Woodyard v. Baldwin County Sheriff's Department et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA
SOUTHERN DIVISION
DRAPER FRANK WOODYARD, 	)
Plaintiff, 	)
)
v. 	) 	CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:24-00210-TFM-N
)
BALDWIN COUNTY SHERIFF’S 	)
DEPARTMENT, et al., 	)
Defendants. 	)
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Petitioner Draper Frank Woodyard—at the time an inmate at the Baldwin
County (Alabama) Corrections Center, and who at all times in this action has been
proceeding without counsel (pro se)—filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus under
28 U.S.C. § 2241 dated July 1, 2024,1 	challenging his detention resulting from his
then-pending parole revocation proceedings in Baldwin County state court.2 The
1 Woodyard initiated this action by filing a handwritten “Motion for Injunction” dated
June 18, 2024 (Doc# 1). By order dated and entered June 25, 2024, the undersigned
explained why the “Motion for Injunction” was being construed as a § 2241 petition
and ordered Woodyard to refile his petition on the Court’s requisite form. See (Doc#
4); S.D. Ala. CivLR 9(a)(“All persons applying or petitioning for release from custody
under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 or 28 U.S.C. § 2254…must file their application, petition, or
motion with the Clerk using forms available from the Court.”); Rule 2(d) of the Rules
Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United States District Courts (“The petition must
substantially follow either the form appended to these rules of a form prescribed by a
local district-court rule.”); United States v. Stossel, 348 F.3d 1320, 1322 n.2 (11th Cir.
2003) (per curiam) (“Federal courts are obligated to look beyond the label of a pro se
inmate’s 	motion 	to 	determine 	if 	it 	is 	cognizable 	under 	a 	different 	statutory
framework.”). Woodyard timely complied with that directive, resulting in his operative
§ 2241 petition dated July 1, 2024 (Doc# 7).
2 See Stacey v. Warden, Apalachee Corr. Inst., 854 F.2d 401, 403 n.1 (11th Cir. 1988)
(per curiam) (“Pre-trial habeas petitions ... are properly brought under 28 U.S.C. §
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assigned District Judge has referred said petition to the undersigned Magistrate
Judge for appropriate action. See S.D. Ala. GenLR 72(b); (Doc# 2 & 7/11/2024
electronic reference notation). Under S.D. Ala. GenLR 72(a)(2)(R), the undersigned is
authorized to require responses, issue orders to show cause and any other orders
necessary to develop a complete record, and to prepare a report and recommendation
to the District Judge as to appropriate disposition of the petition, in accordance with
28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Rule 8(b) of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the
United States District Courts.3
I. 	Analysis
a. Mootness
As was previously mentioned, at the time Woodyard filed his operative § 2241
petition, he was being held at the Baldwin County Corrections Center awaiting
adjudication of his parole revocation proceedings. Subsequent filings revealed that
Woodyard was later transferred to the custody of the Alabama Department of
Corrections (ADOC), indicating that his parole was revoked. However, Woodyard
2241, which applies to persons in custody regardless of whether final judgment has
been rendered.”); Hughes v. Att'y Gen. of Fla., 377 F.3d 1258, 1261 (11th Cir. 2004)
(“because this petition for habeas relief is a pre-trial petition it would only be properly
asserted pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241”); Georgia v. Shafer, 119 F.4th 1317, 1321 (11th
Cir. 2024) (per curiam) (“A state pretrial detainee may file a petition for a writ of
habeas corpus. 28 U.S.C. § 2241…”).
3 See Rule 1(b) of the Rules Governing § 2254 Cases in the United States District
Courts (“The district court may apply any or all of these rules to a habeas petition not
[filed under 28 U.S.C. § 2254].”); S.D. Ala. CivLR 9(b) (“The Court may apply any of
the Rules Governing 28 U.S.C. § 2254 Cases in the United States District Courts to
applications for release from custody under 28 U.S.C. § 2241.”).
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contacted the Court in late November 2024 via email to update his mailing address,
with the new address indicated that Woodyard has been released from ADOC custody.
A 	recent 	review 	of 	ADOC’s 	online 	“Inmate 	Search” 	tool
(https://doc.alabama.gov/InmateInfo.aspx (last visited Jan. 13, 2025)) confirms this,
indicating he has finished serving his sentence of incarceration for his parole
revocation. In light of this development, the undersigned concludes that Woodyard’s
present § 2241 petition is due to be dismissed as moot.
