USA Truck, Inc. v. Jackson Elite Trucking, LLC

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS
FORT SMITH DIVISION
PLAINTIFF
CASE NO. 2:24-CV-02090
THE WREX GROUP, LLC
vs.
USAT LOGISTICS, ET AL 	DEFENDANTS
MAGISTRATE JUDGE’S REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
I. Background
It is alleged that on January 20, 2020, a tractor trailer being operated by Jackson Elite
Trucking, LLC (Jackson) lost control and crashed in Missouri. (ECF No. 5). At the time of the
accident, Jackson was hauling a load of Royal Oak charcoal which had been brokered by USA
Truck, Inc. (USA Truck) and was en route to the customer, a Walmart facility in Alabama. The
Missouri Highway Patrol contacted the Wrex Group, LLC – who operated a towing and recovery
business known as Chuck’s Wrecker Service – to remove the tractor, trailer and approximately
37,138 pounds of bagged charcoal from the accident scene so the highway could be reopened.
Litigation was filed in Missouri state court on January 26, 2021, by Wrex Group against USA
Truck and Royal Oak to recover the costs of towing, recovery and storage of the charcoal, with Wrex
Group noting that the charcoal remained in a storage facility and was accruing daily charges. (ECF
No. 5). 	Royal Oak was later dismissed. (ECF No. 14). At some point in 2021, there is discussion
in the state court’s docket sheet about Jackson; on April 17, 2023, there is a notation that Jackson
was served. (ECF No. 1-1). On May 15, 2023, Jackson removed this case to the U.S. District Court
for the Eastern District of Missouri. A Second Amended Complaint (ECF No. 27) was filed on
October 19, 2023, which included both USA Truck and Jackson and also added Walmart, Inc. as a
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defendant.
In March 2024, USA Truck filed a Crossclaim against Jackson. (ECF No. 40). USA Truck
says it entered into a Broker Provider Agreement (Agreement) with Jackson which requires Jackson
to indemnify USA Truck for all costs USA Truck may incur as a result of the transportation,
specifically including (but not limited to) “costs of containment, cleanup and remediation ....” Id.
In addition to its claim for indemnification, USA Truck also alleges a right to contribution from
Jackson, the tortfeasor who is allegedly responsible for the damages. (ECF No. 40, pp. 3-5).
Jackson filed a Motion to Dismiss the Crossclaims and/or Motion to Transfer Venue of the
Crossclaims to Arkansas pursuant to a forum selection clause contained in the parties’ Agreement.
(ECF No. 45). U.S. District Judge Henry E. Autry ruled on June 28, 2024, that Jackson and USA
Truck entered into a “valid, binding forum selection agreement . . .[and] [a]s such, [USA Truck’s]
crossclaims must be adjudicated in the Western District of Arkansas, Fort Smith Division.” (ECF
No. 58). Citing the Eighth Circuit’s decision in Terra Int’l, Inc. v. Mississippi Chem. Corp., 119
F.3d 688, 693-94 (8th Cir. 1997) and analysis of “contract-related tort claims,” Judge Autry
specifically found the forum selection clause of the parties’ Agreement was enforceable and
encompassed not only contractual indemnity but also USA Truck’s contribution claim; Judge Autry
granted Jackson’s 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) Motion to Transfer. (ECF No. 58). Judge Autry’s decision
did not address whether the parties’ choice-of-law provision – contained in the same paragraph as
the forum selection clause, “20. Governing Law1 ” – is enforceable.
