Jackson v. Payne

1
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS
TEXARKANA DIVISION
TIMOTHY WADE JACKSON 	PETITIONER
vs. 	Civil No. 4:25-cv-04028
DEXTER PAYNE,
Director of Arkansas Division of Corrections 	RESPONDENT
MAGISTRATE JUDGE’S REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Before the Court is Petitioner Timothy Wade Jackson’s Writ of Habeas Corpus filed
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. (ECF No. 2.) The Court has granted Petitioner’s Motion for Leave
to Proceed In Forma Pauperis. (ECF No. 9.) Dexter Payne, Director of the Arkansas Division of
Correction (“Respondent”) filed a Response (ECF No. 18), and Jackson filed a Reply. (ECF No.
19.) This Petition was referred for findings of fact, conclusions of law, and recommendations for
the disposition of the case. 	The Court has reviewed the Petition, Response, and Reply and
recommends this Petition be DENIED. Further, the Court concludes that no evidentiary hearing is
necessary.0F
1
1. 	Background:
Petitioner pleaded guilty to rape and was sentenced to a term of ten years of imprisonment
in the Arkansas Division of Correction (“ADC”) on April 18, 1994.1F
2 (ECF 18-5, pg. 1.) After 30
1 “A federal court may dismiss a claim without an evidentiary hearing where the allegations are
frivolous, where the allegations fail to state a constitutional claim, where the relevant facts are not
in dispute, or where the dispute can be resolved on the basis of the record.” Urquhart v. Lockhart,
726 F.2d 1316, 1318-19 (8th Cir.1984).
2 Jackson is currently incarcerated in the ADC for two counts of failure to comply with sex offender
registration and reporting requirements and not for the offense of rape for which he now seeks
relief. (ECF Nos. 18-3-18-5.)
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years of electing not to seek further review, Petitioner filed a petition in Miller County Circuit
Court on April 15, 2024, requesting postconviction relief pursuant to Arkansas Code Annotated
§ 16-112-201—Writ of Habeas Corpus based on New Scientific Evidence. (ECF No. 18-2, Pgs. 1-
5.) The Miller County Circuit Court denied his petition as untimely on August 9, 2024. (ECF No.
18-2, Pgs. 6-8.)
On April 25, 2025, Petitioner filed a petition in Miller County Circuit Court requesting
postconviction 	relief 	pursuant 	to Arkansas 	Rule of 	Criminal 	Procedure 37.2—Ineffective
Assistance of Counsel. (ECF 18-2, 9-15.) The Miller County Circuit Court again denied Jackson’s
petition as untimely on March 18, 2025. (ECF No. 18-2, Pgs. 16-17.)
In Jackson’s current Petition, he seeks relief from his conviction, asserting (1) he was
convicted of a crime for which there was insufficient evidence, (2) he received ineffective
assistance of counsel for trial counsel’s failure to present mitigating evidence, and (3) the State
offered no DNA evidence to support his conviction. (ECF No. 2.)
The Respondent argues Petitioner’s claims are time barred and therefore should be
dismissed. (ECF No. 18.)
2. 	Applicable Law:
Jackson seeks habeas review of a state-court conviction in this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254. (ECF No. 2.) In the interests of finality and federalism, a federal habeas court is constrained
by statute to exercise only a “limited and deferential review of underlying state-court decisions.”
See, e.g., Whitehead v. Dormire, 340 F.3d 532, 536 (8th Cir. 2003). The “AEDPA erects a
formidable barrier to federal habeas relief for prisoners whose claims have been adjudicated in
state court.” Burt v. Titlow, 571 U.S. 12 (2013). A federal court reviewing a state-court merits
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ruling of a federal question may grant habeas-corpus relief only if the state’s adjudication
“(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly stablished
Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision
that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in
the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), (2).
Review under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) is limited to the record that was before the state court
that adjudicated the claim on the merits. See Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, 181 (2011). Under
§ 2254(d)(2), a decision adjudicated on the merits in a state court based on a factual determination
will not be overturned on factual grounds unless it is objectively unreasonable in light of the
evidence presented in the state court proceeding. See, e.g., Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322,
340 (2003). In making this determination, factual findings by the state courts are presumed correct
absent clear and convincing evidence to the contrary. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1).
