USA v. Harding et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA
SOUTHERN DIVISION
DARRELL WILLIAMS, # 73459-509, *
*
Petitioner, 	*
* CRIMINAL NO. 21-00165-TFM-B
vs. 	* CIVIL ACTION NO. 23-00320-TFM-B
*
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 	*
*
Respondent. 	*
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Pending 	before 	the 	Court 	is 	Petitioner 	Darrell 	Williams’
motion 	under 	28 	U.S.C. 	§ 	2255 	to 	vacate, 	set 	aside, 	or 	correct
sentence 	(Doc. 	348). 	This 	matter 	has 	been 	referred 	to 	the
undersigned Magistrate Judge for consideration and recommendation
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B), S.D. Ala. GenLR 72(a)(2)(R),
and 	Rule 	8(b) 	of 	the 	Rules 	Governing 	Section 	2255 	Proceedings.1
Having 	carefully 	reviewed 	the 	record, 	the 	undersigned 	finds 	that
no 	evidentiary 	hearing 	is 	necessary 	for 	the 	disposition 	of 	this
matter.2 	Upon 	consideration, 	the 	undersigned 	hereby 	recommends
that Williams’ § 2255 motion (Doc. 348) be DENIED, that this action
1 	The 	undersigned 	has 	reviewed 	Williams’ 	motion 	and 	all 	other
relevant documents in the Court’s file and has fully familiarized
herself with the proceedings in this case.
2 	A district court is not required to hold an evidentiary hearing
on 	patently 	frivolous 	claims, 	claims 	that 	are 	based 	upon
unsupported 	generalizations, 	or 	claims 	that 	are 	affirmatively
contradicted 	by 	the 	record. 	Holmes 	v. 	United 	States, 	876 	F.2d
1545, 1553 (11th Cir. 1989).
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be DISMISSED with prejudice, and that judgment be entered in favor
of 	Respondent, 	the 	United 	States 	of 	America, 	and 	against
Petitioner, Darrell Williams. 	The undersigned further recommends,
in 	the 	event 	Petitioner 	Williams 	requests 	a 	certificate 	of
appealability 	and 	seeks 	to 	appeal 	in 	forma 	pauperis, 	that 	said
requests be DENIED.
I. 	BACKGROUND
Petitioner 	Darrell 	Williams 	(“Williams”) 	was 	indicted 	along
with four other individuals and charged with conspiracy to possess
with 	intent 	to 	distribute 	cocaine 	and 	crack 	cocaine 	in 	violation
of 	21 	U.S.C. 	§ 	846 	(count 	two) 	and 	possession 	with 	intent 	to
distribute 	cocaine 	in 	violation 	of 	21 	U.S.C. 	§ 	841(a)(1) 	(count
three). 	(Doc. 	1). 	After 	a 	four-day 	trial 	that 	began 	on 	October
24, 2022, a jury found Williams guilty as to both charged counts.
(Docs. 	257, 	259, 	262, 	365). 	On 	February 	17, 	2023, 	the 	Court
sentenced 	Williams 	to 	648 	months 	in 	prison, 	consisting 	of
consecutive 	terms 	of 	324 	months 	as 	to 	counts 	two 	and 	three. 	The
Court 	entered 	a 	judgment 	consistent 	with 	the 	pronounced 	sentence
on 	March 	6, 	2023. 	(Doc. 	321). 	Williams 	did 	not 	appeal 	his
conviction or sentence.
On 	August 	7, 	2023,3 	Williams, 	proceeding 	pro 	se, 	filed 	the
instant 	motion 	under 	28 	U.S.C. 	§ 	2255 	to 	vacate, 	set 	aside, 	or
3 Under the mailbox rule, “a pro se prisoner’s motion to vacate is
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correct 	sentence. 	(Doc. 	348). 	In 	the 	motion, 	Williams 	raises
four 	grounds 	for 	relief, 	all 	based 	on 	allegations 	that 	his
detention 	and 	imprisonment 	violate 	the 	“Treaty 	of 	Peace 	&
Friendship between Morocco & the United States of America 1787, as
amended 1837” (hereinafter “Morocco Treaties”).4 	(Id. at 6-10).
deemed 	filed 	the 	date 	it 	is 	delivered 	to 	prison 	authorities 	for
mailing.” 	Adams v. United States, 173 F.3d 1339, 1341 (11th Cir.