1 Paragraph 20 is titled “Governing Law” and provides that “This Agreement shall be executed by
USAT in Van Buren, Crawford County, Arkansas, and shall be construed and enforced according
to the laws of the State of Arkansas, without regard to its conflict of laws principles, to the extent
said laws are not inconsistent with any applicable federal laws. All controversies and claims arising
hereunder shall be brought in the appropriate state or federal court having jurisdiction over Crawford
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At a point near in time, Wrex Group reached a settlement with Jackson, and on July 15, 2024,
filed a Motion to Dismiss Jackson from the litigation (ECF No. 64); Wrex Group also sought
permission to file a Third Amended Complaint in which Wrex planned to “eliminate the claims
which have been resolved with Jackson” and reserve the claims against USA Truck and Walmart for
“Indoor Storage Charges only for the cargo stored by [Wrex Group] since the date of the accident
....” (ECF No. 64, p.1). Review of the Eastern District of Missouri’s docket sheet reflects that Judge
Autry dismissed all of Wrex Group’s claims against Jackson and permitted the Third Amended
Complaint which was filed on October 8, 2024, seeking recovery of only Indoor Storage Charges
between January 21, 2020 and June 11, 2024 (when USA Truck retrieved the charcoal), at the daily
rate of $350 for total damages in the amount of $561,400.2 (See Eastern District of Missouri, 4:23-
cv-00649-HEA, ECF Nos. 66, 67).
On July 16, 2024, USA Truck’s crossclaims were transferred to the Western District of
Arkansas (ECF No. 66) and assigned to U.S. District Judge Timothy L. Brooks; for clarity and
conciseness, Judge Brooks directed that USA Truck file a Complaint against Jackson asserting the
crossclaims. (ECF No. 71). USA Truck filed its Amended Complaint (ECF No. 74), asserting Count
I (crossclaim for contractual indemnity) and Count II (crossclaim for contribution under Arkansas
law). Jackson answered the Amended Complaint and filed a Motion to Dismiss the crossclaim for
contribution. (ECF Nos. 75,76). The case was referred to the undersigned for all pretrial matters.
County, Arkansas. Provider specifically consents to the jurisdiction of said courts, and further
consents to service by registered mail at its principal office address.”
2 The Third Amended Complaint alleges that Jackson paid Wrex Group for “charges for the retrieval
of the wrecked tractor/trailer, salvage of the charcoal, transloading, and towing and related
charges....” (ECF No. 67, ¶34).
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USA Truck responded to the Motion on October 1, 2024 (ECF No. 79), and Jackson replied on
October 8, 2024. (ECF No. 80).
II. Choice of Law
Both in support of dismissal and in its reply, Jackson argues that Missouri law applies to
USA Truck’s contribution claim. Under Missouri law, Jackson says its settlement with the Wrex
Group, and Judge Autry’s dismissal with prejudice of Wrex Group’s claims against Jackson,
extinguished USA Truck’s claim for contribution, citing Union Elec. Co. v. Metro St. Louis Sewer
Dist., 258 S.W.3d 48, 55 (Mo. banc 2008); Gore v. Saint Anthony’s Med. Ctr., 866 S.W.2d 871 873
(Mo. App. E.D. 1993). Alternatively, says Jackson, even if USA Truck is correct that Arkansas law
applies, USA Truck’s failure to challenge the settlement, release language and Jackson’s dismissal
with prejudice in the Missouri action constitutes waiver, and USA Truck cannot now challenge the
disposition. For these reasons, says Jackson, USA Truck cannot proceed with its claim for
contribution.
USA Truck sees it differently, arguing that Arkansas law – in particular, Ark. Code. Ann. §
16-61-202(a) – applies to its contribution claim and that the Wrex Group/Jackson settlement did not
extinguish the claim as a matter of law. USA Truck points out Judge Autry determined that the
“contract-related tort claim” of contribution is subject to the forum selection provision contained in
the Agreement’s Governing Law provision because the contribution claim is “encompassed” within
the parties’ contractual relationship. (ECF No. 58, p. 11). USA Truck says the same contractual
provision dictates that Arkansas law will govern “without regard to its conflict of laws principles”
and therefore, Jackson’s dismissal argument should be rejected because Arkansas law applies. USA
Truck additionally contends that Jackson’s release with Wrex Group does not satisfy Arkansas law
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by identifying a pro rata reduction of Jackson’s potential contribution liability as to joint tortfeasors.
