Case Name in Social Security Case - Unavailable

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA
SOUTHERN DIVISION
PHILLIP MITCHELL FLEMING, 	)
)
Plaintiff, 	)
)
v. 	) 	CIVIL ACTION NO. 24-30-TFM-MU
)
MARTIN O’MALLEY, 	)
Commissioner of Social Security, 	)
)
Defendant. 	)
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Plaintiff Phillip Mitchell Fleming brings this action, pro se, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§
405(g), seeking judicial review of a final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security
(“the Commissioner”) denying his claim for Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”) under
Title XVI of the Act. This motion was referred to the undersigned Magistrate Judge for
appropriate action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). (Doc. 4). Upon consideration of the
administrative record (Doc. 8), Fleming’s brief (Doc. 10), the Commissioner’s brief (Doc.
11), and oral argument presented at the August 15, 2024, hearing before the undersigned
Magistrate Judge, it is RECOMMENDED that the Commissioner’s decision denying
benefits should be AFFIRMED.
I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Fleming applied for SSI, under Title XVI of the Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1381-1383d, on
October 	29, 	2021, 	alleging 	disability 	beginning 	on 	September 	4, 	2021. 	(Doc. 	8,
PageID.70, 150-61). His application was denied at the initial level of administrative review
on April 28, 2022 (Doc. 8, PageID.70-77), and upon reconsideration on December 14,
Case 1:24-cv-00030-TFM-MU Doc# 14 Filed 09/24/24 Page 1 of 14 PageID#
<pageID>

2
2022. (Doc. 8, PageID.78-85). On December 20, 2022, Fleming requested a hearing by
an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ). (Doc. 8, PageID.102). Fleming, who was represented
by counsel at the time, appeared at his hearing in person before the ALJ on July 18, 2023.
(Doc. 8, PageID.57-69). On August 7, 2023, the ALJ issued an unfavorable decision
finding that Fleming was not under a disability during the applicable time period. (Doc. 8,
PageID.30-49). Fleming appealed the ALJ’s decision to the Appeals Council, and, on
November 29, 2023, the Appeals Council denied his request for review of the ALJ’s
decision, thereby making the ALJ’s decision the final decision of the Commissioner. (Doc.
8, PageID.24-28).
After exhausting his administrative remedies, Fleming sought judicial review in this
Court, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). (Doc. 1). The Commissioner filed the social
security transcript on April 3, 2024. (Doc. 8). Both parties filed briefs setting forth their
respective positions. (Docs. 10, 11). Oral argument was held before the undersigned
Magistrate Judge on August 15, 2024. (Doc. 12).
II. CLAIM ON APPEAL
Fleming submitted his brief pro se, and while it does not explicitly identify his
claim(s) on appeal, it is clear he disagrees with the ALJ’s finding that he is not disabled.
Thus, the undersigned will consider whether substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s
decision that Plaintiff was not disabled.
III. BACKGROUND FACTS
Fleming was born on June 6, 1965, and was 58 years old on the date of the ALJ’s
decision. (Doc. 8, PageID.30, 152). He graduated from high school and had no relevant
work history. (Doc. 8, PageID.60-61, 181-82). Fleming alleged that he was disabled due
Case 1:24-cv-00030-TFM-MU Doc# 14 Filed 09/24/24 Page 2 of 14 PageID#
<pageID>

3
to: a stroke, numbness on the right side of his body, tingling/pins and needle sensation
on his right side, high blood pressure, and cholesterol. (Doc. 8, PageID.180). He has a
driver’s license and drives his car. (Doc. 8, PageID.63). He does his own shopping and
cleans the travel trailer where he lives. (Doc. 8, PageID.63-64).
IV. ALJ’S DECISION
The ALJ found at step one of the Commissioner’s five-step sequential evaluation
process that Plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since October 29,
2021, his application date (Doc. 8, PageID.35). At step two, the ALJ found that Plaintiff
had the severe impairment of status post left posterior cerebral artery territory ischemic
cerebrovascular 	accident 	in 	a 	multifocal 	fashion 	with 	subacute 	ischemic 	changes
involving the left thalamus, left temporal lobe, and left occipital lobe (hereinafter “CVA” or
“stroke”) (Doc. 8, PageID.36). At step three, the ALJ found that Plaintiff did not have an
impairment or combination of impairments that met or medically equaled the severity of
an impairment listed in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart, P, Appendix 1. (Doc. 8, PageID.38).
Before proceeding to step four, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had the residual
functional capacity (“RFC”) to perform the full range of medium work as defined in 20
C.F.R. § 416.967(c). (Doc. 8, PageID.38). At step four, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had no
past relevant work. (Doc. 8, PageID.45-47). At the fifth and final step, the ALJ found that
Plaintiff could perform other work based on testimony from a vocational expert that an
individual with Plaintiff’s vocational factors and RFC could perform the representative
occupations of crate liner, patient transporter, and hospital cleaner, which are all medium
level of exertion, unskilled work. (Doc. 8, PageID.47-48). The ALJ therefore concluded
that Plaintiff had not been under a disability, as defined in the Social Security Act, since
Case 1:24-cv-00030-TFM-MU Doc# 14 Filed 09/24/24 Page 3 of 14 PageID#
<pageID>

