CourtListener 10845996

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In the Supreme Court of Georgia

Decided: March 17, 2026

S26A0051. BADIE V. THE STATE.

BETHEL, Justice.

Maurice Badie appeals his conviction for the murder of

Christopher Ramsay and other crimes, all committed in connection

with a public gunfight. 1 On appeal, Badie argues that the evidence

1 The shooting occurred in the late hours of July 17, 2008. On October

28, 2008, a Fulton County grand jury jointly indicted Badie and Domonique
Hodo for malice murder (Count 1), felony murder (Counts 2–3), aggravated
assault (Counts 4–8), aggravated battery (Count 9), possession of a firearm
during the commission of a felony (Count 10), and one count each of possession
of a firearm by a convicted felon (Counts 11 and 12). The grand jury also
indicted Matthew Benton on Counts 1–2 and 4–10.
The State dismissed Hodo’s charges before trial. Badie and Benton were
tried jointly from June 14 to 21, 2010. The jury found both defendants guilty
on all counts. The trial court sentenced Badie to serve life in prison for Count
1, a consecutive 20 years in prison on Count 5, a concurrent 20 years in prison
on Counts 6, 7, and 9, and a consecutive 5 years in prison on Count 10. The
remaining counts merged or were vacated by operation of law. The trial court
sentenced Benton similarly. We previously reversed Benton’s convictions in
Benton v. State, 302 Ga. 570, 570 & n.1 (2017) (reversing murder conviction
based on custodial interview of defendant who did not understand Miranda
rights).
Badie timely moved for a new trial and amended the motion twice, in
was constitutionally insufficient to support his conviction; that he is

entitled to a new trial so that he can present evidence of a co-

defendant’s successful appeal and subsequent guilty plea; that

admission of said co-defendant’s statements violated Badie’s

Confrontation Clause rights; that he received ineffective assistance

of counsel in two respects; and that the trial court should have

granted Badie a new trial on the general grounds. Each claim fails,

so we affirm.

1. Viewed in the light most favorable to the verdicts, the trial

evidence showed the following. Sometime on July 17, 2008, Ramsay

approached R.B., the younger brother of co-defendant Matthew

2019 and in 2024, the latter through new counsel. The trial court held a
hearing on Badie’s motion and entered an order denying the motion on January
24, 2025. Badie filed a timely notice of appeal, and the case was docketed to
this Court’s term beginning in December 2025 and submitted for a decision on
the briefs.
We note the long delay in resolving Badie’s appeal. The trial court
apparently had not ruled on Badie’s first new trial motion, filed in 2010, when
Badie amended that motion in 2019. And after Badie amended his new trial
motion in 2019, he did not file a second amended motion until 2024. So we
“reiterate that it is the duty of all those involved in the criminal justice system,
including trial courts and prosecutors as well as defense counsel and
defendants, to ensure that the appropriate post-conviction motions are filed,
litigated, and decided without unnecessary delay.” Owens v. State, 303 Ga. 254,
258 (2018) (quotation marks omitted).
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Benton, and asked to buy R.B.’s four-wheeler. R.B. declined, and

Ramsay responded by putting a gun in R.B.’s mouth. R.B. reported

the incident to Benton’s friends.

Later in the day, a group of men approached Ramsay. One said,

“You can draw a gun on a kid, how about [you] try to draw one on a

man[?]” Someone also said, “12:00 o’clock … we going to see how

much of a man … are you.” Later that night, shortly before midnight,

Ramsay and a group of friends were barbecuing outside a friend’s

apartment. Multiple gunmen emerged from several directions and

fired dozens of shots at Ramsay’s group. Ramsay was fatally shot in

the head; four others were injured. The shooters then fled the scene.

Multiple witnesses saw Badie near the scene before and during

the shooting. One saw him firing a gun toward the victims. Another

saw Badie seconds before the shooting, standing near the scene with

Benton and others. Badie was openly carrying a handgun and hid

behind a nearby truck upon making eye contact with that

eyewitness. And about 10 or 20 minutes before the shooting, a victim

saw Benton and Badie on a hill from which shots were later fired.