3. 	Discussion:
a. 	Statute of Limitations:
On April 24, 1996, the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (hereinafter
“AEDPA”) was signed into law. A one-year statute of limitations was enacted for motions to
vacate, set aside, or correct a sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. In general, a movant for
collateral relief has one year from “the date on which the judgment became final” to file a petition
challenging his or her conviction.
AEDPA’s one-year statute of limitations begins to run at the conclusion of direct review in
each case. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A)-(D). The conclusion of direct review for a petitioner
who pleaded guilty in an Arkansas state court is 30 days from the entry of judgment. Camacho v.
Hobbs, 774 F.3d 931, 934-45 (8th Cir. 2015). Jackson plead guilty on April 18, 1994, and the court
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entered its judgment on April 19, 1994. (ECF No. 18-1, Pgs. 75-78.) Jackson’s convictions became
final on May 19, 1994. Prisoners whose state court proceedings were completed prior to AEDPA’s
enactment receive a one-year grace period running from AEDPA’s 1996 enactment. See, e.g.,
Cross-Bey v. Gammon, 322 F.3d 1012, 1014 (8th Cir. 2003). Jackson, however, waited until April
23, 2025 to file this Petition. (ECF No. 2.) Accordingly, Jackson’s Petition is time-barred under
the AEDPA one-year statute of limitations unless there are grounds to support tolling of the
limitations period.
The limitations clock may be statutorily or equitably tolled, but neither of these situations
applies here. Jackson never “properly filed [an] application for state post-conviction or other
collateral review,” so statutory tolling under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2) does not apply. As for
equitable tolling, a petitioner is only entitled to this tolling if “he shows . . . that he has been
pursuing his rights diligently” and “that some extraordinary circumstance stood in his way” to
prevent timely filing. Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 645 (2010). While the diligence required
for equitable tolling is “not maximum feasible diligence,” reasonable diligence is required. See Id.
at 653. Jackson’s Petition does not establish he acted with any due diligence in pursuing the timely
filing of this Petition. Jackson’s Petition also does not demonstrate any extraordinary circumstance
beyond his control made it impossible for him to file the Petition before the statute of limitations
ran. See, e.g., Runyan v. Burt, 521 F.3d 942, 945 (8th Cir. 2008). Therefore, AEDPA’s one-year
statute of limitation applies in this case, and Jackson’s Petition is untimely and should be
dismissed.
b. 	Actual Innocence:
An actual innocence claim, “if proved, serves as a gateway through which a petitioner may
pass,” to overcome the expiration of the statute of limitations. McQuiggin v. Perkins, 569 U.S. 383,
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386 (2013). In order to proceed on an actual innocence claim though, the Petitioner must provide
new, credible evidence that establishes “it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would
have convicted him.” Id. Said new evidence must not “rely on a factual predicate that could not
have been previously discovered through the exercise of due diligence.” Shoop v. Twyford, 596
U.S. 811, 812 (2022).
Jackson fails to provide any new evidence or arguments to support an actual innocence
claim,2F
3 and therefore he is not entitled to invoke the actual-innocence exception toward his time-
barred habeas claim.
4. 	Conclusion:
Based on the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED: (1) Petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 be
DENIED, (2) this habeas action be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE, (3) and a Certificate of
Appealability be DENIED pursuant to Rule 11(a) of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases.
The Parties have fourteen (14) days from receipt of this Report and Recommendation
in which to file written objections pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). The failure to file timely
objections may result in waiver of the right to appeal questions of fact. 	The Parties are
reminded that objections must be both timely and specific to trigger de novo review by the
district court. See Thompson v. Nix, 897 F.2d 356, 357 (8th Cir. 1990).
ENTERED this 2 nd day of December 2025.
/s/ Spencer G. Singleton
HONORABLE SPENCER G. SINGLETON
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
3 The Court notes Jackson would have a difficult time showing credible evidence of actual
innocence considering he entered a plea of guilty to the rape charge.
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