Fleet Lease Exchange Co., Inc. v. GIG Logistics, Inc.

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS
TEXARKANA DIVISION
FLEET LEASE EXCHANGE CO., INC.
d/b/a FLEXCO FLEET SERVICES 	PLAINTIFF
v. 	Case No. 4:24-cv-04070
GIG LOGISTICS, INC. 	DEFENDANT
ORDER
Before the Court is an Amended Motion for Default Judgment (ECF No. 14) filed by
Plaintiff Fleet Lease Exchange Co., Inc. d/b/a Flexco Fleet Services (“Plaintiff”). Defendant Gig
Logistics, Inc. (“Defendant”) has not responded, and the time to do so has passed. The Court finds
the matter ripe for consideration.
I. 	BACKGROUND
The unchallenged facts of this case are that sometime in June 2023, Plaintiff hired Defendant
to transport two vehicles from Irving, Texas to Horsham, Pennsylvania. 	(ECF No. 2, at 3).
Pursuant to a contract between the parties, the vehicles were not to be “dropped off, stored at, or
routed through a 3rd party location for any amount of time.” (ECF No. 2, at 3). Shortly thereafter,
Defendant retained the services of Haulbeat Trans LLC (“Haulbeat”), an uninsured registered
motor carrier, to transport the vehicles to Pennsylvania. (ECF No. 2, at 3). On June 15, 2023, an
employee for Haulbeat picked up the vehicles and began transporting them to their destination.
(ECF No. 2, at 3). The same day, while transporting the vehicles, the employee was responsible
for a multi-vehicle accident in Nevada County, Arkansas. 	(ECF No. 2, at 4). 	Both vehicles
sustained significant damage because of the accident. (ECF No, 2, at 5-6). The employee then
abandoned the vehicles following the accident, causing them to be towed. (ECF No. 2, at 6).
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On July 2, 2024, Plaintiff filed the instant action asserting a breach of contract claim against
Defendant. (ECF No. 2, at 7). On September 23, 2024, Plaintiff filed a motion that requested an
Entry of Default by the Clerk of Court. (ECF No. 12). On September 24, 2024, the Clerk of Court
entered default against Defendant. 	(ECF No. 13). 	On September 30, 2024, Plaintiff filed the
instant motion requesting that the Court enter default judgment against Defendant for a sum
certain. (ECF No. 14).
II. DEFAULT JUDGMENT
A district court may enter a default judgment when a party fails to appropriately respond
in a timely manner. See, e.g., Inman v. Am. Home Furniture Placement, Inc., 120 F.3d 117, 119
(8th Cir. 1997). If the court determines that a defendant is in default, the factual allegations of the
complaint, except those relating to the amount of damages, will be taken as true. 	Everyday
Learning Corp. v. Larson, 242 F.3d 815, 818 (8th Cir. 2001). However, the court must ensure that
“the unchallenged facts constitute a legitimate cause of action” prior to entering final judgment.
See Murray v. Lene, 595 F.3d 868, 871 (8th Cir. 2010).
Plaintiff entered into a written contract with Defendant to have two vehicles transported
from Irving, Texas to Horsham, Pennsylvania. The contract held that Defendant is responsible for
“operating costs, expenses, repairs, supplies, vehicles insurance, and maintenance.” (ECF No. 2,
at 5). 	It also read that “[i]f a vehicle is damaged while at a location other than the pick up or
delivery location(s), the parties agree that the carrier [Defendant] and/or driver are solely liable for
such damage, whether the carrier and/or driver are insured or not.” (ECF No. 2, at 5). Defendant
agreed to “indemnify and hold harmless [Plaintiff] from any and all claims by Contractor which
may arise out of and in the course of performance of its duties.” 	(ECF No. 2, at 6). Thus, the
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Court finds that there was a valid and fully enforceable contact between Plaintiff and Defendant
which Defendant subsequently breached.
The contract states that Defendant is responsible for costs associated with the vehicles if
an incident occurs. An incident has occurred, and costs have now accumulated surrounding the
vehicles. Defendant has not paid Plaintiff, nor have they indemnified Plaintiff for costs related to
the vehicles. Accordingly, upon a review of the pleadings and papers on file, the Court finds that
Plaintiff has demonstrated sufficient facts to support a legitimate cause of action against
Defendant.
1. 	Sum Certain
Now the Court will turn to damages. 	Plaintiff requests that the Court enter default
judgment for a sum certain and include reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. These amounts are
all ascertainable from Plaintiff’s evidence, so an evidentiary hearing is not necessary. See Taylor
v. City of Ballwin, Mo., 859 F.2d 1330, 1333 (8th Cir. 1988).