Article III of the Constitution “limits the jurisdiction of federal courts to
‘cases’ 	and 	‘controversies,’ 	” 	and 	the 	justiciability 	doctrine’s 	main
components include mootness. See Christian Coal. of Fla., Inc. v. United
States, 662 F.3d 1182, 1189 (11th Cir. 2011) (quotation marks omitted).
A cause of action becomes moot “when it no longer presents a live
controversy with respect to which the court can give meaningful relief.”
See id. (quotation marks omitted).
Because mootness is jurisdictional, [a court is] required to resolve any
question implicating the doctrine before we assume jurisdiction over an
[action]. United States v. Al-Arian, 514 F.3d 1184, 1189 (11th Cir. 2008)
… In considering mootness, we look at the events at the present time, not
at the time the complaint was filed … Dow Jones & Co. v. Kaye, 256 F.3d
1251, 1254 (11th Cir. 2001).
Djadju v. Vega, 32 F.4th 1102, 1106 (11th Cir. 2022). “The fundamental question is
whether events have occurred that deprive [the federal courts] of the ability to give
the [petitioner] meaningful relief.” Id. at 1107.
It is well-recognized that a § 2241 petition is moot once the petitioner has been
convicted on the underlying state charges since a federal court can no longer grant
meaningful relief for pretrial federal rights violations once the petitioner is held as a
convicted defendant. See Powers v. Schwartz, 587 F.2d 783, 783–84 (5th Cir. 1979)
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(per curiam) (“At oral argument, all parties admitted that since the district court's
action, Ms. Powers has been tried on and convicted of the charges that precipitated
this [habeas] action. Ms. Powers is therefore no longer a pretrial detainee; she has not
shown a reasonable probability that she will again acquire that status in the future;
and this is not a class action. The case is therefore moot.”);4 Yohey v. Collins, 985 F.2d
222, 228-29 (5th Cir. 1993) (“Yohey claims that the state court erred in refusing to
grant his requests for pretrial habeas relief. However, such claims for federal habeas
relief for pretrial issues are mooted by Yohey's subsequent conviction.”); Jackson v.
Clements, 796 F.3d 841, 843 (7th Cir. 2015) (per curiam) (“Once Mr. Jackson was
convicted, the claims concerning his pre-trial confinement became moot.”); Thorne v.
Warden, Brooklyn House of Det. of Men, 479 F.2d 297, 299 (2d Cir. 1973) (“Since
Thorne is now held as a convicted defendant rather than merely on a criminal charge
not yet brought to trial, the issue as to the legality of his continued pretrial detention
has been mooted, and it therefore becomes unnecessary to resolve the constitutional
issues 	presented.” 	); 	Clark 	v. 	Payne, 	341 	F. 	App'x 	355, 	356 	(10th 	Cir. 	2009)
(unpublished) (Petitioner “filed his petition in the district court while awaiting his
4 On “October 1, 1981 pursuant to the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals Reorganization
Act of 1980, P.L. 96-452, 94 Stat. 1995, … the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit was divided into two circuits, the Eleventh and the ‘new Fifth.’ ” Bonner
v. City of Prichard, Ala., 661 F.2d 1206, 1207 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc). “The Eleventh
Circuit, in the en banc decision Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th
Cir.1981), adopted as precedent decisions of the former Fifth Circuit rendered prior to
October 1, 1981.” Smith v. Shook, 237 F.3d 1322, 1325 n.1 (11th Cir. 2001) (per
curiam).
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state-court trial; however, § 2241 petitions that challenge a defendant's pretrial
custody become moot upon the conviction of the petitioner.”).
Alternatively, Woodyard’s ground for relief under § 2241 has been that there
was no parole period left to revoke because he had already served the entirety of his
original sentence of imprisonment on the underlying conviction, and that the state
courts and/or ADOC had miscalculated his original sentence by failing to include
credit for time he had spent in pretrial detention. However, because Woodyard has
served his sentence of incarceration for his parole violation and been released, this
Court can no longer provide him meaningful habeas relief on those issues, and this
action is due to be dismissed without prejudice as moot. See Hernandez v. Wainwright,
796 F.2d 389, 390 (11th Cir. 1986) (per curiam) (affirming dismissal of state habeas
petition “alleging that prison officials had unconstitutionally miscalculated [the
petitioner’s] gain time credits” as moot where the petitioner was released from custody
while the petition was still pending).