4
October 29, 2021, his application date. (Doc. 8, PageID.48-49).
V. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Eligibility for SSI benefits requires that the claimant be disabled. 42 U.S.C.
§1382(a)(1)-(2). A claimant is disabled if the claimant is unable “to engage in any
substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental
impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be
expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months.” 42 U.S.C. §
1382c(a)(3)(A). The impairment must be severe, making the claimant unable to do the
claimant’s previous work or any other substantial gainful activity that exists in the national
economy. 20 C.F.R. §§ 416.905(a).
In all Social Security cases, an ALJ utilizes a five-step sequential evaluation in
determining whether the claimant is disabled:
(1) whether the claimant is engaged in substantial gainful activity; (2) if not,
whether the claimant has a severe impairment; (3) if so, whether the severe
impairment meets or equals an impairment in the Listing of Impairment in
the regulations; (4) if not, whether the claimant has the RFC to perform her
past relevant work; and (5) if not, whether, in light of the claimant’s RFC,
age, education and work experience, there are other jobs the claimant can
perform.
Watkins v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 457 F. App’x 868, 870 (11th Cir. 2012) (per curiam) (citing
20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4), (c)-(f), 416.920(a)(4), (c)-(f) (footnote omitted). The claimant
bears the burden of proving the first four steps, and if the claimant does so, the burden
shifts to the Commissioner to prove the fifth step. Jones v. Apfel, 190 F.3d 1224, 1228
(11th Cir. 1999).
If the claimant appeals an unfavorable ALJ decision, the reviewing court must
determine whether the Commissioner’s decision to deny benefits was “supported by
Case 1:24-cv-00030-TFM-MU Doc# 14 Filed 09/24/24 Page 4 of 14 PageID#
<pageID>

5
substantial evidence and based on proper legal standards.” Winschel v. Comm’r of Soc.
Sec., 631 F.3d 1176, 1178 (11th Cir. 2011) (citations omitted); see 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), 42
U.S.C. § 1383(c)(3). “Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla and is such relevant
evidence as a reasonable person would accept as adequate to support a conclusion.”
Winschel, 631 F.3d at 1178 (citations omitted). 	“In determining whether substantial
evidence exists, [the reviewing court] must view the record as a whole, taking into account
evidence favorable as well as unfavorable to the [Commissioner’s] decision.” Chester v.
Bowen, 792 F.2d 129, 131 (11th Cir. 1986). The reviewing court “may not decide the facts
anew, reweigh the evidence, or substitute [its] judgment for that of the [Commissioner].”
Id. When a decision is supported by substantial evidence, the reviewing court must affirm
“[e]ven if [the court] find[s] that the evidence preponderates against the Secretary’s
decision.” MacGregor v. Bowen, 786 F.2d 1050, 1053 (11th Cir. 1986).
VI. DISCUSSION
A. RFC Determination
As noted above, Fleming appears to disagree with the ALJ’s RFC determination
that he can perform the full range of medium work. Specifically, Fleming seems to argue
that the ALJ did not properly consider the evidence in assessing his RFC because the
ALJ largely dismissed his subjective complaints of disabling symptoms and instead relied
on the findings of the consulting neurological exam performed by Dr. Ilyas Shaikh and the
opinions of two state agency medical consultants. (Doc. 10, PageID.583-87).
A claimant’s RFC is “an assessment of an individual’s ability to do sustained work-
related physical and mental activities in a work setting on a regular and continuing basis.”
SSR 96-8p, 1996 WL 374184, at *1. It is an “administrative assessment of the extent to
Case 1:24-cv-00030-TFM-MU Doc# 14 Filed 09/24/24 Page 5 of 14 PageID#
<pageID>

