Williams v. Gulick

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS
TEXARKANA DIVISION
HARMON WILLIAMS 	. 	PLAINTIFF
v. 	Civil No. 4:20-cv-04079-SOH-BAB
DETECTIVE REYN BROWN;
OFFICER DANIEL OLLER;
and STEPHEN GULICK 	DEFENDANTS
MAGISTRATE JUDGE’S REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Before the Court is Separate Defendant Stephen Gulick’s Motion for Summary Judgment
(ECF No. 75). 	Plaintiff responded. 	(ECF No. 93). 	Pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. §
636(b)(1) and (3)(2011), the Honorable Susan O. Hickey, Chief United States District Judge,
referred the instant motion to the undersigned for the purpose of making a Report and
Recommendation.
I. 	BACKGROUND
Plaintiff is currently incarcerated in the Arkansas Division of Corrections – Tucker Unit in
Tucker, Arkansas. 	His claims in this lawsuit stem from alleged civil rights violations which
occurred during his arrest in Hempstead County by officers from the Hope Police Department and
the Hempstead County Sheriff’s Office. Plaintiff filed his original Complaint on September 15,
2020, (ECF No. 1), and then an Amended Complaint on October 5, 2020, (ECF No. 9).
Plaintiff alleged two claims in his Amended Complaint, but the second claim and some
Defendants were initially dismissed at screening pursuant to the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 28
U.S.C. § 1915A(b). (ECF No. 13). This leaves Plaintiff’s Claim One against Separate Defendants
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Sergeant Daniel Oller, Hope Police Department; Special Agent Reyn Brown, Hempstead County
Sheriff’s Office; and Stephen Gulick, Parole Officer.0F
1 Separate Defendants Oller and Brown have
filed separate motions for summary judgment. 	The Court previously issued a Report and
Recommendation on Defendant Oller’s Motion for Summary Judgment, (ECF No. 95), and
Separate Defendant Brown’s Motion for Summary Judgment, (ECF No. 96).
Plaintiff 	alleges, 	in 	his 	Claim 	One 	that 	Separate 	Defendant 	Gulick 	violated 	his
constitutional rights on October 15, 2019 when he ordered Separate Defendants Oller and Brown
to go harass Plaintiff at his workplace—the Tyson Feed Mill. According to Plaintiff this order led
to Plaintiff being illegally stopped, searched, arrested, and imprisoned. Further, Plaintiff alleges
Separate Defendant Gulick violated his constitutional rights by causing him to be held
unnecessarily by Hempstead County Detention Center (“HCDC”) without a “White Warrant.”
Specifically, Plaintiff claims:
On Oct. 15, 2019, approx.. 8:40 am I Harmon Williams, was called into the office at my
job by Terry Crabtree and Daniel Hampton, due to another employee Hunter Britten, told
them that he had knocked some dust down on me and officer Stephen [G]ulick order to
come harass me on my job; which led Det. Reyn Brown and Officer Daniel Oller to violate
my 4 th , 5th , 8th and 14th Amendments. 1) They first detain me off false accusations claiming
they received a call stating I was selling drugs from the Feed Mill. 2) They arrest me off a
false investigation, no probable cause was establish nor was there any proof to support their
allegations. 3) They false imprison me with off of false reports and falsified documents.
After . . . making it to the Hempstead County Jail, where we met up with my parole officer
Stephen Eulick, who informed me that Det. Reyn Brown, claimed to have retrieved “meth”
from me that I’ve never seen nor had. Stephen [G]ulick, never attain a “White Warrant”
from the state to hold me in jail. I later found out (6) days by another parolee who return
from a parole hearing; that goes by the name Lemon Scott, informed me that I had been
deferral by the state and my parole officer Stephen [G]ulick, withheld the information
1 Plaintiff’s Claim One against all remaining Separate Defendants was also administratively stayed
pursuant to the Younger doctrine until Plaintiff’s criminal charges in Arkansas State Court were
resolved. (ECF No. 13, pp. 3-4). This case was reopened on September 22, 2021 once Plaintiff’s
criminal case was resolved. (ECF No. 16).
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causing me to lose my job at the Feed Mill after causing me to miss over (3) consecutive
days over regulation abusing this public trust.1F
2
(ECF No. 9, p. 8) (errors in original).
Plaintiff sued Separate Defendant Gulick in both his individual and official capacities.