After determining that a default judgment should be entered, the Court must determine the
amount and character of the recovery. Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(b)(2)(B). A default judgment may be
entered on a sum certain upon the plaintiff’s request, with an affidavit showing the amount due.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(b)(1).
Plaintiff seeks a sum certain from Defendant in the amount of $96,711.15. Itemized and
broken down, Plaintiff presents: (1) a payoff statement showing $58,465.89 paid for the totaled
vehicle (ECF No. 14-2); (2) a cancelled check showing $30,000.01 paid to the towing company
(ECF No. 14-3); (3) receipts showing $5,445.26 paid for body shop repairs; and (4) an affidavit
statement showing $2,800.00 for the waived transportation fee. (ECF No. 14-1, at 3). The Court
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is satisfied that Plaintiff’s affidavits and exhibits establish the requested sum certain of $96,711.15.
Accordingly, the Court finds that $96,711.15 should be awarded to Plaintiff.1
2. 	Attorneys’ Fees and Costs
Plaintiff has retained two separate law firms as counsel. Plaintiff retained Ms. Elizabeth
Fletcher (“Ms. Fletcher”) of Munson, Rowlett, Moore & Boone, P.A. (“MRM&B”) and then Mr.
Ian R. Walsworth (“Mr. Walsworth”) of FisherBroyles LLP. Plaintiff has requested attorney fees
and costs in the amount of $23,991.11. The Court will address the facts and payments of each
respectively.
Ms. Fletcher has provided an affidavit and billing statement in support of her requested
attorney’s fees of $9,018.11. (ECF No. 14-5; ECF No. 14-8). MRM&B charged Plaintiff $200.00
per hour for attorneys. In the instant case, Ms. Fletcher has billed 40.3 hours at the hourly rate of
$200.00, for a total of $9,018.11.
Mr. Walsworth has provided an affidavit and billing statement in support of his requested
attorneys’ fees and costs of $14,973.00. 	(ECF No. 14-6; ECF No. 14-7). 	FisherBroyles LLP
charged Plaintiff $400.00 per hour for attorneys and $200.00 per hour for paralegals. In the instant
case, Mr. Walsworth has billed 24.9 hours at the hourly rate of $400.00, for a total of $9,960.00.
Mr. Alfred Monte (“Mr. Monte”) has billed 5.4 hours at the hourly rate of $400.00, for a total of
$2,160.00. Ms. Emmalee Giffin (“Ms. Giffin”) has billed 12.7 hours at the hourly rate of $200.00,
for a total of $2,540.00. 	Mr. Walsworth then requests costs of $313.00 which brings Mr.
Walsworth’s total attorneys’ fees and costs to $14,973.00.
1The Court notes that Plaintiff’s proposed Order (ECF No. 14-9) includes interest at the rate of 10% per annum
from the date this Order is filed until paid. However, the Court sees no mention of this in the pleadings or other
papers. Thus, the Court declines to include a 10% per annum interest against Defendant.
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“In a diversity case, state law generally governs the question whether there is a right to
attorney’s fees.” Ferrell v. W. Bend Mut. Ins. Co., 393 F.3d 786, 796 (8th Cir. 2005). Arkansas
is the forum, so the Court applies the Arkansas choice-of-law rules in determining which state law
governs the issue. Id. Arkansas’s law relating to attorney’s fees applies “where Arkansas is the
forum, even where the law of another State governs substantive issues,” such as the interpretation
of a contract. 	Id. 	Unless otherwise barred by law or contract, Arkansas allows the recovery of
reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs “[i]n any civil action to recover on an open account, statement
of account, account stated, promissory note, bill, negotiable instrument, or contract relating to the
purchase or sale of goods, wares, or merchandise, or for labor or services, or breach of contract.”
Ark. Code Ann. § 16-22-308. The case at bar is for a breach of contract. Accordingly, Plaintiff
may recover reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs incurred in dealing with this case.
The burden of proving reasonable attorneys’ fees rests with the fee applicant. See Hensley
v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 437 (1983). 	In determining the reasonableness of an attorneys’ fee
award, a “district court [is] required to first calculate a lodestar, by multiplying the number of
hours reasonably expended on litigation by a reasonable hourly rate, and to then consider whether
the lodestar amount should be reduced, based on appropriate considerations.” Jones v. RK Enters.
of Blytheville, Inc., 632 Fed. App’x. 306, 307 (8th Cir. 2016) (citing Hensley, 461 U.S. at 433-34).