6
which 	an 	individual’s 	medically 	determinable 	impairment(s), 	including 	any 	related
symptoms, such as pain, may cause physical or mental limitations or restrictions that may
affect his or her capacity to do work-related physical and mental activities.” Id. at *2. A
claimant’s RFC is the most that he can still do despite his limitations and is assessed
based on “all of the relevant medical and other evidence.” See 20 C.F.R. §§ 416.920(e),
416.945(a)(1), (a)(3); SSR 96-8p, 1996 WL 374184, at *2. In assessing a claimant’s RFC,
the 	ALJ 	must 	consider 	only 	limitations 	and 	restrictions 	attributable 	to 	medically
determinable 	impairments, 	i.e., 	those 	that 	are 	demonstrable 	by 	objective 	medical
evidence. SSR 96-8p, 1996 WL 374184, at *2. Similarly, if the evidence does not show a
limitation or restriction of a specific functional capacity, the ALJ should consider the
claimant to have no limitation with respect to that functional capacity. Id. at *3.
At the hearing level, the ALJ has the responsibility of assessing the claimant’s
RFC. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.946(c); accord Walker v. Soc. Sec. Admin., Comm’r, 987 F.3d
1333, 1338 (11th Cir. 2021) (“The Commissioner of the Social Security Administration
has, at the hearing level, delegated to an [ALJ] the responsibility of determining a
claimant’s [RFC] and whether the claimant is disabled.”). Thus, as the Eleventh Circuit
has recognized, “the task of determining a claimant’s [RFC] and ability to work rests with
the [ALJ], not a doctor.” Moore v. Soc. Sec. Admin., Comm’r, 649 F. App’x 941, 945 (11th
Cir. 2016); accord Ybarra v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 658 F. App’x 538, 543 (11th Cir. 2016)
(holding “the ALJ did not usurp the role of a physician” in evaluating an opinion and
assessing the claimant’s RFC); Beegle v. Soc. Sec. Admin., Comm’r, 482 F. App’x 483,
486 (11th Cir. 2012) (“A claimant’s [RFC] is a matter reserved for the ALJ’s determination,
and while a physician’s opinion on the matter will be considered, it is not dispositive.”).
Case 1:24-cv-00030-TFM-MU Doc# 14 Filed 09/24/24 Page 6 of 14 PageID#
<pageID>

7
An ALJ will consider a claimant’s symptoms and the extent to which his symptoms
can reasonably be accepted as consistent with the objective medical evidence and other
evidence, but a claimant’s statements about his symptoms will not alone establish that he
is disabled. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.929(a); SSR 16-3p, 82 Fed. Reg. at 49462-63. When a
claimant attempts to prove disability based on his subjective complaints, he must provide
evidence of an underlying medical condition and either objective medical evidence
confirming the severity of his alleged symptoms or evidence establishing that his medical
condition could be reasonably expected to give rise to his alleged symptoms. See 20
C.F.R. § 416.929(a), (b); SSR 16-3p, 82 Fed. Reg. at 49463-64; Wilson v. Barnhart, 284
F.3d 1219, 1225-26 (11th Cir. 2002). If the objective medical evidence does not confirm
the severity of the claimant’s alleged symptoms but the claimant establishes that he has
an impairment that could reasonably be expected to produce his alleged symptoms, the
ALJ must evaluate the intensity and persistence of the claimant’s alleged symptoms and
their effect on the claimant’s ability to work. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.929(c), (d); SSR 16-3p,
82 Fed. Reg. at 49463-64; Wilson, 284 F.3d at 1225-26.
Here, the ALJ found that Fleming could perform the full range of medium work as
defined in 20 C.F.R. § 416.967(c). (Doc.8, PageID.38). The ALJ also found that, although
Plaintiff’s medically determinable impairments could reasonably be expected to cause
some of his alleged symptoms, his statements concerning the intensity, persistence, and
functionally limiting effects of his alleged symptoms were not entirely consistent with the
medical evidence and other evidence in the record. (Doc. 8, PageID.40-41). The ALJ then
discussed his evaluation of Plaintiff’s complaints, as well as the medical evidence of
record. (Doc. 8, PageID.35-45). The ALJ concludes his RFC finding by stating:
Case 1:24-cv-00030-TFM-MU Doc# 14 Filed 09/24/24 Page 7 of 14 PageID#
<pageID>

