Meraz v. Patrol Officer Z. Tallon

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS
FAYETTEVILLE DIVISION
JEROME M. MERAZ 	PLAINTIFF
v. 	Civil No. 5:24-cv-05029-TLB-MEF
OFFICER Z. TALLON #471,
Fayetteville Police Department 	DEFENDANT
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Plaintiff, Jerome M. Meraz (“Meraz”), currently an inmate of the Delta Regional Unit of
the Arkansas Division of Correction, filed this civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 	Meraz
proceeds pro se and in forma pauperis (“IFP”). 	He contends his constitutional rights were
violated on April 2, 2022, when he was arrested by Defendant Tallon.
Pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. §§ 636(b)(1) and (3), the Hon. Timothy L. Brooks,
United States District Judge, referred this case to the undersigned for the purpose of making a
Report and Recommendation. 	The case is before the Court on a Motion for Summary Judgment
filed by the Defendant. 1 	(ECF Nos. 22-24). 	Meraz filed a response. 	(ECF Nos. 28-29).
Defendant replied. 	(ECF No. 31). 	The Motion is ready for decision.
I. 	BACKGROUND
On April 2, 2022, officers of the Fayetteville Police Department (“FPD”) were dispatched
1 Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, at the pretrial screening stage, the following claims were
dismissed: all claims against the John Doe Prosecutor; all claims against the John or Jane Doe
Dispatcher; and the deprivation of property, defamation, and malicious prosecution claims against
Defendant Tallon. 	This left only the false arrest claim against Defendant Tallon. 	(ECF Nos. 6
& 13).
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to 775 W. Sycamore, Apt. 49, in response to calls from Rayna Mello (“Mello”), Meraz’s ex-
girlfriend. 	(ECF No. 22-4 at 3-4). 	In each call, Mello reported that Meraz was at her apartment.
Id. 	The first time Meraz appeared at her apartment was at 9:16 a.m. when Meraz rang the doorbell
wearing a brown wig, gloves, and a black mask. 	Id. at 4. 	Meraz left before the police arrived.
Id.
The second time Meraz was at Mello’s apartment was at 1:37 p.m. 	(ECF No. 22-4 at 4).
Although Meraz was wearing a different shirt, he still had the wig on. 	Id. 	Again, Meraz left
before officers arrived. 	Id.
The final time was at 6:51 p.m. 	(ECF No. 22-4 at 4). 	On this occasion, Meraz was
located at the apartment complex. 	Id. 	Defendant Tallon was one of the FPD officers dispatched
in response to a trespassing call. 	(ECF No. 22-3 at 2). 	Defendant Tallon was informed by
dispatch that Meraz “was ringing [Mello’s] doorbell and would not leave and [she] was hiding in
the bathroom with her son because she believed Meraz was a danger to her.” 	Id. 	Defendant
Tallon was also advised that officers had previously responded to the location for the same issue
but had been unable to locate Meraz. 	Id. 	In the earlier call, Defendant Tallon was told Mello
said that Meraz was wearing a wig, mask, and gloves. 	Id.
When Defendant Tallon arrived, he located Meraz driving towards the exit of the apartment
complex. 	(ECF No. 22-3 at 2-3). 	Defendant Tallon asked Meraz what he was doing there. 	Id.
Meraz responded he was attempting to get his belongings back. 	Id. 	Meraz consented to the
search of his vehicle. 	Id. 	Defendant Tallon located a wig, mask, and gloves. 	Id.
According to Defendant Tallon, he was advised by dispatch that Meraz had a previous
stalking and kidnapping conviction from 2011 out of Oklahoma and was involved in a felony
stalking case in 2011 out of Arkansas. 	(ECF No. 22-3 at 3). 	Dispatch also advised Defendant
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Tallon that Meraz had previously been trespassed from Mello’s apartment. 	Id. 	As a result of
this information, Defendant Tallon placed Meraz under arrest for “criminal trespass and stalking
in the third degree.” 	Id. 	Meraz was handcuffed and transported to the WCDC. 	Id. 	In his
preliminary report, Defendant Tallon wrote: “Me[r]az purposefully went to the apartment knowing
the victim was fearful of him, which knowingly would put her in emotional distress for her safety.”
Id. at 6.
Corporal Bailey was also dispatched on the evening of April 2, 2022. 	(ECF No. 22-4 at
2). 	He spoke with Mello who stated she had dated Meraz from March 2020 to May 2021, and
they lived together for three months before she broke up with Meraz due to his drug use and
infidelity. 	Id. 	Mello stated she moved to Fayetteville to get away from Meraz. 	Id. 	She did not
tell Meraz where she lived; however, Meraz located her apartment in October 2021. 	Id. at 2-3.