(ECF No. 9, p. 5). However, Plaintiff’s official capacity claim against Separate Defendant Gulick
was previously dismissed. 	(ECF No. 44). 	Plaintiff requests both compensatory and punitive
damages for relief. Id. at 14.
Separate Defendant Gulick filed his Motion for Summary Judgment on December 4, 2023
along with a Brief in Support and Statement of Undisputed Facts. (ECF Nos. 75, 76, 77). Separate
Defendant Gulick argues: (1) he did not participate in Plaintiff’s stop, search, or arrest and cannot
be liable for any constitutional violations related to such conduct; and (2) he did not cause
Plaintiff’s incarceration and cannot be liable for said incarceration. (ECF No. 76).
Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 10(c), Defendant Gulick incorporates the
exhibits submitted by Separate Defendant Oller in his Motions for Summary Judgment, Brief in
Support, and Statement of Undisputed Facts into his own Motion for Summary Judgment. (ECF
No. 75). 	Accordingly, the Court utilizes the evidence presented by Defendant Oller herein.
Separate Defendant Gulick also submitted his own statement of facts, exhibits, and arguments in
support of his Motion for Summary Judgment. (ECF No. 75-77).
On October 15, 2019, Plaintiff was on parole from the Arkansas Division of Corrections
with a signed warrantless search waiver on file. 	Plaintiff was under active supervision with his
2 There are additional facts alleged in Plaintiff’s Claim One, but they relate solely to Plaintiff’s
claims against the Separate Defendants who were dismissed at screening. 	(ECF No. 9, p. 8).
Accordingly, the Court finds them irrelevant to Separate Defendant Gulick’s Motion for Summary
Judgment.
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parole officer, Separate Defendant Gulick. (ECF Nos. 71-1, p. 2). The warrantless search waiver,
signed by Plaintiff, from the Arkansas Department of Corrections reads:
As a condition of my supervised parole or probation, I agree to allow any Arkansas
Community Correction officer, or any certified law enforcement officer, to conduct a
warrantless search of my person, place of residence, or motor vehicle at any time, day or
night, whenever requested by the Arkansas Community Correction officer, or certified law
enforcement officer.
I understand that a warrantless search based on this waiver must be conducted in a
reasonable manner but does not need to be based on a clearly expressed suspicion that I am
committing or I have committed a criminal offense.
Arkansas law code annotated § 16-93-106 requires this waiver to be signed by a person
who is placed on supervised probation or is released on parole under this section as a
condition of his or her supervised parole or probation.
(ECF No. 71-1, p. 9).
On October 15, 2019, Separate Defendant Gulick received a call from an anonymous
individual who stated he worked with Plaintiff at the Tyson Feed Mill in Hempstead County,
Arkansas. In the call, the informant informed Separate Defendant Gulick that Plaintiff was selling
drugs and had drugs in his possession at the Feed Mill while on duty as an employee. (ECF No.
75-1, p. 1, p. 1) After receiving this call, Separate Defendant Gulick notified Separate Defendant
Brown of all the information given by the informant. Id.
Separate Defendants Oller and Brown were both members of the Eighth North Drug Task
Force (“DTF”) which is comprised of employees from Hope Police Department, Hempstead
County Sheriff’s Office, Nevada County Sheriff’s Office, and Prescott Police Department. (ECF
No. 71-1, p. 24). Separate Defendant Oller was aware that Plaintiff had a warrantless search waiver
on file as part of his parole. Id. at 25. Separate Defendant Brown was also aware of Plaintiff’s
status as a parolee and his warrantless search waiver prior to engaging with Plaintiff at the Feed
Mill. (ECF No. 71-1, p. 33).
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Once Defendants Oller and Brown arrived at the Feed Mill they contacted Plaintiff while
he worked. 	Separate Defendant Oller took a piece of work equipment from Plaintiff and asked
Plaintiff if he had anything illegal on his person. Plaintiff responded he did not. Plaintiff then put
his arms out in front of his body and told the officers to “hold on.” Separate Defendants Brown
and Oller then grabbed Plaintiff’s wrists to gain control over Plaintiff for safety. 	Separate
Defendant Brown then explained to Plaintiff he would perform a parole search pursuant to
Plaintiff’s warrantless search waiver. Separate Defendant Brown also informed Plaintiff he was
being detained and placed Plaintiff in handcuffs. (ECF No. 71-1, p. 25).
