The Town of Pine Hill, Alabama v. 3M Company et al

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA
NORTHERN DIVISION
THE TOWN OF PINE HILL, ALABAMA, 	)
)
Plaintiff, 	)
)
vs. 	) 	CIVIL ACTION NO. 2:24-00284-KD-N
)
3M COMPANY, et al., 	)
)
Defendants. 	)
ORDER
This matter is before the Court on Defendant 3M’s motion to stay the court’s remand
order pending appeal (Doc. 94) and Pine Hill’s response. (Doc. 96). Upon consideration, the
motion is GRANTED.1 Because the case was prematurely transmitted back to state court, the
Clerk of Court is directed to notify the state court of this action.
3M removed this case from state court on the bases of 28 U.S.C. §1442 (federal officer
removal) and diversity jurisdiction. On March 6, 2025, this Court issued a judgment finding that
this Court did not have jurisdiction under federal officer removal or diversity jurisdiction and
ordered remand of this case to state court. (Doc. 87). On March 7, 2025, the clerk of court
emailed the letter to state court notifying it of the court’s judgment of remand. (Doc. 88). A few
hours later, 3M filed an appeal of the remand order. (Doc. 89). 3M appealed pursuant to 28
U.S.C. §1447(d). The relevant portion of §1447(d) provides that “an order remanding a case to
the State court from which it was removed pursuant to section §1442 or §1443 of this title shall
1 The Court notes that an order is not necessary as the stay was automatic upon the filing of the
appeal.
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be reviewable by appeal or otherwise.” On March 14, 2025, 3M filed this motion to stay
execution of the remand order pending appeal. Pine Hill objects.
Pine Hill first asserts that this Court has been divested of jurisdiction to stay the case
because the clerk of court has already mailed the remand order to state court. The Court
disagrees that mailing the remand order alone divested the court of jurisdiction. As explained in
Plaquemines Par. v. Chevron USA, Inc., 84 F.4th 362(5th Cir. 2023), Pine Hill
overread[s] 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c), which states, “A certified copy of the order of
remand shall be mailed by the clerk to the clerk of the State court. The State court
may thereupon proceed with such case.” Plaintiffs quote Arnold v. Garlock, Inc.,
for the proposition that the “district court is divested of jurisdiction” at the time
“the remand order ... is certified and mailed by the clerk of the district court,” 278
F.3d 426, 438 (5th Cir. 2001), and conclude that the district court below was
divested of jurisdiction to stay the remand order upon mailing it. But this
argument proves too much. It is inconsistent with the undisputed proposition that
the district court retains jurisdiction to vacate its already-mailed remand order
because the order is appealable under section 1447(d)…. [W]here a remand order
is appealable under section 1447(d), “the remand order is treated like any other
final judgment.” Thomas v. LTV Corp., 39 F.3d 611, 616 (5th Cir. 1994).
Id. at 372.2
Moreover, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 62(a), “execution on a judgment
and proceedings to enforce it are stayed for 30 days after its entry, unless the court orders
otherwise.” Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(a) defines “judgment” as “a decree and any order
from which an appeal lies.” So, although the remand order has been transmitted, the 30-day
automatic stay is in effect. W. Virginia State Univ. Bd. of Governors for & on behalf of W.
Virginia State Univ. v. Dow Chem. Co., No. 2:17-CV-3558, 2020 WL 3053542, at *1 (S.D.W.
2 The concept that the district court retains the jurisdiction to vacate its remand order is found in
§1447(d) which states that the remand order “shall be reviewable by appeal or otherwise.”
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Va. June 8, 2020) (“Inasmuch as this case was removed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1442,
defendants are entitled to a 30-day automatic stay on the execution of the remand order from the
date of its issuance.”). Pursuant to calculations under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 6(a), the
automatic stay was in effect until April 7, 2025. Accordingly, the undersigned did not lose
jurisdiction of this case based on the remand order being mailed to state court because the
automatic stay was in effect preventing the execution of the court’s judgment. In other words,
the act of transmitting the order is ineffective at least until the automatic stay expired.
Pine Hill next asserts that 3M is not entitled to an automatic stay pending appeal. In
support, Pine Hill cites Clark v. Georgia, No. 23-13368, Doc. 26(11th Cir. Dec. 21, 2023),
wherein the Eleventh Circuit denied in an unpublished order Clark’s motion to stay a state court
criminal proceeding while Clark appealed the District Court’s order of remand.3 Clark had
attempted to remove his state criminal case under the federal officer removal statue, 28 U.S.C. §
1442. Pine Hill asserts that the Eleventh Circuit indicated in its order that there is not a
mandatory stay in cases involving remand of cases that are removed under §1442. The Court
disagrees that the Eleventh Circuit has taken this position.
In response to the assertion that Coinbase, Inc. v. Bielski, 599 U.S. 736, 741(2023)
required a mandatory stay of a state criminal case, the Court in Clark stated that “the Griggs
‘background principle’ animating Coinbase does not support a stay of Clark’s state criminal
case…. If the Griggs principle applied, Clark could perhaps stay his district court proceedings—
but instead, he seeks a stay of his state court prosecution.” Clark, Doc. 26 at 2(emphasis added).