b. Certificate of Appealability
For habeas petitions brought by persons in state custody, a “district court must
issue or deny a certificate of appealability when it enters a final order adverse to the
applicant.” Rule 11(a) of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United States
District Courts. “Unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of appealability,
an appeal may not be taken to the court of appeals from the final order in a habeas
corpus proceeding in which the detention complained of arises out of process issued by
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a State court.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(A).5
Where the district court “has rejected the constitutional claims on the merits,
the showing required to satisfy § 2253(c) is straightforward: The petitioner must
demonstrate that reasonable jurists would find the district court’s assessment of the
constitutional claims debatable or wrong.” Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484, 120
S. Ct. 1595, 146 L. Ed. 2d 542 (2000). Where habeas relief is denied on procedural
grounds without reaching the merits of the underlying constitutional claim(s), “a COA
should issue [only] when the prisoner shows . . . that jurists of reason would find it
debatable whether the petition states a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional
right and that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the district court was
correct in its procedural ruling.” Id. See also Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 336,
123 S. Ct. 1029, 154 L. Ed. 2d 931 (2003) (“Under the controlling standard, a petitioner
must show that reasonable jurists could debate whether 	(or, for that matter, agree
that) the petition should have been resolved in a different manner or that the issues
presented were adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further.” (citations
omitted and punctuation modified)). For all cases, “[a] certificate of appealability may
issue ‘only if the applicant has made a substantial showing of the denial of a
constitutional right.’ ” Spencer v. United States, 773 F.3d 1132, 1137 (11th Cir. 2014)
(en banc) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2)). While “a COA does not require a showing
that the appeal will succeed[,]” a “prisoner seeking a COA must prove something more
5 “Based on the statutory language of 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1), state prisoners proceeding
under § 2241 must obtain a COA to appeal.” Sawyer v. Holder, 326 F.3d 1363, 1364
n.3 (11th Cir. 2003).
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than the absence of frivolity or the existence of mere good faith on his or her part.”
Miller-El, 537 U.S. at 337-38 (quotations omitted).
Upon due consideration, the undersigned finds that Woodyard should be
DENIED a certificate of appealability in connection with the dismissal of this habeas
action. Woodyard has failed to make a substantial showing of the denial of a
constitutional right, and reasonable jurists would not find it debatable or wrong that
dismissal for mootness is warranted on at least one of the grounds set out above.6
II. 	Conclusion
In accordance with the foregoing analysis, the undersigned RECOMMENDS
that Woodyard’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 dated July
1, 2024 (Doc# 7), be DISMISSED without prejudice as MOOT, that all pending
motions accordingly be DENIED as also MOOT, that the Court DENY Woodyard a
Certificate of Appealability in connection with this dismissal, and that such final
judgment thereafter be set out by separate document in accordance with Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 58.
6 	Rule 11(a) further provides: “Before entering the final order, the court may
direct the parties to submit arguments on whether a certificate should issue.” If there
is an objection by the petitioner to the recommendation to deny a certificate of
appealability, he may bring this argument to the attention of the district judge in the
objections permitted to this report and recommendation.
Should this Court deny a certificate of appealability, the petitioner “may not
appeal the denial but may seek a certificate from the court of appeals under Federal
Rule of Appellate Procedure 22.” Rule 11(a) of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases
in the United States District Courts.
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NOTICE OF RIGHT TO FILE OBJECTIONS
A copy of this report and recommendation shall be served on all parties in the
manner provided by law. Any party who objects to this recommendation or anything
in it must, within 14 days of the date of service of this document, file specific written
objections with the Clerk of this Court. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Rule 8(b) of the Rules
Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United States District Courts; S.D. Ala. Gen LR
72(c)(1) & (2). The parties should note that under Eleventh Circuit Rule 3-1, “[a] party
failing to object to a magistrate judge’s findings or recommendations contained in a
report and recommendation in accordance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)
waives the right to challenge on appeal the district court’s order based on unobjected-
to factual and legal conclusions if the party was informed of the time period for
objecting and the consequences on appeal for failing to object. In the absence of a
proper objection, however, the court may review on appeal for plain error if necessary
in the interests of justice.” 11th Cir. R. 3-1. In order to be specific, an objection must
identify the specific finding or recommendation to which objection is made, state the
basis for the objection, and specify the place in the Magistrate Judge’s report and
recommendation where the disputed determination is found. An objection that merely
incorporates by reference or refers to the briefing before the Magistrate Judge is not
specific.
DONE this the 13th day of January 2025.
/s/ Katherine P. Nelson
KATHERINE P. NELSON
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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