Mello reported she had blocked him on social media and blocked his phone number. 	Id. at 3.
According to Corporal Bailey, Mello also told him that in October of 2021 Meraz attempted
to hang himself in front of her apartment. 	(ECF No. 22-4 at 3). 	Next, Mello stated on February
26, 2022, she woke at around 2 a.m. and saw Merz standing over her bed. 	Id. 	She did not know
how he got into the apartment. 	Id. 	The next thing Mello recalled was waking up on the floor of
her bedroom with Meraz standing over her and her son sitting on her bed. 	Id. 	Mello reported
she had bruising on her neck, on her left wrist and left shoulder, and believed she had been
strangled. 	Id. 	Meraz had taken possession of her phone and smart watch so she could not call
the police. 	Id. 	Meraz left the apartment at around 6:30 a.m. taking “her father’s Glock 17 Gen
with 5-6 magazines and ammo, a Taurus 9 mm with 2-3 magazines, and a tactical bullet proof vest
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carrier with hard plates.2” 	Id. 	Mello filed for a protective order but did not realize she needed
to file a separate police report. 	Id.
Mello reported being concerned for her son’s safety “because Meraz had previously
kidnapped and raped an ex-girlfriend in Berryville.” 	(ECF No. 22-4 at 4). 	Mello informed
Corporal Bailey of the two other incidents at 9:16 a.m. and 1:37 p.m. that day. 	(ECF No. 22-4 at
3-4). 	Corporal Bailey indicated that when Meraz was arrested for trespassing and stalking, he
was also served with the protective order. 	Id. at 4; see also id. at 5-6 (Bailey’s field report).
Officer Ellis Donaldson was one of the FPD officers who responded to the apartment
complex, apartment 47, at 2:43 p.m. on October 16, 2021. 	(ECF No. 22-1 at 2). 	Dispatch had
advised the officers there was an unconscious male hanging near the apartment. 	Id.
When the officers arrived Meraz was conscious but had a red ligature mark around his
neck. 	(ECF No. 22-1 at 2). 	Corporal Calvillo spoke with Mello who advised him that Meraz
was her former boyfriend. 	Id. at 3. 	She heard music playing and went outside and found Meraz
hanging in front of her door. 	Id. 	Mello ran to Meraz and attempted to lift him up when a female
neighbor came out and called 911, grabbed a pair of scissors, and assisted her. 	Id.; see also (ECF
No. 22-2 at 2—Affidavit of Corporal Calvillo). 	Mello explained that when she learned of Meraz’s
kidnapping and rape convictions she ended the relationship. 	(ECF No. 22-1 at 3).
Meraz was transported to the hospital and placed on a medical hold. 	(ECF No. 22-1 at 3).
When Officer Donaldson returned Meraz’s backpack, he explained to Meraz about his criminal
trespass from 775 W. Sycamore Street, Apartment 47, and warned him if he returned to the
premises and FPD was dispatched to the apartments because of a complaint against him, he would
2 Meraz denies the guns belonged to Mello. 	(ECF No. 29 at 3). 	Instead, he maintains they
belonged to his mother, Charlene Meraz, and were never at Mello’s apartment.
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be arrested for criminal trespass. 	Id. 	Officer Donaldson asked dispatch to add Meraz to the
criminal trespass log “so that if another call was received about Meraz returning to the premises,
dispatch would advise the officers who responded to the call that Meraz had been warned he would
be arrested for criminal trespass if he returned to the premises.” 	Id. at 3-4.
Court records indicate Mello filed for a protective order on October 18, 2021, in Mello v.
Meraz, 72DR-21-1563. 	(ECF No. 22-5 at 2).3 	An order of temporary protection was issued that
day, but the case was dismissed on November 12, 2021. 	Id. at 4. 	Court records indicate Mello
also filed for a protective order on March 29, 2022, in Mello v. Meraz, 72DR-22-451.4 	An order
of temporary protection was issued on March 29, 2022, and served on Meraz on April 4, 2022.
Id. 	A final order of protection was issued on April 25, 2022. 	Id.
On September 7, 2024, a criminal information was filed against Meraz charging him with
stalking in the first degree and being a habitual offender, State v. Meraz, 72CR-22-2105.5 	(ECF
No. 22-7 at 2-3). 	This criminal case, however, deals with the occurrences between August 9,
2022, and August 13, 2022. 	Id. 	The case was nolle prossed on November 13, 2024.