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2. (a) Badie seems to suggest the evidence was constitutionally

insufficient to sustain his murder conviction. As best we can tell,

Badie believes that, because Benton subsequently pleaded guilty to

voluntary manslaughter, no rational trier of fact could find Badie

guilty as a party to the crime of Ramsay’s murder. Badie’s claim

fails.

“Evidence is constitutionally sufficient to sustain a conviction

if, when viewed in the light most favorable to the verdicts, any

rational trier of fact could have found the defendant guilty beyond a

reasonable doubt of the charged crime.” Owens v. State, ___ Ga. ___

(2026), S25A1229, slip op. at 8 (Ga. Feb. 17, 2026) (2026 WL 436319)

(quotation marks omitted). Conviction as a party to the crime

requires proof of “a common criminal intent, which the jury may

infer from the defendant’s presence, companionship, and conduct

with another perpetrator before, during, and after the crimes.” Sims

v. State, 321 Ga. 627, 629 (2025) (quotation marks omitted). And we

have repeatedly held that “participating in a gunfight in a crowded

area is enough to support a conviction for malice murder as a party

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to the crime.” Id. at 630–31.

Here, three eyewitnesses placed Badie at the scene of Ramsay’s

murder. Two of those witnesses saw him with a gun. One witness

saw him fire that gun in Ramsay’s direction. The other witness saw

Badie hide behind a truck upon being spotted with the gun. And

Ramsay unquestionably died from a gunshot wound to the head.

Evidence that Badie “armed himself and subsequently discharged

his weapon during” the attack on Ramsay authorized a rational jury

to infer that Badie shared a common criminal intent with the other

shooters to engage in a gunfight, which killed one man and injured

four others. See id. (collecting similar cases). See also Williams v.

State, 313 Ga. 325, 327–28 (2022) (evidence of participation in fatal

shootout authorized conviction as party to the crime of malice

murder); Blackwell v. State, 302 Ga. 820, 821–22 (2018) (same). That

is enough for a rational trier of fact to find Badie guilty beyond a

reasonable doubt as party to the crime of murder.

Neither reversal of Benton’s conviction nor his subsequent plea

to voluntary manslaughter undermines that conclusion. The

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constitutional sufficiency analysis considers “all the evidence

presented at trial.” Copeland v. State, 314 Ga. 44, 47 (2022)

(emphasis added, quotation marks omitted). Evidence not presented

at trial, much less post-trial procedural developments in a co-

defendant’s case, is irrelevant to that analysis. So our reversing

Benton’s conviction and Benton’s subsequent guilty plea to a lesser

offense has no bearing on whether a rational jury could have found

Badie guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of murder.

Further, while we reversed Benton’s conviction because his

custodial statements were inadmissible under Miranda, we

affirmatively held that the evidence was otherwise constitutionally

sufficient to sustain his conviction for malice murder. Benton, 302

Ga. at 572. And where only one witness testified that Benton

participated in the shooting, id. at 575 n.8, three witnesses testified

to Badie’s presence or participation. Thus, neither our ruling in

Benton nor any subsequent developments cast doubt on the

constitutional sufficiency of Badie’s convictions.

(b) As best we can tell, Badie also appears to assert that he is

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entitled to a new trial to present evidence that, following reversal of

Benton’s convictions, Benton pleaded guilty to the lesser offense of

voluntary manslaughter. Badie predicates this argument on our

decision in White v. State, where we held that a person charged

distinctly as an accessory to a crime may be entitled to present

evidence that the person charged distinctly as the principal was

acquitted of that same crime. 257 Ga. 236, 236 (1987). Badie reads

White to mean that, without evidence of Benton’s subsequent guilty

plea, Badie could not have received a fair trial and that he must be

retried so that a jury can hear that evidence.