A federal court siting in diversity ordinarily must apply the forum state's choice-of-law
principles; here, that is Arkansas’. See Cassirer v. Thyssen-Bornemisza Collection Found., 142 S.
Ct. 1502, 1509 (2022) (“According to long-settled precedent, a federal court sitting in diversity
borrows the forum State's choice-of-law rule.”); Simmons Foods Inc. v. Indus. Risk Insurers, 863
F.3d 792, 797 (8th Cir. 2017) (citation omitted); Schwan's Sales Enters., Inc. v. SIG Pack, Inc., 476
F.3d 594, 595 (8th Cir. 2007). However, according to Wisland v. Admiral Beverage Corp., 119 F.3d
733, 735 (8th Cir. 1997), “[w]hen a diversity case is transferred from one federal court to another,
the choice of law depends on the nature of the transfer.” Importantly, “[w]ith a § 1404(a) transfer
the law of the transferor court applies,” but “[a] § 1406(a) transfer calls for application of the law
of the transferee court....” Id. at 736 (citing Ferens v. John Deere Co., 494 U.S. 516, 531 (1990)).
Judge Autry’s transfer decision was made pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1404(a)3 and thus, Missouri choice
of law analysis applies.4
As a preliminary matter, the undersigned finds the parties included in their Agreement a
choice of law provision in Paragraph 20: Governing Law, and the law chosen to govern construction
and enforcement of their contractual Agreement was Arkansas law. 	Under Missouri law, the
parties’ contractual choice-of-law provisions are generally enforced. Eagle Technology v. Expander
3 “For the convenience of the parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice, a district court may
transfer any civil action to any other district or division where it might have been brought or to any
district or division to which all parties have consented.” 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (2012).
4 The undersigned does not find the Supreme Court’s decision in Atlantic Marine Const. Co., Inc.
v. U.S. Dist. Court for the Western Dist. of Texas, 571 U.S. 49 (2013) alters this analysis because
USA Truck did not inappropriately or improperly file suit in a venue violative of the parties’ forum
selection clause; the Wrex Group is plaintiff.
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Americas, Inc., 783 F.3d 1131, 1137 (8th Cir. 2015); Sturgeon v. Allied Professionals Ins. Co., 344
S.W.3d 205, 210 (Mo. App. E.D. 2011). Incidentally, there is no conflict of law on this issue –
Arkansas law also gives deference to choice of law provisions in the context of contracts. 	See
Nursing Home Consultants, Inc. v. Quantum Health Servs., Inc., 926 F. Supp. 835, 841 (E.D. Ark.
1996) (collecting cases), aff'd, 112 F.3d 513 (8th Cir. 1997); see also Pioneer Civil Construction,
LLC v. Ingevity Arkansas, LLC, 659 F. Supp. 3d 977, 986 (W.D. Ark. 2023). 	USA Truck’s
indemnity claim arises from the Agreement – i.e., Paragraph 8: Indemnity – is contractual in nature
and is governed by Arkansas law. The key remaining question is whether the parties’ choice of
Arkansas law also governs USA Truck’s claim against Jackson for contribution.
“[B]efore entangling itself in messy issues of conflict of laws a court ought to satisfy itself
that there actually is a difference between the relevant laws of the different states.” Phillips v. Marist
Soc. of Wash. Province, 80 F.3d 274, 276 (8th Cir. 1996) (quoting Barron v. Ford Motor Co. of
Can., Ltd., 965 F.2d 195, 197 (7th Cir. 1992)). In other words, absent a conflict between relevant
legal principles, a court need not conduct a full-blown choice-of-law analysis. See Leonards v. S.