Separate Defendant Brown then searched Plaintiff’s pockets and handed the contents to
Separate Defendant Oller. Separate Defendant Oller determined that a white powdery substance
in a plastic bag from Plaintiff’s pockets was methamphetamine. 	Id. at 26. 	Separate Defendant
Brown then placed Plaintiff under arrest and escorted Plaintiff to his patrol vehicle while Separate
Defendant Oller collected Plaintiff’s belongings from the Feed Mill. 	Id. The video footage of
Plaintiff’s search and arrest, from Separate Defendant Brown’s body camera, is consistent with
Separate Defendant Oller’s rendition of the facts. (ECF No. 71-1, p. 33).
The bag of white powder pulled out of Plaintiff’s pocket by Separate Defendant Brown
was tested by the Arkansas State Crime Laboratory and determined to be 0.9340 grams of
methamphetamine. 	(ECF No. 71-1, p. 32). 	Plaintiff was booked into the Hempstead County
Detention Center (“HCDC”) for possession of a controlled substance on October 15, 2019. (ECF
No. 71-1, p. 34). Plaintiff was provided a First Judicial Appearance on October 16, 2019 in front
of the Judge Wright, Circuit Judge of Hempstead County. 	Judge Wright denied bond at that
hearing. (ECF No. 75-3).
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As a result of this October 15, 2019 arrest, Separate Defendant Gulick submitted a
Violation Report to the Arkansas Parole Board so the Board could determine whether to issue a
“white warrant” for Plaintiff. (ECF No. 75-1, p. 2). A “white warrant” is an arrest warrant that
may be issued by the Parole Board when a parolee violates the terms of his parole and needs to be
taken into custody. If a “white warrant” is issued the parolee may be jailed pending a hearing to
determine whether there is reasonable cause to believe the parolee violated the terms of his parole.
(ECF No. 75-1, p. 3). 	The Parole Board voted not to issue a “white warrant” for Plaintiff.
According to the Board Hearing/Screening documentation the hearing date was October 15, 2019,
the board members voted over the course of October 15, 2019 and October 16, 2019, and the
hearing results were finalized on October 21, 2019. (ECF No. 75-1, pp. 12-14).
Then, on October 22, 2019, Separate Defendant Gulick sent a letter to Hempstead County
Detention Center informing them that the parole hold was released on Plaintiff and he could be
released if he had no other warrants or holds from other agencies. 	(ECF No. 75-1). 	Separate
Defendant Gulick explains in his declaration that even though he used “hold” language in his letter,
the Parole Board had not, in fact, exercised any legal hold on Plaintiff for the period of October
15, 2019 through October 23, 2019. Instead, Separate Defendant Gulick was only communicating
that a white warrant was not issued by the Parole Board. (ECF No. 75-1, p. 3). Separate Defendant
Gulick states in his sworn declaration that neither he, nor the Parole Board, took any action to
detain Plaintiff in the HCDC from October 15, 2019 through October 23, 2019. Id. at 4.
Judge Wright released Plaintiff on October 23, 2019 on his own recognizance. (ECF No.
71-1). 	Plaintiff’s charge of possession related to this arrest was later dismissed based on a
negotiated plea of guilty related to subsequent charges. (ECF No. 71-1, pp. 36-41).
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In response to Defendant Gulick’s Motion, Plaintiff filed a document titled “Plaintiff
Statement of Disputed Facts.” (ECF No. 92). This document is properly sworn and subscribed
and consist of twenty-one (21) numbered paragraphs. 	Id. 	The numbered paragraphs do not
correspond with Separate Defendant Gulick’s numbered paragraphs in his Statement of Facts.
Plaintiff does, however, allege many facts in his Response. 	The Court will include all material
factual disputes here. Plaintiff first states he was assigned to Defendant Gulick’s supervision in
May 2019 after returning from a supervision sanction program, and he never missed a visit or
payment in the five months under Separate Defendant Gulick’s supervision. Id. Defendant Gulick
did not visit Plaintiff’s residence at the Relax Inn or come to Tyson Feed Mill on October 10, 2019.
Id. at 2. Separate Defendant Gulick did not make any mention of failed home visit or delinquency
in his violation report. Id.