A “reasonable” hourly rate is usually the ordinary rate for similar work in the community where
the case has been litigated. Fish v. St. Cloud State Univ., 295 F.3d 849, 851 (8th Cir. 2002). The
United States Supreme Court has set forth twelve factors to be considered when making a lodestar
determination: 	(1) time and labor required; (2) novelty and difficulty of the questions; (3) skill
requisite to perform the legal service properly; (4) preclusion of other employment, due to
acceptance of case; (5) the customary fee; (6) whether the fee is fixed or contingent; (7) time
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limitations imposed by the client or the circumstances; (8) the amount involved and the results
obtained; (9) the experience, reputation, and ability of the attorneys; (10) the undesirability of the
case; (11) the nature and length of the professional relationship with the client; and (12) awards in
similar cases. 	Hensley, 461 U.S. at 430 n.3. 	After determining the lodestar amount, the Court
must then “consider whether other factors not considered in arriving at the lodestar amount suggest
upward or downward adjustment to arrive at the appropriate fee award.” Reeder-Simco GMC, Inc.
v. Volvo GM Heavy Truck Corp., No. 2:00-cv-2031-RTD, 2006 WL 1445719, at *1 (W.D. Ark.
May 22, 2006) (citing Hensley, 461 U.S. at 434).
Although Plaintiff has failed to offer evidence as to the prevailing rate in the community
for services similar to those performed in this case, the Court may draw on its own experience and
knowledge of prevailing market rates in determining a reasonable rate. See Warnock v. Archer,
397 F.3d 1024, 1027 (8th Cir. 2005). 	The Court has reviewed Plaintiff’s pleadings and, after
considering the Hensley factors, finds that Ms. Fletcher’s number of hours and billable rate is
reasonable in Texarkana, Arkansas, the community where this case was litigated. Thus, the Court
finds that Ms. Fletcher’s request of $9,018.11 in attorney’s fees and costs is reasonable.
The Court is not persuaded that FisherBroyles LLP’s hourly rate of $400.00 for attorneys
and $200.00 for paralegals is reasonable for the case at bar. Mr. Walsworth has been practicing
for nineteen (19) years and appears to be well versed in commercial litigation with several awards
to his name. Mr. Monte has been practicing for thirty-eight years (38) and appears to specialize in
federal environmental regulations. However, the case is for breach of contract and does not present
any complex issue or novel concepts. 	This case has only been pending since July 2, 2024, and
there have only been a handful of short motions filed by Plaintiff. Upon review of the case, Court
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finds that an hourly rate of $400.00 for attorneys and $200.00 for paralegals to litigate a simple
breach of contract case is unreasonable.
Based on the Court’s experience, knowledge of the local market, and Eastern and Western
Districts of Arkansas precedent, the Court finds the following rates to be reasonable: Mr.
Walsworth, $300.00 per hour, Mr. Monte $250.00 per hour, and Ms. Giffin $75 per hour. 	See
Hale v. Belmont Mgmt. Co., Inc., No. 2:21-CV-02094, 2022 WL 2833983, at *2 (W.D. Ark. July
20, 2022); see also Hum. Rts. Def. Ctr. v. Baxter Cnty., Arkansas, No. 3:17-CV-3070, 2023 WL
7404236, at *9 (W.D. Ark. Oct. 30, 2023). Using the new rates, the Court finds attorney fees and
costs in the amount of $9,772.50 is reasonable for the work performed by Mr. Walsworth, Mr.
Monte, and Ms. Giffin.
III. CONCLUSION
Accordingly, Plaintiff’s Motion for Default Judgment (ECF No. 14) should be and hereby
is GRANTED. Plaintiff’s previously filed Motions for Default Judgment (ECF No. 10; ECF No.
12) are DENIED AS MOOT.
Judgment is hereby entered in favor of Plaintiff Fleet Lease Exchange Co., Inc. d/b/a
Flexco Fleet Services against Defendant GIG Logistics, Inc. in the amount of $96,711.15. The
Court awards counsel for Plaintiff, Ms. Elizabeth Fletcher, reasonable attorney’s fees of $9,018.11.
The Court also awards counsel for Plaintiff, Mr. Ian R. Walsworth, reasonable attorneys’ fees of
$9,772.50 and costs of $313.00. Combined, the judgment total stands at $115,814.76.
IT IS SO ORDERED, this 14th day of January, 2025.
/s/ Susan O. Hickey
Susan O. Hickey
Chief United States District Judge
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