Badie is mistaken. The defendant in White was “charged

distinctly and exclusively as an accessory to an identified principal,”

from which we concluded that the “theory of liability asserted by the

State necessarily [made] the factual guilt of the identified principal

an essential part of the case against the accessory.” Davis v. State,

296 Ga. 126, 129 (2014) (emphasis in original). But for a defendant

“simply … charged with murder,” we said, the State may “make out

its case against [the defendant] with proof beyond a reasonable

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doubt that he was a party to that crime in any way,” whether as a

principal, an accessory to a co-defendant, or an accessory to an

unindicted third party. Davis, 296 Ga. at 128. See also OCGA § 16-

2-21 (“Any party to a crime who did not directly commit the crime

may be indicted, tried, convicted, and punished for commission of

the crime upon proof that the crime was committed and that he was

a party thereto, although the person claimed to have directly

committed the crime has not been prosecuted or convicted, has been

convicted of a different crime or degree of crime, or is not amenable

to justice or has been acquitted.”). Even under the theory articulated

in White, the guilt of a co-defendant “simply … charged with

murder” is not an element of another co-defendant’s conviction:

acquittal of one does not entitle the other to a retrial. See Davis, 296

Ga. at 128–29; OCGA § 16-2-21.

Here, Badie “simply was charged with murder.” See Davis, 296

Ga. at 128. So even assuming White were correctly decided,2 Badie’s

2 We do not suggest that White was correct, see Davis, 296 Ga. at 128 &

n.3, nor do we read Davis to conclude that a defendant “charged distinctly as

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argument fails on its own terms—the State plainly did not have to

prove that Benton was guilty of murder as a principal in order to

prove that Badie was guilty as a party to the crime. See OCGA § 16-

2-21. See also Davis, 296 Ga. at 128–29. Benton’s post-trial guilty

plea to the lesser offense of voluntary manslaughter was thus

“inconsequential” to Badie’s guilt, he “is not entitled under White to

a new trial,” and this argument fails. Id at 129.

3. Badie next advances two related Confrontation Clause

claims regarding an out-of-court statement by co-defendant Benton.

At trial, the State introduced evidence of Benton’s custodial

interview. During that interview, Benton admitted to shooting at

Ramsay (in response to the four-wheeler incident) on two separate

occasions shortly before the fatal shooting; he denied involvement in

the shooting that killed Ramsay. The trial court did not instruct the

an accessory” would be entitled to a new trial following a guilty verdict in order
to introduce evidence of the acquittal of another defendant “charged distinctly
as a principal,” id. at 127–28. As relevant here, Davis held only that White—
whether correct or not—did not apply to a defendant who “simply was charged
with murder” rather than charged only as aiding and abetting another. Id. at
128. The same is true here, so we need not definitively evaluate White and
Davis.
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jury to consider the statement only against Benton, and Badie did

not request such an instruction.

Badie argues that the admission of co-defendant Benton’s

custodial statements at their joint trial violated Badie’s rights under

the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment to the United

States Constitution pursuant to Bruton v. United States, 391 US 123

(1968). Badie also argues that, even if his Bruton rights were not

violated, admitting Benton’s statement without instructing the jury

to consider it only against Benton violated Badie’s Confrontation

Clause rights.

Because Badie did not raise either issue at trial, we review

them for plain error only. See Henderson, 317 Ga. 66, 77 n.3, 78

(2023); OCGA § 17-8-58. To prevail on this claim, then, Badie “must

show that the trial court made a legal error that was not

affirmatively waived, was clear and obvious, likely affected the

outcome of the trial, and seriously affected the fairness, integrity, or

public reputation of judicial proceedings.” Owens, 2026 WL 436319,

at *3 (quotation marks omitted). And if Badie fails to show any

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prong, we need not consider the others. See James v. State, 321 Ga.

812, 818 (2025).

(a) When defendants are tried jointly, admission of one co-

defendant’s out-of-court statement can be “powerfully incriminating

against the [other] defendant[.]” Henderson, 317 Ga. at 76. And

“[t]he co-defendant whose statement is introduced has, and often

will assert, the right under the Fifth Amendment’s Self-

Incrimination Clause not to testify.” Id. at 75. So, the defendant

“who is implicated by the statement [is] unable to cross-examine the

witness who would testify against him—a clear-cut violation of the

defendant’s rights under the Confrontation Clause.” Id. “The

longstanding ‘solution’ to this Fifth Amendment-Sixth Amendment

conflict is a limiting instruction” that the jury consider the

statement only against the co-defendant. Id. But at a joint trial, a

“powerfully incriminating” statement creates too great a risk that

the jury would not follow an instruction to consider the statement

only against the co-defendant who made it. Id. at 76. So, under

Bruton, it must be excluded. Id. But only when a non-testifying co-

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defendant’s statement incriminates the defendant “on its face” is

that statement “powerfully incriminating” and thus subject to

Bruton’s narrow exclusionary rule. Id. at 76–77 (quotation marks

omitted). Bruton does not apply to statements that become

incriminating only when “linked with evidence introduced later at

trial.” Id. at 76. But even if a non-testifying co-defendant’s statement

falls outside the Bruton rule, admission can still violate the

Confrontation Clause if the jury is not instructed to consider the

statement only against the non-testifying co-defendant. See id. at

78–79.