Farm Bureau Cas. Ins. Co., 279 F.3d 611, 612 (8th Cir. 2002). 	Here, without getting into an
exhaustive recitation of the law of contribution under Missouri and Arkansas law (as well as
potential defenses), the Court observes that the parties have teed up a conflict – i.e., arguably
Jackson’s settlement with Wrex Group extinguished USA Truck’s contribution claim under Missouri
law while Jackson’s settlement with Wrex Group did not automatically extinguish USA Truck’s
right to seek contribution and/or an apportionment of fault under Arkansas law.
The pleadings of both Jackson and USA Truck describe USA Truck’s contribution claim as
a tort claim. Under Missouri law, the right of contribution, while “not grounded in tort, “ Rowland
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v. Skaggs Conmpanies, Inc., 666 S.W.2d 770, 773 (Mo. en banc 1984), serves to rectify the unjust
enrichment that occurs when one tortfeasor “discharge[s] a burden which both in law and conscience
was equally the liability of another.” See Leflar, “Contribution and Indemnity Between Tortfeasors,”
81 U.Pa.L.Rev. 130, 138 (1932). Courts have observed that “[b]y definition, a suit for contribution
among tortfeasors must arise from some underlying tort action ... [but] this does not alter the
independent nature of the cause of action for contribution.” 	Rowland, 666 S.W.2d at 773-774.
Under Arkansas law, contribution – an apportionment of the common liability5 – is a derivative
claim, Martin Farm Enterprises, Inc. v. Hayes, 320 Ark. 205, 208 (1995), which is based on upon
a common liability to an injured party. The right to contribution arises under Arkansas’ Uniform
Contribution Among Joint Tortfeasors Act (UCATA) which historically applies only to “persons
liable for torts” and not to actions for breach of contract. Roberts and Co., Inc., v. Sergio, 22 Ark.
Ap. 58, 61 (1987).6 Finding that both Missouri and Arkansas law view contribution as tort-related,
the Court agrees with the parties – USA Truck’s contribution claim sounds in tort, rather than
contract.
USA Truck argues that Judge Autry answered the choice of law issue when determining that
6 See Howard W. Brill & Christian H. Brill, 1 Ark. Law of Damages, § 7:4, p. 120 (Nov. 2020
Update).
7 In 2013, the UCATA was amended to provide that “the right to contribution is not limited to
money damages but also includes the right to allocation of fault as among all joint tortfeasors and
the rights provided for in § 16–61–204.” Ark.Code Ann. § 16–61–202(c). 	Section 16–61–204
provides rights for joint tortfeasors against released tortfeasors and provides, “[w]hen the injured
person releases a joint tortfeasor, the remaining defendants are entitled to a determination by the
finder of fact of the released joint tortfeasor's pro rata share of responsibility for the injured person's
damages.” Ark. Code Ann. § 16–61–204(d). These sections create substantive rights absent from
the previous version of the UCATA. English v. Robbins, 2014 Ark. 511 (2014).
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the “contract-related tort claim” of contribution was subject to the Agreement’s forum selection
provision because the contribution claim is “encompassed” within the parties’ contractual
relationship. 	(ECF No. 58, p. 11). The undersigned does not read Judge Autry’s transfer decision
so broadly – Judge Autry scrutinized the parties’ forum selection language of Paragraph 20 when
considering Jackson’s § 1404(a) transfer motion but was silent on the choice of law language. Judge
Autry’s analysis was clearly couched in the forum selection clause as is further evidenced by his
reliance on Atlantic Marine Const. Co. v. U.S. Dist. Court for Western Dist. Of Texas, 571 U.S. 49
(2013), and Terra Int’l, Inc. v. Miss. Chem. Corp., 119 F.3d 688 (8th Cir. 1997), where it is made
clear that “a proper application of § 1404(a) requires that a forum-selection clause be ‘given
controlling weight in all but the most exceptional cases.’” 571 U.S. at 59-60 (quoting Stewart Org.
v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22, 33 (1988) (Kennedy, J., concurring)). Inclusion of the tort claim in the
forum selection analysis was necessitated because “[w]hether certain claims are ‘governed by forum
selection provisions depends upon the intention of the parties reflected in the wording of particular
clauses and the facts of each case.’” Stacks v. Bluejay Holdings, LLC., No. 4:10CV00718, 2010 WL
3893990, at *3 (E.D. Ark. Sept. 29, 2010) (quoting Terra Int'l, Inc. v. Mississippi Chem. Corp., 119
F.3d 688, 693 (8th Cir. 1997)). The undersigned finds Judge Autry’s well-reasoned opinion did not
reach the parties’ choice of law language of Paragraph 20.