8
In sum, the claimant’s medium range is best supported by his well-
documented 	recovery 	from 	his 	stroke, 	his 	good 	progress 	in
occupational/physical therapy, his specific improvement in coordination and
dexterity-related tasks, his lack of significant functional residuals during his
consulting exam, his intact grip and dexterity on consulting exam, his
improving strength on exam, his improving sensation, and his ongoing
conservative treatment plans, all bolstered by the persuasive elements of
the state agency consultants’ opinions.
(Doc. 8, PageID.45).
The ALJ’s RFC finding is supported by the record in which Plaintiff’s clinical
examinations 	and 	diagnostic 	studies 	did 	not 	reveal 	significant 	physical 	or 	mental
abnormalities indicative of disabling limitations, particularly for any consecutive twelve-
month period. (Doc. 8, PageID.316, 318, 328, 330-31, 333, 336, 338-44, 452-55, 481-82,
493-95, 501-04, 513-16, 542-43). See 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(A); 20 C.F.R. §§
416.905(a), 416.909; accord Barnhart v. Walton, 535 U.S. 212, 217 (2002) (holding
claimant’s impairments and inability to work must last for a continuous period of at least
twelve months). Occupational therapy notes also do not include objective findings or other
evidence showing that Plaintiff had disabling limitations for at least twelve consecutive
months. (Doc. 8, PageID.261-306, 458-72).
The ALJ also considered Plaintiff’s reported activities in assessing his RFC and
evaluating his allegations of disabling symptoms and limitations. (Doc. 8, PageID.35-45).
See 20 C.F.R. § 416.929(c)(3); SSR 16-3p, 82 Fed. Reg. at 49465. As the ALJ noted,
Plaintiff reported that he could handle his personal care, prepare simple meals, help with
laundry, run the vacuum, and rake the yard; he could socialize with family in person and
on the phone; he could walk places he needed to go; and he could drive and run errands
for himself. (Doc. 8, PageID.37-40, 191-98, 211-18). The undersigned finds that there
was substantial evidence for the ALJ to conclude that Plaintiff’s activities were not entirely
Case 1:24-cv-00030-TFM-MU Doc# 14 Filed 09/24/24 Page 8 of 14 PageID#
<pageID>

9
consistent with the disabling limitations that he alleged. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.929(c)(3)(i);
SSR 16-3p, 82 Fed. Reg. at 49465; Hargress v. Soc. Sec. Admin., Comm’r, 883 F.3d
1302, 1306-07 (11th Cir. 2018); accord Meehan v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 776 F. App’x
599, 603 (11th Cir. 2019) (holding ALJ properly found subjective complaints inconsistent
with simple daily activities).
As for treatment, Plaintiff was admitted to the hospital in early September 2021 for
a stroke, but he was discharged after a few days and received only a few months of
occupational therapy, which was noted as largely effective. (Doc. 8, PageID.41-43, 261-
472). The treatment that Plaintiff’s providers subsequently prescribed and recommended
was primarily medication. (Doc. 8, PageID.37, 38, 41-45, 480-83, 501-06, 523-28, 536-
44, 547-56). 	Plaintiff’s routine and conservative treatment after his brief hospital stay
provides additional evidence that his condition was not as limiting as he alleged. See 20
C.F.R. § 416.929(c)(3)(iv)-(v); SSR 16-3p, 82 Fed. Reg. at 49465; Hargress, 883 F.3d at
1306; Wolfe v. Chater, 86 F.3d 1072, 1078 (11th Cir. 1996).
The 	ALJ 	also 	appropriately 	considered 	the 	consulting 	neurological 	exam
performed by Dr. Shaikh in April 2022. (Doc. 8, PageID.44). In reviewing the findings of
Dr. Shaikh, the ALJ notes that because “Dr. Shaikh did not provide any formal medical
opinion on the claimant using vocationally relevant maximal language…[t]here is no
opinion in need of a persuasiveness analysis.” (Id.). However, “Dr. Shaikh’s lack of
assessed limitation is consistent with the claimant’s improvement across therapy, his
infrequent follow ups with providers, his admitted daily activities, and his presentation
within the consulting exam itself. Dr. Shaikh is further supported by his subject matter
specialization and history of medical vocational analysis for the Administration.” (Id.).
Case 1:24-cv-00030-TFM-MU Doc# 14 Filed 09/24/24 Page 9 of 14 PageID#
<pageID>