Arkansas court records also indicate that on September 30, 2024, Meraz filed a civil action
against Mello, in Meraz v. Mello, 08ECV-24-130.6 	In addition to attempting to collect money
Meraz maintains Mello owes him, the complaint alleges Mello filed two false orders for protection
that are being used against him. 	Id.
Meraz’s deposition was taken on June 27, 2024. 	(ECF No. 22-8 at 3). 	He testified he is
3 Arkansas state court records can be found on ARCourts. 	The record about this case can be found
at https://caseinfo.arcourts.gov/opad/case/72DR-21-1563 (last visited December 19, 2024).
4 https://caseinfo.arcourts.gov/opad/case/72DR-22-451 (last visited December 19, 2024).
5 https://caseinfo.arcourts.gov/opad/case/72CR-22-2105 (last visited December 19, 2024).
6 https://caseinfo.arcourts.gov/opad/case/08ECV-24-130 (last visited December 19, 2024).
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currently serving a sentence on a kidnapping and stalking conviction from 2008. 	Id. at 4.
Meraz testified Defendant Tallon had falsely arrested him for trespass from apartment 49.
(ECF No. 22-8 at 5). 	Meraz points out that according to the police report he was considered to
have trespassed from apartment 47 in October of 2021. 	Id. at 9. 	Meraz indicates he was told he
had not been “trespassed from the apartment complex, but I was trespassed from Apartment 47.”
Id. 	As he was at the door of apartment 49 in October of 2021, Meraz states he had not trespassed
at apartment 47. 	Id. 	Moreover, Meraz maintains he was not even coherent at the time and
contends the first trespass was not legitimate. 	Id. at 10.
Meraz admitted he had been to Mello’s apartment three times on April 2, 2022. 	(ECF No.
22-8 at 6). 	He admitted to wearing a wig and mask on at least one occasion. 	Id. 	Meraz
explained that after his suicide attempt on October 16, 2021, Mello had asked him to try to disguise
himself when he came to the apartment so he would not upset the other tenants. 	Id. at 6-7.
According to Meraz, he and Mello were together on numerous occasions between October 16,
2021, and April 2, 2022. 	Id. at 7-9.
Meraz testified that when Defendant Tallon arrested him, he was relying on incorrect
information that Meraz had been trespassed from Apartment 49 on a prior occasion. 	(ECF No.
22-8 at 11-12). 	Meraz indicates he did not know until 36 hours later that he was being charged
with stalking. 	Id. at 12. 	He testified he did not understand how Defendant Tallon had grounds
for either charge. 	Id. at 14. 	Meraz further pointed out that these charges were later dismissed.
Id. at 12.
Except for 45 days when he was out on bond, Meraz states he was incarcerated from April
2, 2022, until December 13, 2023. 	(ECF No. 1 at 10). 	Meraz indicates his arrest triggered a
parole revocation charge and his bond was revoked. 	Id.; (see also ECF No. 22-8 at 12).
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II. 	APPLICABLE STANDARD
Summary judgment is appropriate if, after viewing the facts and all reasonable inferences
in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio
Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986), the record “shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any
material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” 	Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).
“Once a party moving for summary judgment has made a sufficient showing, the burden rests with
the non-moving party to set forth specific facts, by affidavit or other evidence, showing that a
genuine issue of material fact exists.” 	Nat’l Bank of Commerce v. Dow Chemical Co., 165 F.3d
602, 607 (8th Cir. 1999).
The non-moving party “must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical
doubt as to the material facts.” 	Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586. 	“They must show there is sufficient
evidence to support a jury verdict in their favor.” 	Nat’l Bank, 165 F.3d at 607 (citing Anderson
v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986)). 	“A case founded on speculation or suspicion
is insufficient to survive a motion for summary judgment.” 	Id. (citing Metge v. Baehler, 762 F.2d
621, 625 (8th Cir. 1985)). 	“When opposing parties tell two different stories, one of which is
blatantly contradicted by the record, so that no reasonable jury could believe it, a court should not
adopt that version of the facts for purposes of ruling on a motion for summary judgment.” 	Scott
v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007).
III. 	DISCUSSION
Defendant Tallon moves for summary judgment arguing he had probable cause to arrest
Meraz. 	Even if the Court finds probable cause did not exist, Defendant Tallon contends he had
arguable probable cause and is, therefore, entitled to qualified immunity.