1999) (per curiam). 	Absent evidence to the contrary, that date is
presumed to be the date the prisoner signed the motion. 	Washington
v. 	United 	States, 	243 	F.3d 	1299, 	1301 	(11th 	Cir. 	2001) 	(per
curiam). 	Williams’ motion states that it was signed and placed in
the 	prison 	mailing 	system 	on 	August 	7, 	2023. 	(See 	Doc. 	348 	at
14).
4 	Williams 	is 	apparently 	referring 	“to 	the 	Treaty 	with 	Morocco
sealed by the Emperor of Morocco on June 23, 1786, and ratified by
the 	United 	States 	July 	18, 	1787. 	The 	Treaty 	with 	Morocco 	is 	one
of 	the 	Barbary 	Treaties 	(executed, 	during 	1795–1836 	between 	the
United 	States 	and 	semi-autonomous 	North 	African 	city-states 	of
Algiers, 	Tunis, 	and 	Tripoli, 	and 	the 	Sultanate 	of 	Morocco).” 	El
Ameen Bey v. Stumpf, 825 F. Supp. 2d 537, 558 n.10 (D.N.J. 2011).
The 	treaty 	“provided 	for 	the 	United 	States 	diplomatic
representation 	in 	Morocco 	and 	open 	commerce 	at 	any 	Moroccan 	port
on 	the 	basis 	of 	‘most 	favored 	nation.’ 	It 	also 	established 	the
principle of non-hostility when either country was engaged in war
with any other nation. 	Most importantly, the treaty provided for
the 	protection 	of 	U.S. 	shipping 	vessels 	at 	the 	time 	when 	most
American 	merchant 	ships 	were 	at 	risk 	of 	harassment 	by 	various
European warships.” 	United States v. Foster, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
249799, 	at 	*4-5, 	2021 	WL 	7286016, 	at 	*2 	(N.D. 	Ala. 	Nov. 	5, 	2021)
(citing the remarks of United States Senator Bob Casey in 2012 on
the 	225th 	anniversary 	of 	the 	Morocco 	Treaty 	of 	Peace 	and
Friendship, 	158 	Cong. 	Rec. 	S5727-01, 	2012 	WL 	3100992 	(daily 	ed.
July 31, 2012)), report and recommendation adopted, 2022 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 4361, 2022 WL 94916 (N.D. Ala. Jan. 10, 2022). 	“[W]hile the
1787 Treaty of Marakesh was in fact ratified by the United States
Congress 	in 	1787, 	the 	treaty 	was 	only 	binding 	for 	fifty 	years.”
Houston 	v. 	Houston, 	2021 	U.S. 	Dist. 	LEXIS 	180198, 	at 	*7, 	2021 	WL
4290198, at *3 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 21, 2021), aff’d, 2022 U.S. App.
LEXIS 	15110, 	2022 	WL 	3452473 	(6th 	Cir. 	June 	1, 	2022). 	“The 	1836
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In 	ground 	one, 	Williams 	claims 	that 	his 	detention 	and
imprisonment violate Article 16 of the Morocco Treaties5 because:
When the United States of America through its government
<municipal> 	charged/forced 	the 	aforementioned 	crimes
<commercial> on (me), the same was a declaration of war
through the operation of the Trading with the Enemy Act.
There is no proof to the contrary.
(Id. at 6).
In 	ground 	two, 	Williams 	claims 	that 	his 	detention 	and
imprisonment violate Article 20 of the Morocco Treaties6 because:
Treaty of Morocco apparently replaced the 1787 Treaty of Marakesh
after the Treaty of Marakesh expired.” 	Id., 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
180198, at *8, 2021 WL 4290198, at *3. 	“In fact, the United States
Department 	of 	State 	does 	not 	list 	the 	1787 	Treaty 	of 	Marakesh 	as
an 	active 	treaty, 	but 	the 	1836 	Treaty 	of 	Morocco 	is 	listed 	as 	a
treaty currently in force.” 	Id. 	The provisions of the 1836 Treaty
of Morocco are “vastly similar” to those of the 1787 treaty. 	Id.,
2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 180198, at *9, 2021 WL 4290198, at *3.