10
Despite Plaintiff’s objections to Dr. Shaikh’s exam findings, the ALJ adequately described
his consideration of Dr. Shaikh’s medical exam and how he considered it in context with
all of the other evidence of record.
Finally, the ALJ properly considered the medical opinion evidence, which consists
of two reviews performed by state agency medical consultants. (Doc. 8, PageID.45).
Phillip Matar, M.D., initially reviewed the record in April 2022, and recommended a range
of medium work with additional limitations. (Doc. 8, PageID.45, 71-77). Victoria L. Hogan
MD, reviewed the record on reconsideration in late November 2022 and concurred with
Dr. Matar’s opinion. (Doc. 8, PageID.45, 78-84). Based on additional evidence that was
not available to the medical consultants at the time of their reviews, including the notes
from Plaintiff’s consulting neurological exam and continuing conservative and limited
treatment, the ALJ disagreed with Matar and Hogan’s additional limitations to medium
work and found that Plaintiff could perform a full range of medium work. (Doc. 8,
PageID.45). In evaluating the reviews of the state agency consultants and reaching his
own RFC decision, the ALJ explained:
Drs. 	Matar 	and 	Hogan 	otherwise 	have 	supporting 	subject 	matter
specialization 	and 	a 	history 	of 	medical 	vocational 	analysis 	for 	the
Administration. They provided extensive reference to the objective record
and drew generally reasonable inferences therefrom. However, they did not
appear to fully account for how unremarkably the claimant presented during
his consulting exam. They did not have the benefit of the most recent
treatment records to show that his improvement persisted without more than
modest intermittent treatment.
(Id.).
State agency medical consultants are highly qualified and experts in Social
Security disability evaluation. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.913a(b)(1). ALJs must consider prior
administrative medical findings from state agency medical consultants, but ALJs are not
Case 1:24-cv-00030-TFM-MU Doc# 14 Filed 09/24/24 Page 10 of 14 PageID#
<pageID>

11
required 	to 	adopt 	any 	prior 	administrative 	medical 	findings. 	(Id.). 	Here, 	the 	ALJ
appropriately explained that he found part of the consultants’ medical opinions consistent
with and supported by medical evidence in the record but found that their additional
restrictions were not consistent with or supported by Plaintiff’s most recent treatment
records, thereby assigning an RFC for a full range of medium work. See 20 C.F.R. §
416.920c.
It is well-established that it is not this Court’s place to reweigh the evidence or
substitute its judgment for that of the Commissioner. See Chester, 792 F.2d at 131. This
Court is limited to a determination of whether the ALJ’s decision is supported by
substantial evidence and based on proper legal standards. Having reviewed the ALJ’s
decision and the hearing transcript and considered the arguments made by Fleming, the
Court finds that, even though there may be some contrary evidence concerning his
abilities, the Commissioner’s determination is due to be affirmed on this issue. Mitchell v.
Comm’r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 771 F.3d 780, 782 (11th Cir. 2014).
B. New Evidence
Fleming also discusses a January 2024 MRI scan of his lumbar spine that is
included in documents attached to his brief (Doc. 10, PageID.567-68). However, evidence
submitted to the district court may be considered only to determine if remand is warranted
under sentence six of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). See Ingram v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin.,
496 F.3d 1253, 1267-68 (11th Cir. 2007); Caulder v. Bowen, 791 F.2d 872, 876 (11th Cir.
1986); Cherry v. Heckler, 760 F.2d 1186, 1192 (11th Cir. 1985). To satisfy the criteria for
a remand under sentence six of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), a claimant must establish that: (1)
the evidence is new and noncumulative; (2) the evidence is material such that a
Case 1:24-cv-00030-TFM-MU Doc# 14 Filed 09/24/24 Page 11 of 14 PageID#
<pageID>