Plaintiff argues Separate Defendant Gulick should not be a “cat’s paw for the law enforcer
officer.” Id. Plaintiff then argues Separate Defendant Gulick was not engaged in administering
his supervisory functions on October 15, 2019 and instead was only playing the role of “front” for
the police. 	Id. 	Lastly, as a challenge to his stop, search, and arrest, Plaintiff argues Separate
Defendant Gulick did not investigate the anonymous tip he received. Id.
With regards to his imprisonment, Plaintiff argues Separate Defendant Gulick’s violators
report was inaccurate because it stated Plaintiff stopped reporting. Id. at 3. Also, Plaintiff states
he saw an unprocessed warrant for his arrest at the HCDC while he was booked into the jail. Id.
The remainder of Plaintiff’s arguments in his Response relate to his claim that was previously
dismissed by the Court at the screening stage. Id.
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II. LEGAL STANDARD
Summary judgment is appropriate if, after viewing the facts and all reasonable inferences
in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, the record "shows that there is no genuine
dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R.
Civ. P. 56(a); Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). "Once
a party moving for summary judgment has made a sufficient showing, the burden rests with the
non-moving party to set forth specific facts, by affidavit or other evidence, showing that a genuine
issue of material fact exists.” Nat’l Bank of Comm. v. Dow Chem. Co., 165 F.3d 602, 607 (8th Cir.
1999).
The non-moving party "must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical
doubt as to the material facts." Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586. "They must show there is sufficient
evidence to support a jury verdict in their favor." Nat’l Bank, 165 F.3d at 607. "A case founded
on speculation or suspicion is insufficient to survive a motion for summary judgment." Id. at 610.
“When opposing parties tell two different stories, one of which is blatantly contradicted by the
record, so that no reasonable jury could believe it, a court should not adopt that version of the facts
for purposes of ruling on a motion for summary judgment.” Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380
(2007).
Under § 1983, a defendant may be sued in either his personal capacity, or in his official
capacity, or claims may be stated against a defendant in both his personal and his official
capacities. 	The type of conduct that is actionable and the type of defense available depend on
whether the claim is asserted against a defendant in his official or individual capacity. See Gorman
v. Bartch, 152 F.3d 907, 914 (8th Cir. 1998) (internal citations omitted). 	“Claims against
individuals in their official capacities are equivalent to claims against the entity for which they
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work; they require proof that a policy or custom of the entity violated the plaintiff’s rights, and the
only type of immunity available is one belonging to the entity itself.” Id. Personal capacity claims
“are those which allege personal liability for individual actions by officials in the course of their
duties; these claims do not require proof of any policy and qualified immunity may be raised as a
defense” to these individual capacity claims. Id. To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Plaintiff
must allege that the defendant acted under color of state law, and that the actor violated a right,
privilege, or immunity secured by the Constitution. 	West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988);
Dunham v. Wadley, 195 F.3d 1007, 1009 (8th Cir.1999).
III. DISCUSSION
Plaintiff alleges his search, arrest, and imprisonment on October 15, 2019, violated his
constitutional rights. (ECF No. 9). Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint can also be read to include a
claim for an unlawful stop or detention—a Terry stop. Id. Separate Defendant Gulick argues all
of Plaintiff’s claims against him fail as a matter of law: (1) first, because Separate Defendant
Gulick had no personal involvement in the stop, search, arrest, or imprisonment; and (2) second,
because his stop, search, arrest, and imprisonment were all lawful. 	Additionally, Separate
Defendant Gulick argues even if Plaintiff’s constitutional rights were violated he is entitled to
qualified immunity.
Qualified immunity “shields [a] government official from liability in a section 1983 action
unless the official’s conduct violates a clearly established right of which a reasonable person would
have known.” 	Brown v. City of Golden Valley, 574 F.3d 491, 495 (8th Cir. 2009). 	Qualified
immunity protects “all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.”
Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986). “At summary judgment, qualified immunity shields
a law enforcement officer from liability in a § 1983 action unless: (1) the facts viewed in the light
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most favorable to the plaintiff, demonstrate the deprivation of a constitutional or statutory right;
and (2) the right was clearly established at the time of the deprivation.” Watson v. Boyd, 2 F.4th
1106, 1109 (8th Cir. 2021) (internal citation and quotations omitted). As Plaintiff did not dispute
any of the summary judgment evidence presented by Separate Defendants here, the Court will first
determine whether any of Plaintiff’s claims, considering the undisputed facts, rise to the level of a
constitutional violation. 	See Kulkay v. Roy, 847 F.35 637, 642 (8th Cir. 2017) (explaining the
court may start with either prong of the qualified immunity test and may end the analysis if either
is not met).