5 	Article 16 of the 1836 Treaty of Morocco provides:
In case of a war between the parties, the prisoners are
not 	to 	be 	made 	slaves, 	but 	to 	be 	exchanged 	one 	for
another. 	Captain for Captain, Officer for Officer, and
one private man for another; and if there shall prove a
deficiency, 	on 	either 	side, 	it 	shall 	be 	made 	up 	by 	the
payment 	of 	one 	hundred 	Mexican 	dollars 	for 	each 	person
wanting. 	And it is agreed, that all prisoners shall be
exchanged in twelve months from the time of their being
taken, 	and 	that 	this 	exchange 	may 	be 	effected 	by 	a
merchant, 	or 	any 	other 	person, 	authorized 	by 	either 	of
the parties.
The 	Barbary 	Treaties 	1786-1816: 	Morocco 	- 	Treaty 	of 	Peace;
September 	16, 	1836, 	The 	Avalon 	Project 	at 	Yale 	Law 	School,
https://avalon.law.yale.edu/19th_century/bar1836t.asp 	(last
visited Jan. 22, 2024).
6 	Article 20 of the 1836 Treaty of Morocco provides:
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A dispute between parties if any was not decided by the
consul, 	and 	the 	records 	do 	not 	reveal 	(I) 	waived 	the
right(s): there was no consent, contract or joinder – no
law whatsoever. 	There is no proof to the contrary.
(Id. at 7).
In 	ground 	three, 	Williams 	claims 	that 	his 	detention 	and
imprisonment violate Article 21 of the Morocco Treaties7 because:
A 	Moor 	(me) 	has 	been 	forced 	under 	penalty 	of 	a
misnomer(s) 	be 	it 	capital 	<DARRELL 	WILLIAMS> 	offense
where 	not 	any 	killed 	or 	wounded. 	There 	is 	no 	proof 	to
the contrary.
(Id. at 8).
If 	any 	of 	the 	citizens 	of 	the 	United 	States, 	or 	any
persons 	under 	their 	protection, 	shall 	have 	any 	dispute
with 	each 	other, 	the 	Consul 	shall 	decide 	between 	the
parties; and whenever the Consul shall require any aid,
or 	assistance 	from 	our 	government, 	to 	enforce 	his
decisions, it shall be immediately granted to him.
The 	Barbary 	Treaties 	1786-1816: 	Morocco 	- 	Treaty 	of 	Peace;
September 	16, 	1836, 	The 	Avalon 	Project 	at 	Yale 	Law 	School,
https://avalon.law.yale.edu/19th_century/bar1836t.asp 	(last
visited Jan. 22, 2024).
7 	Article 21 of the 1836 Treaty of Morocco provides:
If 	a 	citizen 	of 	the 	United 	States 	should 	kill 	or 	wound
a 	Moor, 	or, 	on 	the 	contrary, 	if 	a 	Moor 	shall 	kill 	or
wound 	a 	citizen 	of 	the 	United 	States, 	the 	law 	of 	the
Country 	shall 	take 	place, 	and 	equal 	justice 	shall 	be
rendered, the Consul assisting at the trial; and if any
delinquent 	shall 	make 	his 	escape, 	the 	Consul 	shall 	not
be answerable for him in any manner whatever.
The 	Barbary 	Treaties 	1786-1816: 	Morocco 	- 	Treaty 	of 	Peace;
September 	16, 	1836, 	The 	Avalon 	Project 	at 	Yale 	Law 	School,
https://avalon.law.yale.edu/19th century/bar1836t.asp 	(last
visited Jan. 22, 2024).
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In 	ground 	four, 	Williams 	claims 	that 	his 	detention 	and
imprisonment violate Article 4 of the Morocco Treaties8 because:
All humble attempts to communicate the necessary signal
and/or 	pass 	were 	disregarded 	by 	parties 	ab 	initio. 	As
a 	Moor 	American 	National, 	not 	an 	enemy, 	billigerent,
rebel or terrorist subject to the Trading with the Enemy
Act of October 6, 1917, the Emergency Banking Relief Act
of March 9, 1933, the Patriot Act of October 26, 2001 or
any 	other 	public 	policy 	and/or 	statute 	of 	the 	United
States 	or 	its 	subsidiary 	states, 	possessions 	or
territory. 	There is no proof to the contrary.
(Id. at 10).
The Government filed a response in opposition to Williams’ §
2255 motion, in which it argues that the motion is due to be denied
because Williams’ claims are procedurally defaulted and frivolous.