12
reasonable probability exists that it would change the administrative result; and (3) there
was good cause for the failure to submit the evidence at the administrative level. See
Caulder, 791 F.2d at 877; Cherry, 760 F.2d at 1192. Although the January 2024 MRI scan
may be new and noncumulative and Plaintiff may have had good cause for not submitting
it at the administrative level, he failed to prove that it is material.
Evidence is material if a reasonable probability exists that the evidence would
change the administrative result. Caulder, 791 F.2d at 877; Cherry, 760 F.2d at 1192. The
January 2024 MRI scan is not chronologically relevant to the period considered by the
ALJ, who issued his decision on August 7, 2023. The issue in a disability case is whether
a claimant was “entitled to benefits during a specific period of time, which was necessarily
prior to the date of the ALJ’s decision.” Wilson v. Apfel, 179 F.3d 1276, 1279 (11th Cir.
1999). The January 2024 MRI scan does not relate back to the relevant period. Even if it
did, it would merely provide a basis for a diagnosis, and diagnoses do not establish work-
related limitations. See Moore v. Barnhart, 405 F.3d 1208, 1213 n.6 (11th Cir. 2005)
(“[T]he mere existence of these impairments does not reveal the extent to which they limit
her ability to work or undermine the ALJ’s determination in that regard.”); accord Wind v.
Barnhart, 133 F. App’x 684, 690 (11th Cir. 2005) (stating “a diagnosis or a mere showing
of ‘a deviation from purely medical standards of bodily perfection or normality’ is
insufficient; instead, the claimant must show the effect of the impairment on her ability to
work”) (quoting McCruter v. Bowen, 791 F.2d 1544, 1547 (11th Cir. 1986). The January
2024 MRI scan thus does not create a reasonable probability of changing the ALJ’s
Case 1:24-cv-00030-TFM-MU Doc# 14 Filed 09/24/24 Page 12 of 14 PageID#
<pageID>

13
decision, nor do any of the other documents included with Plaintiff’s brief.1 See Caulder,
791 F.2d at 877; Cherry, 760 F.2d at 1192. Because Plaintiff failed to demonstrate that
the new records submitted with his brief are material, he has failed to establish that they
warrant remand under sentence six of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).
CONCLUSION
Based 	on 	the 	foregoing, 	it 	is 	RECOMMENDED 	that 	the 	decision 	of 	the
Commissioner of Social Security denying Plaintiff benefits be AFFIRMED.
NOTICE OF RIGHT TO FILE OBJECTIONS
A copy of this report and recommendation shall be served on all parties in the
manner provided by law. Any party who objects to this recommendation or anything in it
must, within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this document, file specific written
objections with the Clerk of this Court. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b);
S.D.ALA. GenLR 72(c). The parties should note that under Eleventh Circuit Rule 3-1, “[a]
party failing to object to a magistrate judge’s findings or recommendations contained in a
report and recommendation in accordance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)
waives the right to challenge on appeal the district court’s order based on unobjected-to
1 Some of the records included with Plaintiff’s brief are duplicates of evidence already in
the record (Doc. 10, PageID.566, 571, 580-82). Plaintiff also submitted documents
concerning prescriptions later in 2024 and a February 2024 letter stating Plaintiff is eligible
for food assistance (Doc. 10, PageID.588-92). These documents are not chronologically
relevant and do not provide any evidence indicating that Plaintiff was as limited as he
claimed or that he could not perform medium work during the relevant period. In addition,
even if the February 2024 letter found that Plaintiff was disabled or had work-related
limitations, an ALJ is not required to provide any analysis of decisions by other
governmental 	agencies 	because 	such 	evidence 	is 	inherently 	neither 	valuable 	nor
persuasive to the issue of whether a claimant is disabled under the standards of the Social
Security Act. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 416.904, 416.920b(c).
Case 1:24-cv-00030-TFM-MU Doc# 14 Filed 09/24/24 Page 13 of 14 PageID#
<pageID>

14
factual and legal conclusions if the party was informed of the time period for objecting and
the consequences on appeal for failing to object. In the absence of a proper objection,
however, the court may review on appeal for plain error if necessary in the interests of
justice.” 11th Cir. R. 3-1. To be specific, an objection must identify the specific finding or
recommendation to which objection is made, state the basis for the objection, and specify
the place in the Magistrate Judge’s report and recommendation where the disputed
determination is found. An objection that merely incorporates by reference or refers to the
briefing before the Magistrate Judge is not specific.
DONE and ORDERED this the 24th day of September, 2024.
s/P. BRADLEY MURRAY
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Case 1:24-cv-00030-TFM-MU Doc# 14 Filed 09/24/24 Page 14 of 14 PageID#
<pageID>