A. 	Stop, Search, and Arrest
First, the Court notes “[l]iability under Section 1983 requires a causal link to, and direct
responsibility for, the deprivation of rights.” Madewell v. Roberts, 909 F.2d 1203, 1208 (8th Cir.
1990) (citing Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 370 (1976)). To state a cognizable Section 1983 claim,
a complaint must set forth specific factual allegations showing what each named defendant
allegedly did, or failed to do, that violated the Plaintiff's constitutionally protected rights. Here, it
is undisputed that Separate Defendant Brown stopped, searched, and arrested Plaintiff. Separate
Defendant Gulick cannot be held liable for another officer’s actions.
Moreover, in its October 11, 2024 Report and Recommendation, the Court determined
Separate Defendant Brown’s actions in stopping, searching, and arresting Plaintiff were lawful.
(ECF No. 96). 	Even if the Court held Separate Defendant Gulick directly responsible for
Plaintiff’s stop, search, and arrest, Plaintiff’s constitutional rights were not violated. Accordingly,
Separate Defendant Gulick is entitled to qualified immunity on Plaintiff’s claims of illegal stop,
search, and arrest.
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B. 	Imprisonment
Next, Plaintiff argues he was improperly held in the HCDC by Separate Defendant Gulick
without a white warrant. Separate Defendant Gulick argues he was not responsible for Plaintiff’s
imprisonment. 	The Court agrees that Separate Defendant Gulick did not cause Plaintiff’s
incarceration for the nine (9) days between October 15, 2019 and October 23, 2019. The record
clearly shows Plaintiff was imprisoned by Hempstead County Circuit Court, and specifically Judge
Wright, who denied him bond until October 23, 2019. (ECF No. 75-1, p. 5).
Plaintiff’s arrest and imprisonment on October 15, 2019 was not based on a parole violation
but instead on the new violation he committed on October 15, 2019. Therefore, no white warrant
was necessary to hold Plaintiff, and Separate Defendant Gulick did not cause Plaintiff’s arrest and
incarceration on October 15, 2023 nor the continuation of it through October 23, 2019. 	Separate
Defendant Gulick cannot be held liable under Section 1983 for something he did not cause. See
Madewell v. Roberts, 909 F.2d at 1208 (“Liability under Section 1983 requires a causal link to,
and direct responsibility for, the deprivation of rights.”) . Accordingly, Separate Defendant Gulick
is entitled to qualified immunity on Plaintiff’s claims of illegal imprisonment.
To the extent Plaintiff makes a false imprisonment claim against Separate Defendant
Gulick, such claims are state law claims and not actionable under Section 1983. King v. Beavers,
148 F.3d 1031, 1034 (8th Cir. 1998) (“False imprisonment is a state law tort claim. It is not
coextensive with the Fourteenth Amendment, which ‘protects only against deprivations of liberty
accomplished ‘without due process of law.’” (quoting Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 145
(1979))). 	As the Court recommends dismissal of Plaintiff’s federal claims, it will not exercise
supplemental jurisdiction over any pendant state claims raised by Plaintiff. See Franklin v. Zain,
152 F.3d 783, 786 (8th Cir. 1998) (explaining a federal court may decline to exercise supplemental
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jurisdiction over a pendent state claim if it has dismissed all claims over which it had original
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3).).2F
3
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, I recommend Separate Defendant Gulick’s Motion for Summary
Judgment (ECF No. 75) be GRANTED and all claims asserted against Separate Defendant Gulick
be DISMISSED with prejudice, and as no further claims remain that this case be dismissed.
Referral Status: The referral should be terminated.
The parties have fourteen (14) days from receipt of the Report and Recommendation
in which to file written objections pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). The failure to file timely
objections may result in waiver of the right to appeal questions of fact. 	The parties are
reminded that objections must be both timely and specific to trigger de novo review by the
district court.
DATED this 31st day of October 2024.
/s/ Barry A. Bryant
HON. BARRY A. BRYANT
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
3 The Court notes Plaintiff listed the Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments in his Amended
Complaint, however, the facts he alleged only stated a Fourth Amendment claim. Accordingly,
the Court need not address any additional amendments herein.
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