Sharpe v. Social Security Administration Commissioner

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS
FAYETTEVILLE DIVISION
KINLEE SHARPE 	PLAINTIFF
vs. 	Civil No. 5:24-cv-05028
COMMISSIONER, SOCIAL SECURITY
ADMINISTRATION 	DEFENDANT
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
OF THE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Pending now before the Court is the Stipulated Motion for Attorney’s Fees Pursuant to the
Equal Access to Justice Act (“EAJA”). ECF No. 22.
Pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and (3) (2009), the Honorable Timothy
L. 	Brooks 	referred 	this 	Motion 	to 	the 	Court 	for 	the 	purpose 	of 	making 	a 	report 	and
recommendation. 	In accordance with that referral, this Court enters the following report and
recommendation.
1. 	Background:
On January 30, 2024, Kinlee Sharpe (“Plaintiff”) appealed to the Court from the Secretary
of the Social Security Administration’s (“SSA”) denial of her request for disability benefits. ECF
No. 1. On January 31, 2025, Plaintiff’s case was reversed and remanded pursuant to sentence four
of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). ECF No. 20, 21.
On March 20, 2025, the parties filed this Motion. ECF No. 22. With this Motion, Plaintiff
states the parties have stipulated to an award of $7,020.00 in attorney’s fees and costs for work
performed ($6,615.00 in attorney fees and $405.00 costs). Id.
2. 	Applicable Law:
Pursuant to the EAJA, 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A), a court must award attorney's fees to a
prevailing social security claimant unless the Secretary’s position in denying benefits was
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substantially justified. 	The Secretary has the burden of proving that the denial of benefits was
substantially justified. See Jackson v. Bowen, 807 F.2d 127, 128 (8th Cir.1986) (“The Secretary
bears the burden of proving that its position in the administrative and judicial proceedings below
was substantially justified”). An EAJA application also must be made within thirty days of a final
judgment in an action, See 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(B), or within thirty days after the sixty day time
for appeal has expired. See Shalala v. Schaefer, 509 U.S. 292, 298 (1993).
An award of attorney’s fees under the EAJA is appropriate even though, at the conclusion
of the case, the plaintiff’s attorney may be authorized to charge and to collect a fee pursuant to 42
U.S.C. § 406(b)(1). Recovery of attorney’s fees under both the EAJA and 42 U.S.C. § 406(b)(1)
was specifically allowed when Congress amended the EAJA in 1985. See Gisbrecht v. Barnhart,
535 U.S. 789, 796 (2002) (citing Pub. L. No. 99-80, 99 Stat. 186 (1985)). 	The United States
Supreme Court stated that Congress harmonized an award of attorney’s fees under the EAJA and
under 42 U.S.C. § 406(b)(1) as follows:
Fee awards may be made under both prescriptions [EAJA and 42 U.S.C. §
406(b)(1)], but the claimant’s attorney must “refun[d] to the claimant the amount
of the smaller fee.”. . .“Thus, an EAJA award offsets an award under Section
406(b), so that the [amount of total past-due benefits the claimant actually receives]
will be increased by the . . . EAJA award up to the point the claimant receives 100
percent of the past-due benefits.”
Id. Furthermore, awarding fees under both acts facilitates the purposes of the EAJA, which is to
shift to the United States the prevailing party’s litigation expenses incurred while contesting
unreasonable government action. 	See id.; Cornella v. Schweiker, 728 F.2d 978, 986 (8th Cir.
1984).
The statutory ceiling for an EAJA fee award is $125.00 per hour. 	See 28 U.S.C. §
2412(d)(2)(A). 	A court is only authorized to exceed this statutory rate if “the court determines
that an increase in the cost of living or a special factor, such as the limited availability of qualified
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attorneys for the proceedings involved, justifies a higher fee.” Id. 	A court may determine that
there has been an increase in the cost of living, and may thereby increase the attorney’s rate per
hour, based upon the United States Department of Labor’s Consumer Price Index (“CPI”). 	See
Johnson v. Sullivan, 919 F.2d 503, 504 (8th Cir. 1990). See also General Order 39 (“Attorney’s
Fees Under the Equal Access to Justice Act”).
3. 	Discussion:
In the present action, Plaintiff’s case was remanded to the SSA. ECF No. 21. Defendant
does not contest Plaintiff’s claim that she is the prevailing party and does not oppose her
application for fees under EAJA. ECF No. 22. The Court construes the lack of opposition to this
application as an admission that the government’s decision to deny benefits was not “substantially
justified” and that Plaintiff is the prevailing party.
The Parties have stipulated to a total award of $7,020.00. 	ECF No. 22. 	This includes
$6,615.00 in attorney fees and $405.00 in costs. 	Id. 	Based on this stipulation, the Court
recommends this amount in fees and costs be awarded.
As a final point, attorney’s fees must be awarded to the “prevailing party” or the
litigant. See Astrue v. Ratliff, 560 U.S. 586 (2010). Thus, these fees must be awarded to Plaintiff,
not to Plaintiff’s attorney. 	However, if Plaintiff has executed a valid assignment to Plaintiff’s
attorney of all rights in an attorney’s fee award and Plaintiff owes no outstanding debt to the federal
government, the attorney’s fee may be awarded directly to Plaintiff’s attorney.
4. 	Conclusion:
Based upon the foregoing, the Court recommends the Stipulated Motion for Attorney’s
Fees (ECF No. 22) be GRANTED, and Plaintiff be awarded $7,020.00. This amount represents
$6,615.00 in attorney fees and costs of $405.00.
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The Parties have fourteen (14) days from receipt of this Report and Recommendation
in which to file written objections pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). The failure to file timely
objections may result in waiver of the right to appeal questions of fact. 	The Parties are
reminded that objections must be both timely and specific to trigger de novo review by the
district court. See Thompson v. Nix, 897 F.2d 356, 357 (8th Cir. 1990).
ENTERED this 17th day of April 2025.
/s/ Barry A. Bryant
HON. BARRY A. BRYANT
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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