(Doc. 	354). 	Williams 	did 	not 	file 	a 	reply 	to 	the 	Government’s
response. 	Thus, Williams’ § 2255 motion is ripe for review.
II. 	HABEAS STANDARD
The 	limited 	scope 	of 	habeas 	relief 	is 	well 	established, 	as
this Court has recognized:
8 	Article 4 of the 1836 Treaty of Morocco provides:
A 	signal, 	or 	pass, 	shall 	be 	given 	to 	all 	vessels
belonging to both parties, by which they are to be known
when they meet at sea: and if the Commander of a ship of
war 	of 	either 	party 	shall 	have 	other 	ships 	under 	his
convoy, the declaration of the Commander shall alone be
sufficient to exempt any of them from examination.
The 	Barbary 	Treaties 	1786-1816: 	Morocco 	- 	Treaty 	of 	Peace;
September 	16, 	1836, 	The 	Avalon 	Project 	at 	Yale 	Law 	School,
https://avalon.law.yale.edu/19th century/bar1836t.asp 	(last
visited Jan. 22, 2024).
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Collateral relief is an extraordinary remedy which “may
not do service for a[ ] [direct] appeal.” 	United States
v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 165, 102 S. Ct. 1584, 71 L. Ed.
2d 816 (1982); see also Lynn v. United States, 365 F.3d
1225, 	1232 	(11th 	Cir. 	2004) 	(“Courts 	have 	long 	and
consistently affirmed that a collateral challenge, such
as a § 2255 motion, may not be a surrogate for a direct
appeal.”). 	A defendant who has waived or exhausted his
right to appeal is presumed to stand “fairly and finally
convicted.” 	Frady, 	456 	U.S. 	at 	164. 	Unless 	a 	claim
alleges a lack of jurisdiction or constitutional error,
the 	scope 	of 	collateral 	attack 	has 	remained 	extremely
limited. 	United States v. Addonizio, 442 U.S. 178, 185,
99 S. Ct. 2235, 60 L. Ed. 2d 805 (1979). 	Consequently,
“[i]f issues are raised and considered on direct appeal,
a defendant is thereafter precluded from urging the same
issues 	in 	a 	later 	collateral 	attack. 	. 	. 	. 	A 	defendant
is, of course, entitled to a hearing of his claims, but
not 	to 	duplicate 	hearings. 	The 	appellate 	process 	does
not 	permit 	reruns.” 	Moore 	v. 	United 	States, 	598 	F.2d
439, 441 (5th Cir. 1979).
United States v. Evans, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 59836, at *8-9, 2008
WL 3200694, at *3 (S.D. Ala. Aug. 6, 2008).
III. DISCUSSION
The 	Government 	contends 	that 	Williams’ 	claims 	that 	his
imprisonment 	violates 	the 	Morocco 	Treaties 	are 	procedurally
defaulted because he failed to raise them on direct appeal. 	(Doc.
354 	at 	1, 	3-4). 	“Under 	the 	procedural 	default 	rule, 	a 	defendant
generally 	must 	advance 	an 	available 	challenge 	to 	a 	criminal
conviction 	or 	sentence 	on 	direct 	appeal 	or 	else 	the 	defendant 	is
barred from presenting that claim in a § 2255 proceeding.” 	Lynn,
365 	F.3d 	at 	1234. 	“A 	ground 	of 	error 	is 	usually 	‘available’ 	on
direct 	appeal 	when 	its 	merits 	can 	be 	reviewed 	without 	further
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factual development.” 	Mills v. United States, 36 F.3d 1052, 1055
(11th Cir. 1994) (per curiam).
If 	a 	defendant 	fails 	to 	pursue 	an 	available 	claim 	on 	direct
appeal, he can avoid a procedural bar only by establishing one of
two 	exceptions 	to 	the 	procedural 	default 	rule. 	“Under 	the 	first
exception, 	a 	defendant 	must 	show 	cause 	for 	not 	raising 	the 	claim
of 	error 	on 	direct 	appeal 	and 	actual 	prejudice 	from 	the 	alleged
error.” 	Lynn, 365 F.3d at 1234 (emphasis in original). 	Under the
second exception, a court will consider “a procedurally defaulted
claim, 	without 	a 	showing 	of 	cause 	or 	prejudice, 	to 	correct 	a
fundamental 	miscarriage 	of 	justice.” 	Fortenberry 	v. 	Haley, 	297
F.3d 	1213, 	1222 	(11th 	Cir. 	2002) 	(per 	curiam). 	To 	meet 	this
standard, a petitioner must show that “a constitutional violation
has 	probably 	resulted 	in 	the 	conviction 	of 	one 	who 	is 	actually
innocent.” 	Lynn, 365 F.3d at 1234 (quotation omitted).