Turning back to Missouri’s conflicts of law analysis for tort claims, “Missouri employs the
most significant relationship test set forth in Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 145
(1971).” Zafer Chiropractic & Sports Injuries, P.A. v. Hermann, 501 S.W.3d 545, 550 (Mo. App.
E.D. 2016). Section 145 states:
(1) 	The rights and liabilities of the parties with respect to an issue in tort are
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determined by the local law of the state which, with respect to that issue, has the most
significant relationship to the occurrence and the parties under the principles stated
in § 6.
(2) 	Contacts to be taken into account in applying the principles of § 6 to determine
the law applicable to an issue include:
(a) the place where the injury occurred,
(b) the place where the conduct causing the injury occurred,
(c) the domicile, residence, nationality, place of incorporation and place of
business of the parties, and
(d) the place where the relationship, if any, between the parties is centered.
These contacts are to be evaluated according to their relative importance with respect to the
particular issue.
With respect to torts, Arkansas’ choice of law analysis differs from Missouri’s. In Wallis v.
Mrs. Smith's Pie Co., 261 Ark. 622, 550 S.W.2d 453 (1977), the Arkansas Supreme Court adopted
Professor Robert A. Leflar's five-factor approach to deciding tort choice-of-law questions. 	See
Miller v. Pilgrim's Pride Corp., 366 F.3d 672, 674 (8th Cir.2004). Those factors are: (1)
predictability of results; (2) maintenance of interstate and international order; (3) simplification of
the judicial task; (4) advancement of the forum's governmental interests; and (5) application of the
better rule of law. Id. Arkansas law has not, however, altogether discarded the traditional approach
of lex loci delicti, so a court “must consider the lex loci delicti rule within the framework of the five
Leflar factors.” Id.; see also Ganey v. Kawasaki Motors Corp., U.S.A., 366 Ark. 238, 251, (2006)
(noting that Arkansas choice-of-law analysis “ha[s] evolved from a simple application of the doctrine
of lex loci delicti into a consideration of both that doctrine and Leflar's five choice-influencing
factors”); Gomez v. ITT Educ. Servs., Inc., 348 Ark. 69, 77 (2002) (noting that “the adoption of the
Leflar factors in Wallis and subsequent cases appears to be merely a softening of what previously
had been a rigid formulaic application of the former rule of law”).
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As noted above, because Judge Autry’s transfer decision was made pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§1404(a),7 Missouri’s choice of law analysis applies. Turning to the factors, the underlying injury
occurred in Missouri which is also the location of the place where the conduct causing the injury
occurred; both of these factors favor Missouri. The next factor favors Arkansas as USA Truck is
domiciled in Arkansas and conducted business with Jackson through a contract executed in
Arkansas; Jackson appears to be domiciled in Texas. The place where the relationship is centered
also favors Arkansas as the contractual relationship (which caused Jackson to be hauling this
brokered freight) was “centered” in Arkansas – these parties chose Arkansas as the place of contract
execution, the forum in which they agreed to resolve their disputes, and whose law would govern
their contractual disputes. In reaching this conclusion, the undersigned rejects Jackson’s arguments
that Missouri law should be applied because Wrex Group is a Missouri based company; Wrex Group
has no interest in the Arkansas crossclaims between Jackson and USA Truck, and the ruling on this
issue does not diminish any claim Wrex Group has asserted in the Missouri litigation. Additionally,
the contribution claim being asserted by USA Truck is one arising under Arkansas statutory law.