3 “Unpublished opinions are not considered binding precedent, but they may be cited as
persuasive authority.” CTA11 Rule 36-2
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The referenced “background principle” is that an appeal “divests the district court of its control
over those aspects of the case involved in the appeal.” Griggs v. Provident Consumer Discount
Co., 459 U.S. 56, 58(1982). As the Court in Clark indirectly notes, there were no ongoing
proceedings in district court to stay, rather the proceedings were in state court. Thus, the Griggs
principle is not implicated.
Clark is clearly distinguishable on the important fact that Clark was attempting to remove
his criminal case. Section 1455(b)(3) provides that “[t]he filing of a notice of removal of a
criminal prosecution shall not prevent the State court in which such prosecution is pending from
proceeding further, except that a judgment of conviction shall not be entered unless the
prosecution is first remanded.” In other words, unlike civil case removals from state court, the
state court was never divested of its jurisdiction over the case.4
The District Court in Clark recognized this distinction while agreeing that Coinbase
might otherwise be applicable:
In Coinbase, Justice Kavanaugh wrote for the majority that an automatic
stay was appropriate when a court had denied a motion to compel arbitration
because the denial could be appealed on an interlocutory basis under federal
statute. 599 U.S. at 740–43. Clark argues that the reasoning for an automatic stay
of a court's denial to compel arbitration applies equally in his context, where
Section 1447(d) allows the appeal of a remand order of a removal action based on
federal officer removal, 28 U.S.C. § 1442. Doc. No. [59], 5–8.
The Court agrees that some language in the Coinbase decision supports
Clark's argument. Particularly, appeals of Section 1442 remand orders and denials
of motions to compel arbitration are similar because they both are exceptions to
general rules that do not allow for appeals. Compare 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d)
(disallowing appeals of remand orders except for cases removed under Sections
1442 or 1443) with Coinbase, 599 U.S. at 740 (“Section 16(a) creates a rare
statutory exception to the usual rule that parties may not appeal before final
judgment .... Congress provided for immediate interlocutory appeals of orders
denying ... motions to compel arbitration.” (citing Mohawk Indus., Inc. v.
Carpenter, 558 U.S. 100, 108–09 (2009))). Moreover, the more central question
underlying an appeal of a denial to compel arbitration is a question of “whether
4 28 U.S.C. §1446 provides that after removal “the State court shall proceed no further….”
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the case belongs in arbitration or instead in the district court.” Id. at 741. The
question presented on a permissible appeal of a remand order likewise involves
whether a case “belongs in” federal or state court.
Even taking these considerations into account, however, the Court cannot
ignore the additional statutory directive that applies to Clark's removal of his
criminal prosecution. Distinct from the arbitration context described in Coinbase,
Clark's removal of his State criminal prosecution is governed by the procedures
described in 28 U.S.C. § 1455.
Georgia v. Clark, No. 1:23-CV-03721-SCJ, 2023 WL 11796094, at *2–3 (N.D. Ga. Nov. 9,
2023)
Thus, the denials of the motion to stay by both the District Court and Eleventh Circuit in
Clark are not inconsistent with City of Martinsville, Virginia v. Express Scripts, Inc., 128 F.4th
265, 271 (4th Cir. 2025), wherein the Court found that there was a mandatory stay of the remand
order in a civil case based on Coinbase, Inc. v. Bielski, 599 U.S. 736, 741(2023) and Griggs.
The Court in Martinsville relied on the fact that “at the time of the appeal, the district court still
had an action it needed to take before it could shunt the case elsewhere—the statutorily required
mailing of the order. That is a proceeding in the district court to which Coinbase applies.”
Martinsville at 271. In other words, because the judgment of remand had not been enforced,
there was still a proceeding related to the appeal which should be stayed pending the appeal as of
right.
When a judgment of remand can be appealed as of right, the judgment is automatically
stayed for 30 days pursuant to Rule 62(a). During this 30-day period, the Court can entertain
motions to reconsider, or the parties can appeal. As stated previously, the Court jumped the gun
and transmitted the case to the state court before the 30-day period ran. But the appeal in this
case was timely filed within the time provided by the automatic stay. Once the appeal was filed,
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this Court lost jurisdiction to execute the remand at the end of the automatic stay. As explained
in Griggs:
The filing of a notice of appeal is an event of jurisdictional significance—it
confers jurisdiction on the court of appeals and divests the district court of its
control over those aspects of the case involved in the appeal. See, e.g., United
States v. Hitchmon, 587 F.2d 1357 (CA5 1979). Cf. Ruby v. Secretary of United
States Navy, 365 F.2d 385, 389 (CA9 1966) (en banc) (notice of appeal from
unappealable order does not divest district court of jurisdiction), cert. denied, 386
U.S. 1011, 87 S.Ct. 1357, 18 L.Ed.2d 440 (1967).
Griggs at 58.
In BP P.L.C. v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore, 593 U.S. 230, 141 S. Ct. 1532,
1536(2021), the Court stated that “Congress has deemed it appropriate to allow appellate review
before a district court may remand a case to state court.” While this is prefatory language, it
explains the plain meaning of 29 U.S.C. §1447(d). Accordingly, the execution of the remand
order is stayed until the appeal is complete.
DONE and ORDERED this 2nd day of April, 2025.
s / Kristi K. DuBose
KRISTI K. DuBOSE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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