Williams’ claims that his detention and imprisonment violate
Articles 16, 20, 21, and 4 of the Morocco Treaties were available
on direct appeal. 	See, e.g., United States v. Toader, 409 F. App’x
9, 	13 	(7th 	Cir. 	2010). 	However, 	Williams 	did 	not 	file 	a 	direct
appeal 	challenging 	his 	conviction 	or 	sentence. 	Therefore, 	he 	is
barred 	from 	raising 	these 	claims 	in 	the 	instant 	§ 	2255 	motion,
unless he can show cause and prejudice or a fundamental miscarriage
of 	justice. 	Williams 	has 	neither 	alleged 	nor 	established 	cause
and 	actual 	prejudice, 	nor 	has 	he 	attempted 	to 	show 	that 	he 	is
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actually 	innocent 	of 	the 	crimes 	for 	which 	he 	was 	convicted.
Accordingly, 	Williams’ 	claims 	are 	procedurally 	defaulted 	and 	may
not be raised in this § 2255 proceeding.
Additionally, 	Williams’ 	claims 	are 	frivolous. 	As 	other
federal courts addressing similar claims have held, nothing in the
Morocco 	Treaties 	deprives 	a 	federal 	court 	of 	jurisdiction 	over 	a
person 	who 	asserts 	Moorish 	nationality 	or 	otherwise 	exempts
individuals 	who 	claim 	Moorish 	nationality 	from 	prosecution 	for
crimes 	committed 	in 	the 	United 	States. 	See 	United 	States 	v.
Foster, 	2021 	U.S. 	Dist. 	LEXIS 	249799, 	at 	*5, 	2021 	WL 	7286016, 	at
*2 	(N.D. 	Ala. 	Nov. 	5, 	2021) 	(“As 	numerous 	courts 	have 	found,
Foster’s argument that the Treaty of Friendship and Peace deprives
a federal court of jurisdiction over a person who asserts Moorish
nationality 	is 	meritless.”), 	report 	and 	recommendation 	adopted,
2022 	U.S. 	Dist. 	LEXIS 	4361, 	2022 	WL 	94916 	(N.D. 	Ala. 	Jan. 	10,
2022); United States v. Boone, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5116, at *5,
2021 	WL 	84398, 	at 	*2 	(E.D. 	Cal. 	Jan. 	11, 	2021) 	(“Nothing 	in 	this
treaty 	exempts 	the 	Movants, 	by 	virtue 	of 	their 	nationality, 	from
criminal 	prosecution 	in 	the 	United 	States.”), 	report 	and
recommendation 	adopted, 	2021 	U.S. 	Dist. 	LEXIS 	67803, 	2021 	WL
1297557 	(E.D. 	Cal. 	Apr. 	7, 	2021); 	United 	States 	v. 	Stokes, 	2013
U.S. 	Dist. 	LEXIS 	76001, 	at 	*7, 	2013 	WL 	2387763, 	at 	*3 	(N.D. 	Ohio
May 	30, 	2013) 	(finding 	“nothing” 	in 	the 	1787 	Treaty 	of 	Peace 	and
Friendship 	“which 	supports 	the 	Defendant’s 	position 	that 	his
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nationality 	exempts 	him 	from 	prosecution 	in 	the 	United 	States”);
Brown-Bey 	v. 	Hooks, 	2018 	U.S. 	Dist. 	LEXIS 	216000, 	at 	*5, 	2018 	WL
6788044, 	at 	*2 	(W.D.N.C. 	Dec. 	26, 	2018) 	(“Petitioner’s 	purported
status as an ‘indigenous Moor alien’ does not place him beyond the
reach of federal or state law.”); Flanagan v. United States, 2014
U.S. 	Dist. 	LEXIS 	41869, 	at 	*17, 	2014 	WL 	1315230, 	at 	*6 	(E.D. 	Mo.