(b) Badie argues that admitting Benton’s statement violated

his Confrontation Clause rights under Bruton. But he concedes in

his appellate brief that Benton “did not explicitly name Badie in his

statement.” See Henderson, 317 Ga. at 77 (“We have consistently

held that Bruton excludes only a statement of a non-testifying co-

defendant that, standing alone, ‘directly inculpates’ the

defendant[.]”).The record confirms his concession: Benton simply

disclaimed responsibility for the killing and admitted to shooting at

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Ramsay twice shortly before the crimes. That does not inculpate

Badie “on its face.” Id. at 76. Nor does it inculpate Badie by naming

an anonymous third party under circumstances obviously

suggesting Badie’s guilt. Cf. Gray v. Maryland, 532 US 185, 188–89,

193–95 (1998) (Bruton applies to statement redacting co-defendant’s

name when presented under circumstances “point[ing] directly” to

the defendant, as when a statement redacts the co-defendant’s name

but is followed by officer’s testimony that the statement led

immediately to that co-defendant’s arrest). Indeed, Benton’s

statement did not even mention an unnamed third party that the

jury could have inferred was Badie. In short, “nothing in the

statement itself” implicated Badie, see Henderson, 317 Ga. at 78,

and that is not enough to trigger Bruton’s protection, see Samia v.

United States, 599 US 635, 648–53 (2023) (distinguishing

statements that name a co-defendant or simply replace that name

with a conspicuous blank space from statements that implicate the

co-defendant only indirectly). See also Simpkins v. State, 303 Ga.

752, 755–56 (2018) (no Bruton violation when co-defendant’s

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statement did not implicate the appellant directly and left open the

possibility of multiple other shooters besides appellant). This claim

fails because Badie has not shown clear and obvious legal error.

statement did not violate Bruton, admitting the statement without

a limiting instruction telling the jury to consider that statement only

against Benton nevertheless violated Badie’s Confrontation Clause

rights.

Badie has identified a clear and obvious error that was not

affirmatively waived: the trial court should have instructed the jury

to consider Benton’s statement only against Benton. See Henderson,

317 Ga. at 78. But Badie has not satisfied the plain-error harm

prong—that the absence of a limiting instruction likely affected the

outcome of his trial. See Owens, 2026 WL 436319, at *3 (to establish

plain error, appellant must show, among other things, harm by

demonstrating that clear and obvious legal error likely affected the

outcome of the trial). Without Benton’s statement—which the State

barely mentioned in closing argument, and never in connection with

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Badie—the evidence against Badie was quite strong: three

eyewitnesses placed him at the scene shortly before the shooting,

two of whom saw him with a gun and one of whom saw him fire that

gun at the victims. Considering that strong evidence, Benton’s

statement likely carried little (if any) weight—especially when the

statement inculpated Benton alone and said nothing about Badie’s

involvement, directly or inferentially. Badie offers no reason to

conclude otherwise. See Wilson v. State, 322 Ga. 76, 93 (on plain-

error review, defendant bears burden of making “an affirmative

showing that the error probably did affect the outcome below”

(quotation marks omitted)).

We did conclude in Benton that the Miranda violation was not

harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. 302 Ga. at 575 n.8. But that

was because Benton’s statement “provided substantial supporting

evidence of [his] guilt,” id., so its improper admission into evidence

may have made a meaningful difference in Benton’s trial. Benton’s

harm determination, however, does not apply here. Unlike co-

defendant Benton, multiple eyewitnesses identified Badie either as

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a shooter or as part of the group suspected of carrying out the

shooting. And where Benton’s statement provided “substantial”

evidence of his guilt, id., it provided little—if any—evidence of

Badie’s guilt. Plus, Benton’s harm determination required the State

to prove that a preserved Miranda violation was harmless beyond a

reasonable doubt; this harm determination requires Badie to show

that an unpreserved Confrontation Clause error likely affected the

outcome. He has not carried that burden, so this claim fails under

the third prong of plain error review. See Henderson, 317 Ga. at 79–

80. See also, e.g., Morris v. State, 311 Ga. 247, 256 (2021) (rejecting

plain error claim based on lack of Confrontation Clause limiting

instruction when statement did not directly identify defendant and

substantial other evidence supported defendant’s guilt).