“[E]valuat[ing] [these factors] according to their relative importance with respect to the particular
issue” makes for a close call but the undersigned finds that in totality, Arkansas has the most
significant relationship to USA Truck’s claim for contribution.
While unnecessary to this decision, the undersigned would have reached the same close-call
if applying Professor Leflar's five-factor approach under Arkansas law. Application of Arkansas law
provides predictability of results in Arkansas courts, simplifies the judicial task because Arkansas
8 “For the convenience of the parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice, a district court may
transfer any civil action to any other district or division where it might have been brought or to any
district or division to which all parties have consented.” 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (2012).
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law is already applicable to one of the parties’ two claims, maintains interstate order because
Arkansas has sufficient contacts with the dispute, and advances the forum's interests under
circumstances where the location of the injury favors neither Jackson nor USA Truck. Missouri
arguably has little remaining interest in this matter as Wrex Group has dismissed Jackson with
prejudice from the litigation; Missouri has no articulable interest in the crossclaims of two parties
neither of whom is a citizen of Missouri. 	In making this determination, the undersigned offers no
opinion on the better of the two conflicting laws on contribution as Arkansas’ courts have “been
especially hesitant to pronounce the better law when other Leflar factors point decidedly towards the
application of one state's law.” Hughes v. Walmart Stores, Inc., 250 F.3d 618, 621 (8th Cir. 2001).
III. Motion to Dismiss – F.R.Civ.P. 12
To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, a complaint must provide “a short and plain
statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). The
purpose of this requirement is to “give the defendant fair notice of what the ... claim is and the
grounds upon which it rests.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp.
v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2017). 	The Court must accept all of the complaint’s factual
allegations as true and construe them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, drawing all
reasonable inferences in the plaintiff’s favor. See Ashley Cnty., Ark. v. Pfizer, Inc., 552 F.3d 659,
665 (8th Cir. 2009). However, the complaint “must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as
true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’ ” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678
(2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff
pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is
liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. “A pleading that offers ‘labels and conclusions’ or ‘a
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formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.’ Nor does a complaint suffice
if it tenders ‘naked assertion[s]’ devoid of ‘further factual enhancement.’” Id. In other words, while
“the pleading standard that Rule 8 announces does not require ‘detailed factual allegations,’ ... it
demands more than an unadorned, the defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Id.
Jackson seeks dismissal of USA Truck’s contribution claim through application of Missouri
law, and as a result of Jackson’s settlement with Wrex Group and dismissal of the litigation against
Jackson with prejudice. Jackson’s motion relies upon Missouri statutes and case law. Because the
undersigned finds that Arkansas law applies to the contribution claim, Jackson’s Motion to Dismiss
on these grounds should be denied. Additionally, there are arguments throughout the pleadings
about possible defenses Jackson may have to contribution but this requires the Court to look beyond
the pleadings which is inappropriate at this stage. 	In other words, Jackson may have defenses to
contribution which are not properly adjudicated on a motion to dismiss.
The undersigned has reviewed Count II of USA Truck’s Complaint (ECF No. 74) through
the lens of F.R.Civ. P. 12(b)(6), accepted all of the complaint’s factual allegations as true, and
construed them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. After doing so, it is concluded that USA
Truck properly has pled its contribution claim, including the right to apportionment of fault, under
Arkansas law, and thus, it is recommended that Jackson’s Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 76) be
DENIED.
The parties have fourteen (14) days from receipt of the Report and Recommendation
in which to file written objections pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). The failure to file timely
objections may result in waiver of the right to appeal questions of fact. 	The parties are
reminded that objections must be both timely and specific to trigger de novo review by the
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district court.
RECOMMENDED this 12 th day of November 2024.
CHRISTY COMSTOCK
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
13
RISTY COMSTOCK
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