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A. 	Probable Cause and Arguable Probable Cause
“Under the Fourth Amendment, a person has a right to be secure in his person and warrants
may not issue but upon probable cause.” 	Ross v. City of Jackson, Mo., 897 F.3d 916, 920 (8th
Cir. 2018). 	“It is well established that a warrantless arrest without probable cause violates an
individual’s constitutional rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments.” 	Joseph v. Allen,
712 F.3d 1222, 1226 (8th Cir. 2013) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 	However, a
false arrest claim under § 1983 “fails as a matter of law where the officer had probable cause to
make the arrest.” 	Kurtz v. City of Shrewsbury, 245 F.3d 753, 758 (8th Cir. 2001).
“[P]robable cause is a fluid concept—turning on the assessment of probabilities in
particular factual contexts—not readily, or even usefully, reduced to a neat set of legal rules.”
Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 232 (1983). 	The Eighth Circuit has stated that probable cause
exists when “the totality of the circumstances at the time of the arrest ‘[is] sufficient to lead a
reasonable officer to believe that the defendant has committed or is committing an offense.’”
Borgman v, Kedley, 646 F.3d 518, 523 (8th Cir. 2011) (quoting Fisher v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.,
619 F.3d 811, 816 (8th Cir. 2010)). 	“The substance of all the definitions of probable cause is a
reasonable ground for belief of guilt.” 	Baribeau v. City of Minneapolis, 596 F.3d 465, 474 (8th
Cir. 2010).
“We must give law enforcement officers ‘substantial latitude in interpreting and drawing
inferences from factual circumstances,’ ... but such latitude is not without limits.” 	Kuehl v. Burtis,
173 F.3d 646, 650 (8th Cir. 1999) (quoting United States v. Washington, 109 F.3d 459, 465 (8th
Cir. 1997)). 	First, evidence tending to “negate the possibility that a suspect committed a crime is
relevant” to whether probable cause exists. 	Id. 	“In this sense, the Fourth Amendment requires
that we analyze the weight of all the evidence—not merely the sufficiency of the incriminating
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evidence.” 	Id. 	Second, “law enforcement officers have a duty to conduct a reasonably thorough
investigation prior to arresting a suspect, at least in the absence of exigent circumstances and so
long as law enforcement would not be unduly hampered if the agents wait to obtain more facts
before seeking arrest.” 	Id. (internal punctuation marks and citations omitted).
If officers did not have probable cause to arrest, an officer is nevertheless entitled to
“qualified immunity for a warrantless arrest if the arrest was supported by at least ‘arguable
probable cause.’” 	Jospeh, 712 F.3d at 1226. 	“Arguable probable cause exists even where an
officer mistakenly arrests a suspect believing it is based on probable cause if the mistake is
objectively reasonable.” 	Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 	The existence of
probable cause is a question of law. 	Id. at 1227.
B. 	Application
Defendant Tallon relies first on the criminal trespass statute, Ark. Code Ann. § 5-39-203,
which, in relevant part, provides as follows.
(a) A person commits criminal trespass if he or she purposely enters
or remains unlawfully in or upon:
(2) The premises owned or leased by another person;
. . .
(c) It is a defense to prosecution under this section that:
(1) The person was a guest or an invitee;
“Criminal trespass is complete upon the making of an unlawful entry. 	No intent to engage
in further unlawful conduct is necessary.” 	Brown v. State, 671 S.W.2d 228, 229 (Ark. App. 1984).
Next, Defendant Tallon relies on the stalking statute, Ark. Code Ann. § 5-71-229.
Specially, Defendant Tallon contends Meraz committed the crime of stalking in the third degree.
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Under § 5-71-229(c)(1), “[a] person commits stalking in the third degree if he or she knowingly
commits an act that would place a reasonable person in the victim’s position under emotional
distress and in fear for his or her safety or a third person’s safety.” 	Subsection (e) provides, “[i]t
is not a defense to a prosecution under this section that the actor was not given actual notice by the
victim that the actor’s conduct was not wanted.” 	Ark. Code Ann. § 5-71-229(e). 	Emotional
distress is defined as “significant mental suffering or distress.” 	Ark. Code. Ann. § 5-71-
229(f)(2)(A). 	However, it “does not require that the victim sought or received medical or other
professional treatment or counseling.” 	Ark. Code Ann. 5-71-229(f)(2)(B).
Defendant Tallon was aware of the following when he placed Meraz under arrest: Meraz
was ringing the doorbell and would not leave; Mello was hiding in the bathroom with her son
because she believed Meraz was a danger to her; officers had been dispatched to the apartment
earlier that day but had been unable to locate Meraz; Mello reported that on the earlier occasion
Meraz was wearing a wig, mask, and gloves; when Meraz’s vehicle was searched a wig, mask,
and gloves were found; Meraz had a previous stalking conviction from 2011 in Oklahoma and was
involved in a stalking case in Arkansas in 2011; Meraz had attempted to hang himself in front of
Mello’s apartment on October 16, 2021; and Meraz had previously been trespassed from Mello’s
apartment.
