Lumley v. Lindsay et al

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS
FAYETTEVILLE DIVISION
PLAINTIFF	RYAN ANDREW LUMLEY
v. Civil No. 5:24-CV-05253-TLB-
CDC CIRCUIT JUDGE MARK LINDSAY; and
PROSECUTING ATTORNEY JONATHAN DIXON DEFENDANTS
MAGISTRATE JUDGE’S REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Plaintiff Andrew Lumley, an inmate at the Washington County Detention Center
(“WCDC”), has initiated the above-captioned civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
(ECF No. 1). 	Plaintiff proceeds pro se and in forma pauperis (“IFP”). 	(ECF No. 3). 	This case
was directly assigned to the undersigned pursuant to General Order 2024-02; however, not all
parties to the action have consented to the jurisdiction of the undersigned. 	See 28 U.S.C. § 636(c).
Accordingly, for the purpose of preservice review pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a), the case will
automatically be reassigned to U. S. District Judge Timothy L. Brooks and referred to the
undersigned 	for 	a 	report 	and 	recommendation 	pursuant 	to 	the 	provisions 	of 	28
U.S.C. § § 636(b)(1) and (3).
Upon that review, this Court recommends that Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint (ECF No.
6) be DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE because the defendants are immune from suit. 28
U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(2).
BACKGROUND
Upon initial review of Plaintiff’s original complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a),
this Court found that the complaint included claims that were improperly joined. 	(ECF No. 3).
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Accordingly, in accordance with Rule 21 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, this Court
directed that the misjoined claims be severed from the original complaint and that this action be
opened. 	Id. 	Further, this Court ordered that Plaintiff submit an amended complaint in this
action asserting only his claims against Defendants Judge Lindsay and Prosecutor Dixon. 	Id.
Plaintiff subsequently submitted that Amended Complaint asserting a single ground for relief.
(ECF No. 6).
Plaintiff says he has been incarcerated at the WCDC for over fourteen months without a
trial. 	He claims that Defendant Dixon “overcharged” him with the intent to coerce him into
entering a plea agreement and that Defendant Lindsay’s bail order is excessive. 	Plaintiff says he
is being held indefinitely because he has been found “unfit” to proceed. 	He also claims
Defendants have treated him differently based on race and social poverty and that his
incarceration has caused him to suffer mental anguish, mental health deterioration, and loss of
faith in the legal system. 	Plaintiff says there are no legitimate grounds for his imprisonment and
that Defendants have retaliated against him for not accepting the plea deal. 	Plaintiff brings his
claim against Defendants in their official and individual capacities and requests “relief from
bondage” and money damages.
LEGAL STANDARD
The Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”) requires the Court to review cases brought by
prisoners prior to service of process being issued. 	See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). 	The Court must
dismiss a complaint, or any portion of it, if it contains claims that: (1) are frivolous, malicious, or
fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted; or (2) seek monetary relief from a defendant
who is immune from such relief. 	28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b).
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A claim is frivolous if “it lacks an arguable basis either in law or fact.” 	Neitzke v.
Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). 	A claim fails to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted if it does not allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). 	A pro se complaint, moreover, is to be
given liberal construction, meaning “that if the essence of an allegation is discernable, even though
it is not pleaded with legal nicety, then the district court should construe the complaint in a way
that permits the layperson’s claim to be considered within the proper legal framework.” 	Stone v.
Harry, 364 F.3d 912, 915 (8th Cir. 2004). 	However, “they still must allege sufficient facts to
support the claims advanced.” Id. at 914 (citing Dunn v. White, 880 F.2d 1188, 1197 (10th Cir.
1989)).
DISCUSSION
The fundamental problem with Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint is that Defendants are
immune from suit.
A. Judicial Immunity
First, Defendant Lindsay is entitled to judicial immunity. 	Judicial immunity “is grounded
in a ‘general principle of the highest importance that a judicial officer, in exercising the authority
vested in him, shall be free to act upon his own convictions, without apprehension of personal
consequences to himself.” 	Hamilton v. City of Hayti, Mo., 948 F.3d 921, 925 (8th Cir. 2020)
(quoting Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 10 (1991)) (cleaned up). 	There are only two limited
exceptions to judicial immunity. 	Id. 	“First, a judge is not immune from liability for nonjudicial
actions, i.e., actions not taken in the judge’s judicial capacity. 	Second, a judge is not immune
from action, though judicial in nature, taken in the complete absence of all jurisdiction.” 	Id.