Mar. 28, 2014) (finding that defendant who asserted that the court
lacked jurisdiction because he was a Moorish American and claimed
the 	benefit 	of 	the 	Treaty 	of 	Peace 	and 	Friendship 	of 	1787, 	“like
any other individual found within the United States, is subject to
federal 	laws, 	and 	he 	was 	properly 	indicted 	under 	federal 	law”);
Toader, 	409 	F. 	App’x 	at 	13 	(rejecting 	as 	frivolous 	defendant’s
arguments 	“that 	the 	federal 	courts 	lack 	subject 	matter
jurisdiction 	over 	him 	and 	that 	the 	laws 	he 	is 	charged 	with
violating 	are 	inapplicable 	to 	him 	because 	he 	is 	a 	Native 	Asiatic
Moorish National Citizen”); United States v. Burris, 231 F. App’x
281, 	282 	(4th 	Cir. 	2007) 	(per 	curiam) 	(finding 	defendant’s 	claim
that 	the 	court 	lacked 	jurisdiction 	because 	of 	his 	alleged 	status
as a Moorish American National to be “patently frivolous”).
Indeed, “[t]he law is clear that Moorish Americans, like all
citizens 	of 	the 	United 	States, 	are 	subject 	to 	the 	laws 	of 	the
jurisdiction 	in 	which 	they 	reside.” 	Jones–El 	v. 	South 	Carolina,
2014 WL 958302, at *8 (D.S.C. March 11, 2014) (quotation omitted);
see also United States v. James, 328 F.3d 953, 954 (7th Cir. 2003)
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(“Laws 	of 	the 	United 	States 	apply 	to 	all 	persons 	within 	its
borders. 	Even 	if 	James 	were 	not 	a 	citizen 	of 	the 	United 	States
(though 	he 	is, 	having 	been 	born 	here), 	he 	would 	be 	obliged 	to
respect the laws of this nation.”).
Further, 	even 	assuming 	arguendo 	that 	the 	Morocco 	Treaties
could 	provide 	a 	valid 	basis 	for 	relief 	under 	§ 	2255, 	the 	treaty
provisions 	that 	Williams 	alleges 	were 	violated 	are 	plainly
inapplicable 	to 	the 	circumstances 	of 	this 	case. 	See 	Houston 	v.
Houston, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 180198, at *10, 2021 WL 4290198, at
*3 	(E.D. 	Mich. 	Sept. 	21, 	2021) 	(“After 	reviewing 	the 	1836 	Treaty
of 	Morocco, 	the 	Court 	agrees 	that 	nearly 	all 	the 	provisions 	deal
with 	maritime 	or 	merchant 	issues 	and 	observes 	that 	the 	other
provisions 	appear 	confined 	to 	events 	occurring 	in 	Morocco.”),
aff’d, 2022 U.S. App. LEXIS 15110, 2022 WL 3452473 (6th Cir. June
1, 	2022). 	Accordingly, 	Williams’ 	claims 	based 	on 	alleged
violations of the Morocco Treaties are frivolous, and Williams is
entitled to no relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2255.
IV. CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY
Pursuant 	to 	Rule 	11(a) 	of 	the 	Rules 	Governing 	§ 	2255
Proceedings, 	the 	undersigned 	recommends 	that 	a 	certificate 	of
appealability in this case be DENIED. 	See Rules Governing § 2255
Proceedings, 	R. 	11(a) 	(“The 	district 	court 	must 	issue 	or 	deny 	a
certificate of appealability when it enters a final order adverse
to 	the 	applicant.”). 	The 	habeas 	corpus 	statute 	makes 	clear 	that
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an 	applicant 	is 	entitled 	to 	appeal 	a 	district 	court’s 	denial 	of
his 	habeas 	corpus 	petition 	only 	where 	a 	circuit 	justice 	or 	judge
issues a certificate of appealability. 	See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1).
A 	certificate 	of 	appealability 	may 	be 	issued 	only 	where 	“the
applicant 	has 	made 	a 	substantial 	showing 	of 	the 	denial 	of 	a
constitutional right.” 	Id. at § 2253(c)(2).