That this information was provided to Defendant Tallon is not in dispute. 	Meraz asks the
Court to consider the following: at the scene, he was only charged with criminal trespass7; he was
not questioned about why he was wearing a wig or about charges Mello had made on his debit
7 Meraz cites to body cam footage in support of this proposition, but no body cam footage is part
of the summary judgment record. 	(ECF No. 28 at 1).
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card8; his visit to Mello’s apartment had been prearranged9; he had never been trespassed from
Apartment 49, but instead the prior trespass was from Apartment 47; there were no 2011
convictions10; on April 2, 2022, Officer Bailey made the statement he did not believe anything
Mello said11; and he was not served with the March 2022 protective order until he was arrested.12
“Whether the police had probable cause at the time of [Meraz’s] arrest is a question of law
for the court to decide.” 	Fisher v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 619 F.3d 811, 816 (8th Cir. 2010).
Probable cause exists “when the facts and circumstances are sufficient to lead a reasonable person
to believe that the defendant committed or is committing an offense.” 	Id. (internal quotation
marks and citation omitted). 	The Court looks to the “totality of the circumstances as set forth in
the information available to the officers at the time of arrest.” 	Id. (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted). 	Two other factors are important to consider: first, facts developed after the
arrest are “irrelevant to the probable cause analysis”; and second, “[o]fficers are generally entitled
to rely on the veracity of information supplied by the victim of the crime.” 	Id. at 816-17 (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted).
8 Meraz refers the Court to body cam footage in support of his argument that he was not questioned
why he was wearing a wig or about charges Mello had made on his debit card for the February
rent payment. 	(ECF No. 29 at 4). 	As previously noted, no body cam footage is part of the
summary judgment record.
9 Meraz refers the Court to text messages between Mello and himself between February 25, 2022,
and April 2, 2022. 	Id. at 5. 	While Meraz has submitted some text messages as exhibits, the
messages do not cover the February of 2022 to April of 2022 time frame. 	Id. at 115-274. 	Rather,
they end in September of 2021. 	Id. at 274. 	Additionally, Meraz has submitted phone records as
exhibits, but these records end in January of 2022. 	(ECF No. 28-1 at 56-113).
10 Meraz submitted as an exhibit his criminal records from Oklahoma. 	They indicate he was
charged with violation of Interstate Corrections Compact for the crime of kidnapping and stalking.
(ECF No. 28-1 at 43).
11 Once again Meraz refers the Court to body cam footage that is not in evidence. 	(ECF No. 29
at 4).
12 Meraz had been served with the first protective order that was ultimately dismissed. 	(ECF No.
28-1 at 33).
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Given the information Defendant Tallon had at the time of the arrest, the undersigned has
little trouble finding that probable cause existed to arrest Meraz for trespassing and stalking.
White v. Jackson, 865 F.3d 1064, 1074 (8th Cir. 2017) (“A warrantless arrest does not violate the
Fourth Amendment if it is supported by probable cause . . ..”) (internal quotation marks and
citations omitted). 	Defendant Tallon acted reasonably in his encounter with Meraz. 	Meraz’s
possession of the wig, mask, and gloves, established the veracity of the information provided by
Mello. 	That some of the information later proved to be misleading or erroneous does not alter
this determination. 	Many of the facts Meraz asks the Court to consider are not supported by his
own exhibits or anything in the summary judgment record. 	Others, such as that he was previously
trespassed from Apartment 47 and not Apartment 49, do not alter the fact that Defendant Tallon
was advised he has been previously trespassed from Mello’s apparent. 	In short, nothing Meraz
advances calls into question the existence of probable cause for his arrest.
Alternatively, the Court believes Defendant Tallon had arguable probable cause to arrest
Meraz for trespass and stalking. 	Defendant Tallon is, therefore, entitled to qualified immunity.
IV. 	CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, it is RECOMMENDED that Defendant’s Motion for
Summary Judgment (ECF No. 22) be GRANTED, and this case be DISMISSED WITH
PREJUDICE.
Status of Referral: The referral terminated upon the filing of this Report and
Recommendation.
The parties have fourteen (14) days from receipt of the Report and Recommendation
in which to file written objections pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). 	The failure to file
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timely objections may result in waiver of the right to appeal questions of fact. 	The parties
are reminded that objections must be both timely and specific to trigger de novo review by
the district court.
DATED this 20th day of December 2024.
/s/	
Mark E. Ford
HON. MARK E. FORD
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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