion, applies
when (1) the first suit resulted in a final judgment on the merits; (2) the first suit
was based on proper jurisdiction; (3) both suits involve the same parties (or those
in privity with them); and (4) both suits are based upon the same claims or causes
of action.
Id. at 782. 	Res judicata prevents “the relitigation of a claim on grounds that were raised or could
have been raised in the prior suit.” 	Lane v. Peterson, 899 F.2d 737, 741 (8th Cir. 1990).
The first two requirements are met. 	In Meraz v. Tallon, a final decision was made on
Meraz’s § 1983 claim he was arrested without probable cause in violation of the Fourth
Amendment. 	There is no question this Court had federal question jurisdiction over Meraz’s claim
brought under § 1983.
The third requirement asks whether the current Defendants are in privity with Officer
Tallon. 	In Elbert, the Eighth Circuit discussed the concept of privity. 	It said:
The term “privity” once referred to specific substantive legal relationships, but it
has come to be used more broadly, as a way to express the conclusion that nonparty
preclusion is appropriate on any ground. 	The term “privity” is not used to describe
various relationships between litigants that would not have come within the
traditional definition of that term. . .. “[P]rivity” is merely a word used to say that
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the relationship between the one who is a party on the record and another is close
enough to include that other within the res judicata.
Elbert, 903 F.3d at 782 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). 	In Fowler v. Wolff, 479
F.2d 338 (8th Cir. 1973) the Eighth Circuit found “the relationship of [the two new defendants] to
the parties sued in the [previous] action is so close that their addition cannot change the fact that
this present action is repetitious and barred by res judicata.” 	The current Defendants were present
with Officer Tallon and their relationship is clearly close enough that their addition “cannot change
the fact that [the claims concerning Meraz’s arrest on April 2, 2022, are] repetitious.” 	Id.
The final requirement is that both cases be based on the same claims or causes of action.
“[W]hether two claims are the same for res judicata purposes depends on whether the claims arise
out of the same nucleus of operative fact or are based upon the same factual predicate.” 	Murphy
v. Jones, 877 F.2d 682, 684-85 (8th Cir. 1989). 	The April 2, 2022, claims clearly arise out of the
same nucleus of operative facts. 	Res judicata applies and bars Meraz from relitigating his claims
concerning his arrest on April 2, 2022.
4. 	August 13, 2022, Claims
The August 13, 2022, arrest was not at issue in Meraz’s prior § 1983. 	For purposes of this
screening, the Court believes Meraz has stated a plausible claim that his arrest by Defendants Seratt
and Liles on August 13, 2022, was not supported by probable cause. 	Fisher v. Wal-Mart Stores,
Inc., 619 F.3d 811, 816 (8th Cir. 2010) (warrantless arrest is only consistent with the Fourth
Amendment if it is supported by probable cause). 	These claims will proceed against Defendants
Seratt and Liles in their individual capacity to service of process. 	Manuel v. City of Joliet, Ill.,
580 U.S. 357, 367 (2017) (plaintiff alleging arrest without probable cause could bring claim for
wrongful arrest under the Fourth Amendment).
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However, Meraz’s official capacity claims against Defendants Seratt and Liles, i.e., against
the City of Fayetteville will not proceed. 	Elder-Keep v. Aksamit, 460 F.3d 979, 986 (8th Cir.
2006) (“A suit against a public official in his official capacity is actually a suit against the entity
for which the official is an agent.”). 	To prevail on a claim against the City of Fayetteville, Meraz
must show that the constitutional violation resulted from (1) an official “policy,” (2) an unofficial
“custom,” or (3) a deliberately indifferent failure to train or supervise. 	Corwin v. City of Indep.,
829 F.3d 695, 699 (8th Cir. 2016).
When asked to describe his official capacity claim, Meraz responded Defendants Seratt
and Liles did not investigate the incident instead only speaking with the 911 caller. 	(ECF No. 6
at 10). 	He also indicated they violated his rights to carry a small knife as a tool, to be at another
apartment complex or street, and caused him to be incarcerated for twenty-six months. 	Id.
A policy involves “‘a deliberate choice to follow a course of action . . . made from among
various alternatives’ by an official who has the final authority to establish government policy.”
Jane Doe A by and through Jane Doe B v. Special Sch. Dist. Of St. Louis Cty., 901 F.2d 642, 645
(8th Cir. 1990) (quoting Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 483 (1986)). 	Meraz points
to no policy of the City of Fayetteville.
An unofficial custom is shown by demonstrating:
the existence of a continuing, widespread, persistent pattern of unconstitutional
misconduct by the governmental entity’s employees; (2) deliberate indifference or
tacit authorization of such conduct by the governmental entity’s policymaking
officials after notice to the officials of that misconduct; and (3) that plaintiff was
injured by acts pursuant to the governmental entity’s custom, i.e., that the custom
was the moving force behind the constitutional violation.
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Malone v. Hinman, 847 F.3d 949, 955 (8th Cir. 2017) (citing Corwin, 829 F.3d at 699-700).
Meraz has failed to allege any facts from which an inference can be drawn that his constitutional
rights were violated by an unofficial custom of the City of Fayetteville.
Finally, Meraz has alleged no facts sufficient to state a plausible failure to train or failure
to supervise claim against the City of Fayetteville. 	To prevail on a failure to train claim, plaintiff
must show that “in light of the duties assigned to specific officers . . . the need for more training is
so obvious, and the inadequacy so likely to result in the violation of constitutional rights, that the
policymakers of the [city] can reasonably be said to have been deliberately indifferent to the need.”
City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 390 (1989). 	Meraz has alleged no facts from which an
inference can be drawn that the City of Fayetteville’s failure to train resulted in Defendants Seratt
and Liles depriving him of his federal constitutional rights.
Similarly, there are no factual allegation sufficient to support a failure to supervise claim.
A failure to supervise claim requires (1) a showing of deliberate indifference to the rights of
persons with whom the employee comes into contact; and (2) municipal inaction was the moving
force behind the constitutional violation. 	S.M. v. Lincoln Cty., 874 F.3d 581, 585 (8th Cir. 2017)
(citations and quotation marks omitted). 	Meraz has merely alleges that Defendants Seratt and
Liles failed to investigate and instead relied on the content of the 911 call. 	(ECF No. 6 at 10).
Even under the liberal pleading standards of Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
the allegations fail to state a plausible failure to train or supervise claim.
IV. 	CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, I recommend that:
• 	All claims stemming from incidents occurring in October 2021 be dismissed as
barred by the statute of limitations;
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• 	The claim under HIPPA be dismissed for failure to state a claim;
• 	All claims stemming from incidents occurring on April 2, 2022, be dismissed as
barred by res judicata;
• 	The official capacity claim stemming from Meraz’s arrest on August 13, 2022, be
dismissed for failure to state a claim.
Adoption of this Report and Recommendation would dismiss all claims against all
Defendants except for the individual capacity claims against Defendants Seratt and Liles
stemming from the arrest occurring on August 13, 2022. 	By separate order the Amended
Complaint will be served on them.
The parties have fourteen (14) days from receipt of the Report and Recommendation
in which to file written objections pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). 	The failure to file
timely objections may result in waiver of the right to appeal questions of fact. 	The parties
are reminded that objections must be both timely and specific to trigger de novo review by
the district court.
Status 	of 	Referral: 	This 	case 	should 	remain 	referred 	for 	all 	matters 	not
recommended for dismissal in this Report and Recommendation.
RECOMMENDED this 10th day of February 2025.
s/ Christy Comstock
CHRISTY COMSTOCK
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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