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(quoting Mireles, 502 U.S. at 11-12). 	But “[a] judge will not be deprived of immunity because
the action he took was in error, was done maliciously, or was in excess of his authority; rather, he
will be subject to liability only when he has acted in the clear absence of all jurisdiction.” 	Stump
v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356-57 (1978) (citations omitted).
Here, while Plaintiff clearly disagrees with Defendant Lindsay’s bail order, that order is
plainly a judicial action taken by Defendant Lindsay in the course of his duties as a judicial officer.
Further, Plaintiff asserts no facts suggesting that Defendant Lindsay acted in clear absence of any
jurisdiction in setting Plaintiff’s bail. 	Accordingly, Plaintiff’s claim against Defendant Lindsay
for money damages is barred.
To the extent, moreover, that Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint could be construed as
requesting injunctive relief, judicial immunity also “typically bars claims for prospective
injunctive relief against judicial officers acting in their judicial capacity. 	Only when a declaratory
decree is violated, or declaratory relief is unavailable would plaintiffs have an end-run around
judicial immunity.” 	Justice Network, Inc. v. Craighead Cnty., 931 F.3d 753, 763 (8th Cir. 2019)
(quotation and citation omitted). 	Here, Plaintiff does not assert that Defendant Lindsay violated
an existing declarative order or that declarative relief is unavailable to him. 	Accordingly,
Defendant Lindsay is immune from suit and the claims against him should be dismissed on that
basis.
B. Prosecutorial Immunity
Second, Defendant Dixon is entitled to immunity as well but of a different sort.
Prosecutors, such as Defendant Dixon, are entitled to absolute immunity “[i]f the prosecutor is
acting as advocate for the state in a criminal prosecution . . ..” Brodnicki v. City of Omaha, 75
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F.33d 1261, 1266 (8th Cir. 1996). 	Absolute immunity “covers prosecutorial functions such as the
initiation and pursuit of a criminal prosecution, the presentation of the state’s case at trial, and
other conduct that is intimately associated with the judicial process.” Id. 	Plaintiff asserts that
Defendant Dixon “overcharged” him and is trying to coerce him into pleading guilty; however,
decisions related to Plaintiff’s prosecution, including what charges to bring and what plea
agreements to extend, are clearly prosecutorial functions. 	Defendant Dixon is also immune from
suit.
C. Unlawful Detention
One final matter requires some discussion: To the extent that Plaintiff asserts that his
current detention is unlawful, Plaintiff has failed to assert a cognizable claim under 42
U.S.C. § 1983. A “§ 1983 action is a proper remedy for a state prisoner who is making a
constitutional challenge to the conditions of his prison life, but not to the fact or length of his
custody.” Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 499 (1973). 	In Preiser, the United States Supreme
Court made clear that “when a state prisoner is challenging the very fact or duration of his physical
confinement, and the relief he seeks is a determination that he is entitled to immediate release or a
speedier release from that imprisonment, his sole federal remedy is a writ of habeas corpus.”
Preiser, 411 U.S. at 500.
Plaintiff’s request for money damages does not change the Court’s conclusion that
Plaintiff’s unlawful detention claim is not cognizable under § 1983. 	In Heck v. Humphrey, 512
U.S. 477 (1994), the Supreme Court held:
[T]o recover damages for allegedly unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment,
or for other harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would render a conviction
or sentence invalid, a § 1983 plaintiff must prove that the conviction or sentence
has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid
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by a state tribunal authorized to make such determination, or called into question
by a federal court’s issuance of a writ of habeas corpus. A claim for damages
bearing that relationship to a conviction or sentence that has not been so invalidated
is not cognizable under § 1983.
Id. at 477.
Thus, pursuant to Heck, a claim for damages for an allegedly unlawful pretrial detention
does not arise until (or unless) the detainee has successfully challenged that detention through
habeas or some other proceeding. Portley-El v. Brill, 288 F.3d 1063, 1066 (8th Cir. 2002).
Because Plaintiff’s detention has not been determined to be unlawful through some other
mechanism, Plaintiff cannot assert a claim for money damages alleging that his detention is
unlawful pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
CONCLUSION
Having reviewed Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, the
undersigned recommends that Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint (ECF No. 6) be DISMISSED
WITHOUT 	PREJUDICE 	because 	Defendants 	are 	immune 	from 	suit. 	See 	28
U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(2).
The parties have fourteen days from receipt of the Report and Recommendation in
which to file written objections pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). The failure to file timely
objections may result in waiver of the right to appeal questions of fact. The parties are
reminded that objections must be both timely and specific to trigger de novo review by the
district court.
RECOMMENDED this 29th day of January 2025.
CHRISTY COMSTOCK
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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