4. Badie next argues that he received ineffective assistance of

counsel when trial counsel failed to request a limiting instruction

regarding Benton’s statement and when trial counsel failed to move

to sever Badie’s trial from Benton’s. Demonstrating ineffective

assistance of counsel requires a defendant to show both that his trial

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counsel performed deficiently and that said deficiency prejudiced his

defense. Momon v. State, 322 Ga. 848, 850 (2025). Deficiency

requires the defendant to “show that his attorney performed at trial

in an objectively unreasonable way considering all the

circumstances and in light of prevailing professional norms.” Id.

(quotation marks omitted). This inquiry “focuses on the objective

reasonableness of counsel’s performance, not counsel’s subjective

state of mind.” Id. (cleaned up). And prejudice requires the

defendant to “show a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s

unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been

different.” Id. (quotation marks omitted). Demonstrating ineffective

assistance is a “high bar,” and if a defendant fails to show either

prong, we need not consider the other. Id. (quotation marks omitted).

(a) Badie’s first ineffectiveness claim—that trial counsel should

have requested a limiting instruction for Benton’s statement—fails

because we have already concluded that the absence of such an

instruction was unlikely to have affected the outcome of Badie’s

trial. The “test for prejudice in the ineffective assistance analysis is

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equivalent to the test for harm in plain error review.” Clark v. State,

315 Ga. 423, 442 (2023) (quotation marks omitted). We concluded

above that the absence of a limiting instruction did not harm Badie,

so any presumed deficiency caused no prejudice, and this claim fails.

(b) Badie’s second ineffectiveness claim also fails because he

has not shown that not moving to sever Badie’s trial from Benton’s

was objectively unreasonable. Whether to move for severance is

presumptively strategic. Green v. State, 302 Ga. 816, 819 (2018).

Badie argues that it would have been more advantageous to be tried

separately because Benton’s statement exculpated Benton and left

Badie as the only party on trial for Ramsay’s murder.

But an objectively reasonable attorney could have made the

strategic decision not to seek severance under these circumstances.

The State had difficulty finding witnesses to testify against the co-

defendants and other suspected shooters. The State decided not to

try co-indictee Domonique Hodo shortly before trial because one

witness recanted his identification of Hodo. And, as Badie points out

elsewhere in his brief, the State lacked ballistic and forensic

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evidence linking Badie to the shooting. Badie’s attorney could have

strategically decided to force the State to proceed to trial, rather

than give the State more time to develop its case by locating

additional witnesses or securing additional kinds of evidence. See

DeLoach v. State, 308 Ga. 283, 288–90 (2020) (counsel’s strategic

decision not to seek severance because he believed his client was

“better served” by proceeding to trial and emphasizing gaps in

State’s case “rather than risking giving the State additional time to

strengthen its case” was reasonable and, thus, not deficient

performance). We therefore cannot say that no reasonable attorney

would have failed to move to sever Badie’s trial from Benton’s.

Benton has failed to show that trial counsel performed deficiently in

this respect, and this enumeration fails.

5. Finally, Badie argues that the trial court should have

granted him a new trial because, he says, the verdict was “contrary

to evidence and the principles of justice and equity,” OCGA § 5-5-20,

and “decidedly and strongly against the weight of the evidence,”

OCGA § 5-5-21. But a trial court’s decision to grant or deny a new

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trial based on these statutes—the general grounds—“is left to the

sole discretion of the trial court; our role on appeal is limited to

determining whether the trial court exercised that discretion.”

Welsch v. State, 2026 WL 271367, at *4 (quotation marks omitted).

The record shows that the trial court clearly did so here, so there is

nothing for us to review. Id.

Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.