When 	a 	habeas 	petition 	is 	dismissed 	on 	procedural 	grounds
without reaching the merits of an underlying constitutional claim,
a 	certificate 	of 	appealability 	“should 	issue 	[only] 	when 	the
prisoner 	shows, 	at 	least, 	that 	jurists 	of 	reason 	would 	find 	it
debatable whether the petition states a valid claim of the denial
of a constitutional right and that jurists of reason would find it
debatable whether the district court was correct in its procedural
ruling.” 	Slack 	v. 	McDaniel, 	529 	U.S. 	473, 	484 	(2000). 	When 	a
habeas 	petition 	is 	denied 	on 	the 	merits 	of 	the 	underlying
constitutional 	claims, 	a 	certificate 	of 	appealability 	may 	issue
only 	when 	the 	petitioner 	demonstrates 	“that 	reasonable 	jurists
would 	find 	the 	district 	court’s 	assessment 	of 	the 	constitutional
claims debatable or wrong.” 	Id. at 483-84 (“To obtain a COA under
§ 	2253(c), 	a 	habeas 	prisoner 	must 	make 	a 	substantial 	showing 	of
the 	denial 	of 	a 	constitutional 	right, 	a 	demonstration 	that 	. 	. 	.
includes showing that reasonable jurists could debate whether (or,
for that matter, agree that) the petition should have been resolved
in 	a 	different 	manner 	or 	that 	the 	issues 	presented 	were 	adequate
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to 	deserve 	encouragement 	to 	proceed 	further.”) 	(citation 	and
internal 	quotation 	marks 	omitted); 	accord 	Miller-El 	v. 	Cockrell,
537 U.S. 322, 336 (2003).
After 	reviewing 	the 	issues 	presented 	in 	light 	of 	the
applicable standards, the Court concludes that reasonable jurists
would 	not 	find 	the 	Court’s 	disposition 	of 	Williams’ 	claims 	wrong
or 	debatable, 	and 	that 	none 	of 	the 	issues 	presented 	are 	adequate
to deserve encouragement to proceed further. 	As a result, Williams
is 	not 	entitled 	to 	a 	certificate 	of 	appealability 	and 	should 	not
be permitted to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal.
V. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, it is recommended that Petitioner
Darrell 	Williams’ 	motion 	under 	28 	U.S.C. 	§ 	2255 	to 	vacate, 	set
aside, or correct sentence (Doc. 348) be DENIED, that this action
be DISMISSED with prejudice, and that judgment be entered in favor
of 	Respondent, 	the 	United 	States 	of 	America, 	and 	against
Petitioner, Darrell Williams. 	It is further recommended that any
requests 	for 	a 	certificate 	of 	appealability 	or 	for 	permission 	to
appeal in forma pauperis be DENIED.
NOTICE OF RIGHT TO FILE OBJECTIONS
A 	copy 	of 	this 	report 	and 	recommendation 	shall 	be 	served 	on
all parties in the manner provided by law. 	Any party who objects
to 	this 	recommendation 	or 	anything 	in 	it 	must, 	within 	fourteen
(14) 	days 	of 	the 	date 	of 	service 	of 	this 	document, 	file 	specific
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written objections with the Clerk of this Court. 	See 28 U.S.C. §
636(b)(1); 	Fed. 	R. 	Civ. 	P. 	72(b); 	S.D. 	Ala. 	GenLR 	72(c). 	The
parties 	should 	note 	that 	under 	Eleventh 	Circuit 	Rule 	3-1, 	“[a]
party 	failing 	to 	object 	to 	a 	magistrate 	judge’s 	findings 	or
recommendations 	contained 	in 	a 	report 	and 	recommendation 	in
accordance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) waives the
right 	to 	challenge 	on 	appeal 	the 	district 	court’s 	order 	based 	on
unobjected-to 	factual 	and 	legal 	conclusions 	if 	the 	party 	was
informed of the time period for objecting and the consequences on
appeal 	for 	failing 	to 	object. 	In 	the 	absence 	of 	a 	proper
objection, however, the court may review on appeal for plain error
if necessary in the interests of justice.” 	11th Cir. R. 3-1.
In 	order 	to 	be 	specific, 	an 	objection 	must 	identify 	the
specific 	finding 	or 	recommendation 	to 	which 	objection 	is 	made,
state 	the 	basis 	for 	the 	objection, 	and 	specify 	the 	place 	in 	the
Magistrate 	Judge’s 	report 	and 	recommendation 	where 	the 	disputed
determination is found. 	An objection that merely incorporates by
reference 	or 	refers 	to 	the 	briefing 	done 	by 	the 	Magistrate 	Judge
is not specific.
DONE this 24th day of January, 2024.
/s/ SONJA F. BIVINS
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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